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ABSTRACT

SPINOZA’S ETHOLOGY:
RECOGNIZING DYNAMIC TRANSITIONS BETWEEN
IMAGINATION, REASON, AND INTUITION

By
Christina Rawls
December 2015

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Daniel J. Selcer
Seventeenth Century lens grinder and Dutch philosopher, Benedictus Spinoza,
illuminates a rigorous and dynamic theory of knowledge and action in his major system the
Ethics. What we adequately understand by learning Spinoza’s epistemology is that within it is a
proto-physics of ideational force between the three kinds of knowledge expressed by the attribute
of thought and, simultaneously, expressed as ratios of motion and rest, speed and slowness,
intensity and transformation by the attribute of extension. Such dynamic processes or ways lead
to one’s capacity for increased rational thought and action, increased uses of creativity, and the
enhanced ability to join with others in powerfully effective, affirmative ways. This is Spinoza’s
proto-physics of force. The outcome of the enhanced ideational force and extensive action
includes an increase in one’s overall singular conatus, the capacity for continuous understanding,
and perseverance, joy and energy, not only for oneself but also for the benefit of all of Nature. In
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the end, Spinoza rigorously demonstrates that all of Nature is one organic substance with infinite
varieties of expressive power. We are singular, conscious expressions of that power in our own
determinate ways. Our mind does not have ideas, it is ideas, and our ratios of motion and rest
expressed in extension are multiple yet maintain a homeostatic balance for bodily integrity and
comportment. Combined, the two attributes create affects that influence the increases and
decreases in our power of continued thought and action. Affects cannot be explained by any
theory of representation. Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology requires such an understanding.
In the end, Spinoza’s ethology involves an enhancement in our ability for creativity and
experimentation as well. Such expressions and affects are not possible without other minds and
bodies, but they are also not possible without a singular power and enhanced capacity for
increasing ideational power and rational conscious reflection. As Paulo Freire writes, “Liberating
education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information.”1 For Spinoza, acts of
enhanced cognition (and thus action) are increases in our overall conatus through continued
understanding of natural phenomena. Our love of Nature (or God) is transformed into actions of
real living experiences, joy and levity, peace of mind, and an acute interest in all expressions of
the laws of Nature. Still, we cannot possibly approach or exhaust the totality of causal processes
and effects in Nature. In our awareness of this fact, we are transformed to create and understand
our individual human affects and relations with other bodies in our environments towards
freedom of thought, happiness, and safety while living amidst a diversity of interests.

1

Paulo Freire, pedagogy of the oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum Press, 1970), 79.
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INTRODUCTION
SPINOZA’S ETHOLOGY

“Free of metaphor and myth, he grinds a stubborn crystal:
the infinite map of the One who is all His stars.”
-Jorge Luis Borges
In Seventeenth Century Dutch philosopher and lens grinder, Benedictus Spinoza’s,
magnum opus, the Ethics, we read, “An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon
as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.”1 Forming and arranging more powerful chains of clear
and distinct ideas are what Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology strives to accomplish in its readers.
In this way we can say that we create various ways of knowing. Yet, Spinoza’s theory of
knowledge is composed of more than our striving for clear and distinct knowledge. Spinoza’s
method also includes strengthening certain kinds of imaginative knowledge, and putting all three
kinds of ideas we are capable of, imaginative, rational, and intuitive, to use in effective, efficient,
and creative ways. In my reading, the entirety of the Ethics requires that our understanding of its
dynamic epistemology must repeatedly include reflecting on propositions and demonstrations
regarding human affects specifically, as well as singular conscious transformation, and not only
on abstract laws of Nature. Affects are the combination of thought and extension into an
experience we can reflect on which increase or decrease our conatus, our perseverance and our
tendencies.
This thesis examines how singular, human consciousness and reflection play a
foundational role in the development of affirmative thought and extension, as well as how to
adequately understand Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. My reading demonstrates that there is a

1

Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edward Curley (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 5p3: 163.

1

theory and practice of an ideational proto-physics of force and motion in Spinoza’s Ethics. This
force is expressed simultaneously along with continually shifting ratios of motion and rest in
extension. The result is more or less powerful transformations in one’s conatus, as well as how
much we can be affected by other ideas and actions or motions of bodies in our environment. In
the end, what one discovers is that Spinoza’s epistemology emphasizes the methods of reasoning
that strengthen understanding and the capacity to act with more rational and imaginative power,
bodily motion, creativity, and effectiveness. For Spinoza, truth is not a measure of adequate
knowledge. Adequate thinking is a power of its own kind, and all of its expressions are eternal.
To adequately understand myself as the cause of arranging kinds of knowledge as expressions in
order to manipulate the laws of thought and extension to my benefit and the benefit of the greater
whole is what I am capable of as a human mind and body. Spinoza also notes that we do not
know all of what bodies can do. This enhanced awareness brings me eternal joy and types of
creative expressions that can be shared with other human minds and bodies. Such expressions
include the increasing perfection of the expressions of substance, which is always in existence.
All of substance is one organic and interconnected whole with infinite attributes of which human
beings know and use only two. Nonetheless, the two attributes we express, thought and
extension, can be separately expressed in infinite ways. Where they come together is in the
experience of our affects. It is our affects that give or take away our power.
Friendship and love of one’s neighbor, tolerance of diverse opinions, freedom of thought
and of speech, radical democracy, and the enhancement of singular and collective reasoning in
powerfully imaginative ways are at the forefront of Spinoza’s philosophy. In an early letter to
Henry Oldenburg, Spinoza writes that all good friends who share the same purpose should share
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everything, especially spiritual things.2 In this and other ways, Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology
cannot be divorced from his monist ontology and the intellectual love of God or Nature. We are
finite, but as we learn about the laws of thought and extension we understand how all of Nature’s
expressions are perfect and eternal, even if only partial in their force of power. What we learn is
that we are not separate from Nature or God, but are expressions of Nature at every turn.
Therefore, we are God, as is everything else to varying degrees of power.
One application of learning in this way is the production of new knowledge and further
understanding, but also greater uses of creativity. In the preface to his translation of Spinoza’s
collected works, Samuel Shirley writes, “Can the essence of God be seen as the source of the illunderstood phenomena that we call artistic creativity? In the ‘conatus’ of human beings, a
conatus that derives from God’s potential, do we see a shadow, an image, of God’s creativity,
finding expression most markedly in the process of artistic creativity?”3 So one can ask: what
might we do if we had access to using Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology in creative new ways
both philosophically and practically in the everyday? What could be generated?

2

Spinoza, Letter 2, trans. Sam Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 761. It should be noted that Steve Nadler, in
his biography of Spinoza, translates this letter as saying friends should share all things spiritual, but Sam Shirley
makes it a point to translate the same passage as “…especially when I reflect that between friends all things, and
particularly things of the spirit, should be shared…” This, of course, is a very different meaning than Nadler’s and
the difference should be taken into serious consideration. All things of the human spirit are not all things spiritual.
3
Samuel Shirley, Spinoza: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002) viii.

3

CHAPTER ONE
SPINOZA ON THE FREEDOM TO PHILOSOPHIZE:
A NEW SCIENCE OF THOUGHT AND ACTION

“Probably no philosopher of repute has been worse served by his expositors and commentators
than Spinoza. Monist, pantheist, atheist, acosmist, ethical nihilist, mechanist, mystic, and even
dialectical materialist, are among the epithets more or less commonly used to describe and
pigeon-hole a doctrine which, nevertheless, though neglected, misinterpreted, and deplored, has
never been despised as a mere curiosity of philosophical history.”
-H. F. Hallett
“Spinoza's world is motion, and motion once more.”
- W. Klever
Geen ketter sonder letter1
French philosopher Gilles Deleuze once wrote to Reda Bensmaia about Seventeenth
Century philosopher and lens grinder, Benedictus Spinoza:
The Ethics is a book of concepts...but of affects...and percepts...too...Thus the paradox in
Spinoza is that he's the most philosophical of philosophers...but also the one who more
than any other addresses nonphilosophers and calls forth the most intense nonphilosophical
understanding. This is why absolutely anyone can read Spinoza, and be very moved, or see
things differently afterward, even if they can hardly understand Spinoza's concepts...2
Other contemporary Seventeenth Century scholarship on Spinoza aligns with Deleuze's claim.
For example, Julie Klein writes that today “Spinoza's readers are numerous and diverse, and their
interpretations of his work follow suit.” Klein continues, “...a reasonably comprehensive list
would include the Cartesian-Spinoza, the Hobbesian Spinoza, the Judaeo-Islamic Spinoza, the
Protestant Spinoza, the atheist and pantheist Spinoza, the neoplatonist or idealist Spinoza...”3 The
list grows with several more legitimate categories of interpretation, including a work of public art
Old Dutch saying: “No heretic without a book.”
Gilles Deleuze, negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia, 1995), 165-166.
3
Julie Klein, “Philosophizing Historically/Historicizing Philosophy” in Philosophy and Its History, ed. Morgens
Laerke et al. (Oxford: Oxford, 2013), 134-135.
1
2

4

in the Netherlands by Thomas Hirschhorn titled Spinoza Monument.
My interpretation in this thesis is, therefore, merely one exercise, an experiment, a singular
reading and example that is most closely aligned with the sentiments of Gilles Deleuze above. I
write to further support what such a system as Spinoza's found in the Ethics and other works can
accomplish in its readers on a transformational level, that is, how it is still relevant today and
what it can do to affect its readers. We read in Letter 37 among Spinoza's correspondence with
other scientists, friends, and thinkers of his time, “...there is needed constant meditation and a
most steadfast mind and purpose, to acquire which it is most important to establish a fixed way
and manner of life, and to have a definite aim in view.”4 As Eugene Marshall has recently
pointed out, “…if David Hume can be considered ‘the Newton of the mind,’ then Spinoza is its
Galileo.”5
This chapter focuses on how Spinoza was influenced by specific theories of knowledge
and systems of philosophy immediately prior to his own. In his original system, Spinoza was
interested in teaching us how to better reflect on which type of knowledge we are relying on in
order to enhance our power of thought, action, and overall sense of joy, well-being, activity,
creativity, and peace of mind. This is a type of philosophical reflection which enhances the power
of our affirmative affects as well. For Spinoza, true philosophical reflection never begins with
conjectures:
In the common round of life we have to follow what is probable, but in speculative thought
we have to follow what is true. A man would perish of hunger and thirst if he refused to eat
or drink until he had obtained perfect proof that food and drink would be good for him,
but this does not hold in the field of contemplation… When one false proposition is
allowed entry, innumerable others follow...6
4

Spinoza, Letter 37, in Spinoza: Collected Works, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 861.
Eugene Marshall, The Spiritual Automaton: Spinoza’s Science of the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 3. This is a recent work which deserves much attention. Unfortunately, it does not emphasize the importance
of imaginative knowledge in adequately understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology in any real depth.
6
Spinoza, Letter 56: 904.
5
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The Seventeenth Century was a time of profound and diverse change, with significant
developments in science, religion, education, literature, nautical navigation and trade,
mathematics, medicine, and philosophy, to name a few. With the proliferation of pamphlets and
books through modern advancements such as the availability of printing presses, publishers,
book stores, and increased means for trading between countries, various attempts at censorship
also became more prevalent. The Pauline, Tridentine, and Clementine Indexes, for example, were
put into place by the Catholic Church in Rome during the Renaissance, banning hundreds of
books in science, philosophy, politics, medicine, and other religious texts. Poetry and literary
works were deemed especially troublesome. In addition, anyone who wrote against the Church
put their lives at risk while their works were labeled heretical. “Political dissent was one thing,
heresy another... Heresy threatened the souls of believer and nonbeliever alike as well as the
fabric of society itself... The Index condemned heretical religious works and attacks on the
papacy.”7 Spinoza’s works would also be condemned.
Catholics were not the only religion to ban new research or divergent opinions.
“Professors and university students were expected to conform outwardly to the local religion...
Intellectuals might hold any heterodox conclusions they wished privately, but could not
articulate them in lecture hall or in print without risk or dismissal or worse.”8 Just about
everyone conformed outwardly, but, despite the influence (and violence) of organized religion,
some secret societies and marginal scholarly groups continued to explore every area of
existence in every way they could, like a planet all their own in the ultimate glass bead game.
“Nevertheless, men found ways to circumvent censorship. The philosophical heritage of an

Paul Grendler, “Printing and Censorship,” in Cambridge History to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles Schmitt
et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1988), 42, 47. The primary Index was not abolished until 1966!
8
Ibid. 51.
7

6

optimistic view of man's potentiality favoured an open search for learning...”9 Although the
practice of a true and open freedom of inquiry “did not exist” during the Renaissance, by the
end of the Sixteenth Century the ability to read what one desired to read (should they have the
time and means to do so that is), study new areas, have more publication possibilities, and find
environments for new inventions or experiments became more and more prevalent. By the end
of the Seventeenth Century, scholars and scientists, at the least, were afforded much more
freedom of inquiry than ever before. None-the-less, many other people and cultures of
individuals were left out of such privileges and freedoms, especially all women.
With these transformations came radical changes in the social, economic, and overall
psychological development of individuals and cultures. Seventeenth Century Europe in
particular gained increased tolerance for diverse religious practices, and weakened the
dominion and influence of religious leaders over large masses of individual beliefs. More
democratic ideals and diverse scientific practices (a general respect for science) seeped into
new forms of politics, law, education, and philosophy. An increase in tolerance for diverse
ideas and cultural practices took shape. Academia too was under attack and radically
transforming, both internally and from non-academic circles. “The attack on scholasticism's
barbarous jargon and the argument that its dialectic was irrelevant to genuine human concerns
were also assertions of a different way of thinking; one that promoted the arts useful to civic
life and made them central to education and the basis for training new intellectual classes
outside traditional academic hierarchies.”10 Spinoza was not a professional academic.
One problem is that we may think we have true knowledge and act on it accordingly,
when, in fact, we are in error (with an inability to recognize our errors) in reasoning. The
Grendler, “Printing and Censorship,” 53.
Cesare Vasoli, “The Renaissance Concept of Philosophy,” in Cambridge History to Renaissance Philosophy, ed.
Charles Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1988), 59.
9

10

7

ability to reason well with ideational force is not the same as simply having the ability to
reason. It is one thing to be able to use reason, to have the right to do something because one
has the power to do so, but it is something else all-together to be able to use reason well,
efficiently, and in creative ways which affect multiple individuals and not only ourselves. As
Spinoza writes in the TP:
We are not asserting that everything that is done by right is also done in the best way, it
is one thing to till a field by right, another thing to till it in the best way. It is one thing, I
say, to defend oneself, to preserve oneself, to give judgment, etc., by right, another thing
to defend and preserve oneself in the best way and to give the best judgment.11
In many ways, most individuals use reasoning daily in trying to persevere in their
existence. One way to enhance the capacity to reason well would be to learn about how
adequate knowledge is generated and recognized. This call to enhancement includes the ability
to recognize that we are embodied individuals embedded within a social context and community
of which we can be affected by other bodies and ideas continuously. This kind of learning is
complex and more difficult, but it is one that involves a proto-physics of force and motion in
producing powerful, singular effects.12 The Ethics 4p37s2 and Letter 50 are good examples
which demonstrate that seeking your own advantage for preservation is only compatible to your
survival and experience of joy if, and only if, others around you are acting rationally.13
Therefore, the more we surround ourselves with others who value the use of rationality, the
more we have a better chance of not only surviving, but also ensuring that we are living in the
best ways possible. There is a better way to preserve oneself by using rational power regularly.
The discovery of, and empirical evidence for, various laws of nature changed the face of
11

Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, trans. Sam Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 5: 699.
Spinoza was very interested in physics, evident by his deep concentration on Rene Descartes’ work in PP.
13
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p37s2: 135-136. This is also one reason why some who have written on Spinoza found ways to
justify acts of suicide, such as A. Kiarina Kordela argues in Spinoza Now (2011). I have an alternate reading that
does not allow for suicide as a rational choice as easily and point to Spinoza’s demonstrations in E4p18s and 4p20s
for support.
12
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science and philosophy at this time. As Early Modern historian, Stephen Gaukroger, writes,
within philosophical circles there was a pressing need to address the difference between natural
and supernatural knowledge and experiences in particular.14 The more specific issue was how to
better understand the relation between activity and matter. If one could not show how matter
and activity truly go together, as the Aristotelian doctrine was deemed no longer adequate
enough to fit with the new science of the times, then one would have to resort to more
supernatural explanations.
The Netherlands (Holland) experienced the most of every type of change in all domains.
Spinoza was born into, and fully immersed within, many of these developments. He would be
condemned as a heretic by his young twenties for reasons still not completely known, and was
born within the same years as the papal condemnation of Galileo.15 It is in the1630s that the
doctrines of Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes, among others, were being read widely, and, as
a result, causing tremendous turmoil among various intellectual, theological, and political
circles.16 In less than a decade the world would change forever. In addition, the notions of
cause and effect in scientific, mathematical, and philosophical circles became much more
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Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: an intellectual biography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 146-152.
It is my belief that the final blow that caused Spinoza’s excommunication was the help he was giving the Society
of Friends, today known as the Quakers. In 1655 through 1657, Amsterdam witnessed Quaker missionaries sent
from England by the one of the founders of the Quakers, Margaret Askew Fell Fox. They were sent to have her
pamphlet, A Loving Salutation, translated from English into both Dutch and Hebrew. Spinoza had many friends who
were both Quaker missionaries and of the Mennonite religion. He also befriended several Quaker missionaries. In
1656, the year Spinoza would be excommunicated, it was well known that the new religion of the Quakers were
preparing to distribute their literature widely, literature which included many details of living which were against
Jewish doctrine. By 1657, over seventy translated Quaker pamphlets (in Hebrew) were distributed throughout
Amsterdam. To date, no scholar knows why Spinoza was excommunicated with any certainty so my interpretation is
as viable as others.
16
Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 582-583. Israel writes, “Dutch freedom was real
but had stringent limits.” In an article from 2009, Simon Duffy writes, “What Israel contends is that 'the
Enlightenment should be understood as a series of protracted struggles between a host of political and religious
authorities, on the one hand, and four competing philosophical systems – Cartesianism, Newtonianism, LeibnizianWolffism, and Spinozist-radicalism – on the other. The spectre of Spinozist radicalism at the center of European
culture in this period is treated by Israel not only as an immanent intellectual danger but also as an active
philosophical movement.”
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pressing. As Jonathan Israel writes:
The mechanistic world-view, a mode of abstraction whereby all worldly reality is
reducible to terms of extension, mass, and movement which can be expressed
mathematically, first emerged in the years around 1630 in the minds of Rene Descartes
(1596-1650) and [Isaac] Beeckman [In Holland]...The war of Cartesianism and
Aristotelianism now pervaded not only the whole of Dutch science, philosophy, and
theology but was beginning to invade civic politics and the confrontation of partyfactions, not only within city council, and university, but also the States, consistory, and
beyond...Cartesianism was thus now inseparable from the general ideological and
political battle in progress in Utrecht and therefore the Republic.17
Everyone had to take a stand on what part of Cartesianism they either agreed or disagreed with
during the very years Spinoza was a child and adolescent. Cartesianism was everywhere.
Spinoza relied on a version of Euclidean geometry as a respected method of doing
philosophy to write the Ethics and had a rather nice library, including many books in the
history of philosophy, theology, and science. There is considerable debate as to what his use of
the geometric method entails specifically, as well as how he altered this method and
incorporated algebraic thinking developed by Descartes into this system. Benno Artmann has
complicated this issue, writing that the name Euclid is ambiguous: “On the one hand, it means
the author of the Elements who lived about 300 B.C.E. On the other hand, 'Euclid' stands for a
collection of mostly unknown Greek mathematicians who lived between 500 and 300 B.C.E.
And contributed most of the material contained in the Elements...”18 Further, Artmann
references a statement by Proclus that the author(s) of the Elements “avoided proportion.”19

17

Israel, The Dutch Republic, 583, 585. Nature cannot be explained by only mathematics for Spinoza because its
combinations and expressions are infinite, as one example. In the Appendix to E1 he writes, “And besides
mathematics, we can assign other causes also...”
18
Benno Artmann, Euclid-The Creation of Mathematics (New York: Springer, 1999), xvi.
19
Ibid. 141. Artmann also writes, “It has always been a mystery why Euclid started all over again in Book VII with a
theory of proportion for numbers (p. 130).” Considering the definitions of Book V of Euclid's, a book that is
considered very different from all the other books (“Book V is much more abstract... Its propositions apply to various
kinds of magnitudes like lines, surfaces, solids...”), it is fun to wonder if what Spinoza meant by ratio was something
other than logos, something closer to a magnitude between equal values of force or power which can then be
measured as proportions? One reason is because of how difficult it would be to measure any continually shifting
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If this is true, then it is another way to show that, although Spinoza may have relied on a
Euclidean geometric method in ways later influenced by Galen (emphasizing definition,
analysis, and synthesis), it was not his intention to rely solely on a form of geometry as the
only means for the deductive, synthetic force of his arguments.
What Spinoza seems to have appreciated was the axiomatic method of definition used
by Euclid, but only as a starting point. One cannot mathematize human creativity and novelty,
for example. Therefore, some form of genetic definitions is required. Ursula Renz supports
this view when, in a 2012 interview, she comments:
Spinoza is always very clear about the implications of a certain claim for claims in other
fields. Hence I do not think that the systematicity of Spinoza’s works is simply due to
his usage of the geometrical method. On the contrary, his usage of the geometrical
method is, in my view, a matter of the exposition of this systematicity, rather than of
proof. Still, his usage of this method shows that he had a firm idea of how things cohere
with each other.20
How things cohere with each other is an element of demonstration and clarity that we can also
find, in certain respects, in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and in Cicero, both who also
influenced Spinoza to some degree. Nonetheless, as Gilles Deleuze has written, Spinoza's
geometric method produces a sort of immanent methodology because words, being a part of
imaginative partial knowledge, are not themselves representative of reality as much as they are
a way reality is expressed. This is why some believe Spinoza is a productive nominalist. Consider
how far Christopher Long takes this in a 2001 essay when he concludes:
The geometrical mode of presentation lends an aura of necessity to the systematic
strategy and tends to eclipse the rhetorical strategy that functions as a critique of
relation between magnitudes which effect each other? Reference to a static type of measurement would be
mathematically impossible for continually shifting magnitudes, but ideas about proportions of force could work well.
Perhaps Spinoza is not too far from Aristotle's sentiments about what mathematics cannot capture, as Carla Rita
Palmerino points out briefly in her article “Galileo's and Gassendi's Solutions to the Rota Aristotelis Paradox: A
Bridge Between Matter and Motion Theories.” There Palmerino cites Aristotle's De anima 1.1, Metaphysica 2.2, and
De caelo 3.8 in footnote 3 as such evidence
20
Ursula Renz, “After Spinoza: wiser, freer, happier,” interview by Richard Marshall, 3:AM Magazine, September
17, 2012, http:www.3ammagazine.com/3am/after-spinoza-wiser-freer-happier/2/
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Cartesian dualism. To this extent, the systematic strategy itself functions rhetorically.
On the other hand, to the extent that any seventeenth-century attempt to establish a
monistic system would inevitably have had to involve a critique of Cartesian dualism,
the rhetorical strategy itself functions systematically. Thus, although two distinct
strategies are simultaneously discernible in the opening passages of the Ethics, the two
work together, each arguing on a different front, to establish Spinoza’s monism. By
focusing on the rhetorical side of this double strategy, the underlying nature of
Spinoza’s critique of Descartes can be clarified and certain gaps in the systematic,
geometrical argument for monism can be explained.21
We might ask what the metaphysical status of language is in the Ethics if words are a part of
imaginative knowledge and cannot be said to “represent” reality. It seems the content of the
definitions must be capable of being demonstrated in a deductive manner, but what is the
nature of this level of demonstration when the knowledge we acquire is also being expressed
corporeally through the use of words? It seems the process of adequate concept construction
and our understanding of the causal processes and natural phenomena involved are profoundly
intertwined. In this way, different definitions of causality have room to logically emerge.22
This is, as we will read, exactly what Spinoza asks us to consider, to approach ever closer to
adequately understanding more and more natural phenomena. It is of our essence to generate
more powerful, useful, and creatively intense knowledge in this way. That knowledge, in turn,
is also a real experience and, therefore, an expression of natural phenomena, including the joy
and pleasure such knowledge produces.
This is a good place to consider other important figures from the history of philosophy
Christopher Long, “The Rhetoric of the Geometric Method: Spinoza's Double Strategy,” Philosophy and Rhetoric
54, no. 4 (2001): 292-307.
22
Spinoza, TIE, trans. Sam Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 25-26. In the KV (part 1), we read, “First of all, then,
they say that a correct definition must consist of a 'genus' and 'differentia.' Now, although all the Logicians admit this,
I do not know where they get it from. And, to be sure, if this must be true, then we can know nothing whatever. For if
it is through a definition consisting of genus and differentia that we can first get to know a thing perfectly, then we can
never know perfectly the highest genus, which has no genus above it. Now then: If the highest genus, which is the
cause of all our knowledge of all other things, is not known, much less, then, can the other things be understood or
known which are explained by that genus...” As we will read in chapter two, language is part of imaginative, partial
knowledge. We use language to formulate definitions for our understanding. If we classify things according to genus,
Spinoza is worried, then we will have to logically admit there is a highest genus yet we will not be able to define or
understand it even when named. This is a significant logical inconsistency for Spinoza.
21
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with which Spinoza was familiar. His system differs in significant ways from Aristotle's natural
philosophy and theory of substantial forms, as well as the relation of natural philosophy to
human motivation, knowledge, and ethics, as is evident in comments made in the PPD and
preface to the TTP. 23 In addition, for Aristotle, a scientific explanation about the structure of
nature that relies on a discourse common to all would be more about metaphysics than
physics.24 This is not the case for Spinoza. This is indeed the shift we see in vocabulary in the
Seventeenth Century, a shift away from more metaphysical definitions to those of natural
science and terms of the new physics. Dan Selcer notes the transition from the meaning of the
terms in the metaphysics of Scholasticism to new meanings of the same terms in the Early
Modern period combining metaphysics with physics:
As the Scholastic-Aristotelian language of potentia and dynamis is reinscribed within a
vocabulary of force and power organized by the newly emerging science of dynamics, a
fundamental metaphysical shift takes place. While several terms of the vocabulary
remain the same, their significations change. What for the Scholastics designated the
essential passivity of matter in contrast to its activated form or the various modalities of
its operation, becomes a systematic language for describing a world of bodies in motion
that is fundamentally and fully active. This transformation of vocabulary means that
seventeenth-century materialisms writ large...do not seek to escape from metaphysics as
such, but rather to transform it.25
According to Peg Rawes, Spinoza's system also differs from Greek philosophies, particularly
from the Stoics, in two significant ways: “first, because it is an ontology of absolute
affirmation, and second, because nature is not just subsumed to intellectual forms of
discursivity. Spinoza therefore transforms the disembodied Stoic forms of intellectual
geometric knowledge into embodied geometric figures (that is, bodies, emotions and corporeal
23

See Spinoza's Appendix to the PPD and Letter 56 for additional support as well. Unlike Aristotle, Spinoza did not
believe common notions arise from a character of our soul as another example.
24
John Fitzgerald, “‘Matter’ in nature and the knowledge of Nature…” in The Concept of Matter in Greek and
Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1965), 61.
25
Dan Selcer, Philosophy and the Book: Early Modern Figures of Material Inscription (New York: Continuum,
2010), 103. Dr. Selcer used Spinoza’s system to affect and alter my education and intellectual developement as I
will demonstrate in the following chapters. Learning Spinoza with good teachers can affirmatively change lives.
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experience) so that both the human subject and the geometric figure are understood to be
nature in process.”26
In the geometric style of the Ethics, Spinoza employs some of Euclid's method but not
the exact form. This coheres logically if the above observations are correct. Euclid, for
example, believed that beginning with general definitions is not adequate enough and could
weaken a system, whereas for Spinoza this type of beginning is permissible. There is some
evidence for Spinoza's critique of Euclid's method in his dismissal of those who believe the
latter's proofs substantially influence complete measurements found in E2p40s2.27 Then again,
Piet Steenbakkers writes, in reference to a passage in the TEI on reflexive knowledge and
method (including a footnote that the terms geometry and mathematics are not
interchangeable):
...virtually all seem to agree that the geometrical (or mathematical) order is to be
understood as a method, rather than as a form... I would suggest here that it is expedient
to distinguish between Spinoza's method on the one hand, and the geometrical form he
gave to some of his writings on the other... Method, as a technical term, has a history of
its own in early modern philosophy and science... For an understanding of Spinoza's
notion of method, we must take into account the crucial Cartesian development of this
theme. It is in this climate that Spinoza's conception of method is to be situated.28
I will return to the important question of method throughout the thesis.
By his young twenties, Spinoza was highly versed in several of the new works in
science, theology, mathematics, and philosophy. He had inherited and then abandoned his
father's shipping business, began writing original works of philosophy as well as theological and
political criticism, and became known by 1661 not only for his expert lens grinding, but also as
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Peg Rawes, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh, 2012), 73.
Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s2, 57.
28
Piet Steenbakkers, Spinoza's Ethica from manuscript to print... (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1994), 148, 150.
Steenbakkers continues, “In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the concept of method is determined by the
central position of the twin concepts analysis and synthesis.”
27
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someone building actual microscopes and telescopes.29 By this time he was also condemned as a
heretic by the Jewish community surrounding him, but “Spinoza was always deeply offended by
the accusation that he was an atheist.”30 The condemnation would not stop Spinoza from
investigating the truth. Ken Clatterbaugh notes, “Spinoza’s views were well known in Europe
by 1665.”31 The concept of atheism in the Seventeenth Century “has no bearing on the existence
of or belief in God which is rather the content of the contemporary idea of atheism. When the
theologians of the seventeenth century speak of atheism, they are not referring to someone who
doesn't believe in God... They are referring rather to someone who does not believe in the God
of revelation...”32 The decade following his ex-communication was the beginning of a lifelong
productive period. Benedictus, the heretic, kept busy.
Many other important thinkers of this time period had access to libraries, publishers, and
circles of friends to compare ideas with, but not everyone was as fortunate. What became so
important for Spinoza was to create a system that was not only a new way of thinking about
essence, existence, man, and nature, or all that is as natural, but to include in such a system that
which can assist us in the increased capacity to think for ourselves by learning how to recognize
types of knowledge with more logical force and efficiency. In this way, Spinoza was
significantly influenced by Descartes' methods. For example, as Dan Selcer writes:
Descartes' claim is not merely that we can be aware of our own ignorance, but that this
ignorance is a decisive and definitive aspect of methodological thinking in general...the
subordination of limitation and finitude to method does more than this. It also
instantiates the necessity by which methodological thinking turns back on itself;
reflexively inventorying its own capacity for thought, method's first task soon becomes

Steven Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1999), 182. Nadler’s is the most extensive and accurate
biography of Spinoza to date.
30
Ibid. 246. “Spinoza's sensitivity to the charge of atheism was one of the motivating factors behind his decision to
put aside the Ethics for a while in order to compose a treatise on theological and political matters (246).”
31
Ken Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637-1739 (London: Routledge, 1999), 130.
32
Simon Duffy, “Spinoza Today…” in Spinoza Now, ed. Dimitris Vardoulakis (Minnesota: Minnesota, 2011), 119.
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its self-articulation.33
As I will demonstrate, Spinoza's dynamic epistemology also emphasizes method, learning how
to develop and better recognize the power of reflexive knowledge between the three types of
knowledge we are capable of having (imaginative, rational, intuitive).
For Spinoza there are no simple ideas, but only relations between combinations of types
of ideas. As Alexandre Lefebvre writes, “For Spinoza there are no simple (i.e., noncomposite)
bodies; likewise, thanks to his doctrine of parallelism, there are no simple noncomposite minds
or ideas.”34 One can turn to E1ax3 for support. As social beings, we need other ideas and
interactions in order for our finite ideas and actions to unfold or be fully comprehended. This
does not entail that we all have the same innate ideas. Descartes' influence on Spinoza is, at
times, a difficult subject to address adequately, but Ursula Renz sums up that influence nicely:
Descartes is an epistemological fundamentalist, and his rationalism is tied up with what
is also called ‘innativism’. He thinks that in order to acquire true knowledge we have to
rebuild the whole system of knowledge. In doing this, we have to rely on a few
indubitable ideas, so called ‘innate ideas’ which are essentially distinct from ideas which
are either acquired or fictitious. In his early works Spinoza seemed to be impressed by
Descartes’ epistemology, but later he rejected the idea that we can separate innate ideas
from acquired or fictitious ideas. Finally, there are differences in their theories of
emotions which are too numerous to be dealt with here. Nonetheless, we should not
merely focus on the differences between Descartes and Spinoza, there is also much
continuity. Many of the differences just mentioned grew out of Spinoza’s attempts to
further develop Cartesian concepts.35

In the TTP and throughout his correspondences, Spinoza demonstrates differences from both

Selcer, Philosophy and the Book, 147. “Thus, those capable of striving after good thinking (bona mens) - and this
includes everyone, according to Descartes - are already locked within an ordered and rule-governed structure of
thought.” This ordered and rule-governed structure includes errors in reasoning and recognizing those errors as well.
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Alexander Lefebvre, The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza (Stanford: Stanford, 2008), 203
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Thomas Hobbes and Descartes in various places.36 In the last year of his life, in a letter to
Tschirnhaus, Spinoza writes, “That is why Descartes is wrong in defining matter through
Extension; it must necessarily be explicated through an attribute which expresses eternal and
infinite essence.”37
One example of where Spinoza agrees with Hobbes can be found in Chapter 16 of the
TTP . He writes:
Furthermore, there is nobody who does not desire to live in safety free from fear, as far
as possible. But this cannot come about as long as every individual is permitted to do
just as he pleases, and reason can claim no more right than hatred or anger. For there is
no one whose life is free from anxiety in the midst of feuds...[as] it will become quite
clear to us, in order to achieve a secure and good life, men had necessarily to unite in
one body.38
This is what Spinoza calls “the best way” among rational humans. We can read his
epistemology as the ways in which we understand things and act accordingly. Theo Verbeek
and Dimitris Vardoulakis have also argued that Spinoza's TTP is influenced in significant ways
by Hobbes, and, at times, is a direct response to Hobbes.39
Another important place where Hobbes and Spinoza are similar is in their conception of
constructive, generative definitions, that is, how definitions must act as efficient causes for our
chains of rational, adequate ideas.40 The reason I note their similarity here is because the next
chapters of my thesis will deal with the methodological importance of definitions in Spinoza’s
There are important debates regarding Spinoza’s debt to Hobbes, especially regarding what is found in the second
half of the TTP. A good example is a 2013 conference panel on this influence between Susan James and Dimitris
Vardoulakis in the resources of the Spinoza Research Network.
37
Spinoza, Letter 83, 958. As Pierre Macherey also writes, “We see then how laughable it is to present the Spinozist
‘monism’ as a supersession of Cartesian dualism: the mode of thought put to work by Spinoza produces its effects
on a completely different terrain, where these old questions of philosophy are simply invalid (106).” This reading
includes understanding the dynamic epistemology in the form of ‘ways’ of knowing.
38
Spinoza, TTP, 16: 528.
39
See Verbeek's Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise. Exploring the Will of God (2003) and Vardoulakis'
seminar discussion “The Politics of the Text: Writing and Singularity,” Spinoza Research Network (2010).
40
See, for example, Letter 60. In the Sam Shirley translation we read in a footnote that, for Spinoza, definitions
are constructive. We also read, “Spinoza's understanding of geometrical construction follows closely that of
Thomas Hobbes (913).” In Hobbes see De Corpore, 1.vi.13.
36
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epistemology, but I will not return to the specific influence of Hobbes. It is sufficient enough to
point to where that influence can be found. In Letter 34, for example, Spinoza is clear how his
conception of definition functions:
1. The true definition of each single thing includes nothing other than the simple
nature of the thing defined. Hence it follows that:
2. No definition involves or expresses a plurality, or a fixed number of
individuals, since it involves and expresses only the nature of the thing as it is
in itself...
3. There must necessarily be a positive cause of each thing, through which it exists.
4. This cause must either be placed in the nature and definition of the thing itself
(because in effect existence belongs to its nature or is necessarily included in it)
or outside the thing41
Spinoza's ideas about types of definitions are also made clear in Letter 9 to Simon de Vries in
1663. There, he distinguishes between two forms a definition can take. One form is for a
definition to describe the essence of something real and, therefore, will automatically be true. The
other form is what one may start with to make clear what they are about to prove or demonstrate
after the definition of a thing is hypothesized. Spinoza uses the nature of definition to distinguish
between formal and objective reality, as Descartes had done before him. We read:
Therefore a definition either explicates a thing as it exists outside the intellect – and
then it should be a true definition, differing from a proposition or axiom only in that
the former is concerned only with the essences of things or the essences of the
affections of things, whereas the latter has a wider scope, extending also to eternal
truths – or it explicates a thing as it is conceived by us, or can be conceived. And in
that case it also differs from an axiom and proposition in requiring merely that it be
conceived, not conceived as true, as in the case of an axiom.42
Spinoza differentiates himself from the Scholastic view of definitions with regard to
scholasticism's dependence on proximate genus and specific difference (as already noted in a
footnote above). He argues that one cannot define the highest genus of Being (this is an
41

Spinoza, Letter 34, 854. Keep in mind that all attributes express substance for Spinoza, and substance is eternal.
Spinoza, Letter 9, 781-782. Further, Spinoza writes, in Chapter Seven of the TTP, “Nature does not give us
definitions of natural things…the definitions of natural things must be inferred from the diverse actions of nature.”
Letter 10 is key to understanding the requirements of definitions, which I will return in the next chapter, but it is
good to recall that our “freedom” is “a mode of affirmation or denial.” The less indifference, the more we are free.
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impossibility), which also has no differentiation, at least any we can be aware of with
certainty. We must begin with an approximation of Being (a general definition not in axiomatic
or propositional form). We begin this way because Being is something complex and perfect
knowledge of it may not be possible, especially not at the start of our contemplative processes.
Nonetheless, our knowledge of Being is generative, even if proximate at the start. This is
because our knowledge of Being, according to Spinoza, is expressive in its existence while we
gather more true knowledge about it. This includes learning the procedures of adequate
knowing which are discussed throughout the rest of this thesis.
The main point is that Spinoza's definitions are affirmative. True definitions relate to
both Being and particular affirmative essences (i.e. my adequate knowledge which increases
my conatus). Therefore, they cannot be conceived as negative in any sense, such as the nature
of specific difference can be. We cannot grasp particulars at the start, but we learn that God or
Nature, as self-caused and self-causing, generates and expresses those particulars as part of its
(and our) nature. We learn to understand that our thought is, in some way, inseparable from
Being and its expressions. As I write in later chapters, Spinoza introduces proximate cause to
account for the properties of other created things because only Nature (or God), by definition,
can be both the cause of itself and include its own essence.
Definitions must be capable of producing all the properties of the thing in question, that
is, they can also be seen as a cause of ideational effects and corporeal expressions because of
their force of truth, as well as being expressions of fixed natural laws. As I discuss in the
following chapters, a system like Spinoza's requires concepts found within metaphysics
because the system provides our point of departure in order to reach further points of
understanding about Nature. To deny this is to deny the intelligibility of Being. That which is
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immanent cannot be understood by using equations of transcendence or teleology, and,
therefore, the infinite and the finite are one and the same thing. An expression of substance
can never be a privation for Spinoza because its essence is to always be in existence. That
which is expressing itself must be in existence.43 As finite modes of substance (modifications),
we are always expressing ourselves. When we cease to exist as the combination that we are
now (in finite death) we simply take on a new combination of expressions of substance.
The above is a definitive break with both Descartes and Hobbes. We also witness some
of the more specific differences between Hobbes and Spinoza clearly in Letters 21 and 50 of
Spinoza’s correspondence. In Letter 50 Spinoza writes the following very important
conceptual distinction when thinking about God or Nature as the same thing:
...that God can only improperly be called one or single, I reply that a thing can be called
one or single only in respect of its existence, not of its essence. For we do not conceive
things under the category of numbers unless they are included in a common class. For
example, he who holds in his hand a penny and a dollar will not think of the number
two unless he can apply a common name to the penny and dollar... Hence it is clear
that a thing can not be called one or single unless another thing has been conceived
which, as I have said, agrees with it. Now since the existence of God is his very
essence, it is certain that he who calls God one or single has no true idea of
God...matter in its totality, considered without limitation, can have no figure...44
Spinoza’s ontology is one of immanence, but to classify it as “one” of anything (substance
included) is to rely on ideas of number. Such numerical ideas are an aspect of imaginative
(partial) knowledge as we will read in Chapter Two of this thesis next.45 The ontological truth
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There is much to be said about some overlaps with Neoplatonic emanationist meatphysics and its influence,
regions of being, and relations to the finite that thinks Being immanently. Yet, Seventeenth Century thinkers created
new definitions for terms that cannot be used in direct comparison with older systems. It was the age of rigorous
scientific thought and Spinoza was at the forefront of creating a bridge between elements of the physics of ideational
and physical force with a system that included the expression of Nature in each finite modal modification. There is
nothing negative and there is no privation in his system. God (or Nature) is an immanent cause and not a transitive
one for Spinoza, that is, a cause that remains in its effects (as in “involves”) but is not exhausted by them.
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Spinoza, Letter 50, 892.
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As Pierre Macherey writes in his work Hegel or Spinoza, “To say there is a single substance is to speak from the
imagination that can only consider the absolute negativity, from nothingness, that is from the part of the possible
which it envelops (104).”
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concerns the nature of thought and extension (the attributes in their essence) to perceive the
nature of Being in its expressions. Thus, the truth we express and seek is something other than
that which is representational in the form of ideas. That is, our ideas are not representations of
reality. Our ideas are reality in the ways in which they are expressed. I briefly mention this here
because it is one of the central concerns of Chapter Four of my thesis.
Letter 64 from Spinoza to Schuler confirms this ontological thesis when Spinoza cites
E1p10s and how it is related only to the idea we can have of “an absolutely infinite Entity, and
not from the fact that there are, or may be, entities having three, four, or more attributes.”46 One
absolute (infinite) entity is an affirmative concept without any lack or measure and, therefore,
such concepts cannot be applied to it. To posit the lack of any one thing requires a sufficient
reason why it is lacking this or that. This also coheres with the idea that the attributes, which are
substance, are frameworks for thinking through and expressing substance and not properties or
qualities of substance. I mention this here briefly because it is one main point about different
kinds of definitions that I was referring to above.47
It is clear that Spinoza was influenced by both Descartes and Hobbes in certain
respects, but the former had a unique philosophy of his own. Another way to demonstrate this
is by pointing to a place where Spinoza differs from Hobbes in other unique ways. Early
Modern scholar Warren Montag, for example, has written on the similarities and differences
between Hobbes and Spinoza, particularly regarding their respective views on theological
matters and textual interpretation. In his work Bodies, Masses, Power, Montag writes that both
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thinkers wrote on Scripture in order to rationally flatten any attempts by religious institutions to
use such things against the people of a civil and free society. He also writes, “But there the
similarity ends. Hobbes...spent the last forty years of his life defending absolute monarchy.
...Hobbes's discussion of religious matters, both doctrinal and institutional, occupies fully half
of Leviathan, a fact until very recently ignored by commentators...”48
Montag continues to address the importance of mystery and its role in interpreting
Scripture for Hobbes, something also different from Spinoza: “...not only is it wrong to interpret
the Bible [for Hobbes], it is strictly speaking impossible to do so.”51 Whereas, for Spinoza, this
is completely the opposite, as is evident in the TTP. The only exception is that Spinoza is clear
throughout his works that one can only understand a text if they are familiar with the language
and/or correct definitions of the terms being used by the author of the text. Interpreting any text,
including the Bible, is possible for Spinoza if one addresses the literal textual meanings of what
is written: “Thus, to return to the theme with which we began our discussion of Spinoza's
interpretive procedure, the 'parallelism' of nature and Scripture...we see an abandonment of the
theme, essential to any hermeneutic, or the interior and exterior of Scripture. There is no reserve
meaning, no residue beyond its surface. Meaning and form coincide exactly in the graphic
materiality apart from which Scripture has no existence.”49 This is further evidence of the
collapse of method and form and ontology and epistemology.
When we consider Descartes' influence on Spinoza the matter becomes more nuanced,
especially in light of the method of approaching a text and reading/writing in its materiality and
corporeality. As for this latter topic, Spinoza and Descartes might have more in common than
was previously believed in many respects. Daniel Selcer writes, “In the Cartesian context, we
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need God to create matter, set it in motion, and establish the laws of nature governing motion...
Natural order need not be due to the perfection of the created world...all we need is extended
matter in motion and the persistence of 'ordinary laws of nature.' Together these generate an
orderly and regular world.”50 As already noted, Spinoza's system is a response to Cartesianism,
but, as Steven Nadler writes, Spinoza was too original a thinker to be an “uncritical follower” of
Cartesianism. He was well versed in Descartes' philosophy by the 1650s and found the latter's
work “liberating” in many ways. In the preface of the PPD, Spinoza held Descartes' intellectual
capacities in high regard early in his life, being influenced by the totality of Descartes' system.
Nadler continues, “The new dualistic metaphysical picture of the world that, with the complete
separation of the mental from the material, provided the foundations for a purely mechanistic
physics would allow for fruitful, clear, and nonabstruse explanations of the phenomena of
nature... The unity of the Cartesian scientific enterprise...would promote the quest for certainty
in various disciplines...”51
As chapters Three and Four of this thesis will demonstrate, we can start to recognize a type of
physical mechanics and proto-physics of ideational force in Spinoza’s system if we conceive of
the mechanics between actions and ideas as those effects which are produced by organic
combinations of bodies in interaction with each other. We also accomplish this if we conceive of
physics as those continuous microscopic and macroscopic interactions between parts of bodies
(and certain kinds of ideas) which create the larger organic arrangements of mechanics in
expression. It is not hard to consider Spinoza’s scientific mind when we read what Ken
Clatterbaugh writes when he notes, “Like Descartes, Spinoza was a serious scientist; his work
in optics was both theoretical and practical. Spinoza was widely respected by his
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contemporaries for the microscopes and telescopes that he constructed.”52
Consider what Helen Hattab writes about the renewed study of mechanistic principles of
nature in the Renaissance leading up to the Early Modern period: “In recasting mechanics as a
science between mathematics and physics as opposed to an art, these commentators brought to
the foreground a form of explanation that combined geometrical principles with considerations
regarding the physical causes of motion.”53 This is yet another reason why I categorize
Spinoza's system as a type of philosophical physics. Gordon Chalmers writes, “In 1649 Pierre
Gassendi was to rationalize the new experiments of all sciences under the complete atomic
system of Epicurus.”54 It is unclear how influential Pierre Gassendi's texts were on Spinoza, but
we do know the latter greatly admired Greek atomism, including De Rerum Natura by
Lucretius.55
Jumping ahead to the movements of the new Western scientific method, in Francis Bacon
we find the beginning of a formal scientific method and many references to what it is to think
about true knowledge of the world in a scientific manner. According to Bacon, knowledge is
power. Gaining true knowledge involves an increase in our intellectual and material power.
Gassendi, on the other hand, challenges Aristotle's definition “quatenus in potential” for it was
Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 129-130. Clatterbaugh continues, “Spinoza went
beyond the construction of scientific instruments and employed them to observe astronomical bodies as well as
small bodies in the human blood.”
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not logical to him.56 One reason I mention this brief historical point is because there are
continuous debates within Spinoza scholarship on both the influence of atomism on his
systematic philosophy and because of debates regarding how similar to (or different from)
Spinoza was with Aristotelian philosophy. Again, Spinoza’s system is unique and occurs within
the context of both the new scientific method, as well as versions of scholastic vocabulary that
he alters.
Within philosophical circles in the Seventeenth Century novel debates on the nature of
causality, force, and motion arose with fervor. Ken Clatterbaugh writes, “Aristotle's views on
causation had a far-reaching effect in the causation debate of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries... [His] idea that the efficient cause is a particular substance creates considerable
mischief throughout much of the debate, since it runs counter to modern scientific explanations
that typically identify states of substances as the (efficient) cause.”57
The topic of causality and matter in motion dominated science and philosophy
throughout the Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries. As Clatterbaugh notes, Descartes
“represents the beginnings of the modern concern about causation, and he makes a conscious
effort to transform philosophical thinking about causation. Hume, on the other hand, represents
the culmination of several tendencies in the debate...”58
Where Descartes made cause an eternal truth of the universe and the idea of God
understood as the first cause to which all else are effects, Spinoza's system has several
variations of ways to think about causality as we will read in the following chapters. More
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importantly, Spinoza believes that substance, God, nature, and modal expressions of the laws of
nature are all immanent in their unfolding; they vary only in their expressions of perfection and
degrees of power. After, G. W. Leibniz deemed causality a “self-evident logical law” and David
Hume demonstrated how issues of causation are products of a sensing, perceiving human mind
(of which real cause and effect processes are, in the end, necessary fictions of the imagination).
Of course, Immanuel Kant attempted to provide us with a combination of these necessary
empirical and automatically rational processes of the creation of concepts. Later, G. W. F. Hegel
would expand our definition of cause and effect to include and subsume each other within their
otherwise respective definitions, and Bertrand Russell argued in 1913 that advanced sciences
never employ the term in any seriously useful manner in the contemporary world. For Spinoza,
every effect involves its cause(s). In addition, as we understand our own power of thought and
action as an adequate cause, the meaning and definitions of human powered causes and effects
can alter.
Two fundamental notions that must be properly understood as always in connection to
each other in order to consider Spinoza's proto-physics of force and motion are the concepts of
“cause” and “conatus.” As Ed Curley writes, “...unraveling Spinoza's concept of causation is
absolutely fundamental to understanding his philosophy...the crucial notion for understanding
Spinoza's concept of causation is that of a law of nature.”59 As we will read in this thesis, we
can add to our understanding of causality as well. Curley continues:
Ordinary thinking about causality identifies the event instantiating the antecedent as the
cause of the effect. Spinoza's conception of causality regards it as only a partial cause
and insists that we regard the aspect of reality which the law of nature describes as (at
least) equally necessary to the occurrence of the effect and, hence (at least) equally
entitled to be regarded as a cause...Spinoza regarded the series of fixed and eternal
Ed Curley, “Donagan's Spinoza,” Ethics 4, no. 1 (1993): 114-134. Curley believes Spinoza's definition of Nature
can be explained as something more than “the totality of finite things,” but does not go so far as to believe in an
atomistic conception of Nature. This last conclusion is debatable.
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things as really a more fundamental cause than the series of singular, changeable
things...60
God is not a concept which stands alone (as a real thing) causing all other things to occur unless
the added concept of one organic whole (“Nature”) is paired with it at all times. This is Spinoza’s
monism. The effects and expressions we find as nature involve their cause, but an eternal undivided
substance does not fall under a category of numerical distinction.
One of his primary goals incorporates the new scientific understanding of the universe
with the structures of human knowledge and actions as laws of Nature. In one of his letters we
read about his dedication to scientific and philosophical thought, “Deep speculative thought, in
my view, has nothing to do with Scripture.”61 And, as Herman De Dijn writes, “For a
seventeenth-century thinker like Spinoza, philosophy was fundamentally the same as science.”62
The problem becomes what concept of “God” is best to use with the concept of “cause?” How
would they both work alongside laws of Nature and the dynamics of human psychology at the
same time, especially if such a system is absent of teleology or an anthropomorphic God? This
is not a new concern in the history of philosophy, but how Spinoza handles it is novel. Steven
Nadler writes:
Questions about the nature of causal relations occupy a central position in early modern
philosophy. The prominence of this topic in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century thought
can, in large measure, be traced to a specific historical problem: the need to reconcile an
emerging scientific view of the natural world – mechanistic physics – with traditional
beliefs about the relation between God and his creation.63
The order we find in Nature, for Spinoza, will include what it is for finite individuals to

Curley, “Donagan's Spinoza,” 126.
Spinoza, Letter 21, 827.
62
Herman De Dijn, Spinoza: The Way to Wisdom (Chicago: Purdue, 1996), introduction.
63
Steven Nadler, Causation in Early Modern Philosophy (State College: PSU, 1993), introduction. Spinoza seems to
have believed the same. As we read in Chapter 6 of the TTP, “...God's decrees and commandments, and consequently
God's providence, are in truth nothing but Nature's order; that is to say, when Scripture tells us that this or that was
accomplished by God or by God's will, nothing more is intended than that it came about by accordance with Nature's
law and order...”
60
61

27

gain and express clear and distinct knowledge with increasing force and activity. This is only
possible, at least at first, if one develops the ability to think axiomatically (analytically and
synthetically) in a deductive manner about the definitions of God, Nature, attribute, mode,
human essence, and perseverance. Spinoza writes in the TTP that an idea about God's existence
“is not self-evident,” and, therefore, axiomatic truths of logical deduction are necessary for a
finite mind to adequately understand both the essence and existence of God (as Nature).
Axiomatic truths of logical deduction are necessary, and these truths and deductions are “so
firm and incontrovertible that there can neither be, nor be conceived, any power that could call
them into question.”64 At first glance, this sounds like an appeal to a type of mathematical
certainty, but how can one put human passions and the imagination into an exact mathematical
formula? As this thesis will discuss, we become the adequate causes of our transformations if
we understand these relations in the right way, but we are neither completely free of the
passions nor of imaginative knowledge (as sense perception, language, memory etc.). In E4p4,
for example, we read, “The power by which singular things (and consequently any man)
preserve their being is the power itself of God, or Nature (by 1P24C), not insofar as it is
infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the man's actual essence (by 3P7). The
man's power, therefore...is part of God's or Nature's infinite power, that is (by 1P34), of its
essence.”65 In other words, God is Nature.
Because the actions of thought (intellectual affections and patterns) and extension
(ratios of motion and rest) are simultaneous for Spinoza, and because our understanding of
what definitions constitute is involved in how we continue to comprehend cause and effect,
what becomes important to focus on is how we understand enduring patterns of motion and
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rest in our habits of both thought and extension. This understanding increases or decreases our
power to exist and thrive (our conatus). Thus, our understanding of the ontological and the
epistemological collapse can be understood adequately as one organic whole, especially if our
only reference in the attribute of thought are our own singular chains of ideas.
If there is no real concept of causality except that which is applicable to particular things
(because of the collapse of ontology with epistemology), then Spinoza's insistence that there is
no causality between the attributes (which are fixed, eternal expressions of natural laws)
becomes intriguing. I address why exactly in the following chapters in depth. This insight is
especially important in light of the Dutch translation used during Spinoza's life of inblijvende
oorzaak for causa immanens –“a cause which remains in its effects” – if particular (singular)
things and their essence are understood as the effects of Nature's laws. If these effects are our
knowledge (and what we gather other forms of knowledge from), then one cannot conclude that
Spinoza was an epistemological naturalist (or that he was not one).
Spinoza extracts and produces real knowledge using experience (imagination) and
combining it with knowledge from reason (second kind of knowing) into one formulation of
conceptual force. And, although each kind of knowledge is distinct, they are combined to create
more powerful effects if one understands how to apply such combinations with more force and
creativity or efficiency. Concepts are never simple. They are complex combinations and
arrangements of various types of knowledge at once. To be an epistemic naturalist, Spinoza
would have to reduce all knowledge claims to scientific fact. As much as his system was
influenced by both mathematics and the scientific method, he does not reduce all human
knowledge and experience to scientific fact alone.
To combine cause with conatus in the way Spinoza does is an original contribution to

29

philosophy, as I will demonstrate in chapters Three through Five. His notion of conatus and the
affects are central to the Ethics. In addition, his doctrine of the passions and their balance with
reasoning capacities is also unique, although influenced by Descartes' category of the passions
specifically. Spinoza seems to have interpreted Descartes's work with his own system already in
mind, yet is very clear in the PPD that he feels he understands Descartes correctly. One
significant claim that Spinoza will continue to work with (although alter) which is also found in
Descartes's system includes that the “chief rule [for Descartes] was to enumerate the simple
ideas out of which all others are compounded and to scrutinize each one separately. For when he
could perceive simple ideas clearly and distinctly, he would doubtless understand with the same
clarity and distinctness all the other ideas compounded from those simple ideas.”66
What a “clear and distinct idea” is defined and understood as in the Early Modern period
seems to shift in description from earlier philosophical systems. According to Stephen
Gaukroger, for Descartes, the better we become at intuitive knowing (which includes a form of
strong image-making coupled with an analysis of rational deductions), the more reliable our
deductive processes will be as a result.67 This sounds very similar to what we find in Spinoza,
but in a completely different material expression of force between types of knowing. That is,
Spinoza defines substance very differently from Descartes. Ideas are not expressions of matter
in the material sense but are of “substance” conceived as force and motion occurring
simultaneously among respective attributes. Clear and distinct ideas in Descartes, according to
Gaukroger, are not to be understood in relation to their external causes, though this is not true
for Spinoza in the same way. Where these two thinkers truly differ is on the definition of matter
and the expression of matter in motion. Yet, both overlap in their epistemological agreement to
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some degree. For example, they agree that we must find the best way that we are capable of by
recognizing not only the simplest elements of things in our most powerful, deductive ideas, but
also discovering the best method for gaining true knowledge.68 The topic of method is crucial
because, for example, in Spinoza’s epistemology we discover that our mind does not have
ideas, it is ideas. Therefore, having only one single (simple) idea without any other ideas
accompanying it is an impossibility in Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology.
Further, in Spinoza we find that the internal/external distinction, especially where it
involves the nature of which cause is responsible for which effect, will dissipate. Laws of
Nature include external causes, but they also include what we might think of as internal causes
as well, yet all is one substance. For Descartes, we are to focus on strengthening our personal,
internal method of the most efficient analysis of information. In Spinoza, by contrast, we learn
that with an increased power of rational thought we are able to become more aware of the
chains of causal connections between our ideas with more force. The awareness of rational force
is a kind of vividness or distinctness in recognition and power. It is a synthesis of types of
knowledge. As I explore in later chapters, Spinoza is much more interested in what it means to
synthesize knowledge in order to create larger, more powerful bodies of ideas. He uses the term
“bodies,” but this notion is not meant to designate material borders of separate entities (although
it can mean this when needed as well). The concept of “body,” among other things, designates
constant transformations of ratios of motion and rest between varying interactions in Nature and
different kinds of bodies. Further, without ideational synthesis between types of knowledge, the
increased power of rational thought is not possible. The synthesis itself creates more power
because it is a combination of increasingly adequate knowledge into one body of homeostatic
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expression continually in motion with greater force.
In this and other ways, Spinoza’s system is not a historical continuation of the unfolding
of rationality from Descartes' system to his own. Still, Spinoza did refine and respond to
Descartes' epistemology, as did many of his time. As Pierre Macherey writes:
The geometric 'translation' that Spinoza gives Cartesian philosophy is thus not a way of
saying the same thing in another way: it is even then a way of taking a position to
distance himself in relation to it. The Ethics, in which Spinoza develops a philosophical
content completely different from that of the Cartesian system, is itself ordine
geometrico demonstrata, that is, argued synthetically, in a progression that goes from
cause to effects.69
If we are speaking about only “method,” then they both believe in synthesis through analysis,
but, as Gaukroger writes, Descartes's rejection of deductive synthesis was specific to that
Aristotelian tradition passed down to him of using a certain kind of syllogistic logic in order to
produce and convince oneself of their clear and distinct knowledge:
Syllogistic [reasoning] relies on rules imposed from the outside, in Descartes' view,
whereas his rules are designed to capture an internal process which operates with a
criterion of truth and falsity that is beyond question. This is that we accept as true all and
only that of which we have a 'clear and distinct' perception... Descartes' advocacy of
analysis at the expense of synthesis is an extremely important feature of his method, for
it amounts to the advocacy of a problem-solving approach as the method of discovery,
and the rejection of a deductive approach… Synthesis, on the other hand, shows how a
solution is to be derived from first principles...70
The question of the production of certain knowledge is what is at issue above. There is a
difference between learning the rules for expressing and demonstrating what one knows as
compared to what it is to produce something well. Spinoza's method is more about synthesis
between types of knowledge and their corresponding motions or arrangements in ways that
enhance one's capacity for more adequate knowing and more intense forms of expression.71
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There are other major differences from Descartes that should be addressed in this
opening chapter. Spinoza, unlike Descartes, does not have a notion of substance dualism in any
respect. Free will and the soul are illusions for him as well, but “free necessity” is something
that is what all of Nature does: “...that thing is free which exists and acts solely from the
necessity of its own nature... So you see that I place freedom, not in free decision, but in free
necessity.”72 He differs starkly from Descartes in this respect. “Descartes, for example, believed
that if the freedom of the human being is to be preserved, the soul must be exempt from the
kind of deterministic laws that rule over the material universe.”73 In a letter to Oldenburg,
Spinoza writes that “the will differs from this or that volition in the same way as...humanity
differs from this or that human being...the will is nothing more than a mental construction (ens
rationis), it can in no way be said to be the cause of this or that volition. Particular volitions,
since they need a cause to exist, cannot be said to be free...”74
As well, Spinoza's concept of the first kind of knowledge of the imagination must be
classified as real ideas, however partial or inadequate. This is not always the case for Descartes
according to certain interpretations. In addition, Richard Popkin writes that although Spinoza
was influenced by Descartes, they differ greatly on the nature of essence (and substance) in
particular.75 Our mind, for example, is not an independent substance for Spinoza, as it is for
Descartes. Our mind (as ideas) is about our body and its affections, but this interaction of
concepts and processes (as an affect) will result in that which is also in relation to our adequate
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conception of God and Nature in original ways.76 Spinoza is clear how he feels about Descartes
in this respect in a letter to Oldenburg in late 1661:
Secondly, you ask me what errors I see in the philosophy of Descartes and Bacon. In
this request, too, I shall try to oblige you, although it is not my custom to expose the
errors of others. The first and most important error is this, that they have gone far astray
from knowledge of the first cause and origin of all things. Second, they have failed to
understand the true nature of the human mind. Thirdly, they have never grasped the true
cause of error. Only those who are completely destitute of all learning and scholarship
can fail to see the critical importance of true knowledge of these three points.77
Clearly Spinoza was interested in demonstrating how the concept of substance can act as a
first cause for all effects to follow, but first causes are not the issue. The point is that Spinoza
felt his understanding and development of a theory of knowledge was novel in comparison to
some of the influential epistemological systems of his time.
How, then, can Spinoza incorporate any metaphysics into his otherwise substance
monism which is one organic, infinitely moving and transforming whole? What this
metaphysics is understood as is still an important debate in Early Modern scholarship. Is it
pantheism, as so many have claimed, or something more spiritually related? Spinoza notes
specifically in Letter 73 that he is not a pantheist. He writes that his treatise on theology and
politics (the TTP) does not identify God with Nature, by which his critics of such claims
tended to includes “mass-matter disposed into bodies...” On this assumption, Spinoza writes,
“they have gone totally astray.”78 These are absolutely telling passages for understanding all of
Spinoza's works. He is clearly stating that he is not a materialist. That is, his concept of
substance cannot be defined as (or reduced to) actual physical matter.
Spinoza's materially dynamic system of motion and force (as a system of effects)
continues to be relevant for our understanding of Nature, including human nature, today. We
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can achieve more adequate understanding with the support of the most recent interdisciplinary
scholarship on what it is to learn something, as well as what it is to use the imagination in
increasingly powerful and rationally productive ways. In Chapter 4 of the TTP we read,
“...everything in Nature involves and expresses the conception of God in proportion to its
essence and perfection; and therefore we acquire a greater and more perfect knowledge of God
as we gain more knowledge of natural phenomena.”79 The more we learn about Nature and
ourselves as natural phenomena the more we gain perfect knowledge of God. The more we gain
perfect knowledge of God, the more we are expressing God's (and Nature's) power at that
moment. There is a distinctly non-teleological, yet metaphysical character in all of Spinoza's
epistemology. As Beth Lord writes, “...to call Spinoza a materialist would ignore the central
place of immaterial ideas in his system.”80
Dan Selcer agrees, writing that Spinoza's conception of materiality includes
understanding that “...in the physical, metaphysical, and political registers materiality must be
understood as a dynamic, dispositional theory of constitutive motion rather than as a
straightforward thesis of the reducibility of sensible entities to their micro-level physical
constituents.” Selcer continues that Spinoza's dynamic materialism includes:
…the position that nature may be explicated by reference to bodies conceived as
complex patterns of movement as well as equally complex and constantly mutating
articulations of a power or force to act and to exist... It does not dispense with
immaterial objects such as ideas and minds, but it does involve the claim that nature (or
being) is fully explicable from the perspective of matter conceived as productive
power.81
The above sentiment is carried on throughout the rest of the TTP and several of Spinoza's other
works. It is also consistent with what is found in the Ethics more systematically as I will
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demonstrate in the following chapters. In a footnote to Chapter 6 of the TTP, Spinoza reminds
us, “Here, by Nature, I do not mean simply matter and its modifications, but infinite other
things besides matter.”82 Clearly Spinoza's notion of substance is not restricted to ideas about
matter as material/physical substance, but is more about the relationships between bodies in
motion (physics) and the production of adequate forms and uses of knowledge (ideas as
effects). Even more intriguing is a comment Spinoza makes in Letter 75 in 1675 (two years
before his death) to Henry Oldenburg when he writes, “...do we petty men have such an
understanding of Nature that we can determine how far its force and power extend, and what is
beyond its power?”83 Spinoza wanted us to interpret his system according to the language most
relied on by philosophers and scientists of his day only, including the new ways various terms
(such as “substance”) could be re-defined.
Descartes, for example, in his efforts to transform our thinking about causation, seems
to be very clear about the power of the intellect and use of rationality in his conclusions in the
third meditation of his Meditations on First Philosophy, and in his replies to Arnauld's
objections of his system. Descartes' position on the nature of all ideas includes:
...the mode of being by which a thing exists objectively <or representatively> in the
intellect by way of an idea, imperfect though it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so it
cannot come from nothing. And although the reality which I am considering in my ideas
is merely objective reality, I must not on that account suppose that the same reality need
not exist formally in the causes of my ideas, but that it is enough for it to be present in
them objectively... And although one idea may perhaps originate from another, there
cannot be an infinite regress here; eventually one must reach a primary idea, the cause of
which will be like an archetype which contains formally <and in fact> all the reality <or
perfection> which is present only objectively <or representatively> in the idea. So it is
clear to me...that the ideas in me are like <pictures or> images which can easily fall short
of the perfection of the things from which they are taken...84
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It is clear in this passage that Descartes is distinguishing between the ideas he has about things and the
perfection of things themselves. He is using a concept of representation in a way Spinoza does not use.
We can have an adequate idea, for example, of what an infinite mode is in Spinoza's system,
and this idea cannot possibly be an image. Ed Curley writes, “It is a striking feature of
Spinoza's ontology that his infinite modes seem to have no analogue in Cartesian ontology...
[Descartes] makes no distinction between infinite and finite modes.”85 The above passage
shows that Descartes believed our modes of finite thinking (in the form of ideas) are imperfect
in some way, but that they have derived from a perfect “primary idea” whose formal essence is
in them objectively. Yet, can we conclude that Descartes and Spinoza differ here completely?
In some ways I think we can. Take, for example, what Spinoza writes about modes in the
opening of the Ethics. In 1p8s2 he is clear:
But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt at all of
the truth of P7 [that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist]. Indeed, this
proposition would be an axiom for everyone, and would be numbered among the
common notions. For by substance they would understand what is in itself and is
conceived through itself, that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the
knowledge of any other thing. But by modifications they would understand what is in
another, those things whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which
they are.86
In Descartes we find that there are images of sense data that are corporeal and there are images
of ideas. But what is an image of an idea exactly? This question is important to consider in
Spinoza and for the rest of this thesis as well. Detlev Patzold writes that, for Descartes,
“...imagination works with 'pictures' in the sense of mental images. They are mental or inner
psychological images of ideas, to be distinguished from images of sense perception. The latter
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have a more direct connection to external objects, of which they are representations...”87 Ideas
for Descartes are never true nor false in-themselves, but, as we will read in later chapters, for
Spinoza adequate ideas are always true in-themselves. The point is that, for Spinoza,
imaginative ideas are more than just images, one of the three kinds of thought we are capable
of. In other words, for Spinoza imaginative ideas can be images (in identity), but they can also
be something else too. I elaborate on this in depth in Chapter Two next.
Regarding the distinction from Descartes here, Pierre Macherey writes, “...taken as
themselves, ideas are nothing but passive representations. They are neither true nor false; truth is
a function of judgment, which animates ideas through the intermediary of will.”88 As noted
above, Spinoza, unlike Descartes, does not believe in real free will but only free necessity. For
Spinoza, the parallelism between thought and extension is more important anyway. Some
aspects of imaginative knowledge are connected to external objects in the form of sense
perceptions, which are experienced internally as one's mind and are about the affections of our
body. But the images of the imagination are also the product and production of one's memories
and language use, the latter of which makes the issues of both imaginative knowledge and
representation much more complex.
For Spinoza, the question remains if ideas are representations of their objects (as images
or otherwise) or are they singular things in-themselves that cannot be defined as or reduced to
mere representations? This will be the case, for example, if he can demonstrate that our ideas
can also be adequately understood as affects. If so, and if it is the case that we can increase and
decrease our conatus according to the force of our affects, then we are no longer talking about
only types of ideas and their content or perfection. To speak about affects in Spinoza is to
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understand both types of knowledge (ideas) and the affections they are coupled with at all
times. I demonstrate the importance of this in chapters Three and Four specifically.
In a similar way, I demonstrate in later chapters that just because we need and rely upon
reflexive knowledge in order to increase our power of thought and action does not entail that all
ideas and knowledge can be defined as representations of reality. On the contrary, reflexive
knowing can produce new knowledge as an effect(s). The new combination of ideas hold the
increased levels of ideational and corporeal power. Truth is not a measure of adequacy, in other
words; it is adequacy and power itself. Reflexive knowing does not mean that we are relying on
ideas as representational for the sole reason that, in reflection, we produce new ideas and new
information that we did not have before. Further, as William Sacksteder writes, “The logic of
each concept presupposes relation to other things: they (with whatever self so views them) are
necessarily more than one.”89
There are other ways in which Descartes' writings affected Spinoza's development, one
of which is the way Descartes continues to prioritize the nature of our ideas about the power and
reality of substance. He writes, “...I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite
substance than in a finite one, and hence that my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in
some way prior to my perception of the finite, that is myself.”90 I find a parallel here with the
very first proposition of Spinoza's Ethics that is striking. In E1p1 we read, “A substance is prior
in nature to its affections.”91 In fact, this proposition must be conceptually prior in our
understanding in order for the logic of the axiomatic method to work in producing new
knowledge. The idea of my body is the primary idea that I am aware of, but I learn that my
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ideas and ratios of motion and rest are also expressions of one unified substance. As I
demonstrate in chapters three and four, when I learn this I also learn that the affect becomes the
perceived cause of my new ideas. To perceive myself as a (proximate) cause is to perceive
substance in its essence for Spinoza. The former is a modal modification as an expression of
substance and the latter is substance itself. They are, of course, “one and the same thing”
expressed in different ways. As Nadler writes, this too relates to Descartes in a sense because
Spinoza found “that within a basically Cartesian framework he could begin to pursue his own
philosophical agenda...”92 Piet Steenbakkers writes that Spinoza's “mature doctrine is original
and cannot be reduced to its Cartesian context.”93 Spinoza's own writings support this
conclusion. For example, at the end of Letter 58, late in Spinoza's young life, he writes that his
system is not Cartesian, as well as that his ideas on both necessity and free will are logically
consistent throughout his work: “If you will examine my opinions attentively, you will see that
they are quite consistent.”94
For both Descartes and Spinoza, the first and true idea we are aware of is that we have a
body and that we are thinking. We are aware that there is something doing the thinking and that
we are having ideas about the ways in which our mind and body are affected as an organic
whole. The difference, for Spinoza, is that our mind is ideas, instead of being understood as a
separate entity or container that has ideas. We continuously reflect on our interactions with
others and with our own ideas. Both Descartes and Spinoza each turn their focus to the
awareness that one is having thoughts, ideas about other ideas, ideas about one's environment,
ideas of sense perception, and ideas about the ways our bodies are affected by other bodies.
Spinoza writes that a mind cannot conceive anything unless it also perceives itself as having the
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ability to have ideas about the world. In other words, to have ideas about things in the world is to
already understand a certain type of ideational force about singular causes and effects.
In the following chapters I will argue for a type of proto-physics of ideational force and
motion found in Spinoza’s Ethics specifically. Perhaps he does not have a system of physics as
we would define it today, but it certainly was, in its time, a new system of philosophy concerned
with principles of motion, rest, matter, change, proportion, and dynamics of force between ideas
and actions. In addition, Spinoza's notion of substance can be understood epistemologically and
ontologically as immanent. As we will read, Spinoza's system is a truly dynamic, vibrant, and
deductively lucid philosophy if you can tolerate the strict axiomatic format it uses to create real
material and ideational effects in its readers. Nadler writes:
Spinoza's conception of adequate knowledge reveals an unrivaled optimism in the
cognitive powers of the human being. Not even Descartes believed that we could know
all of Nature and its innermost secrets with the degree of depth and certainty that
Spinoza thought possible... Most remarkably, because Spinoza thought that the adequate
knowledge of any object, and of Nature as whole, involves a thorough knowledge of
God...he also had no scruples about claiming that we can, at least in principle, know God
perfectly and adequately.95
Although this is true, Spinoza also felt that it would be ignorant to believe that we can know
about all of Nature, for there are infinite ways in which it can be expressed.
As noted above, Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology includes three types of knowledge,
imaginative, adequate (rational), and intuitive. We are seeking adequate knowledge about the
laws of thought and extension, which includes what he calls the intellectual love of God.
Adequate knowledge for a finite individual is knowledge (common notions) about laws of
Nature and the common properties between things. Adequate ideas can include knowledge of
both universals and particulars at once. For example, in E1ax5 we read, “Things that have
nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, or the
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concept of one does not involve the concept of the other.”96 There is a question as to how much
Spinoza was influenced by Euclid's use of common notions. Euclid’s common notions have
been defined as “axioms about the behavior of general magnitudes, not only geometric
objects.”97 The idea of magnitude can be assessed in Spinoza in relation to his concept of the
proportions and ratios of motion and rest, as well as in relation to the force between types of
ideas. I take up this topic specifically in Chapter Three.
Intuitive knowledge is more efficient knowledge of singular activity and essences, where
one is certain that this activity increases the power of Nature in some way. This latter type of
knowledge is the only kind that Spinoza felt could be called the intellectual love of God. I
discuss all three types of knowledge (or ways of knowing) separately in chapters Two through
Five. I take up the nature of ideational force between types of ideas, the production of affects,
and the problem of representation in chapter Four specifically.
This brings up an important epistemological point about the nature of how we define
what an idea or concept is, how ideas can be used, and how ideas can be transformed or
combined to create ever more powerfully clear and distinct singular effects. As Hasana Sharp
writes, “Importantly, [for Spinoza] our ideas are no less natural than our bodies. Being parts of
nature, our ideas encounter resistance and assistance to their thriving from nonhuman as well
as human sources.”98 Although this is true, in a letter dated 1666, Spinoza also writes:
...there must necessarily be a method whereby we can direct and interconnect our clear
and distinct perceptions, and that the intellect is not, like the body, at the mercy of
chance... Indeed, all the clear and distinct perceptions that we form can arise only from
other clear and distinct perceptions which are in us, and they acknowledge no other
cause outside us.99
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If this is true then how can we find any similarities between the parallelism of thought and
extension at all? I will demonstrate in Chapter Four that it is through understanding the combination
of the two attributes into affects that allow us to adequately reflect on our ideas and actions. I believe
this is Spinoza’s point about method in the above citation.
Spinoza's concentration on how to recognize and reflect upon dynamic transitions
between types of ideas is how we can enhance our power of comprehension in reflective
awareness and “control our evaluations.” When our power of comprehension is enhanced, our
power of acting in affirmative, rational, and creative ways is simultaneously also enhanced.
Spinoza asks us to consider the “best ways” to use reason. As found in chapters Three
and Five of the TP, to conclude that a people (or nation) are not at war is one thing, but to say
they are enjoying peace is quite another matter. In other words, one does not automatically
follow from the other when we are reasoning well. I realize this might include drawing some
consistency between Spinoza’s many works that could be problematic. There are better ways for
reason to continue to enhance its power. This includes creating real effects in which we are truly
experiencing joy from our ideas. Rational actions will involve learning what the best ways are
for our understanding to thrive. As I demonstrate in the next chapter and in my conclusion, this
is why learning how reason can enhance certain elements of imaginative knowledge is so
important.
I read Spinoza's second kind of knowledge to include a proto-physics of force between
types of ideas, as well as of the perpetuation of adequate understanding and joy. Beth Lord
writes, “When the mind considers its power of thinking, it is necessarily active, and so we feel
joy...”100 This type of joy has multiple dimensions, some of which directly involve an educated
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imagination which is capable of using more powerful and affirmative imaginings (memories,
words, images etc.) over those ideas that are less powerful or reduce our power. An informed
use of the imagination only produces stronger imaginings, which reason understands and uses to
its benefit. This takes practice, habit formation in recognizing idea-types that we are relying on
(and why we are relying on them), and enhanced attention in conscious reflection.
In summary, the main point is that the use of rationality plays a distinctive role in shaping
its discriminative powers. How we reflect on what we are thinking about, especially in more
trying times, becomes particularly important. Included in this are the possible differences in the
level of power of our imagination based on cultural conditioning and the environments in which
we learn. This is not just a matter of recognizing that a better education is good for us. It is a
matter of truly comprehending how the attributes of thought and extension behave according to
respective laws of Nature, yet act in parallel to each other in a combined way as affects. These
affects are what increase or decrease our power to think well, creatively with more force, and,
therefore, to act with more reason and power as well.
When the intellect educates itself about how to eliminate reactions and passions that
diminish its power or the power of others, and instead consider everything that is occurring
according to the laws of thought and extension, then we can understand with more deductive
force to our benefit. What we recognize is that the logic involved in understanding how laws of
Nature work proves what is already necessarily the case, as well as what then can result from that
level of understanding as ideational effects, physical behaviors, and the power of the two
combined as affects. This is why I take up the power of imaginative knowledge and the topic of
racism in the conclusion of this thesis. Spinoza can be read as a white ally in this history of Western
philosophy because, as one example, his system teaches us how to better recognize when our
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imaginative (partial) knowledge is decreasing our power to thrive. If our rational adequate
knowledge and actions can help transform passive imaginative ideas, the errors in our knowledge
and reflective power will diminish. As Beth Lord notes, we are not “defined by” our rationality:
“Affectivity means we are intermeshed with things outside our physical and mental boundaries –
things that affect and change us constantly.”101 I use Spinoza’s theory of affectivity and dynamic
epistemology to demonstrate, in the end, that such a system can eliminate racist ideas and notions.
The joy we experience from our increased power of thought and action is a force which
propels us. Yet, as we read in Chapter 16 of the TTP, “...Nature's bounds are not set by the laws
of human reason which aim only at man's true interest and his preservation, but by infinite other
laws which have regard to the eternal order of the whole of Nature, of which man is but a
particle.”102 To “think in Spinoza” is to think about the infinity of an organic substance with
finite modal modifications and the essence of singular things, and to do so in a way that allows
for the rational comprehension of what it is to be a finite expression of substance with greater
individual and collective vitality. The next chapter evaluates the nature of imaginative knowledge
specifically and describes how to better recognize and use the ideas of the imagination in order to
strengthen our capacities to reason with more force.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IMAGINATIVE KNOWLEDGE
IN SPINOZA’S DYNAMIC EPISTEMOLOGY

“What is now proved was once only imagined...”
-William Blake
“Without fantasy, reality itself disintegrates, and the subject confronts the Real
as a traumatic and incomprehensible force.” -Japhy Wilson

Introduction and History of the Concept of Imaginative Knowledge
Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology found in his magnum opus, the Ethics, includes only
three types of ideas or kinds of knowledge: imaginative, rational common notions, and intuitive.
This chapter focuses solely on imaginative, partial knowledge, or what Spinoza calls
“inadequate” ideas. The first half of the chapter specifically focuses on summarizing the nature
of imaginative knowledge as Spinoza defines it. The second half focuses on the specific
mechanisms from the Ethics that demonstrate how imaginative knowledge works in conjunction
with other types of knowledge to create greater affects. Human affects are a combination of both
ideas (thought) and affections (ratios of motion and rest in extension) for Spinoza.1
Imaginative ideas are defined as ideas about sense data and image making, but they are
also defined as all language, memory, fantasy, and errors in reasoning. They can either
strengthen or weaken our conatus (our tendency towards persevering in existence). As Beth Lord
writes, “...conatus is what makes each particular thing what it is.” 2 Understanding imaginative
knowledge and how it operates according to its own laws of nature is not only crucial to

1
2

Spinoza, Ethics, 3D3: 70.
Beth Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 90.

46

adequately comprehending Spinoza’s epistemological system, but such understanding aids
reason and creates more affirmative and powerful affects, increasing our conatus. When truly
grasping Spinoza’s epistemology one discovers that certain types of imaginative knowledge are
as important as ideas of reason for strengthening our power to produce affirmative affects.
In many areas of our lives, the use of the imagination is something positive, inspirational,
creative, enlightening, capable of sudden insight, experimental, and the one way to convey all
those subtleties and practically unnamable experiences of life which we encounter in the
ontology of the everyday.3 Although Spinoza spent much of his short life attempting to
deductively prove that imaginative knowledge can result in error, falsity, confusion, and
anthropomorphic, teleological conceptions of nature, the implications of which create human
pain and suffering, this chapter demonstrates that he also felt ideas of the imagination can be
transformative and empowering when those ideas are arranged in ways reason can recognize
and use to its benefit.
In the end, it is clear that Spinoza felt certain aspects of imaginative knowing are a part of
how reason can develop more beneficially and joyously. He writes, “...an imagination is an idea
which indicates the present constitution of the human body... [imaginings] are not contrary to
the true, and do not disappear on its presence.”4 What we will read about next includes how
one can join an image with both another imaginative idea and with adequate ideas of reason to
transform an affect we are experiencing from something passive to that which is more active
when we comprehend and reflect on the kinds of knowledge we are using.5
Rationally understood, certain ideas of the imagination can contribute to the development
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of reason. This capacity can then move us with real joy and power in our thoughts and actions
to create other ideas and actions with more strength. This occurs not only in the effectiveness of
our actions, but also in the creative force of our understanding. Imaginative ideas can be
experimented with in an enjoyable, informed manner, and re-arranged or re-imagined to our
benefit and to the benefit of others. The production of images are defined by or as corporeal
motions in relation to sense data and memory, for example.6 That words are part of the
imagination becomes a particularly interesting problem when one uses rational knowledge and
language to construct an explanation or description about what one understands. The first kind
of knowledge is also the only source of falsity or error, that is, of privation: “And indeed, most
errors consist only in our not rightly applying names to things.”7 Yet, language consists of both
images of letters and the memory of meaning, both a part of imaginative knowledge. Spinoza
goes so far as to say, “So if something in Nature appears to us as ridiculous, absurd, or evil, this
is due to the fact that our knowledge is only partial, that we are for the most part ignorant of the
order and coherence of Nature as a whole, and that we want all things to be directed as our
reason prescribes.”8 In other words, when we do not understand something and judge it as
absurd, we are relying more heavily on partial, imaginative knowledge (ideas which are
incomplete) than on reason and understanding. Imaginative knowledge includes ideas which are
incomplete or partial. It is in this way that they are defined as “inadequate.”
There are many important references to imaginari, imaginatio, imago, and imaginarius in
the Ethics throughout all five books, but some references include in the preface of part 3, 3p2s,
p9, p12, p15, p16, p18s, p25, p27, p28, p30, p31, p32, p34, p42, p49, p52, p53, p58, the
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opening definitions and axioms of part 4, 4p1, p11, p59, 4 Appendix, and 5p3, p5, p10, p13,
p14, p20s, p28, p34, and p40c (among many other places). There is an even more extensive use
and reliance on understanding imaginative knowing in Book Two of the Ethics of which I will
concentrate on specifically throughout this chapter. Imaginative ideas work in conjunction with
the understanding throughout the Ethics. Therefore, to ignore the importance of imaginative
knowledge in this system is to misunderstand Spinoza’s epistemology. Spinoza scholar, Piet
Steenbakkers, notes that there are 232 references to the imagination in Book Three of the Ethics
alone.9
The mind does not cause the body to act and the body does not cause ideas in the mind in
Spinoza’s system. The attributes of thought and extension run parallel with each other. They are
both expressions of one substance (God or Nature). The relations (connections) we rely upon
between finite ideas about the laws of thought are how we form a more adequate understanding
about the imagination and its power. Spinoza’s system emphasizes understanding the structures
of all three types of knowledge we are capable of in order to strengthen both the force and joy
of our ideas and the power of our motions and actions. Because of this, any reading that labels
his system as strictly “rationalist” is inaccurate. As Spinoza scholar Ed Curley writes, “The
view that Spinoza was a rationalist...is not just mildly inaccurate, it is wildly inaccurate.
Experience has a much greater role to play in Spinoza's theory of knowledge than this view can
allow for.”10 As we will read next, we require imaginative knowledge in order to process all of
our experiences.
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As a flexible form of more certain knowledge, reason can understand with fluidity how
the imagination can create stronger, more useful ideas that are productive and creative. This
type of understanding and practical application is not a causal interaction in the usual sense that
we understand cause and effect. Adequate ideas can only cause other adequate ideas,
imaginative ideas cause other imaginative ideas. The effect of understanding the causes of our
ideas is that we tend towards more adequate conceptions of both how to think well and with
more force. When the intellect understands and recognizes its own flexibility between varying
forces of types of ideas, the imagination can produce stronger ideas (and better descriptions)
that cooperate with what reason already knows to be true in increasing its power. One benefit of
this increased strength in the capacity to use types of ideas is the increase in varieties of
expression of those ideas. As a result of such a combination in stronger idea types, an increase
in our power of thought and action occur by the necessity of the laws of thought and extension.
As Beth Lord writes, “Imagination has a central role to play [for Spinoza], in building true
understanding, in representing it, and in limiting and obfuscating it.11
Yet, as with anything in Nature, too much power can be destructive. 12 If the mind has too
many imaginative ideas or too many ideas of a conflicting nature, the mind will become more
and more confused. What we will learn is that the proportional power between ideas of reason
and ideas of the imagination will include those ideational effects which enhance rational
Lord, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 4. Lord continues, “Through
and in philosophical thinking, multiple other ways of thinking come to be. This is what emerges in Spinoza’s major
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12
Consider what Spinoza writes in Chapter 2 of the TP: “So from the fact that the power of natural things by which
they exist and act is the very power of God, we can readily understand what is the right of Nature… By the right of
Nature, then, I understand the laws or rules of Nature…that is, the very power of Nature. So the natural right of
Nature as a whole, and consequently the natural right of every individual, is coextensive with its power.
Consequently, whatever each man does from the laws of his own nature, he does by the sovereign right of Nature,
and he has as much right over Nature as his power extends… But men are led by blind desire more than by reason,
and therefore their natural power or right must be defined not by reason but by any appetite by which they may be
determined to act and by which they try to preserve themselves.”
11

50

capacities and affirmative bodily actions simultaneously if the laws of thought are understood
with respect to the three idea types. Therefore, the application of the law of proportion, as we
will read about in the next chapter on reason, is extremely important for how ideas can
influence each other. In Chapter Two of the TTP Spinoza writes:
Those with a more powerful imagination are less fitted for purely intellectual activity,
while those who devote themselves to the cultivation of their more powerful intellect,
keep their imagination under greater control and restraint, and they hold it in rein, as it
were, so that it should not invade the province of intellect... Imagination by itself, unlike
every clear and distinct idea, does not of its own nature carry certainty with it. In order
that we may attain certainty of what we image, there has to be something in addition to
imagination, namely, reasoning.13
The mind must find ways to be certain of what it is imagining (along with true causes)
and not only that it is imagining. A common notion of reason and an image can surely co-exist in
the mind at one time. Reason can identify the type of imaging one is doing, for example, with
rational reflection about the structure of different types of the three kinds of ideas we can have.
Spinoza deduces, “By idea I understand a concept of the mind which the mind forms because it
is a thinking thing.”14 Note that Spinoza does not say that ideas are images. They are concepts.
This will become more important as we proceed. Understanding how the imagination and its
laws operate produces greater effects and joy within reasoning capacities. As we will read next
in chapter three, greater joy and power produced by our ideas simultaneously runs parallel to an
increase in power and capacities for actions which benefit both ourselves and all of Nature.
When we learn about how the mind works by necessity, for example, we learn how to joyfully
and rationally manipulate its structure to our benefit and the benefit of others. Experiencing a
cause is involving that cause in its effect (which is expression).
Because of Spinoza’s parallelism between the attributes, it is important to incorporate an

13
14

Spinoza, TTP, 2: 404, 405, emphasis added.
Spinoza, Ethics, 2D3: 32.

51

understanding of what a “body” is in his dynamic epistemology. He writes, “By body I
understand a mode that in a certain and determinate way expresses God's essence insofar as he is
considered as an extended thing (see 1p25c).”15 All of our bodily actions, both internal and
external, express God’s (Nature’s) essence but in the form of modal modifications of substance
(modes). This is exactly why Spinoza writes that the content of a text, including his own, is not
as important in its intention (mathematical or otherwise) as is its power to move us with love and
joy: “As Spinoza remarked of Scripture, a text is to be judged sacred and profane, good or evil,
not by virtue of what it says, or even its truth, but by its power to move people to mutual love
and support. A philosophical work is thus always an intervention in a concrete situation and is to
be judged by the effects it produces in this situation.”16 In this vein, the reader of Spinoza’s work
and of this thesis will find continual references to what it is to increase our capacities for power,
joy, and more understanding as these affects relate to the necessary processes of the laws of
Nature of the attributes of thought and extension. Thus, as we learn about the structure and
power of our ideas, we experience both intellectual and physical pleasure simultaneously. As
Stuart Hampshire summarizes, “Reason by itself cannot move to action without the motive force
of passion, but we can become passionately reasonable...and reasonably passionate... When on
reflection a person perceives the inadequacy, the emotion is immediately changed.”17
Before learning more about the mechanics of this dynamic epistemology, a little more on
the history of the concept of the imagination in Western philosophy is needed. The imagination
has often been understood in the history of Western philosophy (particularly for Rene Descartes
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for example) as a mediator between the senses and the understanding. Detlev Patzold, in an essay
titled “Imagination in Descartes's Meditations,” writes that the imagination “continues to play an
active and cognitive role” in Descartes's philosophy, especially in his mature work, and functions
as a “mediating principle between sense perception and pure understanding.”18 As in Descartes,
the mark of a true idea for Spinoza is clarity and distinctness, which I discuss in more depth in
the next chapter. Each type of knowledge in Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology includes what it is
we are thinking about; sensations, images, memories, common notions, the cause of our ideas, or
the essence of singular things, for example. Piet Steenbakkers writes, “Without the imagination,
the mind would be deprived of all knowledge of its body and of external things. This knowledge
is essential for interacting with the world around us and thus forms part of our essential striving
to maintain our existence... The power to imagine is proportional to the degree of complexity of
the individual body...”19 In Spinoza, imaginative knowledge is not only defined as images.
The use of the imagination both appealed to and terrified religious leaders, while at the
same time fascinated those who sought political power. On the development of the Early Modern
imagination in Europe, Todd Butler writes, “What is thereby revealed is a society deeply
concerned and fascinated with the fundamentally imaginative nature of politics, for to understand
– let alone to employ – the imagination was to gain access to a power that modern critics of the
period have too often ignored.”20 It was organized religion, though, that fundamentally wanted to
control what the masses believed about the employment of their own imaginative ideas and
images, and this was done by generating other images which produced fear and submission. This
was the motivation for Spinoza writing the TTP, where he evaluates the intersection between
religion, politics, and the use of imaginative ideas, and calls for greater separation and structural
Patzold, “Imagination in Descartes’ Meditations,” 157.
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understanding of each through the strengthening of reasoning capacities. As Spinoza writes, the
prophets of dominant religious texts and circles “were not endowed with a more perfect mind,
but with a more vivid power of imagination.”21 He intends this sentiment in the negative sense.
Those who confuse imaginative images with the use of reason were not able to imagine
themselves as causes of their own actions, actions without teleological or transcendental ends or
purposes. They were also not able to imagine all of Nature as eternal and perfect, nor as selfcausing. In addition, Spinoza may have been responding to the Early Modern obsession with
angels, miracles, and various other anthropomorphic notions about the divine. John Milton's
Paradise Lost was very influential at the time, for example, and both public circles and those
more educated had a tendency to talk about transcendent entities. Almost everyone believed in a
God of some kind, but Spinoza was tolerant of diversity in human belief system nonetheless. In
Book Three of the Ethics, when listing the multiple types of affects we can have and why,
Spinoza writes, “Experience itself also confirms this. For not everyone has the same custom and
religion, and reason understands this. What among some is holy, among others is unholy; and
what among some is honorable, among others is dishonorable. Hence, according as each one has
been educated, so he either repents of a deed or exults at being esteemed for it.”22
There has been extensive work done on the history of the concept of the imagination
from a more philosophical perspective, such as by Eva Brann and Murry Bundy, for example.23
In many of these works, Spinoza's actual contribution to this topic is rarely recognized,
minimally referenced, or poorly understood. Under the heading “Juvenile Thinking: The
Rationalist Tradition and Spinoza,” Brann concludes, “Spinoza furnishes a prime example of a
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certain intellectual contempt for the imagination.”24 This assessment could not be further from a
correct and examined understanding of Spinoza's epistemological system. In his work on the
history of the concept of the imagination in Western philosophy and culture, Richard Kearney
mentions Spinoza's system in reference to the inferiority of ideas of the imaginative sort, stating
that Spinoza believed these types of ideas were only about that which is wholly contingent, and
therefore completely insignificant.25 This is a completely inaccurate interpretation.
An accurate English translation of Spinoza's works did not appear until the nineteenth
century. Only recently, in 2010, have we discovered the earliest known copy of the Ethics tucked
neatly away in the Vatican for centuries.26 Although some early interpretations made genuine and
systematic attempts at understanding Spinoza's system, nonetheless quite a few are riddled with
error and contributed to overlooking the importance of the first kind of knowledge. C. De Deugd,
in his extensive treatment about the significance of imaginative knowledge in Spinoza, noted as
early as 1966 that the otherwise indispensable bibliography of Spinoza scholarship collected by
Adolph Oko, which includes over seven thousand entries, “does not have so much as a separate
heading for 'imagination.'”27 The point is, how is this possible? It is a real problem in the
scholarship. De Deugd devoted all of his energy to demonstrating the significance of imaginative
knowledge in conjunction with reasoning adequately in Spinoza’s system. He demonstrates this
to such an extent as to conclude “that none of the ideas of the imagination are pseudoknowledge.”28
De Deugd is the best work to date on the importance of imaginative knowledge in
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Spinoza, but he gives more credit to G. H. R. Parkinson, whose work on Spinoza's theory of
knowledge from 1954 is also significant in this regard. Included in these rare interpretations is
also the 1957 publication by H. F. Hallett, who described Spinoza's first kind of knowledge as
crucial to understanding his overall epistemological system on several occasions. Parkinson
particularly references Spinoza's own use of Descartes' system in the CM and PDP on this
matter, citing Descartes' insistence about the use of hypotheses as an aid to reasoning processes.
This works only as long as the individual is aware that they are relying upon imaginative ideas
heavily or that they are doing so for a certain reason (such as the suspension of judgment, for
example, as we will read about later in the chapter). After several examples of this kind, Hallett
concludes, “Thus true knowledge of the world may be embodied in a fictional account of its
genesis and history – a fiction that differs from the truth only in the order in which the forms of
things appear. And in that case, 'there is no fear of error from a false hypothesis.'” 29 The key term
in this statement is “order” because it is the recognition of the order and causes of our idea types
which can increase our conatus.
In 1973, as a part of a collection of critical essays on Spinoza edited by Marjorie Grene,
R. G. Blair writes, “Spinoza's [epistemological] system cannot teach us much today if it is taken
as a whole.”30 Yet, in 1985, R. J. Delahunty wrote that it may be of significant importance to
investigate what Spinoza truly intends in his epistemological system; “The result is far from clear
what [Spinoza] means to be saying when he alleges that imaginations regarded in themselves are
free from error.”31 In 1988, although only briefly stated, Ed Curley concludes that the
imagination, in all its ways of expression, is an integral part of Spinoza's system:
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...what Spinoza wishes chiefly to emphasize is that the mind's knowledge of other things its knowledge of bodies other than its own in sense perception (P16), its memory of the
past (P18), its knowledge of itself (PP20-23), its knowledge of the common properties of
all material objects (PP37-39), even its knowledge of the essence of God (PP45-47) – all
of these depend on the fact that it first has knowledge of its own body... So imagination
(P17), too, is explained as a function of the mind's knowledge of the states of its own
body. It is hard to see how any philosopher could give a greater priority to knowledge of
the body than Spinoza has.32
In addition, for Spinoza, using reason well is not an automatic capacity or inclination for
everyone. He believes we are not naturally inclined to use reason in a continuous and regular
manner. We may desire to know more, and many are born with the faculty to reason, but it takes
learning how adequate ideas and common notions are produced by necessary laws of Nature in
order to be capable of using this faculty and all types of knowledge in the best way. As we will
read in Chapter Three next, adequate common notions are shared by all because they are eternal
truths about the properties of things, but imaginative ideas are distinctly singular. Our sense
experiences are our own. At the very least, we can mimic the habits of others who are rational. At
our very best, we can use the ideas of all three types of knowledge in their affirmative capacities
more regularly, experimenting with new arrangements of knowledge and their expression.
This observation distinguishes Spinoza from other rationalist or idealist systems that
place only reasoning capacities as the foundation of the highest qualitative human experience. In
other words, reasoning well is not our only desire. We also desire to persevere and thrive in
existence regardless of reason, to stay alive. If it were common for everyone to reason well on a
regular basis, society “would stand in no need of any laws.”33 Human beings, by nature, desire
more than only to reason, and even less of us will be capable of maintaining a continuous
rational disposition in the shifting external influences of the ontology of the everyday. Spinoza
writes that human nature, for most, is “far differently constituted” than that which acts from
32
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reason alone. In the TTP he concludes, “All men do, indeed, seek their own advantage, but by no
means from the dictates of sound reason.”34
Understanding the Power of Imaginative Knowledge
The key for using reason well is to be able to “justify” our percepts through ordered
rational processes, which work as (and can be understood as) the laws of Nature of the attributes
of thought and extension.35 Developing rational capacities will include not only a desire to
understand how the imagination works, but the developed ability to recognize imaginative ideas
that can be used in conjunction with reason, strengthening our knowledge and diversifying our
experiences and our joy and creativity. This type of recognition uses and requires both
imaginative and rational ideas. This aspect of my thesis is the most original element because this
is an interpretation of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology most commentators do not allow. As
Steenbakkers writes, “Because Spinoza labels imagination or opinion as the lowest kind of
cognition and the sole source of inadequate ideas, commentators have inferred that he despised it
and was interested exclusively in the higher levels of cognition. In view of the importance
Spinoza attaches to the imagination, however, this interpretation is hardly tenable.”36
Consider, for example, what we read in E3p12: “The mind as far as it can, strives to
imagine those things that increase or aid the body's power of acting.” 37 Imagining our power to
act includes, among other things, imagining what is involved in building our capacities to reason
(and experimenting with both types of knowledge). This level of imagining involves our
experiencing pleasure and joy. Joy, as pleasure (laetitia), can occur because of a passion. It can
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be the result of an increase in our power of thinking, acting, and recognizing the causes of our
adequately powerful sets of notions. Joy can also be interpreted as elation and not mere pleasure,
just as pain or a lesser perfection (tristitia) can be interpreted as dejection. Thus, the topic of joy,
including intellectual joy, is highly complex in its relations between ideas.38
The imagination is much more than a series of passive sensations or collections of
flickering images. It has the power to inspire greatness as much as cripple us, and there are
elements of it that are not composed of images at all. For example, when we use language to
speak with each other. In the conversation we are not necessarily using or having images, but we
are using language to understand each other. Language is always imaginative knowledge for
Spinoza. Our uses of language are inherently only partial knowledge.
The imagination is a critical, often beautiful aspect of human experience and thought. It
also has an extensive and complicated history as a concept in philosophy and otherwise. “One
may think of magic, the vernacular literary traditions, the use of the imagination in mathematics
and science, imagination used in the composition of works of art, or terminological and more
linguistic questions about the relationship between imaginatio and phantasia, and other related
concepts in the vernacular such as 'fancy' and 'fantaisie.' Indeed, there is no lack of literature on
the theme.”39
In Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology, affects are not something which mediate between
sense perception and the understanding in the same way as they do for Descartes. Affects include
the affections of our bodies (corporeal motions) along with the idea of the affection that we are
I will include the difference between joyful passive affections and passionate joys, the latter of which is closer to
an accurate interpretation of the relation between passive affections and joy within Spinoza's dynamic epistemology,
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having in conscious awareness.40 Affects are not reducible by definition to our affections. They
are also not defined as emotions nor as special kinds of ideas. Some bodily affections are passive
and some are active, but all expressions are also affirmative modes of the existence of substance.
We are not consciously aware of all the affections of our body, but the mind can only be aware of
its body through the affects it is having which it is aware of. The idea of an affection we are
aware of which is adequately conceived is a part of a more powerful or active affect. As a result,
the ideas about our affections that are active affects can produce more chains of adequate ideas
and joyous experiences as a result. This effect of more powerful affects reduces the proportion
and power of the weaker chains of imaginative ideas that could possibly overpower reason.
Alexandre Lefebvre summarizes Spinoza’s epistemology well, “If we suffer affections [affectio]
that we neither determine nor understand, we experience a separation from our powers and
become sad; if, on the other hand, we experience affections of which we are the cause or of
which we know the cause, we experience a connection to our powers and become joyful.
Existence, in this sense, is an effort to experience a maximum of active affections.”41
Affects are also both uniquely singular and a part of any combined collective. My affects
are experienced by me on a singular level, but your ideas and actions can affect me. If we are
adequately understanding something, then our mind is active and our singular awareness and
body experiences joy because of the increase in our power. Yet, if we understand how to create
stronger, more useful ideas in the imagination, then our minds automatically have an increased
capacity for thought and are more active, although this activity, as we will read in Chapter Three
next, may vary. Caroline Williams writes, “As transitive links between states of affairs, affects
40
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pass through subjects communicating and unfolding images and intensities.”42
In part 2 of the KV, Spinoza distinguishes between what he calls opinion (error, falsity),
experience (a type of combination of reason along with experimentation), true belief (that which
requires outside reasons in order to be known), and clear knowledge (a way we can have
knowledge in and through the things themselves in reflective awareness). 43 Some of these
distinctions get collapsed in many respects in his later works. What he develops in his later work
is the concept that the imagination can be transformed, at least those elements of it that are
beyond passive sense data; it can be transformed through our understanding of the laws of the
attribute of thought, such as how ideas of the first kind are generated and operate. The mind, in
understanding that it is nothing but ideas and desiring to increase its power, can (in conscious
reflection about the laws of thought) have better ideas that act as aids to the imagination (auxilia
imaginationis).
The imagination, although incomplete and fragmented knowledge, is not wholly
inadequate for Spinoza. The associations we make between ideas are largely based on memory,
experience, experiment, and learning. Although our memories can also be in error or influence
other finite ideas in ways that decrease our power, there is a crucial role which memory plays in
Spinoza's entire epistemology. If this is true, then certain aspects or elements of imaginative
knowledge are as important for the development of strong common notions as reason is. Spinoza
writes, “For there is something else I wish particularly to note here, that we can do nothing from
a decision of the mind unless we recollect it...”44 Recollection is an element of imaginative
knowledge, but learning is a part of both the imagination and reasoning. We cannot learn and
strengthen our capacity to reason with force if we cannot recollect or imagine. As we will read in
Caroline Williams, “Subjectivity Without a Subject,” in Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 18.
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Chapter Five, active ideas of the imagination that are useful for reason come together with the
most force in intuitive knowledge. Etienne Balibar, noting that reading Spinoza's doctrine of the
first kind of knowledge as that which is merely passive and riddled with only error is
problematic, writes:
However, if we look more closely at the argument of the Ethics and the TTP, we will see
that this simple presentation is too mechanical. In reality, all men live in both the world of
the imagination and that of reason. In every man there is already some reason (that is,
some true ideas and some joyful passions), if only because of the partial knowledge he
has of his own usefulness; and in every man there is some imagination...if only because
of his own inability to dominate all external causes...45
Learning about the laws of thought, reason can transform some aspects of imaginative
knowledge to its benefit and greater use. Although reason can evaluate ideas of the imaginative
sort, the same process does not occur for those who rely upon only imaginative ideas. In such a
disposition our capacity to reason well is diminished in intensity and the imagination dominates
in proportion between our chains of ideas. In other words, we are not thinking rationally as much
as we could be in such a state and we might not have the rational power to recognize this fact.
Imaginative ideas should only occupy the “smallest part of our mind.” 46 Spinoza deals in
ratios of motion and rest as the structure of the attribute of extension, something I examine in
more detail in the next chapters. Yet, due to the parallelism between thought and extension, when
the body's ratio of motion increases in activity, the mind simultaneously increases in its force of
activity. We should consider what ideas one focuses on in reflective awareness. If thought is
relying upon rational common notions, the body has more power to act, and act with more
diversity and creativity. There is an identity between the attributes of thought and extension. The
identity is only that both are expressions of one substance, as is clear in E3p2 and elsewhere.47
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Spinoza’s monism is not a cosmological constant. Although all is one substance, Spinoza’s
substance is dynamic in its varying transformations and animated expressions. Dynamism and
transformations are occurring continuously and in infinite ways. The interactions between our
three kinds of knowledge are transformed by way of arrangement and dispositions taken,
producing more forceful or less forceful rational thought and action.
There are many ways to categorize the types of inadequate ideas in Spinoza's
epistemology, specifically found within certain parts of the Ethics, the TIE, the KV, and
especially the TTP. Errol Harris clearly explains that there are at least three types of inadequate
ideas in Spinoza: those that are considered fictions, those that are categorized as errors, and ideas
that are a part of a method of doubt. But we might add another, namely that this type of
knowledge can be understood as partial. The words we use to create language, for example, are
an aspect of imaginative knowledge because they could not possibly capture what we adequately
conceive with clarity and certainty in its totality. This aspect of an epistemological system will
complicate how we then conceive of our explanations for what we know using reason. Yet, we
might ask if imaginative ideas can be experimented with on the level of operational knowledge,
and, if so, then can we find increasingly affective and rationally powerful ways to use the
imagination?
Each type of inadequate idea has its own level of power in association with other ideas,
and one type does not necessarily involve all of the other types. As Harris notes regarding ideas
of fiction, for example, “they do not necessarily involve any error.”48 This is true particularly if
reason already understands that they are fictions. This level of recognition occurs with intuitive
knowing also, as we will read more about in Chapter Five. Spinoza discusses briefly how this
recognition occurs in Chapter 15 of part 2 of the KV, but did not fully develop that concept.
48
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Harris continues, “The capacity to imagine things that do not exist, as long as we know that they
do not exist, may be considered an accomplishment rather than a defect of mind...”49 Spinoza
confirms this in various works noting how important singular conscious reflection is in this
regard. An inadequate idea is often in error not because of what is stated in the idea, but because
of “what it leaves out,” which is a clear and distinct conception of the adequate cause of the
object of the idea (ideatum). This is also why the first kind of knowledge is “inadequate.”
I argue that these claims are consistent both in the definitions of inadequate knowledge in
the Ethics and in other works where Spinoza discusses the imagination. Note, for example, the
large problem Spinoza discovers between memory and language cited in Chapter 6 of the TTP.
All too often “chronicles and histories reflect the writer's own beliefs rather than the actual facts,
and one and the same occurrence is so differently related by two men holding different beliefs
that they seem to be speaking of two different events...”50 As Harris recognizes, ideas of doubt
are the real problem for partial knowledge because such ideas lead to the vacillation of the mind.
They lack certain knowledge about the essence of things and their true causes. Vacillation of the
mind decreases its power to think well. In the TIE Spinoza emphasizes that if we do not use the
right method of consciously distinguishing between how we form types of knowledge (and also
remain aware of which type of idea we are relying on and why), we will confuse ourselves, as
well as possibly harbor doubts about true ideas! For these reasons Herman De Dijn emphasizes a
specific passage from the TIE:
Let us begin, therefore, from the first part of the Method, which is, as we have said, to
distinguish and separate true ideas from all other perceptions, and to restrain the mind
from confusing false, fictitious, and doubtful, ideas with true ones. It is my intention to
explain this fully here, so as to engage my Readers in the thought of a thing so necessary,
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and also because there are many who doubt even true ideas, from not attending to the
distinction between a true perception and all others.51
The problem of the vacillation of the mind is also directly related to the temporal sense in
which we consider our ideas. If we conceive our ideas in relation to the past or future, we fall
into more inadequate thinking for Spinoza, that is, we compare things to (and about) our duration
and doubt the necessary knowledge we are considering.52 On the other hand, if we conceive
things from a certain species of eternity (sub specie aeternitatus) and as expressions of laws of
Nature, then we can understand more adequately. This leads to the production of more adequate
ideas.53
Ideas of sense and their expression in words can be false or lead us to doubt, but they can
also be sources of inspiration, adequate explanation, and pleasure, particularly when combined
with ideas of reason. Errol Harris writes, “The greater part of human experience is confined to
what Spinoza calls imaginatio... In fact, the truth is already implicit in our imaginal ideas
because their positive content is in God, their causes are available to our kin, and their relations
to other ideas are not altogether hidden but can be developed by thinking in the right order.” 54
There are subtle differences regarding the nature and validity of experience as it pertains to true
knowledge. As Spinoza writes in the KV, opinion can be distinguished from experience in that
the latter can take up experimentation in order to discover more reasons for ways of
understanding. The former, by contrast, does not typically take up experimenting in order to
demonstrate what is thought to be known, and opinion is often the product of imaginative beliefs
based on the senses and conditioned by external causes.55
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Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology is also about modal modifications of substance (modes)
in the form of finite ideas and actions, including ideas conceived as actions. Note what Charles
Huenemann observes regarding Spinoza’s system of necessity in relation to ideas of the first kind
of knowledge: “...Spinoza's commentators agree that Spinoza thought all things were necessary,
in some sense... Commentators disagree, however, about the status of finite modes.” What is
important to reflect on is the logic involved in thinking about things that we feel as affections of
one's body only, as Spinoza notes in E2p28 for example. To reflect on only our affections and
not understand the underlying structure and causes of our affects is to have only partial
knowledge. It is also problematic to think about things only in relation to our own ideas, as is
evident throughout Book Two of the Ethics. We should think of things in their differences and
agreements as they are internally determined and as they are understood in relation to Nature as
the immanent cause of all things. These are two separate processes of thought which can run
parallel to each other, yet that can also work in conjunction with each other. These cognitive
processes involve a high level of reflective awareness and rational capacities to compare sets of
ideas between types of knowledge. In this way we can experience joy that accompanies our
stronger imaginings.
In the Ethics we read that there is nothing in Nature that is truly contingent, although
there are degrees of contingency within the first kind of knowledge when understood modally.
For example, the degree of contingency is illustrated in the ways in which we can imagine
“particular things.”56 Because ideas can be conceived as types of knowledge and events (actions)
of conscious reflection, ideas of the imagination of finite individuals must be capable of being
conceived as necessary in some sense (because these ideas are an expression of Nature). In
addition, certain types of imaginative ideas can bring us great joy, combining with reason to
56
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create stronger bodies of knowledge and power. For Spinoza, what we can truly enjoy and feel in
the intellectual love of Nature and its laws while increasing our power to exist is based on the
ideas we imagine and rationally understand together. As we read in Book Two of the Ethics,
falsity involves the privation of knowledge, but all ideas conceived through the understanding of
or related to God as first cause and as self-causing are always true, and can exist in each of us
conceived as internally determined. In E2p36, Spinoza writes, “Inadequate and confused ideas
follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas.”57
Within our environment we are conscious of our striving, but with attention we can
become more reflective about the ability to embrace our power to exist with increasing joy and
energy beyond mere survival. In E3p9 Spinoza writes, “But since the mind (by 2p23) is
necessarily conscious of itself through ideas of the body's affections, the mind (by p7) is
conscious of its striving...”58 In 3p9 we continue to read about both rationally understood and
imaginative knowledge: “The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and also insofar
as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in being; it does so for an indefinite duration; and it
is conscious of this, its striving.”59 Spinoza defines “appetite” as the conscious consideration of
both our ideas and our bodily actions together (affects), and appetite is “nothing but the very
essence of man.”60 In one way, appetite can be defined as the mind being conscious of its
striving through its ideas. But in another way, Spinoza writes that appetite can also be “devoid of
reason.”61 If our appetite can be devoid of reason, then the adequate understanding of our
conatus must include elements in addition to defining it as appetite that incorporates the best
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ways to use both imaginative knowledge and reflective reasoning. Even so, this interpretation
does not contradict what we understand about Nature’s order (all expressions are ruled by laws
of Nature) but conforms to it in a certain way and as expressed by a certain disposition.62
Our sense of free will is also a product of the imagination, but Spinoza's system of
necessity does not eliminate the psychological experience of deliberation and personal freedom.
In fact, in the TP he writes that the strength of mind is “freedom of spirit.”63 As we will read in
the next three chapters and the conclusion of this thesis, if our sense of freedom of spirit arises
with an increasing strength of mind (understanding about how to combine idea types), then
learning how to enhance our series of ideas is the logical aim a creatively rational mind will
automatically have as an effect. The imagination plays a vital role in how we approach our sense
of free will. The real joy, though, is in rationally understanding that we are an expression of
Nature (God, substance), and that all of Nature is an expression of its own laws by necessity. Not
only do we experience joy on this level of understanding, but this joy is both a feeling and an
idea together (idea reflexiva). This is a feeling of being capable of a certain level of
understanding about Nature and one's perseverance.64 In other words, it is an affect where what
we are reflecting on is our increasing, rationally joyous conatus. As we will read in Chapter
Three and Four next, these reflexive affects exist according to the order of our adequate ideas
and are, therefore, virtuous: “Freedom, in fact, is virtue or perfection; so anything that signifies
weakness in man cannot be referred to his freedom.”65
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Spinoza understood that some individuals suffer from extreme conditions of the
imagination that decrease their power to exist and live well. As noted in E2p39c, the more
properties of things that are common to both oneself and other bodies, the more ideas we are
singularly capable of conceiving adequately as a result.66 If our mind takes on “another nature”
from what it is capable of, the mind does not lose its singular access to personal memories and
sense experiences. Yet, according to 4p39s, when we take on completely new ratios of increasing
motion and rest our old self no longer exists in any substantial sense. Spinoza writes, “But here it
should be noted that I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire
a different proportion of motion and rest to one another.”67 Later in the same proposition he
continues to explain that a human body which changes in these ways “[can] be changed into
another nature entirely different from its own.”68
Spinoza relies heavily on the principle of non-contradiction throughout the Ethics. For
him, there are real differences between logical contradictions, true opposition between relations,
and negative ontological determination. Each of these distinctions requires its own definition and
each is related to the inherent truth as common notions in different ways. They each maintain
their own distinct difference that cannot be collapsed into any of the other two. They can be held
as separate adequate concepts and each has a separate epistemological function. I return to the
necessity of these distinctions in chapters Three and Four, but for now what is important to
understand is that imaginative ideas (even if they are, in part, negations) are ways for the
attribute of thought of an eternally existing substance to express itself (in infinite ways).
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Imaginative ideas are not parts of substance but are modal modifications (modes) of the
attribute of thought according to its laws. Everything that can be said of Spinoza's monism is not
categorized as a part of the whole; it is understood as an expression of power and a degree or
ratio of motion and rest. This interpretation, noted extensively in Letter 32 written by Spinoza
and addressed to Henry Oldenburg of the Royal Society in England in 1665, includes our
understanding of how “the least possible opposition” exists between things in relation to each
other as to create a stronger force as one body together. 69 For Spinoza, difference is a part of
Nature and we use it to compare ideas that are in opposition to each other, but true negation is an
idea of the imagination (because substance as always in existence is an absolute affirmation).
This distinction is closely related to the ways in which we use words and form definitions, as
well as how we understand the productive uses of imaginative knowledge.
For ideas to be defined or understood as opposites does not also include those concepts
negating each other. The understanding of opposites and our ability to compare and contrast
ideas is necessary for the success of a logically deductive method, but the point is that if their
power were equal and they were truly opposites, they would cancel each other or negate their
own power. They would, as it were, be at a standstill. This capacity of recognition is also critical
to the ways in which we draw new associations, compare images, and re-arrange our descriptions
of things in order to enhance our capacities for thought and action. As Spinoza concludes in
Chapter Seven, Twelve, and Fourteen of the TTP, the ways in which we formulate our
descriptions of things is largely based on what we have both experienced and what we have
learned: “Words acquire a fixed meaning solely from their use...”70 The use of common terms
and definitions is a form of repetition. This is something which takes both understanding of how
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these practices shape reason and control our passions in conscious awareness, but also how such
repetition shapes our memory in the re-formulation of our habit(s) in action and thought in the
ontology of the everyday.
Certain imaginative ideas can have a different relation to ideas of reason depending on
the object of the adequate idea being reflected upon. Although opposites, imaginative ideas do
not contradict reason as much as they can overpower reason if the majority of our thoughts (our
mind as we are aware of it) are composed of more ideas of the first kind. It is interesting to
consider that which is known in the literature as passive or inadequate as being capable of
overpowering ideas of reason, but that is exactly why power and reason are two very different
concepts in Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. All things strive to exist or persist, even our ideas
regardless of type. In other words, there are moments reason and power can differ in definition.
Certain types of imaginative ideas are indispensable for enhancing the powers of reason.
In other words, the different kinds of knowledge are not necessarily in opposition to each other
in an equal way or they would cancel each other out. Imaginative ideas, although often “fleeting
and inconsistent,” are not strictly opposed to reason. They are just of a different kind of
knowledge. Our capacity to reason includes within its nature the rational ability to distinguish
between ideas of different kinds of knowledge. Something that is active moves with more speed
or intensity (and fluidity or more easily). That which is more passive (striving with less force)
decreases in its intensity in proportion to the increases in activity to the things it is in relation to
elsewhere. If two things are in relation to each other and one of them speeds up in its force, the
other may either also speed up because its relationship is enhanced or it might slow down as a
result if the relationship is between two things which are opposite. That is, the slowness or rest in
effect cannot be conceived as a negation of one thing over another. Rather, the relationship
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should be understood as a relation between two levels of intensity which separate functions
within their own type (in this case, within their own idea type) where one has more force and,
therefore, can move more readily. Therefore, as Beth Lord writes, negation “cannot be the basis
of agreement” with relations between things for Spinoza’s ontology or epistemology.
A finite individual in this system is defined by, in part, those interactions and relations to
other finite modes of thought and other finite bodies, in a way that is mediated, qua modal, yet
distinctly causal within each respective attribute. Moira Gatens writes, “Each individual body
exerts a causal force on others, and each is in turn constantly impinged on by others.” 71 We exist
as expressions of substance, and this can be adequately understood as patterns of ratios of
motion and rest and ideational powers that combine to create greater affects. We cannot
possibly conceive of the totality of all causes and effects that occur in a monist system such as
Spinoza’s that exists in the form of infinite combinations of expressions. Therefore, the rational
deduction is that we can conceive what applies to all of Nature in our own determinate way only,
that is, as witness to our singular associations, experiences of power, ideational force, and
patterns of action (motion and rest) if we are paying attention. As we will read in the next two
chapters, this is why human conscious reflection is a necessary element of correctly interpreting
Spinoza.
The Mechanics of Ideational Force as Imaginative Knowledge
There is a force between our thoughts, an actual intellectual power, although Spinoza
does not define this in the same manner as the motion of extension. In the attribute of thinking,
the effects of our ideas have the power to produce other ideas and associations between them,
including an increased awareness of the transition and intensity that is possible between ideas. In
reference to E2p13 L7s, Gatens writes:
71

Susan James, “The Power of Spinoza: Feminist Conjunctions,” Hypatia 15:2 (2000), 13.

72

On this model the human body is understood to be a relatively complex individual, made up
of a number of other bodies. The body’s identity cannot be viewed as a final or finished
product because it is a body whose constituent parts are in constant interchange with its
environment. The human body is radically open to its surroundings and can be composed,
recomposed, and decomposed by other bodies.72

Our ideas can also be compared, combined, and recomposed, just like the combinations
of motion and rest of our bodies in our actions and with other bodies. Fully comprehending all of
one’s imaginative ideas is impossible, but adequately comprehending the structures of how
imaginative ideas work and using this to one’s advantage is possible. In his introduction to the
recent anthology Spinoza Now, Dimitris Vardoulakis (in discussing the work of Warren Montag)
writes, “There is no independent space of reason that remains outside a causality that includes
the imagination and all the faults that characterize the human's mind and actions.” 73 The result is
that we cannot ever escape imaginative knowledge regardless of how well we use reason.
A more in depth analysis of Books Two and Three of the Ethics is required to understand
the mechanics of the first kind of knowledge. This is where Spinoza defines imaginative
knowledge in detail. Recall that he writes, “By body I understand a mode that in a certain and
determinate way expresses God's essence insofar as he is considered as an extended thing (see
1p25c).”74 All bodies express God’s essence, but only when understood as modal modifications
of substance. Our bodies express God's (Nature’s) essence in their own determinate manner.
There is no lack or negation in Nature’s necessary and continual existence. Therefore, our bodies
cannot be said to be acting teleologically in any way because substance is eternally perfect and
expresses itself according to its attributes of thought and extension (the only two attributes we
have access to). In addition, as noted above, a modal modification of substance cannot be
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adequately conceived as the essence of substance because it is conceived through something else,
namely, the attributes.
We can reflect on ideas as true in several different respects. Common notions are
universal truths that exist regardless of the existence of our bodies, yet the first idea of a human
mind is that it has a body. Therefore, imaginative knowledge can be understood as experienced
singularly in our own determinate but unique ways. An object of an idea can also be another
idea. Beth Lord writes, “Each idea in the infinite intellect is a true idea of some object (see IA6).
But it is not their correspondence to an object that makes ideas true...”75 They are already
eternally true ideas. Our adequate ideas are not representations of eternity, they are eternal,
necessary, and perfect. They express the eternal laws of Nature to varying degrees of power in
their own determinate ways. Learning about idea types enhances our capacities for reflective
awareness and our conatus. Stuart Hampshire writes:
I come to realize that all my knowledge of causes in the common order of Nature is to
some degree fragmented and partial, and that I concentrate irrationally on only a few
proximate causal factors. So a balance between the active and the passive in the mind
characterizes my empirical knowledge...which Spinoza characterizes as the level of
imagination. The laws of thought operating at this level are both the laws of logic and the
laws of the association of ideas, one pressing against the other...76
I will now turn to a more specific demonstration of the nature of imaginative knowledge
and how it can strengthen our capacity to reason. Realizing that I discuss the other two types of
knowledge in later chapters, it is still necessary to discuss reasoning and reflective awareness in
order to understand how imaginative knowledge shapes itself according to necessary laws.
Spinoza opens the Ethics with eight “metaphysical” definitions. What we later learn is
that we are to return to them after we finish all five books in order to more adequately
understand how important definitions operate to structure deductive logic. This too is an
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effective method of repetition and a place for adequate knowing to work on strengthening its
capacities. Many other demonstrations will be needed to prove their logical connections. This
will also aid the force of rationally comprehending the ways in which imaginative knowledge
works.
Recall that in E3p9 Spinoza defined the striving of all types of our knowledge as part of
our appetite and conatus, that this is also something we can be aware of and that occurs as an
“indefinite duration.” The idea of the “indefinite” is not the same as “indeterminate,” nor is it the
same as some limited sense of a contained whole. The consequence of duration being included in
striving to exist includes an element of the undetermined, and, therefore, of the possibility of a
novel arrangement which did not exist before as one acts. The structures for this possible novel
arrangement of ideas and actions are determined, they are expressions of the laws of thought and
extension, but the arrangement itself is undetermined until it is in action. The power to live well,
for example, will automatically enhance our power to survive, which, by necessity, will enhance
our imaginative capacities with more affirmative and creative force in conjunction with reason.
How else do we imagine possibilities that have never existed before?
The first place I find a significant need to rationally reflect on imaginative knowledge
occurs early in Book One of the Ethics in 1p8. This is missed in the secondary literature. In 1p8,
under the rubric of demonstrating how substance is infinite due to its self-causing and unlimited
essence, Spinoza writes that “confused” knowledge occurs when one cannot distinguish between
substance itself (attributes) and the modifications of substance (modes) in their singular ordering
of ideas.77 In other words, we instantly have confused, partial knowledge when we are not aware
that our conatus as increases or decreases in our power differ from that which is conceived as
only a modification in substance. In this proposition Spinoza starts, “Every substance is
77
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necessarily infinite.” We, along with everything else, are substance, therefore, we are also
infinite in some way. Yet, our personal, subjective affects cannot be conceived as infinite in the
exact same logical way. So, already at the start of the Ethics we are asked to consider the nature
of the imagination and its differences from common notions in their strength and possibilities.
One of Spinoza's more well-known deductions appears in this part of the Ethics when he
writes that “being finite is really, in part, a negation, and being infinite is an absolute affirmation
of the existence of some nature...”78 As we conceive more adequately (as our conatus increases),
we become closer to an absolute affirmation of our existence in its largest possible magnitude
and proportion of power. Modifications of substance include every event, every effect, every
intensity, every transition, and the myriad of infinite causal connections in all directions, but our
singular affects include the types of ideas we are aware of in consciousness.
In E1p8, Spinoza will include those ideas whose objects do not exist outside the intellect
and are in need of other, clearer concepts in order to be truly understood. But substance is
conceived through itself and does not need any other concept in order to exist. In other words,
depending on the object of our idea (substance or singular affects), the proper logical deductions
should follow respectively if one is thinking clearly and distinctly. Spinoza writes that this
confusion is one of the easiest ways to have partial knowledge, when we do not keep these two
separate categories of logical deductions clear in our direct awareness while contemplating new
ideas and experiences.
The deductions Spinoza draws from E1p8 will continue to play a major deductive role
throughout the Ethics and is why I feel we should pay close attention to his emphasis on
imaginative knowledge early in this work. The point is that we have to investigate and examine
how we apply “first causes,” and not only what they may be for our understanding. In other
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words, we need a method for reflecting on our ideas – included within that method must be the
awareness of how we distinguish between substance and its modifications. This is apparent as
early as 1p8. If we work through the Ethics from beginning to end, building deductively upon
what we understand, learning which methods to use that lead to certain knowledge, we will not
“fictitiously ascribe to substances the beginning which [we] see that natural things have...” 79 The
same is true for ascribing teleological ends to substance. Ascribing a beginning or end to all of
substance as the same kind as occur to our senses or as observed in Nature is an aspect of
imaginative knowledge. An eternal and perfect substance does not logically have a beginning or
an end. This was already noted earlier in the chapter, but deserves to be repeated as we proceed
further. We are not only expressions of finite modal modifications. We are also expressions of a
perfect, infinite substance.
As E1p8s proceeds, we learn that substance exists by necessity, which is the deductive
consequence of all propositions and definitions up to this point (especially E1p7) and can be
classified as a common notion, but only if we understand the proper order and method of
discovering first causes as the way to gain adequate knowledge and distinguish it from confused
ideas. One cannot adequately grasp the nature of human imaginative knowledge without first
understanding the difference between thinking about the nature of substance and modal
modifications, and some of the differences between rationality and causality. At times, Spinoza
will equate causes with reasons, such as within 1p7 and 1p8, and particularly in 1p11 which
reads, “But this reason, or cause, must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside
it.”80 Yet, to truly understand what Spinoza is deducing here, a difference between causal
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processes in Nature (Nature as a unified, eternal substance) and types of human ideas as
expressions of natural laws must be understood separately. If so, rationality and causality can
never be reduced to identical concepts. I return to the importance of this distinction and its
implications in Chapter Four. For now, we can keep our new order of ideas about types of
knowledge and the nature of substance in order so far. To search for and have confirmation from
only external causes in Nature will be part of empirical experience, and thus will include more
inadequate than adequate knowledge.
Working through Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology involves a proto-physics of force and
motion. What we acquire is a set of tools which become a method for better recognizing what
ideas we are affirming and/or denying. Considering we are looking for the least amount of
opposition between any two or more things so to enhance the overall power and force of the
collection of bodies (or ideas), we are looking for those actions and ideas which are affirmative
and can be combined. The effectiveness of our ideas is directly correlated with (proportional to)
our understanding of the laws of thought and extension, including either knowing or imagining
the causes of those effects. Spinoza emphasizes this deduction repeatedly throughout his works,
including later in 4p9 and p10, for example. A theory of subjectivity and conscious awareness is
necessary for truly understanding Spinoza's ontological and epistemological systems. Therefore,
there is a reading of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology that includes understanding imaginative
knowledge as an inescapable element of our affects in increasing or decreasing our conatus.
Some ideas, both imaginative and rational, are more perfect than others. 81 Furthermore,
some imaginative ideas about the affections of our bodies can be more perfect than others, such
as passionate joys that are understood by reason. Reasoning well is having adequate ideas (recall
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that our mind does not have ideas, it is ideas), and this can also include having adequate ideas
about the laws of thought both in memory and in its application. It includes being able to think
about our deductive chains of ideas and what they affirm or deny in association with types of
knowledge. The right method can enhance our rational capacities to access imaginative
knowledge in powerful ways that continue to give us joy and aid reasoning further. This level of
awareness can enhance the use of both the imagination and reason in ways that increase our
conatus. This includes a rational influence over our dispositions, habits, and ideas that we affirm.
This type of comprehension expresses perfection with more power, as is evident in the
logic of substance discussed in E1p17c: “From this it follows, first, that there is no cause, either
extrinsically or intrinsically, which prompts God to action, except the perfection of his nature.” 82
Notice the shift in the logic of causality here between an ontological reality and the ways in
which a finite mind can access such truths with their own laws of logic depending on which
series of ideas are strongest in the mind in proportion. Our essence has the capacity to increase
its power. In the Appendix to part 1 of the Ethics, we also read, “For the perfection of things is to
be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they
please or offend men's senses, or because they are of use to, or incompatible with, human
nature.”83 This particular aspect of Spinoza's ontological system can be demonstrated to be
intimately connected to the levels of power in our thinking as reflective awareness. Recall that at
the start of the Ethics substance is described as eternal and as perfect. All expressions of Nature
involve varying degrees of perfection to greater or lesser degrees and we are expressions of
Nature. Thus, perfecting our understanding is our only singular cause we can enact ideationally.
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We are expressing substance to its most power as we are capable, which one finite, modal
ratio of unified modifications can express. Spinoza reminds us of this continually. In E2p1 we
read: “For the more things a thinking being can think, the more reality, or perfection, we
conceive it to contain.”84 This applies to any thinking being, whether a finite human being or
God conceived as a thinking thing. We can singularly and collectively think and use more
powerful ideas and actions, arranging them in an affirmative, creative order in ways that enhance
not only our individual power to exist, but also for those around us. The transition to greater
perfection will, in the end, be understood as love, or the intellectual love of God (Nature). The
emphasis is on the order and arrangement of certain knowledge, and not on how many ideas we
can think at once in a spatial sense. As noted in E2p40, Spinoza is clear that having too many
images in one's mind at once can be a source of great confusion, especially if some of those ideas
have been contrary and appeared before in connection to one another inadequately (as evident in
3p14). It is not the quantity of ideas we can have, but the quality and power of arranging our
ideas according to certain common notions regarding the laws of a self-caused substance.
Although memories can be highly problematic, striving to recollect certain types of ideas can
also help us increase our power to exist. Spinoza writes in 3p13 about the importance of this
imaginative exercise, which is one of the most cited propositions in the Ethics.85 We learn that
we also strive to recollect only things that “exclude” the existence of other things that diminish
our power. The use of imaginative ideas in this respect is incredibly important.
Another early reference to the importance of imaginative knowledge occurs in 1p15.86
This proposition specifically discusses the difference between thinking about the concept of
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“quantity” as an imaginative idea as compared to thinking about “quantity” using reason.
Spinoza writes that all abstract thinking is part of imaginative knowledge. It is imaginative
knowledge because it is partially constructed and all properties of the thing being abstracted
about are not (or cannot be) known. The concept of “quantity,” which can be thought about as
either “one” or “many,” as a whole or as parts, is placed in direct relation to the concept of
substance in E1p15. When reason realizes this type of identity, the realization in our awareness is
using common notions (and not the imagination): “So if we attend to quantity as it is in the
imagination, which we do often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and
composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is a
substance, which happens with great difficulty, then...it will be found to be infinite, unique, and
indivisible.”87 Substance understood through the intellect is “everywhere the same” and it is
dynamic. Substance conceived through the imagination is separated into what it is to express
singular modes and is an abstract concept. This opening to the rest of the Ethics is one place
where the concept of modal distinction becomes apparent, as he claims that to think of things in
parts is to think of them as modally distinct. To think of things as parts is to use abstractions
because all is, in actuality, one, unified substance. To think of things modally, though, is helpful
because it includes the understanding that substance can “be affected in different ways” even
though it is “everywhere the same.”88 All finite ideas, for Spinoza, are modal modifications of
substance and so can be thought of as separate entities of their own which can combine to create
larger bodies of ideas. Yet, if so, then to adequately think about modes as distinct “things” is to
use the imagination and reason together while reflecting on different types of knowledge (as we
are doing right now in order to understand these deductions). To adequately conceive of our
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personal knowledge as expressing eternal common notions is to think of substance expressing
itself. I return to these conclusions throughout this thesis.
At this point, Spinoza illustrates his intention deductively through the use of an analogy
about water and water drops. To conceive of water as containing only parts (drops) is an aspect
of the imagination, and it is to miss that it is, in its unity and essence, one substance: “For insofar
as it is substance, it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, insofar as it is water, is
generated and corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted.”89
The distinction between types of knowledge we can have about the same thing is clear in this
example. To conceive the concept of a first cause of all of Nature adequately is to pair ideas
about one organic substance that is self-causing and eternal. Yet, to conceive of things as parts of
Nature is to understand these things as in relation with other things in Nature in a direct causal
manner. Nonetheless, imaginative knowledge is important because we do, at times, think about
water as simply water. I am refreshed when I drink a glass of water as a singular experience. We
can also gather a drop of water or many drops, but we cannot gather all of substance. Here is the
crux of the situation: once we have understood the difference between these factors, we can
encounter everything in relation to the adequate ideas about the laws of one whole, eternal,
perfect substance, instead of as distinct parts of substance. To conceive of modes of substance as
expressions to varying degrees of intensity of a unified whole (Nature) is to conceive both the
laws of the attributes and modal modifications more adequately. To think with more adequate
force, as we will read about in detail in the next two chapters, is to increase our power for action,
additional levels of comprehensive and affirmative imaginative and rational power.
The concepts of essence and existence play an important role in our adequately
understanding the difference between imaginative and rational ideas in similar ways. They
89
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involve our logical understanding of the difference between that which is created and that which
is generated, including new knowledge acquired, for example. The true causes of each will
depend on the order of ideas one is arranging. In other words, a cause cannot be truly conceived
without its effects for Spinoza, including first causes, although they are distinctly different
expressions with different definitions.90 We also cannot know anything with certainty without
knowing both the causes and identifying the effects of those causes as adequately (deductively)
as possible. In this way, as we will read about in Chapter Three, all effects “involve” their cause.
When a system is understood as immanent, a cause cannot logically be external to its effects. If
one substance is immanent, everything you can conceive adequately is an expression of it.
Substance is its own efficient cause, but all of substance can be understood as immanent. This is
its essence. Human essence is defined as desire (appetite with consciousness of this appetite), and
we increase our power to exist through understanding how the laws of motion, force, and power
occur. But, there are other ways in which our power to act is neither increased nor diminished.91
Spinoza wants us to understand that if we consider things using the concept of “creation,” then
we are relying on abstract, imaginative knowledge, but if conceived as expressions of an
immanent and eternal substance (which is its own efficient cause), then we are conceiving
adequate ideas.
Book Two of the Ethics proceeds with the consequences (effects) of the above deductive
common notions. The distinction drawn between parts and the whole continues to play a role in
our descriptions about how ideas and bodies interact with one another, both internal and external
to us. This practical way of understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology will alter as we
comprehend more about the whole of Nature. The end of 2p13 goes into detail about how we
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maintain our nature in its whole, in its homeostasis and conatus, while continually shifting
motions internal and external to us are interacting and influencing one another by
communicating their ratios of speed and rest. This is another place where I read Spinoza’s
system as a proto-physics of force. He demonstrates how “a composite individual can be affected
in many ways,” and yet “still preserve its nature.”92 This claim applies to both individuals (human
beings for example) and all of Nature, but in different, determinate ways. Understanding such
deductive conclusions about substance and its modal modifications is crucial for further
adequately comprehending that we are able to order our ideas as that which are conceived through
something else (as all modes are by necessity). There are other times when we are to order our
ideas based on the common notion of substance as self-caused and self-causing, and, therefore, is
the cause of all that is expressed by it as universally true and “prior in nature to its affections.”93
Spinoza focuses on how to better produce adequate chains of ideas, a topic I explore in depth in
the next two chapters. What is important for this chapter is realizing, as Spinoza writes, “And if
we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one
individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change to the whole
individual.”94
We continue to deductively learn at this point in the Ethics that the more ideas a thinking
thing can think (compare, contrast, and powerfully combine), the more perfection (reality) and
power one expresses: “The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the
more capable, the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways.”95 In this recognition (by
the laws of thought), along with what we have learned in 2p1, more will be produced, or rather,
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more ways of expression will be accessible to us. As each effect involves its cause, nonetheless,
our understanding of causality is not a linear one at this point. A linear concept of causality
would require temporality (time) as something other than what it is for Spinoza, which is a
concept of duration. Duration is a part of our imaginative knowledge because it involves being
directly related to the nature of modal modifications and not attributes in their laws. I return to
these distinctions in the next two chapters. To perceive one’s duration is to use the imagination,
but to conceive of the laws of thought as that which do not require finite temporality in order to
be true is an aspect of adequate thinking and an expression of that law.
Imaginative ideas, therefore, can be conceived as modes of expression if adequately
understood according to the right series of ideas about substance, its attributes which we have
access to (as the affections of substance), and its modal modifications. They are not entirely
reducible to representations, although there are elements that can be described as representational
within the imagination. The power of our affects is wholly dependent not only on our developed
adequate understanding, but also on our ability to imagine the cause of the effect (of the idea)
present in our awareness even when reason knows it is being imagined. This is a type of
“intellectual affection,” as Y. Yovel has explained in some of his writings. 96 Images are pictures,
representations of something else expressed in their own way, but imaginative knowledge is
defined as a way of knowing something, and not as merely an image. We can learn how to create
certain types of effects for any given cause if we can adequately identify the real cause of a given
event as God (or Nature, Substance), and also understand it as a modal modification when
identifying ourselves as internally determined on a singular level. Beth Lord writes:
The power of an affect also varies depending on whether we imagine its cause to be
present, future or past...and on whether we imagine it to be necessary, contingent or
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possible... The intensity of the affects is tied to the intensity of the images connected to
them: as things are more present to mind, we are more strongly affected by them; and as
their presence fades, the affects fade too.97
The power of joy and understanding we are rationally capable depends on having both adequate
chains of ideas about laws of Nature on a singular level (recognizable by both the imagination
and reason together) and common notions about universal truths (which apply to all of Nature).
This also includes imagining God (substance or nature) as the continual cause of all things in
their necessity through eternity, even though an actual image of such a thing is not possible. Joy
includes the affect of an awareness that our mind and body have increased in its natural power to
thrive, move, and think.
Some of our adequately understanding the laws of thought will lead, by necessity, to
stronger, affirmatively powerful imaginings which increase our power to exist. Although
imaginative knowledge is partial and of a distinctly singular nature, it’s laws are universal. In
E1p16 we read:
…the intellect infers from a given definition of any thing a number of properties that
really do follow necessarily from it (that is, from the very essence of the thing); and that
it infers more properties the more the definition of the thing expresses reality, that is, the
more reality the essence of the defined thing involves... From this it follows that God is
the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect.98
Spinoza repeatedly places the concepts of essence, existence, reality, definition, modal
modifications as expressions, and the infinite intellect together. One of the reasons he does this is
because his dynamic epistemology includes that knowledge is felt as part of our affects. The
more reality we understand, the more reality we express. The more reality we express, the more
power, joy, and motion we feel, have access to, and can generate in relations to others and all of
Nature. Beth Lord writes, “True knowledge as such has no power to overcome these affects; only
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insofar as that true knowledge is felt as an essential desire that is more powerful than other
affects will it be able to overcome them (P14).”99 Imaginative ideas can be rationally understood,
applied, and, therefore, felt with increasing power and joy. We feel knowledge, we are affected
by it (in conscious awareness and bodily).
In E1p28 and later in 2p13 and 2p16, we read again that each singular thing is determined
to motion or rest by another singular thing. In our increased understanding of the three kinds of
knowledge, we are singular subjects, equipped with individual, creative power in thought and
action. When Spinoza speaks of affects and dispositions, who is he referring to if not human
individuals? When he speaks about consciousness, he is discussing all animate things in their
degrees of varying expression, but we too are included in these varying degrees of expression in
our own determinate ways. Pebbles may be animated in this system, rocks can be said to have a
type of consciousness to some degree, that is, they are in relation and subject to their
environment and laws of Nature. Yet, they cannot be said to have thought in the same way we do
because we express human thinking according to the attribute of thought in our own determinate
ways. Therefore, such a system cannot be reduced to a pantheist definition only. That order of
our personal ideas is never fixed, but it does monitor its homeostasis and is influenced by the
proportion of idea types occurring. Piet Steenbakkers concludes:
The mind will try to imagine things which increase the body's power to act, and it will try
to avoid imagining things which diminish that power... The only way to control an
imagination is by directing it by means of other, stronger imaginations... That we are able
to do anything at all against the affects is an asset we owe to the imagination, more
particularly to the ability to combine imagination and reason.
The term used in the above reference of “directing” intimately involves the use of our rational
understanding about the laws of thought. The ordering is not the type of causality that includes a

Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics, 110. Lord’s reference here is to E4p14. She then writes, “Our feelings are the barometer
of the well-being that we desire to enhance.” That being said, affects cannot be defined as feelings or emotions.
99

87

one-to-one correspondence because imaginative ideas only produce other imaginative ideas. This
level of understanding is a type of rational force. The result (effect) of that force is the rearranging of imaginative knowledge where possible. It is not the re-arranging of all imaginative
knowledge (which would be impossible), but the rational awareness and conscious reflection on
certain types of ideas and associations placed together in ways which are already understood to
increase the power of both thought and action.
Missing from the dominant secondary scholarship are references to this type of rational
force, and how it works in conjunction with ideas of the imagination, especially in its effects as
increasing other capacities to think and to act with more force and joy. The conclusion is that
Spinoza scholarship cannot ignore an in-depth analysis of imaginative knowledge and its power
to strengthen reason. Not only can certain kinds of imaginative ideas aid reason, but they can
strengthen it. It is essential to demonstrate both the importance of the ordering of ideas and how
understanding these processes are pragmatic and beneficial. These new conditions automatically
lead to new possibilities of actions and combinations of action among a set or group of collective
ideas that carry more force. We can control, therefore, some of our imaginative knowledge to our
joyous benefit. Imaginative ideas are certainly not insignificant. Therefore, a theory of human
(singular) consciousness is also a necessary part of adequately understanding Spinoza’s system.
It becomes important to be able to compare opposite types of ideas because of this
awareness. This is accomplished by consciously noting not only our method of understanding,
but also which effects we are focusing on when re-arranging our ideas. The mechanics of
perspective become more important at this point. It is crucial that we learn how to recognize
what we are consciously aware of, particularly when we are experiencing a powerful external
cause. When we cause our own ideas, that is, when we conceive of ourselves as expressions of
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substance, and, therefore, as expressing an adequate cause, we effect our own actions and
perspective about our experiences; but we can only arrange or re-arrange our ideas if we are
consciously aware in reflection how various types of ideas are constructed and interact as laws
of Nature. It is not that the ideas are different, but only that they are in relation to each other in
ways which vary by their degree of force and type. The key is to reflect on the true cause(s) of
our increase or decrease in power. We cannot know all of the causes occurring in Nature that
affect us, but we can know the adequate (proximate) cause of our immediate ideas in our
reflective awareness and in relation to our affections (as affects). Spinoza notes, “So desire can
be defined as Appetite together with consciousness of the appetite.”100 Thus, desire, or conatus,
is appetite, but appetite needs the consciousness of our affections as affects – the consciousness
of our striving in body and mind together. The rational reconstruction and use of imaginative
knowledge in productive ways is part of our overall increase in rational understanding. In her
recent work, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, Hasana Sharp writes, “Power
(potentia) should be understood as the capacity, vitality, or 'force of existing' that belongs to
ideas as much as to bodies.”101 As we will read in the next two chapters, this definition of power
allows for a principle of conservation in Spinoza’s theory of human consciousness. 102
Spinoza makes the above reference to the ways we can increase our power clearer in
E3p7. As we increase our adequate understanding and motion or activity in extension, the
power we have to be affected and affect others is enhanced. In our enhanced striving we
recognize more of our own essence, that is, of some of the infinite ways in which substance can
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be expressed with power. Already noted in this chapter, in 3p9s we read, “The striving by which
each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.”103 As
we will read in Chapter Five of this thesis, the recognition and understanding of the essence of
singular things is the most powerful and joyous (intellectually enjoyable) kind of knowledge we
can achieve.
What is even more intriguing is that Spinoza relates the conclusion of the above
propositions to several others throughout the Ethics, including much later in E5p9, which he also
uses as support for 2p11 and 3p7. In all of these propositions, the message is clear. The more
adequate ideas we can have at once about the myriad of things that contribute to an event,
including its true first cause as substance with its fixed and eternal laws, the less we will be
affected in a “harmful” manner by any one event. This level of comprehension is not possible
without imaginative knowledge. E5p9 reads, “Next, because the mind's essence, that is, power
(by 3p7) consists only in thought (by 2p11), the mind is less acted on by an affect which
determines it to consider many things together than by an equally great affect which keeps the
mind engaged solely in considering one or a few objects.”104
The type of conceptual focus required to order one's idea types when thinking through
the connections between concepts and their varying power involves an increase in the body's
power to act in direct proportion with the power of thinking, habit, and reflection if thinking
adequately. To be aware of an idea in reflection, despite its truth or falsity in content, is,
nonetheless, real for the person experiencing it. Hasana Sharp writes, “The force of an idea is
experienced affectively, by the whole individual, such that Spinoza ultimately assimilates
judgment to affect. Affect is, therefore, not opposed to reason. Instead, reason names an active
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affect, an action (EVp3).”105 This experience includes having reflective ideas about other ideas
that we are learning or experiencing. In the TTP, Spinoza writes, “So when something in Nature
appears to us as ridiculous, absurd or evil, this is due to the fact that our knowledge is only
partial, that we are largely ignorant of the order and coherence of the whole of Nature and want
all things to be arranged to suit our reason.”106
This is an important insight that Spinoza was already ready for us to consider rationally
at the end of Book One of the Ethics. He asks us to consider our reliance on imaginative
knowledge when we believe that things in Nature were made for us. He observes:
The other notions are also nothing but modes of imagining, by which the
imagination is variously affected; and yet the ignorant consider them the chief
attributes of things, because as we have already said, they believe all things have
been made for their sake, and call a thing good or evil, sound or rotten and corrupt,
as they are affected by it... All of these things show sufficiently that each one has
judged things according to the disposition of his brain; or rather, has accepted
affections of the imagination as things... For although human bodies agree in many
things, they still differ in very many. And for that reason what seems good to one,
seems bad to another; what seems ordered to one, seems confused to another; what
seems pleasing to one, seems displeasing to another, and so on. ...men judge things
according to the disposition of their brain, and imagine, rather than understand
them... We see, therefore, that all the notions by which ordinary people are
accustomed to explain Nature are only modes of imagining, and do not indicate the
nature of anything, only the constitution of the imagination. 107

Because gaining knowledge, including learning about how reflexive knowledge enhances itself,
involves a radical conception of the singularity of conscious awareness, Steenbakkers writes,
“Subjectivity plays an important role in Spinoza's theory of the passions, too, viz. in the
insistence on the imaginatio...”108 Steenbakkers believes there is the concept of a human
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“subject” to be found in Spinoza's system. What we singularly strive to accomplish is not only
more rational thinking. It is also “'a new form...of appropriation' of one's imaginary life, a new
grasp of the peculiar force of ideas, the way that we live and have our being in 'the attribute' of
thought.”109 Recall that it is ok to imagine something that does not exist as long as we know we
are only imagining such a thing. This is not an error in reasoning if one is aware that they are
imagining. Therefore, in reference to the longer citation above, we imagine that there is order in
Nature and there are many good reasons why we need to imagine an ordered world, but reason
understands such singular uses of imaginative knowledge. It is not, in other words, an error that
decreases our power to exist if reason is aware of such imaginings as singular however false. It
is in this way also that one can access their imagination with rational force to create something
artistic, novel, etc.
Spinoza writes that we often prefer our imaginative ideas because they are easier to
maintain an awareness of, such as any given sense experience we decide to focus on which we
are having. Our senses as ordered ideas are partially constructed and this allows us to remember
only those aspects of our sense encounters that directly caused us some pleasure or pain. Yet, the
order of our ideas is the order of things as we know them. As there is no true order in Nature, it
is still apparent that we can learn to order our ideas according to those ideas which are rational,
joyous, affirmative, powerful, and contribute to our and others' power to exist because of how the
laws of Nature operate with necessity. We automatically increase our desire for more
understanding and affirmative, efficient, and creative action that benefits all of Nature.
When we become inclined to desire more true understanding of things, however complex,
we shift the types of pleasures we can experience (and the intensity of those pleasures), including
the intellectual love of Nature. Thus, we can alter the intensity of both our order of ideas and
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subsequently of our affects, if not regularly then at least more consistently in order to “learn the
true way of life and acquire a virtuous disposition.”110 This takes transformations from one using
their power to merely survive based on their appetites to using their power to enhance reason and
combine with others who are disposed to use reasoning more regularly. Affects can be conceived
as actions if the affects are ideas that can cause other ideas with more rational force. As
Genevieve Lloyd writes, “Spinoza's account of imagination...takes very seriously that level at
which all knowledge starts – that immediate awareness of what is happening to one's body. And
it's only on the basis of that that we get to the point of becoming rational. The level of
imagination is never transcended in Spinoza. It's always there as the base of knowledge, even
when knowledge becomes adequate.”111
Some scholars, such as Theo Verbeek, have recently written about how the mind can
perceive itself thinking. In order to recognize when one is relying on the common notions of
rationality without too easily transitioning to ideas of the first kind, one's mind must perceive
itself in reflection.112 Therefore, ideas of the imagination cannot be merely reduced to
descriptions as “perceptions” alone. Adequate ideas are immediately true in Spinoza's system,
that is, they are self-evidently known when comprehended. When we reflect on which kind of
knowledge we are relying on, we can understand which combination of types of knowledge work
with the most affirmative and powerful effects. This is a form of operational knowledge, which
is discussed in more depth in Chapter Five on intuitive knowledge.
We learn in E2p7 not only that “the order and connection of ideas is the order and
connection of things,” but that there are modes of thinking which must be conceived through
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other modes of thinking.113 This is one way reason can understand how to better recognize what
type of ideas are being relied on, how they are processed or associated, and how they are then
categorized. Although what a body can do is as important for Spinoza as what a mind can do, it
is again interesting to remind ourselves that “so long as things are considered as modes of
thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes, through
the attribute of thought alone.”114 Again, we see that this identification is important for truly
applying a method to thought construction, which guarantees an increase in our power to think
and act. To think about ideas or actions as only modes would be to try and conceive of the whole
of Nature (which is impossible), but to adequately understand our affects helps us distinguish
between types of knowledge we are relying on and what each type can tell us about the laws of
thought and extension. In other words, although thinking only about our modes of thought is
problematic in some ways, to understand more about our affects will, in turn, strengthen our
capacity to better recognize which type of knowledge we are relying on and how these ideas are
increasing or decreasing our conatus modally. Although the human mind may be understood as
“part of the infinite intellect,” to think of things in parts can be problematic, as noted above. This
includes thinking of every aspect of thought and extension in modal terms if modes are
conceived as singular ways of expressing substance as conceived through something else
(namely, the attributes), and not as expressions of substance directly. This is similar to the
problem of thinking about expressions of Nature in the form of duration.115
On Method and What a Body Can Do
I will spend the remaining pages of this chapter explaining exactly how my
interpretation is accurate by closely examining several more specific propositions of Spinoza’s
113

Spinoza, Ethics, 2p7: 35.
Ibid. 2p7s: 35.
115
Ibid. 2p11c: 39.
114

94

Ethics. The brief extension of this chapter is necessary due to the lack of scholarship on the
importance of imaginative knowledge in Spinoza’s system. For example, as we move from
E2p9 through 2p19, especially 2p12 (which the scholarship does tend to focus on), Spinoza asks
us to suspend judgment about some of the conclusions being drawn deductively until we
understand more about how the new propositions can be added to all of Book One. It is not the
kind of knowledge that will become immediately apparent to us, but will take the force of further
deductive proofs.
When we are learning we use memory, our senses, and language (all imaginative
knowledge). As Spinoza writes, we will not be capable of understanding adequate (“distinct”)
knowledge unless we first understand “adequately the nature of our body.”116 We are asked to
focus on a combination of our knowledge about the affections of our body, or, in other words,
we are asked to focus on our affects. E2p11 states, “The first thing which constitutes the actual
being of a human Mind is nothing but the idea of a singular thing which actually exists.”117 As
the mind is its ideas, the ordering of ideas will involve the intellect, but the ordering that occurs
as imaginative knowledge will also include the ordering of sensations, at least those we are
aware of. I delayed emphasizing this aspect of Book Two until now because of the importance
on method by Spinoza and how one cannot grasp what it is to order their sensations (affections)
until they first understand the ways in which the laws of the attribute of thought operate. The
rational ordering of our affects is possible the more we can reflect on the types of ideas we are
having and their relations to each other. In effect, we can enhance the power of our personal
affects.
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To understand ourselves and the laws of thought and extension is to understand Nature as
best we can, but this is a complex deductive move because, as Spinoza also writes, there is no
true order in Nature: “Since order does not exist outside the imagination, there is no such thing
as order in the universe.”118 Thus, if “the order and connection of ideas is the order and
connection of things,” and if true order does not exist outside the imagination and what adequate
thinking knows about the laws of thought, ideas of the first kind of knowledge, however partial,
are absolutely necessary for truly comprehending all of Spinoza’s ontology and epistemology.
Better understanding the structure of imaginative knowledge not only strengthens the
capacity to reason well, but it includes adequate knowledge about more natural phenomena.119
As mentioned briefly and will be explored in more depth in the next chapter, recall that it is not
enough to adequately understand the rule of proportion. It has to be applied well and with force.
When one applies such a rule with both imaginative and rational force is when we are truly
engaged in using what we know about such a law. This applies specifically to imaginative
knowledge because Spinoza asks us to imagine those things that increase our power even when
they are not present. As our affects are a combination of both thought and extension, what we are
trying to understand and apply with more force includes increasing our ratios of motion and rest
to our benefit, but also for others. In Chapter 7 of the TTP Spinoza writes, “Now in examining
natural phenomena we first of all try to discover those features that are the most universal and
common to the whole of Nature, to wit, motion-and-rest...”120 In other words, what we discover
are laws of physics (and no one man can change those).
There are passages like this throughout the TTP and they are consistent with what is
deduced in Book Two of the Ethics. If we are consciously reflecting on our affects then we can
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take other ideas about the structures of thought as the object of our reflections. In doing so,
because thought and extension run parallel to each other, to increase the power of thought
through understanding how our ideas operate is to increase the power of actions possible. These
levels of increase in the proto-physics of force add to our capacities for conscious reflection.
Beth Lord writes, “Self-consciousness increases with our bodily capabilities.”121 The result is an
element of proto-physics or chains of actions of force and motion within each respective attribute
that increases power for both, or what a body can do. The precise way to understand our
increase in power is by more easily recognizing with efficiency exactly what series of ideas we
are relying on, the cause of those ideas, the strength of imaginative ideas as compared to the ratio
of adequate conceptions, and what, in total, our resulting affects are. This is also the way affects
can transition to a more affirmative experience.
E2p13 is one of the longest propositions in all the Ethics, covering 5 pages for its
demonstration and explanation. I concentrate on it here because we learn that the human body
exists “as we sense it.” It is important to recognize that our power to exist increases when we are
aware of the true cause of the object of our ideas, which can include ourselves as an adequate
cause. A simple way to state this is that we experience the bodily and intellectual joys which
accompany thinking well and acting with more energy and vivacity for living as both a singular
and social being. As E2A4 notes, we feel that our bodies are or can be affected in multiple
ways. 122 Although they are related, to think about bodies is to think about modes of motion and
rest, speed and slowness, and not about substance. In other words, we enact imaginative
portioning when we focus on only bodies and not some of the common notions about the larger,
organic whole of which we are subject. Modes (even when understood as ideas) cannot be
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adequately understood on their own, such as that which is merely a deterministic modification of
substance, but must involve the concept of the attribute of which they are a part (and all the other
dimensions of attributes being logically true that this involves). This particular aspect of
Spinoza's argument is important. The argument demonstrates that the affections of bodies can be
understood as ratios of motion and rest that can be ordered by understanding the laws of
proportion. By contrast, when we comprehend the first cause of Nature as a whole (substance as
self-caused in its essence of existing), we are to think of the definition of substance understood
through the attribute of thought alone and proceed accordingly. In other words, to achieve the
latter we are to adequately comprehend the laws of thought as an expression of one substance,
but to adequately understand ideas as modal expressions of substance is to include our singular
ways of imagining what can increase our power to exist with more force (according to what we
have access to personally). Again, in 2p49 we read:
In the mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea
involves insofar as it is an idea... So a false idea, insofar as it is false, does not involve
certainty. When we say that a man rests in false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do
not, on that account, say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he
rests in false ideas because there are no causes to bring it about that his imagination
wavers... For by certainty we understand something positive... I begin, therefore, by
warning my readers, first, to distinguish accurately between an idea, or concept, of the
mind, and the images of things which we imagine. And then it is necessary to distinguish
between ideas and the words by which we signify things. ...an idea, insofar as it is an
idea, involves an affirmation or negation... [We] will then understand clearly that an idea
(since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in words.
For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by corporeal motions, which
do not at all involve the concept of thought. ...we perceive that one idea has more reality,
or perfection, than another...123
Certainty is always an absolute affirmation. The above quotation is used only to demonstrate
that when we are relying on a series of false ideas without doubting such ideas, we are
relying on ideas that are in no way adequate knowledge. Nonetheless, such ideas can become
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so strong as to overpower reason. The point is that images are not concepts that we can rely
on like we do with concepts as common notions with certainty. For example, we cannot
imagine eternal substance as an image, but we can understand such a concept in a rational
deduction. In Letter 17 of his correspondence Spinoza also describes images as “effects” of
imaginative knowledge. 124 To adequately understand effects is something entirely different,
at times, from what it is to adequately conceive of causes. Imaginative knowledge can add to
our greater perfection when reason better recognizes these distinctions and the laws of
thought and uses the imagination to its benefit.
Laws of Nature are today classified as forces and, thus, as properties of physics. As an
expression of substance in our own unique combination, what we express is the whole of Nature
by being subject to its laws, though we do this according to our own varying degrees of ideational
and bodily power. The emphasis on the motion and rest between and within bodies is crucial. The
way to increase our power in action is to understand how that power of action can be increased
as a law of Nature. This understanding can produce more adequate ideas, which, in turn,
simultaneously produces more powerful actions. As Spinoza notes, a body in motion stays in
motion unless it is determined by another body to rest or to slow in its own motion. This is
demonstrated in E2p13 L3c and occurs in history well before Issac Newton ever stated the same
formula.125 But, as an external type of description of what occurs between two or more bodies
that causally come into contact with one another, it is not a description of material substances. It
is not a description about matter. Consider what is written earlier in 2p13 on what is true about a
human body as it is applied to ideas: “For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of
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which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human body. And so, whatever
we have said of the idea of the human body must also be said of the idea of anything.”126
When we speak about proportion and laws of Nature, it is not the “quantity” of ideas that
is important, but the power of our thinking and how our adequate understanding can enhance our
capability for powerfully rational and creative thought patterns. In addition, as explained in
E2p16, what we perceive includes many external bodies and their motions simultaneously with
our own ideas and motions of speed and rest.127 In the next two propositions of Book Two, in a
lucid moment of what is now considered early neuroscience, Spinoza deduces that when a mind
and body (in their more fluid aspects) have been influenced by other bodies, the mind will retain
this impression in its memory.128 When the body acts in the same way as it once did (when it was
affected by something that left such an impression), the mind will have an idea of the thing that
affected it as present to it. It is not “present” in the sense that the actual thing that affected us is
truly present before us. It is present in the sense that the mind drew an association of the thing as
it affected us in the form of an idea as an affect. It is the affect that leaves an impression.
This type of regular occurrence is what Spinoza calls an “image” in E2p17s and p18s,
one that is retained in the mind.129 The reason I did not mention this sooner is that Spinoza wants
us to work through the logical deductions of the Ethics up to this point before we actually try to
understand what a finite, human image in the mind might actually be. The more the mind thinks
clearly about laws of Nature that are universal and thus outside of concepts of time, the more it
will have stronger affects which are based in rationality and can overcome other weaker affects,
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which are based on past memories, future fantasies, and present dispositions (all a part of
imaginative knowledge).
E2p40 is considered the most famous proposition about the three types of knowledge
described in Spinoza’s system. I reference it in more depth in the last pages of this chapter
because the deductions prior to this proposition are important for truly understanding the import
of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology (or he would have written about them sooner). In 2p40, we
learn about the three kinds of knowledge we can have, but also about more specifics in how we
error in thought. We can make errors in reasoning if we are: 1) not aware of the laws of thought;
2) not aware of the true causes of the object of our ideas; 3) overcome by stronger passive
notions or sense experiencing without realizing that we are overcome, all of which continually
reduces our power to thrive.
This problem is demonstrated more forcefully in 2p17s: “...the affections of the human
body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things, though
they do not reproduce the [external] figures of things. And when the mind regards bodies in this
way, we shall say that it imagines.”130 Note that our images “do not reproduce” what we sense,
that is, they do not represent what we sense exactly, but are combined with singular, personal
memories and other ideas. This would mean that every person’s images of things must be
different to some extent in how they are experienced on a singular level. What is striking is in
what follows next. As our personal imaginings and remembered images do not “reproduce the
[external] figures of things,” it is clear that imaginative knowledge cannot be said to lack
anything. Further, recall that to understand something as a lack is to understand it negatively, but
to understand something as partial is to have at least some real knowledge.
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Some of these images tell us how we are affected by external things and how we then
combine what affects us with past memories and language (meaning). It is within our power to
imagine those things that we know will increase our conatus. This is the point of learning how to
use a forceful method when reflecting on idea types. The activity of the imagination involves
memory directly. As Steenbakkers writes, “In order to remember something, we must be able to
imagine it, to think of it as present to us even if it does not exist any longer. The link we thus
establish between ideas is not determined by the things themselves, but reflects the way our body
has been affected by earlier experiences.”131 In addition, notice that to imagine something which
one knows is not present any longer while understanding the laws of thought is to use reason to
help strengthen more helpful imaginative knowledge by proportion and patterning. It is to
knowingly have a false impression that is, nonetheless, creating and contributing to real affects
for a singular body and mind.
The implications of this set of propositions in Book Two of the Ethics are great. The
links we establish between types of ideas can be re-arranged to better pattern what we know to
be true about the laws of thought and extension. As a result, as an effect of such increased use
of certain kinds of imaginative knowledge, reason can enhance our understanding of the
capacity of our mind and body, increasing the power and creativity of both kinds of
knowledge. We can combine both ideas of the imagination and of reason with more force, but
what we desire by understanding the laws of thought is to increase our adequate chains of
common notions. This is clear when Spinoza writes next that “the mind does not err from the
fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea which excludes the
existence of those things which it imagines to be present to it. For if the mind, while it
imagined nonexistent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those did not exist, it
131
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would, of course, attribute this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature, not a vice...”132 Our
power to use imaginative ideas well can become a virtue! Steenbakkers writes, “The
imagination is a power (and hence a virtue) in itself, since it is an expression of God's
[Nature's] power.”133 If we cannot better recognize which type of knowledge we are more
heavily relying on we are stuck within what Spinoza calls a vice. To pattern our reflective
thoughts on the real causes of our ideas, which are the laws of thought and how to manipulate
them to our benefit, is to increase our capacity for thinking and acting with more power.
The effects of this level of understanding includes that the imagination itself can
override ideas which decrease our power to exist by imagining those things which we know
will increase our power to exist. Even though we are imagining fictions, reason recognizes the
patterning of ideas that the imagination is capable of as a force that can enhance its own
capacities. Steenbakkers concludes:
...all the imaginations the mind is subject to are not at odds with the truth, nor are they
dispelled by the appearance of the truth. The ethical perspective here is that
imaginations that make us suffer cannot be cured simply by confronting the real state of
affairs: they require something that excludes their presence in the mind. This may well
be another [stronger] imagination.134
Knowing the truth is not enough to override powerful imaginative ideas, although it is a great
start. What we can do is put our rational knowledge of the processes of the first kind of
knowledge into action, creating stronger, more affirmative imaginings which benefit us. In
understanding how imaginative knowledge is formed and influences us, we can better order and
arrange the ideas our mind reflects on, produces, and associates. This is not an act of free will
because all of thought and extension operates according to fixed and necessary laws. The key is
understanding how to manipulate those laws to our benefit and, therefore, the benefit of all of
132
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Nature. In 2p18s we read, “From this we clearly [i.e. adequately] understand what memory is.
For it is nothing other than a certain connection of ideas involving the nature of things which are
outside the human body – a connection which is in the mind according to the order and
connection of affections of the human body.”135 Steenbakkers concludes, “The originality
resides not in the link as such [between imagination and memory], but in [Spinoza's] view of the
imagination as a concatenation of ideas reflecting an identical concatenation of corporeal
affections.”136
In E2p21 Spinoza concludes that the mind and the body “are one and the same
individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of
extension. So the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is
conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought.”137 Brain processes are an
expression of the attribute of extension. The combination of thought and extension come
together in our affects. It is important for us to keep these series of adequate ideas about
thought and extension readily apparent to our memory. The form of an idea in its associations
with other ideas that have caused it is significant when understanding the idea as a mode or
modification of substance. But when the mind is conceived as an idea that God is having as a
thinking thing, the way we think about our ideas alters. This alteration includes how we
conceive of imaginative ideas and their power as well.
By the time we deductively reach E2p22, a proposition that includes more detail about
the nature of affects, we also realize that theories of representation about Spinoza’s
epistemology will not suffice. I take up the exact reasons why in Chapter Four. One reason,
though, is because the adequate understanding of the causes of our ideas and the nature of our
135
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attributes as expressions of substance places together both ontology and epistemology for
Spinoza in a way that cannot be separated. Yet, this system can still include a theory of human
consciousness as well. Our series of adequate ideas that include God (substance) as the cause
deductively, proximally or otherwise, cannot be explained or reduced to categories about
bodily affections alone. Theories of representation which claim Spinoza’s epistemology is
about having ideas that are representations of bodily affections will, therefore, not be accurate
enough. Spinoza is clear about why this is the case from 2p22 onward. In 2p23 we learn that
the mind's ideas “involve” the nature of the body, but due to the identity of substance, the
affections of the body agree with the nature of the mind as one and the same thing: “So
knowledge of these ideas will necessarily involve knowledge of the mind. But (by P22)
knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself. Therefore, the human mind, to that extent
only, knows itself...”138 In other words, anything which is adequately understood as the same
thing cannot include a theory of representation between two things.
The use of deductive reasoning allows us to increase the force of our adequate thinking,
including about the laws of thought. Spinoza clarifies this in 2p25 through 2p29 next, as well
as in 2p40. As noted above, the method and informed order of our reflections becomes very
important, particularly because the ideas we have of our affections do not “involve adequate
knowledge of the human body itself.”139 I discuss this aspect of adequate knowledge in
Chapter Three next, but what we are learning is that we cannot have complete adequate
knowledge of our body because that kind of more scientific knowledge would include being
aware of all the actual physical processes and operations internal to us. Again, we can only be
aware of our affects. This may seem confusing at first, which is why we need to track the order
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of what we have understood thus far in its deductive force. Simply stated, an epistemic agent
does not have complete knowledge about every one of the multitude of interactions occurring
in the body that are in conjunction with all other parts which constitute one singular organism.
How we order our affects will include what we have already adequately understood about the
causes of our ideas, the laws of thought, and the power of expression of both thought and
extension together as one unified force. This is a combination of continually shifting affections
of which I have ideas that I can re-arrange or re-order to create more affirmatively powerful,
useful, and joyous affects. Yet, such understanding can be used to manipulate singular,
imaginative ideas in ways that can create stronger imaginings that aid reason further. As Pierre
Macherey also writes, the “privation of knowledge” is not something negative, “to the
contrary…it cannot be constituted except in relation to knowledge, for which it is a 'mode.' The
inadequate idea is an incomplete idea, to the extent that we cannot grasp it except by mutilating
it. In itself, in God, it is adequate, but by understanding it in a partial manner, we are prevented
from perceiving the necessity within it...”140 This is also what makes it distinctly one’s own, the
singularity of its particular partiality.
E2p40 is considered one of the most important propositions about Spinoza’s version of
epistemology, as noted above, and we have been building to it deductively using a specific type
of deductive method.141 I would like to conclude by examining a few other propositions that
lead to 2p40. The focus of the propositions leading to E2p40, including E2p36, often discuss
the nature of confusion. Our daily lives are continuously affected by imaginative knowledge,
thus confused and fragmented ideas are a regular part of the ontology of the everyday. If we
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only take into consideration our own ideas without understanding the laws of thought and
extension (as adequate knowledge which can be applied to all minds), we will remain
confused. It is to our benefit to combine ideas with others who are also thinking rationally. We
must both understand what it is to be an expression of a self-causing substance and what it is
for our ideas to be affected by other ideas in a singular way. The more we surround ourselves
with others who understand this, the stronger we are as a group (of ideas, of actions, etc.). It is
of the most importance that we learn how to recognize the difference between being affected
by external causes or becoming the adequate cause of our own series of ideas and, therefore,
affects. This is a heightened level of conscious awareness that is capable of rationally reflecting
back on the types of knowledge one is relying on and the causes of that knowledge. This is not
an act of free will. It is the necessary result of understanding how the laws of thought work. In
other words, the newly strengthened capacity to reflect on what types of knowledge we are
relying on more heavily and why is an act of adequate, rational knowing and the power of the
second kind of knowledge. E2p29s makes this clearer:
I say expressly that the mind has, not an adequate, but only a confused knowledge, of
itself, of its own body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the
common order of Nature, that is, so long as it is determined externally, from fortuitous
encounters with things, to regard this or that, and not so long as it is determined
internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, to understand their
agreements, differences, and oppositions. For so often as it is disposed internally, in this
or another way, then it regards things clearly and distinctly...142
What becomes interesting is tracking exactly where Spinoza references imaginative
knowledge for the rest of the Ethics. By the time we get to 2p40s2 defining the three types of
knowledge specifically, Spinoza focuses on what deductive force (as a real force in Nature) can
do for increasing the power of rational thinking up to that point. Citing Euclid again (although
this time in a positive manner), Spinoza’s emphasis is on what can be understood about “the
142
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common property of proportionals.”143 We can be aware of what the law or rule of proportion
is, but we can also be capable of applying it immediately to our various series of ideas and
different types of knowledge. Naturally, it is helpful if we can to do this easily so to more
efficiently regulate the proportion and magnitude of idea types we are directly aware of and
relying on.
Coupled with 2p43, we learn about a more nuanced difference between a method of
reason that is immediate and one which only mimicks reason. If we employ “the proper order
of philosophizing,” we cannot doubt a true idea when we have one, but we need to know what
the proper order of causes are first:
And so he who has an adequate idea, or (by p34) who knows a thing truly, must at the
same time have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge... For no
one who has a true idea is unaware that it is a true idea other than knowing a thing
perfectly, or in the best way. And of course no one can doubt this unless he thinks that
an idea is something mute, like a picture on a tablet, and not a mode of thinking,
namely, the very [act of] understanding.144
Ideas are not mute, they are not pictures, they are modes of thinking, actions of understanding.
This is the specific emphasis of Chapters Three and Four next.
It is not that an idea must agree with its object, but that we understand how ideas can be
conceived as modes of thinking which are intrinsically determined according to the type of
knowledge they are. This level of recognition (conscious reflection) has nothing to do with free
will. As Book Two moves into Book Three of the Ethics, from the nature of the mind to the
nature of the affects, what we are focusing on is not the body as much as on the associations we
draw between series of ideas, and in ways in which we realize that we are not freely
associating ideas either. This is not possible unless a singular individual is aware that they are
consciously reflecting on the order and type of ideas they are having (i.e. of their own power of
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understanding). As noted above, the ability to be able to suspend judgment until more
knowledge is gained is important. Spinoza writes, “For when we say that someone suspends
judgment, we are saying nothing but that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately.
Suspension of judgment, therefore, is really a perception, not [an act] of free will.”145 Rational
adequate knowledge includes knowing when to suspend judgment even though one might be
experiencing strong imaginative ideas and images which leave impressions.
The recognition of such importance is adequate knowledge about the attribute of
thought which creates an affect of joy and understanding. The suspension is an affirmative
action for the mind while recognizing that it is relying on the imagination, something otherwise
considered to be passive and inadequate. Spinoza writes, “The affects...considered in
themselves, follow with the same necessity and force of Nature as the other singular things.
And therefore they acknowledge certain causes, through which they are understood, and have
certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, by the mere
contemplation of which we are pleased.”146
I spent a good deal of time discussing Book Two of the Ethics in this chapter because
of its importance for adequately understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. I end with an
emphasis on Book Three because of how often Spinoza references the opening eleven
propositions of Book Two in order to support his next deductive moves in Book Three. As we
will read in the next chapters, understanding Book Five and intuitive knowledge is also not
possible without pairing it with Book Two specifically.
E3p2s, for example, draws on the connection between ideas (their associations or
connections), as well as the order in which we understand anything in Nature. What we learn
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next is that the ontological collapses within the epistemological. God is conceived as the
adequate cause of the effects of God as a thinking thing (under the attribute of thought). We
can then understand ourselves as a proximate cause in this respect, but also as an adequate
cause if we understand the laws of thought and extension (which together create singular
affects) and how to order our ideas with more force. The discussion turns to what it is to
conceive of oneself as an adequate cause because we can then understand how adequate
thinking can produce more and more powerful effects (ideas as actions which also become
effects). As a result, an adequate idea can be understood as both a cause and as an effect
depending on in what order of ideas about the causes of the knowledge one is consciously
reflecting on.
The result (effect), to which I have been building in this chapter, of this level of
understanding is striking. Our affects can be conceived as actions if the affections of our bodies
are understood as the effects of our understanding being conceived (and thus operating) as an
adequate cause of its own ideas. This is not a causal effect between mind and body as there is a
causal barrier between attributes (each one is still of the same substance). In order to fully
grasp the power of this conclusion and action of understanding we will have to go into more
depth about the structure of common notions and the affects in the next two chapters. What is
important to start to understand is that rationality needs certain elements of imaginative
knowledge in order to strengthen itself and cause more intellectual joy, and that this process is
intimately related to the power of our affects and overall conatus. In this way, Book Three is
directly connected to Book Five of the Ethics and not only Books One and Two. The
intellectual love of God (or Nature) causes us to strive to exist with more power and with an
enhanced capacity to use both reason and the imagination with a stronger combined force. This
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is why I continually emphasize that Spinoza’s epistemology is a type of proto-physics of force
and motion. This level of awareness involves the “art of thinking” as it is more rationally
construed:
All of these things, indeed, show clearly that both the decision of the mind and the
appetite and the determination of the body by nature exist together – or rather are one
and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is considered under, and explained
through, the attribute of thought, and which we call a determination when it is
considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and
rest.147
Piet Steenbakkers concludes that the power of the imagination in its affirmative
capacities is directly proportional to an increase in our understanding; the more we understand
about our affects, affections, and the power of the three types of knowledge, the more we use
them to produce more understanding, joy, motivation, love, and pleasure as powerfully
combined affects. Our power to act depends on our body's complexity, yet what this is remains
nothing other than “reason's capacity of knowledge and action;” and, as it increases, so too
does “the power of the imagination.”148 The conclusion is that understanding the laws of
thought will automatically produce a series of effects that include a more active use of both
imaginative and rational knowledge together. This includes our understanding the attribute of
extension as well.149
When the force of rationality increases in its ability to understand the true causes of any
one encounter, the body's complexity increases because the options available are clearer and
more diverse. We comprehend ourselves as an adequate cause. By E3p53, Spinoza begins to
directly and regularly identify ideas of the imagination with our power to act. He writes, “When
the mind considers itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and does so the more, the more
147
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distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.”150 Ideas of the first kind (our partial,
inadequate ideas) can be the very source of our joy when we imagine our power of acting and
what it would take to increase our power of acting.
As affects “always operate through the medium of the imagination,” then, as noted in
E3p37, the desire that results from our joys or from our love will be greater in proportion to
how strong the affect is.151 Affects are not special kinds of ideas. Affects are felt affections of
the body and ideas of the mind in awareness that cause impressions or move us in certain
directions. True joy increases our power of acting. Joy, as an element of a powerful affect, is
directly related to ideas of the imagination. What brings us joy can result from learning how
joy is created, and the variety of types of true joys that exist and increase our power to exist.
Imagining what brings us joy must involve a transition to a reliance on ideas of reason if we
are to understand the true causes of our joy and of Nature. These transitions between idea
types can only be recognized by a singular mind in conscious reflection, including with the
awareness and knowledge of what the three different types of knowledge that we can have are.
They are also what can motivate us, give us energy, and, therefore, can be conceived as a type
of physical and ideational force.
According to E3p37, when we experience great joy, we desire to preserve it. Virtue, as
we will read about next, is also identified with both reason and power (as identical) in
Spinoza’s system. This level of understanding is applied knowledge about how to use ideas of
the first kind of knowledge with more affirmative and effective force. “An affect will be
stronger if we imagine its cause to be present than if we imagine it to be absent...an affect will
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be more intense if we imagine its object to be possible rather than contingent.”152 The use of
imaginative knowledge for strengthening a positive affect is, therefore, critical.
Each of us has a personal lens through which we filter everything. The importance of
imaginative knowledge as Spinoza defines it adds to our learning about the richness and
variety of human experience, even while understanding that we are driven by laws of Nature.
Spinoza's ontological formulations may not allow for a complete theory of subjectivity or
consciousness that would satisfy everyone in philosophy, psychology, and science, but his
epistemological foundations do allow for what it is to be a singular individual with reflective
awareness and a unique perspective. The fact that we need other ideas and other bodies in order
to both survive and to thrive does not eliminate the reality of singular conscious experience in
Spinoza’s system. How else can one understand or imagine themselves as the adequate cause
of their ideas and actions? How else can one rationally suspend judgment while knowingly
relying on better imaginative ideas until more adequate knowledge is acquired?
As we read in E3p5, we learn that it is impossible for two things that are equally
powerful yet contrary to each other to co-exist.153 Similar to the laws of physics, if one thing is
more powerful than another it will be able to overpower it. The same is true for types of ideas, as
well as the proportion and magnitude of ideas in association with the affects they are a part of. If
they were equally contrary, they would destroy or cancel each other out. In the same way, one
affect must be more powerful than another for it to take over in force. Spinoza writes, “If two
contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change will have to occur, either in both of
them, or in only one, until they cease to be contrary.”154 This is also in line with what was
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noted earlier that two things in relation with each other will look for the “least possible
resistance.”
The question remains: How exactly are mental events efficacious without causally
interacting with, nor being able to be reduced to, their biological or physical counterparts in
explanation? Put bluntly, does Spinoza's epistemology account for how one's ideas transition
exactly, through reflective awareness but without free will, from a passive state into an active
one? As Theo Verbeek writes, “...the author of the Ethics cannot but see the notion of truth and
reason as part of a psychological and genetic theory of mind.”155 But I wonder if we are asking
the wrong question? That is, if imaginative ideas only produce other imaginative ideas, then
asking what the underlying mechanics of the transition between types of knowledge are is an
impossible and illogical question. When Spinoza speaks of transition, as we will read in the
next chapters, he speaks about transformations from lesser to greater perfection. When this
occurs, if it is significant, our old “self” dies and a new combination and expression of ideas
and motion occurs.
One of the only ways to enhance our affects and increase our power of thought and
action is to understand how the laws of thought and extension operate (so to be capable of
better identifying the true causes of our ideas). When we conceive of ourselves as the adequate
cause of our transitions to greater power, we experience great joy and understanding about
laws of Nature and ourselves as more powerful expressions of those laws. This is what it
means to become free from bondage for Spinoza. In an interview with Susan James, Moira
Gatens concludes, “And if you take the view, as I do here, that for Spinoza subjectivity is
always a becoming, and the identity of an individual is always a process which is in turn very
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much affected by the context in which the individual becomes, then that sort of base-line
political theory...allows a possibility for the development of reason and freedom.”156
We are determinate modes of existence, but I do not believe we can categorize this
determination as a determinate mode of “objective” substance in any sense, which will be
explained in more detail in Chapter Three. Ideas of the imagination are not opposite those of
reason and intuition; they are just different from them in kind, and need to be understood using
their own relations to logic that differ from the way we understand the logic of ideas of reason.
As Pierre Macherey writes, “To represent reality through the imagination and to know it
adequately are two entirely different things. And yet, even in an imaginary representation...there
must be something adequate, something true.”157 Moira Gatens and Genevive Lloyd conclude:
Imagination thus has for Spinoza a powerful ontological dimension – a direct and strong
contact with bodily reality. On the other hand, Spinoza's version of the imagination
involves an equally strong emphasis on the reality of the mental... The figments of the
imagination are just as real – just as appropriate as objects of systematic investigation –
as the modifications of matter.158
This is a political and social consideration, and not only an epistemological or ontological one,
because to increase our power to exist is to increase the power to exist of others: “The idea of
any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body's power of acting, increases or
diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind's power of thinking.”159 This applies to all human beings.
Our environment cannot limit the ways in which we imagine ourselves as free, nor can it
limit the ways in which we try to understand any given situation as an effect of a law of Nature,
nor the creative ways in which we find to live and tolerate any given circumstance through
acquiring more adequate knowledge of natural phenomena. These are deeply existential
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insights. In this way, we are transformed.160 Spinoza certainly understood how to tolerate the
limited and punishing circumstances during his lifetime in various creative, intelligent, and
joyous ways. Next, I explore the mechanics of the second kind of knowledge we can have,
rational common notions, in Chapter Three, and how this level of knowledge cannot be reduced
to an epistemological theory of representation in Chapter Four. What we will learn is that
Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology is about the understanding and development of human affects.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POWER OF STRIVING FOR CONTINUOUS UNDERSTANDING

“What distinguishes imaginary representation from true knowledge? It is the point of
view from which this knowledge originates, and with it our mode of knowledge.”
-Pierre Macherey
“Learning to think provides necessary if not sufficient conditions for being genuinely
virtuous; for learning to be a person. Learning to be a person is intimately bound to the idea of
self-reflection, moral agency and responsibility. The test of a decent moralist…as of a decent
scientist, is that she recognizes that her knowledge is incomplete, her theories tentative, and yet
does not despair.”
-Gillian Howie

The Force of Adequate Understanding as a Law of Nature
There is nothing static about Spinoza’s philosophy. To think and act with force, creative
efficiency, and continuous understanding while using both imaginative and rational ideas is, for
Spinoza, immanently dynamic. To adequately understand how to use our ideas and actions
with increased rational force is to experience the infinite enjoyment of existence. As Stuart
Hampshire writes in the introduction to Ed Curley’s translation of the Ethics, Spinoza
“consistently argued that everyone should try to create the conditions for security, peace of
mind and for the active enjoyment of one’s own powers, physical and mental… In a person as
a thinking subject, the levels of complexity are levels of reflexiveness, of thoughts about
thoughts…”1 The more one can think, according to Spinoza, the more one can do. Yet, if we
are not able to clearly identify which types of knowledge we are using, that is, which
disposition we are taking up and why, our acts of reasoning can fall into error quite easily. As

1

Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Ed Curley (London: Penguin Books, 1996), xiii, xiv.
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Spinoza notes, “the path taught by reason is a very difficult one…” 2 The mechanics of
reasoning well, while using methods of reflection which guarantee we have not fallen into
error, is the focus of this chapter. In this process of combined affects, our capacity to thrive is
enhanced.
In this chapter, I first establish the nature of adequate ideas in Spinoza’s dynamic
epistemology and the structure of the second kind of knowledge. Secondly, I demonstrate how
the knowledge of reasoning (common notions) is strengthened by human reflection and certain
kinds of singular, imaginative ideas. The mechanics of such force require that we include and
define the nature of singular, human consciousness. Lastly, I demonstrate how understanding
the second kind of knowledge automatically enhances our rational reflective capacities for a
more creative and affirmative use of imaginative knowledge. In conjunction with the effects of
stronger rational capacities, our resulting actions of thought lead to the limitless enjoyment of
human expression in its increased capacities. As an effect of conceiving oneself as adequately
causing one’s own knowledge to express more rational and affirmatively imaginative force, we
experience increases in our conatus and, simultaneously, add to the power of all of Nature.
That is, by understanding how to adequately conceive of oneself as the adequate cause of one’s
power, the more one can maneuver and transform that power for still greater effects and
enjoyment which benefit all of Nature. As noted in E3p7, the essence of a human being is its
conatus, which is the tendency towards both self-preservation and increases in power. 3 It is
important to begin to understand the nature of human striving as our essence or conatus. For
example, it involves “indefinite time” and is not related to what we typically understand as
“finite time,” the latter of which is durational for Spinoza – therefore always an aspect of
2

Spinoza, TP, trans. Sam Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), 1: 682.
Spinoza, Ethics, 3p7: 75. Spinoza writes, “The striving by which each thing strives to preserve in its being is
nothing but the actual essence of the thing.”
3
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contingency by definition. As we will learn in this chapter, adequate reasoning does not
recognize contingency, only necessity. Conatus is the source of both our singular passions and
our rational actions and understanding, as is evident in E5p4s.4 Conatus is also a singular
desire for self-preservation. This is stated clearly in 3p6: “Each thing, as far as it can by its own
power, strives to persevere in its being.”5
In developing our rational capacities through understanding the laws of thought by
working through Spinoza’s Ethics, which is a deliberate element of the text, we learn that our
methods of reflection on what we learn are a direct expression of the disposition we take as we
use ideas of the imagination and of reason. In this way, working through Spinoza’s dynamic
system, a way in which one learns how to strengthen one’s individual capacity to think with
more force while combining types of knowledge, is beneficial both individually and
collectively. Spinoza is not trying to get us to see order and harmony in Nature. We can only
perceive natural phenomena through human experiences and we can only conceive natural
phenomena through human ideas and their force of expression. He demonstrates how the laws
of thought and extension operate according to the cause and effects of force and motion. This is
Spinoza’s epistemological and ontological proto-physics of force. The order of coherence that
we perceive in Nature is due, in part, to our imagination. In the TP, we read, “This is not
surprising, for Nature’s bounds are set not by the laws of human reason whose aim is only
man’s true interest and preservation, but by infinite other laws which have regard to the eternal
order of the whole of Nature, of which man is but a tiny part.” 6 In other words, Spinoza’s
Spinoza, Ethics, 5p4s: 164. Spinoza writes, “We must, therefore, take special care to know each affect clearly and
distinctly (as far as this is possible), so that in this way the mind may be determined from an affect to thinking those
things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and with which it is fully satisfied, and so that the affect itself may
be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts.” I will return to this in Chapter Four.
5
Ibid 3p6: 75. In addition, 3p8 demonstrates, with 3p6, that an affirmative concept of destruction is not possible
when conceiving Nature and its conatus adequately.
6
Spinoza, TP, 2: 685.
4
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system is not a continuation of the physics of either Aristotle or Descartes. Dan Garber writes,
“According to Aristotelian physics, each kind of thing has its own substantial form, and it was
through this that the basic property of things were to be explained. And so fire rises and stones
fall because of their forms…”7 This is not the case for Spinoza. Conatus is not a form.
Recall from the introduction of this thesis that Spinoza is not talking solely about
physical matter and its modifications when he defines “substance,” but infinite other types of
expressions or attributes. This is another reason why it is important to track not only what type
of knowledge we are focusing on but also which series of adequate ideas we are relating to one
other. As we have already read, this is because Spinoza will specify what it is for substance to
express itself as an attribute as compared to what it is to be a modal modification of substance
in our singular expressions. As substance is eternal, we cannot, for example, conceive of it as
being destroyed. That is an impossible thought for Spinoza. As early as 1661, Spinoza writes
that if any part of matter is destroyed, so too would all of the attribute of extension, for his
monism is without distinct parts or objectively real space and time. 8 A monist system that is
eternally unifying infinite attributes with infinite expressions includes the logical deduction
that each attribute (eygenschappen) “must be conceived through itself.”9 Otherwise, there
would be no way to conceive of distinct expressions of different kinds.
Although all of Spinoza’s substance is animate, his philosophical system cannot be
reduced to one of panpsychism. As we read in E2p13c, all of substance strives toward
preservation in existence with increasing and decreasing powers of expression. 10 Although
each attribute’s expressions are conceived through itself, the modifications of each attribute
Daniel Garber, “Descartes and Occasionalism,” 12. See also Steve Nadler’s edited volume Causality in Early
Modern Philosophy for more on the non-teleology of Spinoza’s system and related.
8
Spinoza, Letter 4, 767.
9
Spinoza, Ethics, 1p7-p11: 4-7.
10
Ibid. 2p13c: 40.
7
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can be conceived as eternal by understanding how attributes are eternal (as modes are
conceived through something else, namely, always their respective attribute). As we know, we
only have access to the attributes of thought and extension. These attributes do not influence
each other causally in any manner. Each effect created by a force, action, motion, or expression
of an attribute is caused by a connected expression from the same attribute. 11 As adequate
knowledge includes true ideas about the properties of things, in our conscious awareness we
learn how to focus and reflect on the object of our ideas and what type of knowledge we are
relying upon heavily. In the KV, Spinoza writes, “For we have said that the object is the cause
of what is affirmed or denied thereof, be it true or false: falsity arising thus, namely, because,
when we happen to know something or a part of an object, we imagine that the object
(although we know very little of it) nevertheless affirms or denies that of itself as a whole…” 12
The two attributes we express are identical in their power simultaneously with each
other, although Spinoza draws an important distinction between thought and extension in
E4p35c2.13 In this proposition we learn that the two attributes share many descriptive
commonalities but they are not to be conceived as identical. The only identity they share is that
they are both expressions of one, organically unified and eternal substance. An example one
can use to understand the difference is the adequate idea that we are both finite as modal
modifications of the attributes of thought and extension, and we will perish in our human ratio
of motion and rest at some point. This ending of our human conscious finiteness, nonetheless,
is also an expression of eternal substance; when we die we simply change or transition into
another ratio of motion and rest which does not include the expressions of a singular, human

11

Spinoza, Ethics, 1D6, 1p10, 1p16, 2p1, 2p2. These are some of the deductions Spinoza uses to draw the
conclusions noted above. E1p16 is especially important.
12
Spinoza, KV, 2:83 (footnote 16).
13
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p35c2: 132-133.
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consciousness and our current homeostatic form of a singular body. The adequate
understanding of this difference is the attribute of thought expressing eternal common notions
about laws of Nature with more force. Those ideas about the affections of our bodies include
both what it is to have and express a finite body and what it is to be a modal modification of
eternal substance. We can hold both ideas as adequate in our understanding simultaneously,
and we experience this understanding as part of our affects. The bodily experience (affection)
as the equivalent of this series of adequate ideas involves an increase in our capacities for
actions and bodily expressions that are more powerful and joyous (pleasurable). In addition, as
we will read about shortly, adequate ideas about other ideas are not always in need of perfect
agreement with any actual physical object in order to be true (as understood). This is why, as
we will see in Chapter Four, theories of cognitive representation cannot adequately address
every aspect of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. The object of one idea can be another idea.
As Gilles Deleuze writes, “In Spinoza the term ‘adequate’ never signifies the correspondence
of an idea and the object it represents or indicates, but the internal conformity of the idea with
something it expresses [i.e. namely, substance].” 14
Because each attribute can be expressed in infinite ways, Spinoza deduces how
adequate knowledge can eliminate problematic concepts of both geometric space and linear
time. He does this by including our experience of human duration, something that is always an
expression of imaginative (singular) knowledge. The concept of something thought about as a
“part” can be replaced, at times, with the concept of the motion of composite bodies, as argued
in 2p13L7s where we learn that each collection of bodily compositions and variation occurs in

14

Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, ed. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 133.

122

a multiplicity of ways “without any change to the whole individual.”15 A new “individual” or
composite body can be understood as expressing itself with new ratios of motion and rest
which continue to alter and are in relation to every other element of what that body (and mind)
are in contact with or being influenced by. These compositions or expressions are continually
shifting variations (increases and decreases) in power and force. Spinoza replaces the concepts
of physical space and time with logical deductions about infinity. By the concept of “eternity,”
Spinoza intends not only that which is infinite, but the concept of “existence itself.”16 The
necessary and sufficient condition (adequate knowledge) that supports the infinite as real and
as that which we can express as a real element of Nature, includes, by necessity, that all of
substance is always in existence. I return to this important deduction throughout the rest of the
thesis, but for now we need to examine the nature of proximate causes in this system.
To demonstrate what kind of order and connection in Nature we are capable of
describing with accuracy, while also expressing and describing modes as modes (wyzen),
requires an understanding of proximate causes. In relation to the definition of substance,
proximate causes in Spinoza’s system include adequate ideas about how cause and effect
operate from the perspective of infinite attributes with infinite effects. Substance is self-caused
and, as Spinoza writes in Chapters One and Two of the KV, that which is nothing cannot be
said to have any attributes, but that which is one eternal whole can be deduced to have all

15

Spinoza, Ethics, 2p13L7s: 43. What we learn at this point in the Ethics is that there are various things which can
speed up or slow down the communication of motion between aggregates of interactions and relations of any one
body, composition of bodies, or substance as one whole.
16
Ibid. 1D8: 2. Spinoza writes, “By eternity I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow
necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing. For such existence, like the essence of a thing, is conceived
as an eternal truth, and on that account cannot be explained by duration or time…”
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attributes possible. A self-caused and self-causing substance “must have all attributes…so that
which is Something has attributes because it is Something.”17
That which exists is defined as that which exists eternally because the definition of
existence can never include that the thing being defined does not or cannot exist, nor that it has
attributes which can cease to exist. This deduction states, therefore, that the attributes of
substance must exist by necessity and can never not exist. Therefore, Spinoza’s system can
have a dual sense of causality. Efficient and material causation (beginnende oorzaak) can only
be conceived in relation to the concept of modes, as noted in 1p28; this is true even when we
understand that God (substance, Nature) is the immanent cause (inblyvende oorzaak) of all of
Nature’s effects.18 Yet, Spinoza is clear in other places that we should not prefer to take up the
disposition of conceiving things in this way. If substance and its attributes are immanent and
inseparable conceptually, and if modes are expressions of substance whose essence is
immanently in and conceived through the attributes, then we can conceive of things as modal
modifications of substance or we can conceive of things as substance and its effects (as selfcaused). Each identification of the actions of substance carries different series of adequately
understood relations and definitions. It is the alteration in our disposition and resulting force of
action that matters. Finite ideas are modes, but an adequate idea about what modes are can also
be taken as an object of thought, and this changes how we conceive of both substance and
modes. The nature and relationship of substance and its effects is that, as its own cause, it must
be understood as involved in its effects. This concept of immanence is not the typical (linear)
conception of causality (for one, substance has infinite attributes which are all creating effects
eternally), but it does involve such a concept when considering the logic of a human mind in its
Spinoza, KV, 2: 40 (footnote 6). In footnote 8 we read, “…for the nature of a thing can require nothing while it
does not exist.”
18
Spinoza, Ethics, 1p28: 19-20, among other places.
17
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adequate chain of other adequate ideas, for example. To reason well is not to cause something
by necessity as much as to cause is not to reason. When ideas of imaginative knowledge affect
other ideas of imaginative knowledge, the notion of causality is altered, and it is not the same
as what occurs when adequate ideas cause other adequate ideas. If it were the same effect, then
imaginative ideas would not be so potentially dangerous in decreasing conatus. Yet, all ideas
can also be understood as acts of some kind. Pierre Macherey writes, “Ideas, all ideas, are acts,
that is, they always affirm something in themselves, according to a modality that returns to
their cause…”19 Even the suspension of judgment is an action of knowledge. The action of
understanding, as an expression of adequate knowledge when we suspend judgment, means we
are aware we are not perceiving or conceiving something as completely as we can. We are
aware that we have partial knowledge (as an experience) of the thing we are trying to
understand. The object of our ideas at this point is not the thing we are trying to understand,
but the awareness of our process of adequate understanding in action. 20
Adequate ideas always increase our conatus. When we reflect on and recognize that we
are not yet fully understanding, we also recognize that we affirm our capacity to reason well.
Spinoza affirms this process in Letter 21 when he writes, “…if only you pay attention to your
nature, you experience the ability to suspend judgment.” 21 The effects of our ideas as effects,
related to their cause as other ideas, can be understood both as singular expressions of adequate
knowledge and as substance itself expressing more power in its eternal truth of how the
attribute of thought operates according to its necessary laws. Imaginative ideas cannot be
conceived in this way. They are singular in nature, even if they are still an aspect of the modal
expression of substance in its power as ways. What is at stake is the object of our ideas and the
19
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disposition we take up. To think as a conscious human being with the capacity to reflect on
what is being thought about is more than only reasoning. Therefore, our expression of
substance understood as substance must differ from our singular powers of reasoning in their
varieties of expressiveness. The relation between substance and mode is an organic whole.
Modes are simply the ways in which substance can be and are expressed, including as
combinations between ideas. Taking up a rational disposition in reflected awareness is what we
know will allow us to generate new knowledge and more diverse experiences.
What we are learning about in Spinoza’s Ethics (adequate reasoning with deductive
conclusions) are the necessary effects of such causes (both material and efficient). From the
beginning of the Ethics, we learn that the knowledge of effects depends on the knowledge of
causes. Therefore, you will not adequately understand the power of your understanding (as
effects of other ideas) unless you rationally comprehend how that understanding was caused by
other adequate ideas (both your own and derived from external sources).22 The ocean is
continually animated, it has motion, power, and force. All its elements are connected
organically in extension, yet we cannot say that the ocean has reflective ideas and actions in the
same way that humans do. The definition of cause and effect, in other words, will vary
depending on what kind of cause one is trying to understand. As Stephen Connelly writes,
substance, for Spinoza, may be analogous to an infinite ocean and its waves, where we are a
moving metronome on a moving ship on a moving ocean; but in some real sense the motion of
the ocean’s waves will be built into our own otherwise particular motion and understanding of
motion.23 They are separate motions, but they are inseparable. How can something be both a
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part of one whole substance yet separate in its own determinate way? This is the problem
Spinoza’s Ethics solves. As Pierre Macherey summarizes:
In axiom 5 of book I of the Ethics, Spinoza affirms the agreement [conventia] of the
true idea with its object. This proposition, which is not a definition, does not express
the intrinsic character of the true idea: it does not constitute an idea starting from its
cause but characterizes it only a posteriori through one of its properties as is confirmed
by definition 4 in book II, which distinguishes the extrinsic and intrinsic qualities of a
true idea. The notion of conventia, which relates the idea to an object that is outside it,
evidently designates an extrinsic quality. By contrast, the causal definition of the true
idea determines it through its adequatio; it is this concept, which is essential for
Spinoza and which marks its rupture with the traditional conception of knowledge. In
effect, by adequatio we must think of exactly the opposite of that which reveals itself
as conventia. Adequatio is the intrinsic determination of the true idea, that is, that which
produces its truth in the idea… The essential function of the category of adequatio is to
break with the conception of knowledge as representation that continues to dominate
Cartesianism… The adequatio is thus the key to truth, because it expresses this intrinsic
relationship of the idea to itself.24
The encounter with ideas (our own and from others) produce real effects. As every
effect involves its cause, this aspect of Spinoza’s system does not say that effects can be
reduced to their cause in definition or explanation. As our ideas cannot be reduced to our
bodily affections and sensations, they can, nonetheless, be understood as real entities which we
encounter and which have degrees of force and intensity. The affects of which we are aware
are a combination of both attributes. E1p25c defines a “body” as a real “singular” thing, a
particular expression of substance in its own determinate way. A body is not, in other words,
only defined as a singular human (physical) body. A body can be the combination of many
bodies into one force, for example, such as the State. To understand Spinoza’s proto-physics of
the force of bodies together, we can refer to Letter 58:
A stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a fixed quantity of motion
whereby it will continue necessarily to move when the impulsion of the external cause
has ceased. The stone’s continuance in motion is constrained, not because it is
necessary, but because it must be defined by the impulsion received from an external
cause. What here applies to the stone must be understood of every individual thing,
24
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however complex its structure and varied its functions. For every single thing is
necessarily determined by an external cause to exist and to act in a fixed and
determinate way.25
Whatever follows or is caused by an attribute of substance is always necessarily
infinite. In this way, as this chapter will demonstrate, our expressions of the force of adequate
understanding are also eternal. In E1p18 through 1p21, we read, “God is the immanent, not the
transitive, cause of all things,” and that all of God’s (Nature’s) attributes are eternal because
“God’s existence and his essence are one and the same.” 26 Therefore, anything that follows
from the absolute nature of God’s attributes is also infinite. Although our essence conceived as
an expression of substance (God, Nature) is eternal, our individual expressions of conatus can
also be conceived as modal modifications of substance (modes), and, therefore, vary in their
intensities and force of expression according to continually shifting ratios of motion and rest in
extension. My force of expression of my conatus is different from my neighbor’s expression of
their conatus or of any singular thing in its own determinate expression of its conatus. As noted
in 1p25c and 1p28, modes “are nothing but the affections of God’s attributes.”27
Laws of Nature are forces that produce effects and relations of increasing or decreasing
power, transformations, re-configurations, and new arrangements.28 Yet, because we are a
continuous expression of extension, identifying a beginning or ending point of any one series of
actions is logically impossible. The language of “beginning” and “ending” is, therefore, often a
part of imaginative (singular) knowledge. Thus, to adequately conceive the causality of effects
that are involved in their causes will not include explanations from a static point A to a static
25
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point B. The nature of the ways in which we can adequately understand causality, for Spinoza,
will logically alter depending on if we are describing the expressions of attributes or the effects
and expressions of modes. Affections of substance cannot be located ‘in time.’
Certain aspects of the essence of modes are composed of parts because imaginative
knowledge is an aspect of what it is to be a modal modification of substance. Our conceiving of
anything as a “part,” as we read in Chapter Two, is always an expression of imaginative
knowledge. In addition, not all modes are finite, some are infinite and immediate, for example.
Yet, any finite expression, if described as an aspect of what it is to be finite, can be logically
conceived as a mode. Among the three types of modes (finite, immediate and infinite, and
mediate and infinite), their combination in expression as a human mind and body. They are an
expression of both imaginative knowledge (in its singularity) and of the adequate knowledge (as
common notions which are eternal and necessarily true). In Letter 12, Spinoza writes, “The
affections of Substance I call Modes. The definition of Modes, insofar as it is not itself a
definition of Substance, cannot involve existence… From this it further follows that when we
have regard only to the essence of Modes and not to the order of Nature as a whole, we cannot
deduce from their present existence that they will or will not exist in the future or that they did
or did not exist in the past.”29 Thus, it is not a logical contradiction to talk about the essence of
modes in duration (finite human bodies die, for example) or to explain the same action of modal
modification understood more adequately as an expression of an eternal law of Nature.
Therefore, our ideas can be understood as expressions of the power of our conatus and
not as in existence or not in existence (that is, as having beginning and ending points). This is
also why, as we will read later in this chapter and in Chapter Four, understanding the nature of
the power of our affects becomes crucial to adequately comprehending Spinoza’s dynamic
29
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epistemology. The letter noted above was written in 1663, but ten years later, in the unfinished
TP, Spinoza reaffirms the same conclusion. He writes:
Therefore, just as the coming into existence of natural things cannot be concluded from
their definition, so neither can their perseverance in existing, for their essence in the
form of ideas is the same after they have begun to exist as it was before they existed…
The same power that they need in order to begin to exist, they also need in order to
continue to exist. Hence it follows that the power of natural things by which they exist,
and consequently by which they act, can be no other than the eternal power of God…
By the right of Nature, then, I understand the laws or rules of Nature in accordance with
which all things come to be; that is, the very power of Nature… 30
In this way, I conceive of my ideas and actions as both adequately caused by the proto-physics
of force and motion on a singular level, and as caused by the laws of Nature. It depends on
which disposition of series of ideas I assume as my conscious mind. The existence of natural
things or phenomena cannot be deduced from their definition (explanation) alone, but have to
be understood according to their relation to the “eternal power of God” and the laws of Nature
of the two attributes we express. Perhaps more importantly, whatever power was in the essence
of a thing when it started to exist (as noted in several passages above about the physics of force
within and between real things) will be required as a bare minimum in order for it to continue
to exist. Yet, that level of power can increase in both force and expression when combined with
other things which enhance our power to exist, such as adequately understanding how the laws
of the attributes operate, and the enjoyment of our singular existence in its variety of
expressive possibilities. As we will read about in Chapter Five, the third kind of knowledge we
are capable of, intuitive understanding and expression, involves the adequate comprehension
and application of all three types of knowledge and the essence of singular things.
It will be helpful to refresh our memory and consider what is said above in relation to
Chapter One about the nature of definition, using support from Spinoza’s Letter 9 addressed to
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Simon de Vries. In this letter, Spinoza writes about two types of definition. He informs de
Vries that the latter’s difficulties in understanding the nature of definition are due to his
“failure to distinguish between two types of definition. There is the definition that serves to
explicate a thing whose essence is in question and the subject of doubt, and there is the
definition which is put forward simply for examination. The former, since it has a determinate
object, must be a true definition, while this need not be so in the latter case.” 31 A definition put
forward for evaluation does not make what is evaluated eternally true; however, the structures
of reasoning used and required in order to evaluate its truth or falsity are an eternal expression
of the attribute of adequate ideas. If the definition is not true as a common notion, then we can
include some of our ideas about it as part of imaginary knowledge but not necessarily an error
in reasoning. This is why it is important to have the rational capacity to reflect on what kinds of
ideas we are considering, as well as their objects, and then suspend further judgment as needed.
Letter 9 also includes references to why Spinoza equates the definition of “substance”
and that of “attribute” when logic requires it as an aspect of series of adequate ideas. The
definition of substance and of modes, on the other hand, are very different kinds of definitions.
Learning how to recognize in conscious reflection which types of knowledge we are relying on
and why, as well as what effects in the form of ideas they produce with more force, becomes
crucial in understanding more about the expression of substance (Nature, God) as compared to
the expressions of modal modifications of substance with lesser degrees of force and
animation. Modes are never (adequately) conceived as contrary to substance or they would
destroy each other, as Spinoza notes in E3p5 and 3p6; they are modifications (affections) of
substance.32 All singular things are modes, and every affection of substance is also a modal
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modification. Every real thing is always opposed to that “which can take its existence
away…”33 This deduction is forcefully consistent. In 3p7 we learn that our striving for
continued existence, therefore, must involve the concept of indefinite time.
What we learn is not only the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata,
but that we also perceive “nothing more clearly” than the intellect and its processes (as
conscious awareness), especially when we are reflecting on the laws of thought. Spinoza writes
that because the intellect is conceived as an expression of an attribute of substance, it must,
therefore, also include what it is for that attribute to have infinite modifications in expression
of itself as itself. He writes, “By intellect (as is known through itself) we understand not
absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from the others, such
as desire, love, and the like, and so (by D5) must be conceived through absolute thought, that is
(by P15 and D6), it must be so conceived through an attribute of God, which expresses the
eternal and infinite essence of thought…”34 We learn that we can adequately understand not
God or Substance or all of Nature itself but a certain modal modification of the expression of
the attribute of thought in its laws by necessity. The laws of expression are the same for all
who express the attribute of thought, but their specific determinate expressions are infinite –
and in that realization we understand still more about the laws of thought. As such, we express
the eternal nature of the attribute of thought in its essence.
As we can “understand nothing that does not lead to more perfect knowledge of the
intellection,” continued understanding, conscious reflection, and an enhancement in the power
of thought and action are intimately connected. 35 Adequate knowing will always use concepts
(common notions) which are derived from reasoning, and, as we read in the last chapter, this
33
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can include understanding how certain imaginative ideas can aid reasoning and understanding.
For Spinoza, “what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in Nature;”
therefore, our true ideas are as much an expression of God (Nature) as everything else. In
accordance with E1ax5, Pierre Macherey writes, “The true idea is not adequate to its object
because it corresponds to it; one must say, quite the contrary, that it corresponds to it because it
is adequate, that is to say determined in itself, in a necessary fashion.” 36 This coheres with
Spinoza’s explanation of the first kind of definition above. We understand that more chains of
common notions are produced as the effect of an increase in adequate knowledge and the laws
of thought as cause. In short, the more our mind and body learn how to move in different ways
with more power, that is, to have more diverse encounters with increased understanding and
efficient and joyous experiences, the more we are able to produce different kinds of effects and
new combinations of ideas which are powerfully rational and effective.
Letters 6 and 12 add support to Spinoza’s conclusion that true ideas are real things
expressed by Nature and that which the attribute of thought expresses in its essence. In Letter
6, in a section on fluidity, Spinoza writes, “In my view, notions which derive from popular
usage, or which explicate Nature not as it is in itself but as it is related to human senses, should
certainly not be regarded as concepts of the highest generality, nor should they be mixed (not
to say confused) with notions that are pure and which explicate Nature as it is in itself. Of the
latter kind are motion, rest, and their laws…”37 Ratios of motion and rest are the ways in which
the attribute of extension expresses itself, but our adequate understanding of this are the natural
expressions of true ideas and the essence of the laws of thought. The same sentiment is

Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 66. He continues, “The active character of knowledge does not depend on the
initiative of a free subject; rather, it is the idea itself that is active, insofar as it expresses in a singular fashion the
infinite causality of substance.”
37
Spinoza, Letter 6: 773. The use of the term “pure” in this letter is problematic, but was acceptable for Spinoza.
36

133

expressed elsewhere, such as in E1p15s and Letter 12 on the infinite. We learn that we can
experience things around us by way of the imagination (through sense data, a feeling of
duration and, therefore, of that which is contingent) or we can conceive of such things as
expressions of one organic substance. If the latter, then we deduce that such expressions are of
one substance with everything else, infinite as expressions of laws of Nature, and indivisible. 38
Spinoza’s work emphasizes what it is to increase our ratios of motion in ways where
more aspects of our human, singular extension combines in active, powerful ways. Learning
what a body can do using adequate knowledge simultaneously combines with feelings of
pleasure, joy, and energy in extension. The individual that I am currently will end in its ratios
of motion and rest upon my finite death, for example, but the adequate ideas that I am
expressing (and their power to effect ideas in other minds) will continue in new expressions
after my death. It is in this way that adequate ideas can also be understood as eternal in
essence. The ratios of my motion and rest will also alter to combine with other expressions of
extension (such as the deterioration of my physical body and its combination with the earth to
create dust and dirt as new forms of an energy resource) and combine to become new ratios.
Spinoza’s system is not devoid of its own method of measurement. Efraim Shmueli
writes, “Spinoza’s system was understood, or rather, misunderstood as an anticoncept, not
determinative of any real objects.”39 His system is as much about true ideas with content as real
expressions of Nature that are infinite in essence as it is about singular experiences as a real
expression of Nature as well. Both are required for such a system, which is why Spinoza had to
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break his deductions down to include both eternal attributes with their laws and modal
modifications and their three types or kinds of expression. In such a system, the “logic of each
concept presupposes relation to other things…Claims to unity for either part or whole are
spurious. Or at least it is attained by absorption into some more adequate unit.” 40 In my
singular expression of ratios of motion and rest I am transformed continually, while also
maintaining a homeostatic balance towards self-preservation, perseverance, and, if reflecting
on and using adequate knowledge, expressing thought and extension with increased force. All
things express extension in its laws of motion and rest. In this way, my pen can be described as
an expression of God or Nature as much as a rolling motorcycle, recipe, lake, rotting animal,
laughter, a prayer, notes on a musical scale, metaphor, or a piece of metal.
To put it another way, Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology cannot be reduced to a human
system of neurons and material substance or inert matter. His proto-physics of force in thought
and extension can be better understood as expressions of real things and not mere mental
constructs. As Spinoza writes in Letter 27, the understanding of his system “must be based on
metaphysics and physics.”41 As Hsana Sharp concludes, “Thought, which is not equivalent to
the symbolic, is its own peculiar reality rather than a reflection other than itself.” 42 To think of
such a system as that which uses representations (as I will discuss in Chapter Four on Michael
Della Rocca’s interpretation) is to reduce it to symbols, reflections, and images or
correspondences. My ideas do not correspond to reality in the form of only representations.
They are reality in the determinate expression of the force of the laws of the attribute of
thought. The ideas of the attribute of thought, in other words, do not represent the actions of
the attribute of extension because attributes are “one and the same thing” in Spinoza’s
William Sacksteder, “Simple Wholes and Complex Parts,” 398.
Spinoza, Letter 27: 839.
42
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understanding of substance. Something that is one and the same thing cannot be said to have
some parts that represent other parts of itself. All expressions are immanent expressions of
itself as itself in their own ways.43 A good example is that if a word appears on a shirt in a
foreign language that both has a literal meaning in that language which does not fully represent
the term proudly shown on the tee-shirt, and the English translation also does not fully account
for the term used in definition either, the word (language) on the shirt is not a representation of
the real meaning in its totality. For Spinoza, it depends on how the term is used and repeated,
what context it is applied to, and, therefore, the term in definition is something different from
the term on the shirt and the way it is used on the shirt. One meaning does not represent the
other meaning, even if the “image” of the term in both instances is identical in some way.
The Expression and Definition of Attributes and Modes as Substance
The problem of how to understand and define the attributes of Spinoza’s substance is a
highly controversial area of debate within the scholarship. As A. Wolf writes, “The only
difference between the Attributes and Substance is that our intellect can be an act of abstraction
thinking of one of the Attributes apart from the rest, whereas in reality all Attributes are
inseparably together.”44 How to adequately conceive of substance and the attributes, therefore,
requires more explanation and demonstration. E1p11 reads, “God, or a substance consisting of
infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.” 45
In 1974, Ed Curley wrote on this interpretive problem in response to the extensive
treatment of Spinoza’s system by Martial Gueroult. I believe some of Curley’s conclusions
summarize the interpretation of such an ontological problem as noted above nicely. He writes:
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Gueroult's own interpretation conceives Spinoza's substance as a complex whole whose
essence is constituted by an infinity of really distinct elements, the attributes, each of
which satisfies in its own right the definition of substance. So substance is identical with
the totality of its attributes, and each attribute both exists in itself and is conceived
through itself. This is very similar to a position I have argued for myself... As Gueroult
points out, a good many objections to Spinozism can be shown to rest on a
misunderstanding if this interpretation is accepted... But once we conceive the idea of an
ens realissimum, of a being whose nature it is to consist of infinitely many attributes and
whose existence follows from that nature, then we are obliged to conceive of the
attributes as constituents of one being and not as a mere collection of substances. God's
existence does not result from the necessary existence of each of the elements which
constitute his nature. It is rather their existence together which results from his necessary
existence...46
The evidence to support Curley’s reading is ample in Spinoza’s work, particularly in E1p29s
that is cited by both Curley and Gueroult. I also find more support for the reality of the
attributes (where each expresses itself infinitely and uniquely) in 1p10 and 1p11. To
understand how to solve some of the problems that arise from such a construction, Spinoza
writes in 1665 that some solutions “cannot be grasped without first understanding the necessity
of things.”47 We have already worked through 1p8s2 and 1p9 that demonstrate that attributes
are not modifications of substance, as that would involve their concept employing another
concept in order to be true. As we have already read, attributes are conceived through
themselves. In 1p9, Spinoza simply writes that the more reality “or being” a thing has, the
more attributes it will have by necessity. 48 It is at this point where Spinoza includes a
discussion about signs and the ways in which we try to recognize Nature as one substance, that
is, as all connected by necessity and not as numerically one thing. As noted above, the concept
of number is not logically required for conceiving substance as having infinite attributes that
express themselves in infinite ways. He writes that we will search in vain if we are looking for
signs in Nature for proof of the diversity of substances. He also notes within this proposition
Curley, “Recent Work on the 17th Century Continental Philosophy,” 240.
Spinoza, Ethics, 1p10, p11: 6-9 and Letter 27: 839.
48
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that “it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct…we still
cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two different susbstances.”49 The
deduction that attributes are real but are not separate substances, therefore, is a conceptual
distinction between what it is to conceive real things through themselves and to do so logically
in a certain determinate way. In other words, Spinoza is not concluding what we might find in
Aristotle about substance and its attributes, nor can we compare the two systems as similar on
the nature of singular expressions of each attribute either.
The above emphasis on how to logically conceive of distinct things that are real
expressions of Nature as one whole is also found in Chapter Four of the TTP. For something to
be really distinct is for it to be conceived through itself without the need for another true
concept in order for it to be true. As early as 1661 and 1663, Spinoza writes about how to
understand what this entails in Letter 2 and Letter 9. What matters in our conceptual
distinctions is what each definition being relied on is in relation to by necessity. Noting the
definition he already ascribed to Substance, Spinoza writes, “I understand the same by
attribute, except that attribute is so called in respect to the intellect… This definition, I repeat,
explains clearly what I mean by substance and attribute…” 50
In other words, substance and attribute can be conceived as the same thing because both
can be conceived through themselves. But their concept must be used differently when required
in order for our singular minds to adequately comprehend what it is for something which is
self-caused and self-causing with infinite expressions to encompass the totality of Nature (for
example, one singular thought of such a thing is not possible so our conceptions must shift in
order to understand what Nature is defined as). Spinoza writes, “For it is of the nature of a
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substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has
have always been in it together…each expresses the reality, or being of substance.”51 Consider
what appears in a footnote of the KV as well: “The [attributes] following are called Propria,
because they are only Adjectives, which cannot be understood without their Substantives. That
is to say, without them God would indeed be no God, but still it is not that they constitute God;
for they reveal nothing of the character of a Substance, through which God exists.” 52 And still
further, if we turn to Chapter Four of the TTP we read, “To put it another way, since the
knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothing other than the knowledge of a property of
that cause, the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge
of God’s essence, which is the cause of all things.”53 Clearly, an attribute can be understood as
a property of substance, but only in the sense of what it is to conceive of Nature as self-caused
and self-causing, and how, therefore, the effects or expressions of Nature always involve their
cause (and its essence as the essence of Nature). The essence of God, Nature, or Substance
(however you name it) is that it is eternal with infinite attributes expressed in infinite ways. In
other words, a human mind must understand the attributes of thought and extension as
expressions of natural phenomena and laws of Nature conceived through themselves!
Otherwise, substance and its attributes can also be understood as the same thing and there
would be no way to logically understand how our singular expressions can be truly distinct and
yet of one and the same thing. The above references demonstrate how and why Spinoza
equates God with Nature or Substance, or that, as Letter 9 continues, “one and the same thing
can be signified by two names.”54 Yet, attributes are not properties of substance. In Letter 10,
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Spinoza writes to Simon de Vries, “So since the existence of attributes does not differ from
their essence [as conceived through itself directly], we shall not be able to apprehend it by any
experience…”55 In other words, some other causal notion is required to explain how singular
things do express substance as substance, or what we know of as modes.
The mind does not have ideas, as already noted. The mind is ideas. Thus, we cannot say
that we “experience” reason as something distinct from our thoughts about it. To think using
the second kind of knowledge is to reason. Our strength of reasoning will always be in relation
to increases and decreases in expressions and proportions of our essence. Anthony Paul Smith
writes, “Spinoza allows us to see that reason is not an absolute; it is placed within a wider
relationship, and it is often strongly directed by the affect it relates to at any given time.” 56 As
we also learn in Letter 6, philosophical investigations must examine individual differences and
similarities between real, distinct things of Nature, which also applies to Spinoza’s system as a
logical explanation of everyone as one substance. But this system is dialectically material, at
least in the sense that it does not end in a type of empiricism that endlessly attempts to evaluate
and hold up particulars alone (an impossible task when speaking about all of Nature). I will
return to the reasons why later in the thesis.
As a result, we need another concept in order to explain the many different and
determinate ways the attributes of thought and extension can be expressed by individuals who
also differ in their degrees of power of expression. My choice of terms to describe what it is I
am understanding rationally involves my singular imaginative knowledge, but the power
expressed is determined by the necessity of the ways in which laws of Nature work. Modes, as
modifications (affections) of substance, are conceived through something else, that is, through
55
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and involving the necessary concept of their respective attributes which is defined in E1D5. 57
In 3p6, we read, “For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a
certain and determinate way (by 1P25C), that is (by 1P34), things that express, in a certain and
determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts.” 58 This type of necessity is not any
different from the freedom of spirit Spinoza speaks of, which we experience when we reflect
on what it is to be a modal expression of eternal substance and increase our power of
expression: “For freedom…does not remove the necessity of action, but imposes it.” 59
As noted earlier and will be addressed at length in this chapter and the next, affects are
key to understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology and proto-physics of force adequately.
They are not special kinds of ideas. They are expressions of substance that are not void of
content because they include both affections and ideas paired together into one experience.
What we reflect on will depend on which affect we are experiencing. As Dan Selcer writes,
affects are:
a transition to a greater or lesser state of perfection, which means a modulation of the
power of a singular thing to act and to exist. Affect is thus an expression of power…a
unification (across attributes) of corporeal affections with the ideas of those affections
to which they ontologically correspond under the identity of the order of ideas with the
order of things… Affect is thus a concept describing the regular distribution,
arrangement, or configuration of a dynamic system. 60
In conscious reflection we are configured by our affects and our understanding in its power
depending on which type of knowledge is proportionally relied on more heavily. The order of
things we encounter is understood according to the order of ideas we are paying attention to or
using. Spinoza writes, “I think I have demonstrated with sufficient clarity and certainty that the
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intellect, even though infinite, belongs to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans.”61 Our
affects are important for us to learn how to understand and reflect upon because they
“constitute sites of transition.” As that which are connected to all three types of knowledge we
are capable of, they are “particularly dynamic ways in which nature is expressed…” 62
Transitions, for Spinoza, are like limits. Transitions between ideas can be understood as
immediately proportional to the type of ideas that have more power, which is referenced in
Letter 12. These limits and their overcoming and recognition are transformations in power and
joy where passionate joys and joyous passions are also possible. Beth Lord writes:
When we have an adequate idea we know that we know it, and the mind necessarily
considers its own power of thinking, leading to joy (P53). Furthermore, those desires
through which we strive to persevere in our being do not come from experience or
imagination, but from our very essence. As we are more active, our essence flourishes
and those essential desires are intensified. The joy and desire that are related to our
activity are different from the joy and desire that arise from our passivity. 63
This interpretation of Spinoza is supported by his references in Letter 23. There, Spinoza
writes that although a mouse and an angel are both dependent on God’s laws in the same way,
one can hardly be said to be like the other, just as we cannot say that sorrow is similar to joy in
any way.64 Sorrow, as a passion, relies on ideas of the imagination and, therefore, decreases our
conatus. On the other hand, passionate joys are rationally understood ideas as part of an affect
which is only partially involved in imaginative knowledge as experience, and are, therefore,
ideas about other ideas, such as how we can separate sorrow from joy as elements of our
affects in continuous understanding.

61

Spinoza, Letter 9: 782. See also E1p29s for more support.
Peg Rawes, “Spinoza’s architectural passages: drawing out geometric comportments,” Spinoza Research
Network, Spinoza and Texts, June 2010. Rawes writes, “…the sequence of their transition are their duration is
always different…the movement between them is itself a kind of geometric reasoning, expressed in the dynamic
nature of our emotional lives.”
63
Beth Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics, 101. Letter 21 also confirms this.
64
Spinoza, Letter 23: 833.
62

142

Spinoza believes that adequate knowledge includes knowledge about true causes and
their effects. Recognizing, understanding, experiencing, or knowing in any way all the causes
of Nature is an absolute impossibility. Therefore, what we learn we can understand truly is how
we express laws of Nature in thought and extension with varying degrees of animation and
force. As C. De Deugd writes, any aspect of that which is contingent, or of what we experience
as contingent, is a part of imaginative knowledge: “Reason does not recognize contingency.”65
This gives depth of meaning to a crucial aspect of all of Spinoza’s system that is causa
immanens, or in the Dutch inblijvende oorzaak, a cause that remains in its effects. If the cause
remains an element of its effects, then one cannot categorize all causes and effects as wholly
distinct from each other. Yet, there is a limit to what sense experience can add to reasoning.
This is why – in Letter 10 to Simone de Vries on empirical experience – Spinoza writes, “To
this I reply that we need experience only in the case of those things that cannot be deduced
from the definition of a thing, as, for instance, the existence of modes… We do not need
experience in the case of those things whose existence is not distinguished from their essence
and therefore deduced from their definition…for experience does not teach us the essence of
things.”66 This passage is telling because Spinoza reminds us when we can conceptually
collapse essence, existence, and definition, as well as when experience and the idea of the
modal expression of substance become distinct. It also relates to what we read in E3D1 on
adequate causes (because it is a cause we rely on to clearly and distinctly perceive an effect).
To summarize thus far, adequate knowledge is that of common notions understood as
the second kind of knowledge (adequate ideas). It is the kind of knowledge that is in relation to
our affects and their transitions, including being aware that we will reason with increasing and
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decreasing levels of power depending on how much accurate information we have and what we
are taking as the objects of our ideas under the influence of any given affect. Adequate
understanding also includes our awareness of what the three types of ideas we can have are and
the processes of knowledge construction that relate to degrees of ideational power. Spinoza
provides a proof that such knowledge is humanly possible as early as the opening definitions of
E1, particularly 1p3: “If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot
be the cause of the other.”67 Only things that have something in common can cause something
to occur as an effect within or in relation to another thing.
Finite ideas cause other finite ideas, but only within their own idea type. Regarding
adequate knowledge, Steenbakkers writes, “The characteristic feature of this kind of
knowledge is the application of general patterns to individual cases, thus yielding adequate
insight (as opposed to knowledge from causal experience).” 68 Notice that this reading accords
with what was just said above about definition and experience and what can be derived from
experience. The object of common notions are “whatever is common to all things,” which is
not the same as discussing the essence of singular things in their unique determinate
transformations and transitions. In other words, the power used to transform may have the
same mechanics for all bodies, but the actual transition will be unique to each singular thing. 69
The material effects of the attributes of thought and extension involve ideas, force,
motion, power, expression, continuous transition, speed, and shifting intensities, among other
things. They are defined as both the recognition of patterns and knowledge of particular things.
They are also expressions of substance in the form of modal modifications to varying degrees
of animation.
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Imaginative knowledge cannot be classified as either “good” or “bad,” because Spinoza
feels such classifications are specific to human circumstance and context. Imaginative
knowledge is only beneficial if, combined with reasoning, it enhances our capacities for
thought and action, creativity and joy. The rational reconstruction, understanding, and use of
partial (imaginative) knowledge only makes reason more complete and enjoyable (if the laws
of thought are rationally understood). This furthers our capacities to think with more adequate
force. As Spinoza writes in 2p13, the object of our ideas is always the affections of our bodies.
Our knowledge, though, runs the risk of being “a completely confused knowledge of our
bodies.”70 We can only transform our ideas by strengthening reasoning capacities with the
ideas we compare and associate with each other, and by recognizing patterns of thought that
increase or decrease our power to exist. This process entails that one’s singular memory plays a
key role in our recognition of rational patterns of thought, and that memory is logically
categorized as imaginative knowledge. We can also add to our transformation in knowledge by
understanding how finite (human) bodies are all the same in that we share various common
properties that the laws of Nature produce. The infamous epistemology passage in the Ethics
2p40s reads:
With this I have explained the cause of those notions which are called common, and
which are the foundations of our reasoning. But some axioms, or notions, result from
other causes… Those notions are Universal, like Man, Horse, Dog, and the like, have
arisen from similar cases, namely, because so many images (e.g. of men) are formed at
one time in the human body that they surpass the power of imagining… For the body
has been affected most [forcefully] by [what is common], since each singular thing has
affected it [by this property]. And [the mind] expresses this by the word man, and
predicates it of infinity many singulars. For as we have said, it cannot image a
determinate number of singulars. But it should be noted that these notions are not
formed by all in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance with what
the body has more often been affected by, and what the mind imagines or recollects
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more easily… And similarly concerning the others – each will form universal images of
things according to the disposition of their body…71
Note that Spinoza mentions both singular associations and one’s experience of infinity in the
same passage. The term “man” automatically indicates an infinite amount of possible men and
expressions made by human beings. Imagining a determinate number of singulars is not
possible. For Spinoza, the alternative is that we have to rationally assume an infinite expression
of actual and possible singulars as a result, and infinite in all ways and all directions. If he is
wrong, what is the alternative? In my reading, 2p40s clearly demonstrates that a theory of
human consciousness and subjectivity is crucial to reading Spinoza correctly.
What we learn is that reflective knowledge can continue to attempt to rationally
transform new knowledge adequately if one can understand the ways in which the three types
of knowledge operate: “The commonality of these singular embodied ideas further enables us
to understand the perfection of God through their resolution of the step-by-step agreement
between mind and body, and their expression of an embodied kind of human ‘perfection’ or
unity.” This level of subjectivity, although singularly experienced, becomes adequately
understood as identical with the order of causes in Nature as we know them.72 In other words,
in order for our human minds to increase their capacities for rational thinking, we will have to
develop the ability to recognize and shift between various registers of different types of
knowledge. Therefore, to become a forcefully rational thinker, using conscious reflection to
pay attention is a method of thought required by necessity, including strong reflections on what
type of imaginative knowledge one is also using (memory, sensation, language, etc.).
In my reading, we cannot do away with a concept of human subjectivity and singularity
even if there are difficulties in reading Spinoza in this way, as Ursula Renz and Harold Skulsky
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have pointed out, for example. Skulsky notes 2p13s as support for his position that what is true
for human minds and bodies is also true for “other individuals” and that “all of these, in
varying degrees, are endowed with minds.”73 E2p12 and its relation to 2p19 cause some to use
these propositions as sweeping interpretive conclusions that Spinoza can only have one
“subject” and that this subject is God. I find that one of the major problems with such readings
is that Spinoza is clear that we (human beings) have individual rights in the TTP. How can
anything that is not a real singular human being have individual rights? According to Spinoza,
using reason well is also an individual experience of virtue. In the TTP, we learn that we have
the right to personal freedom of thought and safety. These aspects of being an individual are
not possible for a human being without personal reflective consciousness.
To further illustrate this point, in the TTP we read, “What greater misfortune can be
imagined for a state than that honorable men should be exiled as miscreants because their
opinions are at variance with authority and they cannot disguise the fact? What can be more
calamitous than that men should be regarded as enemies and put to death, not for any crime or
misdeed, but for being of independent mind?”74 Note what is stated years later in the TP which
is similar, “Furthermore, it follows that every man is subject to another’s right for as long as he
is in the other’s power, and he is in control of his own right to the extent that he can repel all
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force.”75 These deductions require human subjectivity in order to be fully understood. For
example, in order to repel the force of another we have to be capable of consciously reflecting
on one’s singular circumstances, options, and rational dispositions. Because understanding all
of Nature is impossible, attempting to understand oneself within the various contexts and
environments one is involved in is more realistic. Yet, we are to keep in mind something
Spinoza warns us about as early as the KV, namely that “truth,” “essence,” and “existence”
“never depends on me: for, as was shown with reference to the second kind of ideas, they are
what they are independent of me…”76
Emphasized in the above passages is not only singularity but the nature of human
certainty and deductive logic – that such a thing can exist in an objective way. Common
notions are common for all regardless of who/what is thinking them; some are human centered
and some are common to all of Nature (such as the laws of extension). The object of a common
property is not necessarily what the content is as much as the adequate notion that is about laws
of thought operating which act according to the same laws of Nature for all, even God. The
laws are the same even when the content varies. Just because the content varies does not also
entail that Spinoza’s system is one empty of content. As he writes in 3p12 and p13, individual
minds strive to seek those things that increase their unique power to exist.77 Consider it this
way: any theory that deduces that I do not have my own power of thought will decrease my
power to exist singularly. Therefore, I must, as a human mind, have the capacity to reflect on a
singular level and be aware of such things as particularly human and involve human power
through consciousness. I also must remain aware of my interactions with other finite bodies as
distinct, as that which can add to or take away from my power. My collective contribution
75
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allows me to remain aware of my individuality and increases (or decreases) in personal power,
including that aspect of my adequate ideas which expresses common notions that are infinite
and apply to all of Nature. This adds to our joy, by necessity, and Spinoza makes this point
specifically as early as E1p21. To feel our experiences (ideas and actions) as affects that
involve the infinite by logical necessity is to understand that we are thinking and acting with
more power; and such an expression is immensely joyous.78
The above deductions are similar to what Peg Rawes calls “the production of
subjectivity” through philosophically understood “architectural passages” of increasing
capacities to use reason well.79 This requires a theory of human consciousness in my reading.
My essence, as my own desire and tendency towards self-preservation, has ratios of motion and
rest that interact both with my internal actions as well as with external encounters. Yet, these
ratios are unique to my personal equilibrium and homeostasis. As we read in E2p13s, a finite
body can learn how to transform itself according to the laws of the attributes so that “its mind
is more capable of understanding distinctly.” 80 Spinoza is not talking about God’s mind, at
least not directly, nor your neighbor’s mind or your pet’s mind. He is talking about a human
being’s singular mind and thought processes that are controlled by laws of Nature. Spinoza is
also talking about the human mind that is reading and learning his system. It is not a pebble
learning its surrounding environment and internal structures in the same way as we have access
to after-all. It is a singular human person. The ideas we have, as human beings, about the ways
in which things agree, the patterns of motion they assume, and the laws of Nature they abide
are all adequate ideas when understood rationally. This reading is supported further by such
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propositions in the Ethics as 2p38, in conjunction with 2p11c and 2p40s2.81 The interactions
with my environment that play a role in my reflective awareness are continually shifting
spontaneously. This also involves the rational understanding that ratios of motion and rest
cannot be thought of in a linear manner but only as continuously shifting and layered or
multiple. That spontaneity (like the thought that the sun is close to one’s body because the
feeling of warmth increases, although, in fact, the sun is far away from one’s body) is part of
imaginative (singular) experience and knowledge. The key is to not allow imaginative ideas to
become the larger portion of one’s awareness. The only way to do this, for Spinoza, is to
strengthen reasoning. The content of such exercises is not only about other bodies but one’s
own. The content of such experiences is about my own increases and decreases in the power of
my conatus in relation to what I encounter personally. Imagine a human body that has never
experienced being pushed further in reasoning capacities past imaginative experiences (relying
on sense data alone, for example). Such an individual would never be capable of recognizing
common notions even if they were experiencing them. Nonetheless, their expressions are still
an aspect of the reality of Nature. In this way, at least in part, God’s attribute of thought is
expressed in all ways. The emphasis is on singular bodily experiences and our affects in a
deliberate manner.
Spinoza’s Theory of Consciousness
There is a legitimate debate about what a theory of consciousness can be in Spinoza. It
is the position of my thesis that such a theory is possible, and, if so, it is not one that ends in
mind-matter dualism, egoist ethics, or rigid determinism. Spinoza’s theory of consciousness is
transformative, dynamic, and cannot be reduced to any theory of representation, as we will
read about in Chapter Four. My ideas and actions have real effects and are all expressions of
81
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the power of Nature. Spinoza makes this clear in Letter 21 where he writes, “When you say
that by making men so dependent on God I reduce them to the level of elements, plants, and
stones, this is enough to show that you have completely misunderstood my views and are
confusing the field of intellect with that of the imagination.” 82
Some background on current theories of consciousness will be helpful before discussing
Spinoza’s Seventeenth Century version. Leading biologist and neuroscientist, Christof Koch,
writes, “Without consciousness there is nothing… But there’s the rub. How the brain converts
bioelectrical activity into subjective states, how photons reflected off water are magically
transformed into the percept of an iridescent aquamarine mountain tarn is a puzzle. The nature
of the relationship between the nervous system and consciousness remains elusive…” 83
The nature of consciousness is, indeed, a “hard problem,” replete with intricate
theoretical and practical difficulties about the nature of subjectivity and how it differs from the
electrical synapses which continually flow by the trillions between our two hemispheres and
spinal cord.84 David Chalmers writes, “…no explanation given in wholly physical terms can
ever account for the emergence of conscious experience.”85 This modern explanation supports
Spinoza’s epistemology. Singular, phenomenal conscious experience is a real experience that
we are more acutely aware of when reflecting on the types of ideas that are our mind. On
Spinoza’s use of the term “consciousness,” Early Modern philosopher, Udo Thiel, writes, “In
any case, although ‘conscientia’ is clearly a relating to one’s own mental states, it remains
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unclear what kind of relation to one’s own mental states, emotional or otherwise, conscientia is
meant to be in Spinoza.”86 I aim to make Spinoza’s meaning more clear in this chapter.
In 2008, Spinoza scholar and biographer, Steven Nadler, in his essay “Spinoza and
Consciousness,” not only writes that there is a problem with those interpretations which reduce
Spinoza’s system to a theory of cognitive representations, but also that there is a theory of
consciousness to be found in Spinoza’s system. 87 Nadler makes an important comment within
the opening pages of his essay: “What is particularly interesting is how few contributions to the
question of consciousness in Spinoza there really are.” 88 Nadler opens his essay stating,
“Spinoza does indeed have an explanation of consciousness, a rather sophisticated one that
depicts consciousness, like all elements of the mind for Spinoza, as deeply grounded in certain
functional aspects of the body.”89 Nadler combines the meaning of human consciousness with
what it is to be aware that one is conscious in a similar way as I have noted above. As Spinoza
defines the mind as ideas, Nadler’s reading is logical. In his reading, Nadler includes the
capacity to reflect on one’s conscious states, but draws the line at what are typically called
“intentional states” in the literature: “Merely having an intentional state is not ipso facto to
have a conscious state.”90 The distinction being drawn is between merely being conscious and
reflecting on one’s conscious states and dispositions, but the debate is far from over.
Nadler outlines the two schools of thought regarding a theory of consciousness in
Spinoza’s works. There are those who believe there is absolutely no such theory possible in
Spinoza’s Ethics (Bennett, Della Rocca, Matson, Miller, etc.) and those who believe that such a
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theory is possible, but that it is seriously flawed or limited (Curley, Matheron, M. Wilson, etc.).
In one footnote in his Beyond the Geometric Method, Ed Curley, while discussing the KV,
notes, “…Spinoza recognized what ought to be obvious enough from experience: that different
people possess self-consciousness (which I presume includes conscious awareness of the state
of one’s body) in varying degrees, and that no human has full self-consciousness.”91 Some
scholars, such as Caroline Williams, eliminate any possibility of a theory of consciousness in
Spinoza, writing, “…there is no subject of the affect, because affect drives the subject towards
identity and performance.”92 If this is true, I would ask, do we ever get to identity? I wonder
how there can be a singular drive towards identity without a subject of that identity who is
aware that they are a singular subject?
I agree with Nadler that there is a viable theory of human subjectivity and
consciousness to be found in Spinoza. It is also important to recognize what Genevive Lloyd
states, namely that, for Spinoza, ideas about the modifications of our body depend both on
ourselves and on external bodies that we encounter.93 We need other singular subjects, but that
is not all of what it is, for Spinoza, to be a “body” either. The method we learn for better
recognizing our own increases and decreases in power is a distinctly singular experience (even
though the laws used are the same for all of Nature). Although the laws of Nature work the
same for everyone, the experience of the effects produced by those laws as modifications of
modifications of substance vary on a singular level. Why else would Spinoza emphasize so
heavily in the TTP and TP the freedom of thought we are all afforded as a natural right? We
individually have the unique capacity to order and arrange the three types of knowledge in
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unique ways to increase our conatus. How else would a theory of imaginative knowledge be
possible if not that we have distinct memories and singular sense experiences that are our own?
One’s ideas are in continual interaction with other ideas and other bodies external to us.
Spinoza makes this point clear in E2p21s, p22, and p23, among many other places.94 More
support can also be found in Letter 19. There, Spinoza explains that those who partake in
continuous rational understanding are expressing the intellectual love of God (or what he calls
the third kind of knowledge, intuition) and are “conscious.” Those described as “wicked” are
those who do not actively express increasing perfection in this way and are, therefore, merely
moving about human existence “unconsciously.” 95 The necessity of Nature in motion with
continuous interactions is emphasized throughout E4, especially in the Appendix: “Again,
because, among singular things, we know nothing more excellent than a man who is guided by
reason, we can show best how much our skill and understanding are worth by educating men
so that at last they live according to the command of their own reason.” 96 If Spinoza did not
want us to consider the subjectivity of singular human minds he would not use such terms and
phrases as “of their own reason” as he does in the above passage.
Philosopher John Searle has defined consciousness as what we experience in our
waking hours.97 Yet, I would argue that we are consciously aware when we are asleep, and not
only in our waking hours. Any parent who hears their children in danger in the middle of the
night while otherwise sound asleep understands that there is always a level of conscious
awareness of one’s external environment at work. The physicist and part time philosopher,
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Adam Frank, in conjunction with the work of Alva Noe writes, “The truth of the matter is we
are just at the beginning of our understanding of consciousness and of the Mind.”98 This is a
striking statement, and I believe very possibly an accurate one after decades of contemporary
debate on the nature of consciousness.
Conscious reflection is clearly required if we are to control our passions, which are also
singularly experienced. This involves what was referenced previously in Chapter One about the
method of combining analysis with synthesis in reflection. In the Appendix to E4, Spinoza
continues:
But human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external
causes. So we do not have absolute power to adapt things outside us to our use.
Nevertheless, we shall bear calmly those things which happen to us contrary to what the
principle of our advantage demands, if we are conscious that we have done our duty,
that the power we have could not have extended itself to the point where we could have
avoided those things, and that we are part of the whole of nature, whose order we
follow.99
It is not simply that we learn how to build to using the most efficient method. Our increase in
conatus helps us live in more rationally powerful ways. As the passage above states, there will
be times when we consciously reflect on external circumstances and the power of Nature so that
we rationally understand that there are events occurring which are not to our singular benefit.
That is, we adequately comprehend how to calmly tolerate external events that are more
powerful than we are or can be. It is adequate thinking if we are “conscious that we have done
our duty” to the best of our current capacity. Our essence is conatus, but the essence of reason,
according to E4p26, is the mind “insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly (see the
definition of this in IIP40S2). Therefore (by IIP40) whatever we strive for from reason is
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nothing but understanding.”100 This is similar to, but differs from Stoic philosophy because
Spinoza’s theory of affects, as directly tied to his dynamic epistemology, cannot be reduced to
only our emotions. The Stoic version of the passions are about emotions and our understanding
of reasoning verses the passions. Spinoza is clearly talking about singular human minds in the
above reference. For example, as Peg Rawes writes, “Geometric thinking in the Ethics is
therefore aligned with life, and the reader’s journey towards fulfillment or joy reflects this
process as they make the step-by-step movement through the text’s different elements…”101
Absolute affirmations through conscious reflection are done by reasoning with more
conceptual force and understanding. Spinoza writes that the less indifferent we are when
affirming or negating something, the more forcefully rational we are thinking, by necessity. The
laws of the attribute of thought require that ideas of reason cause other ideas of reason only.
This is also why Spinoza concludes, as noted above, that reason does not recognize
contingency. This process of thought is also when we are most free: “I call him free who is led
by reason alone.”102 The processes of analysis, synthesis, and geometric thinking use reason in a
way that builds in strength, and bring about the effects such reflections cause. We can only
understand these processes of a singular human mind by putting forth a theory of human
consciousness. As noted above, because the recognition of contingency is an element of
imaginative knowledge, when reason understands contingent events with more force, it is doing
nothing else but using reasoning about the laws of thought and extension with more clarity.
Furthermore, adequately understanding the proto-physics of ideational force and the
shifting ratios of motion and rest in extension involves reflecting on our affects in adequate
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ways. Such regular habits lead to what Spinoza calls “a virtuous disposition.”103 We can employ
such tools consistently as we strengthen our “habitual readiness.”104 As A. G. Duttmann writes
in the anthology Spinoza Now, “Each time the rule that determines the relationship between rest
and motion is altered, the disposition of bodily parts is transformed.”105 Therefore, the process
of consciously reflecting on our affects must include both the capacity to recognize what kind of
knowledge we are relying on more heavily and what is reasonable to expect our bodies to do in
any given context or environment. While this chapter, and particularly this section, are focused
on the second kind of knowledge, it becomes increasingly clear that we cannot think about what
reasoning is (and the role it plays as a type of force which can enhance our conatus) without
also taking into serious consideration both the attribute of extension and the combination of
extension with our ideas to create affects. In addition, to rationally reflect on the proto-physics
of the force between our ideas includes understanding some fundamental laws of physics. As
Curley notes, at the very least, “the attribute of extension is that fixed and eternal thing to which
the most fundamental laws of physics correspond…”106 It is not enough to understand motion,
for example, since motion involves the concept of another thing (namely extension) in order to
be understood, something Spinoza is clear about in E4. But thought and extension are attributes
which are conceived through themselves: one as increasing and decreasing levels of force and
the other as shifting ratios of motion and rest. In Letter 2, his first letter to Henry Oldenburg,
Spinoza writes, “…by attribute I mean every thing that is conceived in itself and through itself,
so that its conception does not involve the conception of any other thing.” 107 If thought and
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extension were not distinct attributes of the same substance, as Paul Wienpahl notes, we would
never be capable of having thoughts about bodies, and especially about the diverse and varied
experiences of our own body.108
We have adequate knowledge when we determine our ideas internally and not according
to any order we perceive externally in Nature according to Spinoza. This is because we cannot
know all of the causes of Nature and so to see either order or confusion externally is to rely on
imaginative knowledge more heavily than reasoning:
I say expressly that the mind has, not an adequate, but only a confused knowledge, of
itself, of its own body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the
common order of Nature, that is, so long as it is determined externally…and not so long
as it is determined internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, to
understand their agreements, differences, and oppositions. For so often as it is disposed
internally…then it regards things clearly and distinctly…109
This is also more support for not interpreting Spinoza’s conception of extension (ratios of
motion and rest) as something linear. The ordering of one’s ideas is, in this way, distinctly
singular. Conscious, reflective awareness is required for the ordering of singular ideas. By
increasing understanding, we increase our capacities for thinking well. Spinoza writes, “But
skill and alertness are required for this. For men vary – there being few who live according to
the rule of reason…”110 By singular, Spinoza intends both individuals and collective bodies of
individuals, “By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate
existence. And if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the
cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.”111
Continuous understanding of the laws of thought and extension which create our
combined affects become automatically stronger as we understand more. Beth Lord writes,
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“We are more rational as we understand things better, and more imaginative as we are more
affected by our experiences. At no point can we ever be wholly rational (for then we would feel
nothing) or wholly imaginative (for then we would know nothing truly).”112 One way to
understand the deductions made so far are to understand that the laws of thought are separate
from the laws of extension. Nonetheless, within the laws of thought there are three types of
knowledge with their own properties. Each type can only produce another idea of its own kind.
To say that the laws of thought are all we need in order to comprehend Spinoza’s dynamic
epistemology is an over-generalization. The experiences of our senses are completely different
from the use and experience of the capacity to reason. You cannot stop your senses from
flowing (unless you commit suicide, which is an instance of the imagination overpowering
reason).113
There are a diversity of ways to better order our affects in accordance with reason. As
we read in E4p63c, passionate joys can be rational and not excessive.114 It is much easier to
order our affects to benefit ourselves and others if we adequately understand how we are
expressions of forces (laws) of Nature. These intellectual affections are tremendously joyous in
both their ordering and, most importantly, that is, in their effects. In other words, the more we
understand how to apply the laws of proportion to our own lives (ideas and actions), the more
readily and easily we can recognize where such laws can be applied or increased in magnitude.
It is not enough just to know how something works; one must put it into action in order to truly
increase the magnitude of effects from such knowledge. As Spinoza writes in 2p13L7, any
given body is composed of many parts communicating their motion and rest to each other
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continuously.115 What matters to a human being whom is able to consciously recognize certain
effects and transitions is the speed and power of what is possible in such transitions.
Therefore, we cannot eliminate the concept of human, reflective consciousness in
Spinoza’s Ethics. In his monism, “…nature as such resists any total capture by human
thought.”116 Nature and its laws lack nothing nonetheless. So, we have to ask what it is about
human thought that is both expressive of all of Nature in acting out the laws of thought and
extension and, simultaneously, cannot capture all of Nature? To have any lack would imply
there was something we were working towards, which is a form of teleology. For Spinoza,
such systems are not possible. He writes, “What is called a final cause is nothing but a human
appetite insofar as it is considered as a principle, or primary cause, of some thing.”117 We have
to remind ourselves at this point (which involves imaginative knowledge as memory in
conjunction with adequate reasoning) of an important metaphysical component that is
understood as immanent. Spinoza writes, “For if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily
wants something which he lacks. And though the theologians and metaphysicians distinguish
between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless confess that God did all
things for his own sake, not for the sake of the things to be created.”118 The reference by these
theologians/metaphysicians to a future tense is important, as to refer to the future is to say that
God’s modal expressions are not yet fully God, which is absurd. The Latin term perfectus is
translated by Piet Steenbakkers as that which is already complete and fulfilled. The term
potential is also used by Steenbakkers in a way that denotes an identity between virtue and
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power (strength) where human conceptions of values as inherent in Nature are not logically
possible.119
As we will read in the following chapters, the intellectual love of God (and Nature)
includes enhancing one’s reasoning and power to act, but it also includes loving well. In the
TP, we read that individual virtue is identical with the strength of one’s rational capacities,
which Spinoza also calls “freedom of spirit.” 120 In E4p22c, we read, “The striving to preserve
oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue.” 121 These ideas are consistent across
Spinoza’s works. In Letter 32, he also writes, “But I would first ask you to note that I do not
attribute to Nature beauty, ugliness, order or confusion. It is only with respect to our
imagination that things can be said to be beautiful, ugly, well-ordered or confused.”122
Letter 32 can be used to compare with E2p7 (“the order and connection of ideas is the
order and connection of things”) because 2p7 can only be applied to human ideas in my
reading. As Pierre Macherey writes, “‘order’ here designates something completely different
from a relationship of presence between propositions… For Spinoza, the ideas of method and
order cease to be formally determined by a criteria of priority; rather, they express the real
movement of thought…”123 Spinoza’s notion of the power of the intellect and its rational
process “has nothing to do with the obligatory unfolding of an order, because it no longer has
any goal to complete.124 Again, as noted repeatedly throughout this chapter, this is another
reason why one cannot critique Spinoza’s concept of extension as ratios of motion and rest by
relying on linear concepts. When talking about extension, we can only refer to concepts of
119
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continuous transformation, power, layers, and multiple ratios combining in ways that create a
unified force with shifting degrees of increases in power. The natural processes of reasoning
well include using clear and distinct chains of adequate ideas, but they also include learning
more efficient methods of analysis and synthesis in the production of new knowledge.
In Spinoza’s system, knowledge proceeds “…neither from things to ideas nor from
ideas to things, but it goes from idea to idea, that is to say it links acts of thought between
them, according to a necessary causal order that is the same as the one in which things are
linked in reality.”125 Ideas link acts of thought. Acts of thought are always one of two elements
of our combined affects (along with our bodily affections as ratios of motion and rest). Affects
are what we are aware of as an expression of our consciousness and physical sensations. The
point is that all of substance is expressed modally in distinct and infinite ways, but is at the
same time expressed by mechanical operations of the same natural laws. This necessity does
not, therefore, mean that our modal expressions are reduced to representations of reality. They
are reality. Real expressions of natural laws are not representations of Nature, as we will read
about more specifically in Chapter Four. So, for example, contingencies exist in Nature, but
they are an expression of singular, imaginative knowledge. It is also evident from Chapter Two
of the TP that there are certain desires which can only arise from ideas of reason as an effect
the laws of thought and motion together can produce (as affects). In other words, although
there is no cross attributal causality between thought and extension, in an affect the attributes
combine separate forces into an organic, singular expression of power. Affects, as modes, can
be adequately understood as both a cause and an effect of Nature depending on what other
conceptual chains they are placed among. E1p36 reads, “Nothing exists from whose nature
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some effect does not follow. Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence, of God in a
certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all things…” 126
In E1p11, Spinoza challenges you to conceive “if you can” that God does not exist and,
therefore, the essence of God does “not involve existence.”127 The principle of sufficient reason
(PSR) is inserted here with force, but this principle will also take on several different variations
throughout the Ethics. Everything in this system must have a cause for its existence or for its
inability to exist. Those causes cannot contain an inherent contradiction: “But this reason, or
cause, must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it.” 128 As early as the
KV, we read, “…for the nature of a thing can require nothing while it does not exist.”129 In
1p11, Spinoza writes that the reason why substance exists is due to its nature of inherent selfpreservation. Its nature also includes the whole of all its attributes. That which has within the
drive towards self-preservation always has a quality of existence as part of, yet different from,
its essence. So, in a way, even though human beings as singular, finite things die, we continue
to exist as new expressions of substance in other ways (new ratios) upon their death. Substance
(God, Nature) is eternal regardless of its unique finite expressions, and the definition of
“existence” must include that anything which is ever in existence includes a certain set of
factors deductively, namely, that it is evident through itself that a thing which is in existence
includes primary characteristics of absolute affirmation. Spinoza writes, “These things are
evident through themselves; from them it follows that a thing necessarily exists if there is no
reason or cause which prevents it from existing.”130 How we construct order in Nature will be
based on the effect of what ideas we are having and what types of knowledge we are relying
126
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on. The implication of these deductions is that “cause” (as we understand the concept) does not
exist in Nature outside of thought, and yet, the common notion we have about causality is an
expression (truth) of Nature as well. A horse or tree will have different determinate ways of
interacting with the environment. And although everything strives to persist in its existence,
how it persists is unique to each type of thing doing the persisting, including types of ideas.
This is not an anthropomorphic conception of Nature if we adequately recognize and reflect on
the infinite modal ways Nature expresses itself through its attributes.
There are two final considerations related to E1p11 that are important to understand. As
noted, to exist is power, therefore, the more existence a thing has, the more power it has (as a
cause and as an effect). In this way, power is a feedback loop. It must be within the thing to
begin with, a part of its nature, as we cannot draw our power from external causes but must
become self-caused in our own determinate ways. This is what Spinoza refers to as an adequate
cause, one whose effects are clearly and distinctly perceived. 131 In 4p26, we read, “What we
strive for from reason is nothing but understanding…this striving for understanding (by P22C)
is the first and only foundation of virtue…”132 The cause of the thing and its power must be
itself: “…whatever perfection substance has is not owed to any external cause. So its existence
must follow from its nature alone; hence its existence is nothing but its essence.” 133 In this way,
nature, as well as our singular expressions of substance, has an essence that involves existence.
Every effect involves its cause. Something that is in existence is always conceived as
affirmative.
The singularity of individual expressions of substance with their own ratios of motion
and rest and ideational force involve many common notions conceived through and with the
131
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attributes. The ambiguity of daily human experiences can be organized by relying on rational
conceptions of the necessity of natural laws, as well as rational evaluations within conscious
reflection as common notions. Yet, as we learn in 2p32 and 2p36, the same rules of necessity
apply to inadequate ideas as to adequate notions (as all ideas are in God). 134
Recall that an idea is “a concept of the mind which the mind forms because it is a
thinking thing,” and adequate ideas considered in themselves have “all the properties, or
intrinsic denominations of a true idea.”135 These definitions are referenced repeatedly, but
another important distinction includes what is written in 2p40s2 where we learn the distinctions
between the three types of knowledge. Leading up to this point Spinoza writes in 2p38 that
whatever is common to all things and equally in the part as in the whole “can be conceived
adequately.” The corollary reads, “From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or
[universal] notions, common to all men. For (by L2) all bodies agree in certain things, which
(by P38) must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all.”136
By the time we reach E2p40 and the definitions for kinds of knowledge, we have
already learned how to consider what human bodies are, share, and can do or have in common.
We read, “Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind are
also adequate.”137 This result, as an effect produced by something that is identical (and yet its
cause), occurs by necessity. The same thing, as cause, can cause its own kind in effect. It is the
force intrinsic to an affirmation of necessity and it causes its own existence as a law of its
nature. Therefore, learning how adequate ideas are formed and manipulated with more force
only guarantees that one will be capable of conceiving expressions of Nature with more force
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of comprehension and joy. This is also how it is possible to rationally defer judgment and, yet,
such a delay is not something negative but is something affirmative. The delay in judgment is
still a use of reasoning. At this point in the Ethics we learn that common notions are the
“foundations of our reasoning” and that they result from being caused by other adequate notions
about the common properties between things.
Included within these deductions, starting back as early as 1p11, reason is included as a
way to build understanding of what causes are. Therefore, reflecting on our ideas and actions as
only representations of Nature (or as only modal modifications of substance) will become
logically problematic. Modes, for example, can both exist and not exist. Modes are not
determined in-themselves, but rely on other concepts to be understood. Adequate ideas, on the
other hand, must be understood as something different, that is, they are conceived through
themselves and are, therefore, absolute affirmations of existence. We are concerned here with
shifting our thought patterns towards that which we have already learned applies to substance
itself as necessary, and not only the modal expressions of substance. When we do this, we can
produce not only more adequate notions, but more forceful adequate chains of ideas; and we
combine them with other variations of imaginative ideas to create stronger, more affirmative,
and joyful affects. Contingencies and doubt or limitation are not possible as conceptions within
such realizations. In this way, and because we are consciously reflective expressions of Nature,
2p40 can be combined with 3p53, 3p55, 4D6, and 5p6 to allow stronger deductions of rational
force, as well as their logical conceptual results or further effects.
Our habitual readiness to use reason well includes understanding the necessity of laws
of Nature. All of our experiences can be understood according to only select affects: joy
(affirmations), sadness (denials, contingencies, or partial information), or as temporarily neutral
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(also affirmations of adequate understanding even if not joyous). The adequate knowledge we
have about affirmation is itself a force that propels rationality by necessity.138 Steve Nadler
writes, “Since we cannot control the objects that we tend to value and allow to influence our
well-being, we ought instead to try to control our evaluations themselves and thereby minimize
the sway that external objects and the passions have over us. We can never eliminate the passive
affects entirely; nor would that even be desirable in this life.” 139 Singular, conscious selfreflection is needed for daily evaluations and generative transformations or productions of
knowledge being experienced. Passions are singular too, although some are also shared. We
may both be terribly upset about a tornado that has torn our shared neighborhood and homes
apart, but perhaps your structure stands enough to affect you less economically and emotionally
than my completely destroyed home and foundation which I cannot afford to rebuild. Our
passions will be both shared and, yet, singularly experienced. The difference is important, but
the shared common notion is that Nature is larger in force than either of us individually or
combined. In that understanding we are one. Macherey writes, “…the power of the intellect
is…an affirmation of self…”140
In addition, the human experience of space and time is directly proportional to ideas of
the imagination and of reason, depending on what aspect of that experience is being reflected
on. Nonetheless, rational truths are clear and distinct common notions and common notions are
always affirmative. Our experience of space and time, as durational (finite), is part of
imaginative knowledge. Interestingly enough, the effects of thinking clearly and distinctly
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increase the power of our understanding “not from our ‘being convinced by reasons, but from
our feeling and enjoying the thing itself [singular essence]…’”141
The deduction made in the above proposition, that we are not necessarily always
convinced by reason, places a whole new meaning on the use of the PSR by Spinoza in the
Ethics.142 Understanding the law of how something works is not enough. Such an act would
include being able to be convinced by reason(s) alone. We have to put that law into action,
which, as an effect, will increase its force further and be something we feel in addition to
understand. In this way, it is not the reasons which convince us (which also means that it is not
the PSR alone which is at work), but our actions and their results, whose effects we enjoy
because we are aware of the transitions in power and how to enhance our laws of thought and
action. This is also how new ideas or combinations of ideas are born. It is also a disposition of
virtue (and is not only about habits). More is required. Understanding well includes singular
habits as an increase in our interactions with others, with new experiences, with more forceful
concentration or creativity, and so forth. If the powers of imaginative and rational knowledge
were the same for everyone, there would be nothing new to discover, invent, or experience as
the generations pass by. Substance has infinite attributes that express themselves in infinite
ways, combinations, and continuous arrangements, compositions, and decompositions...
Efficiency and Force in Our Magnitude of Understanding
In Chapter Three of the TTP, virtue as a rational disposition can be conceived as a habit
of thought and action that is meant to help “subjugate the passions.” In E4p24, we read, “But
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we act only insofar as we understand (by IIIP3).” 143 Being capable of acquiring a disposition of
strength and virtue through developing conscious rational habits, as well as understanding the
causes of things, and to live in a state of security with opportunities for good health and
freedom of thought and speech are the things Spinoza prioritizes which “depend on human
power alone,” that is, “on laws of human nature.” 144 Spinoza calls these natural laws “gifts.”
We can draw a connection between these deductions and E5p39s. Spinoza writes that
we can be “conscious” of external causes or we can be conscious of one’s mind in its series of
ideas and their idea types which are a part of our affects. 145 To shift one’s conscious reflections
between the two options will require learning how the rules of thought operate through
demonstrations or applications of common notions, observation, habit, and retention.
Reasoning well in a way that allows for an affirmative suspension of judgment is distinctly a
human experience. All parts of Nature may strive for continued existence, but pebbles do not
experience consciousness like a human being. In 4p33, we read, “The nature, or essence, of the
affects cannot be explained through one’s essence, or nature, alone (by IIID1 and D2), but
must be defined by the power, that is (by IIIP7), by the nature of external causes compared
with our own. That is why there are as many species of each affect as there are species of
objects by which we are affected…”146 Because human thought cannot escape its own
participation in and experience of its affects, we cannot only conclude that there are truths
outside of how human thought deduces or understands them. This is Macherey’s point.
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In the KV and the Ethics, we learn that a finite human can be said to be perfect both in
its duration and in its relation to what is an immanent cause of ideas.147 This is because it is an
expression of an eternal God (substance) with the attribute of thought. Another way to
understand that all of substance and my personal finite, modal expressions are both the same
thing to different degrees (or how we are modalized in existence and also eternal expressions)
is to conceive of simple wholes and complex, determinate parts that do not have set material
limits. Motion and force cannot, in themselves, be understood as something with limits. Things
in motion stay in motion until they come up against another force that enhances, hinders, or
stops that motion. This is a law of Nature that Spinoza was working on in the Ethics and in his
correspondence with scientists and friends. As we read in Letter 32, for example, relying on a
fictional story about a worm living within the blood of some body (unaware that it is a small
part of something much larger), Spinoza draws an analogy and asks us to use both our reason
and our imagination to consider both the worm and the larger body it is within co-exist in
separate, determinate ways within one larger whole together:
On the question of whole and parts, I consider things as parts of a whole to the extent
that their natures adapt themselves to one another so that they are in the closest possible
agreement [with the ‘least possible opposition between them’]. Insofar as parts of things
are different from one another, to that extent each one forms in our mind a separate idea
and is therefore considered as a whole in itself, and not as a part. 148
The ideas within this letter are the key to understanding all of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology
and determinist ontology. We get a glimpse of such deductions even earlier in Letter 12 on the
infinite where Spinoza also writes what I consider another key passage for adequately
understanding his system:
It is to the existence of Modes alone that we can apply the term Duration; the
corresponding term for the existence of Substance is Eternity, that is, the infinite
147
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enjoyment of existence or – pardon the Latin – of being (essendi). What I have said
makes it quite clear that when we have regard only to the essence of Modes and not to
Nature’s order, as is most often the case, we can arbitrarily delimit the existence and
duration of Modes without thereby impairing to any extent our conception of them; and
we can conceive this duration as greater or less, and divisible into parts. But Eternity
and Substance, being conceivable only as infinite, cannot be thus treated without
annulling our conception of them. So it is nonsense, bordering on madness, to hold that
extended Substance is composed of parts or bodies really distinct from one another.149
Therefore, as our attributes can be understood as the infinite enjoyment and power of
existence, it is not that I conceived of myself as separate from another human body or as parts;
it is that I adequately understand what it is to be a specific kind of determinate expression of
something that is eternal. When we die, for example, our finite expressions of substance as
human simply transform into another type of expression of ratios of motion and rest. Spinoza
goes so far as to explain that even major transformations in personality due to a growth in
rational capacities for comprehension and an increase in the use of common notions are little
deaths. As adequate thinking about such things will always be affirmations, Spinoza deduces,
“…human understanding is immortal, because it is a product which God has produced in
himself.”150 If we place the deductions of Letters 12 and 32 with E2p38, we start to gain a more
lucid perspective and understanding of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. As one cannot place
a rational limit on the enjoyment of existence, 2p38 states, “Those things which are common to
all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.” 151
The understanding of parts and wholes, in other words, when logical, will always be adequate
149
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knowledge that produces more adequate knowledge. Just as contingency cannot be understood
by reason and is always an aspect of imaginative knowledge, so, too, the understanding of parts
and wholes can only, for Spinoza, be understood by reason if being recognized in its logical
implications and impossibilities. William Stakstedder concludes:
The way of being correlates thus with the way the subject is considered… Neither part
nor whole is a viable notion by itself…calling anything either part or whole is possible
only when it is juxtaposed with something other than itself… Rather, anything is called
a part in view of a common nature shared with others. It is called a whole in view of its
opposition to some other thing.152
Substance is an immanent cause, even if both concepts have to be understood through a
finite lens. Furthermore, “Motion alone does not exist, but only motion and rest together; and
this is in the whole, and must be in it, because there is no part in extension.”153 The above
deductions should make this earlier claim on motion and rest in the KV clearer. He continues,
“Now when we consider extension alone, then we become aware of nothing else in it except
Motion and Rest, from which we then discover all the effects that result therefrom.”154
With the deductions of part and whole in mind, we can return to a discussion of conatus
and especially the proto-physics of force of human conatus. Spinoza writes, “But since the
universal power of Nature as a whole is nothing but the power of all individual things taken
together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do all that it can do; i.e.
the right of the individual is co-extensive with its determinate power.”155 From this passage in
the TTP, it is clear that Spinoza believes in both singular individual things and the natural rights
of singular things as equal to their essence as determinate expressions of power. It is important
for me to establish this point repeatedly so to better structure a theory of human consciousness,
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and how such conscious reflection is co-extensive with the intellectual love of God (or Nature)
and the joy of existence of one’s conatus. To have an idea about the object of one’s idea is to
focus reflectively on the object of the idea, which involves using imaginative knowledge and
reasoning to process that object, but it also involves adequately understanding shifting registers
of motion and rest and ideational power or ways of knowing and being.
My determinate power as my conatus will depend on what type of knowledge I focus
on as the object of my ideas as well. To reflect on types of knowledge is to use ideas to reflect
on other ideas. In the KV, Spinoza writes, “…Desire depends on the idea of its objects…” 156 To
define and understand human power as the power of Nature is to emphasize dynamic and
versatile human singularity in its reasoning capacities specifically, particularly the capacity to
understand the same object from multiple perspectives. Hsana Sharp writes, “…selfdetermination emerges from our receptive powers to be affected and to coordinate multiple
diverse agencies.”157 As I will demonstrate next, adequate understanding involves consciously
reflecting on the three types of knowledge we are capable of. Once we grasp this level of what
reasoning is capable of, we can process what it is for ideas to have varying forces.
Conscious Reflection as a Proto-Physics of Force and Motion
Spinoza reflected on his system in terms both ecological and ethological. If we are not
only moved and convinced by reasons, but are also moved by feelings, then all three forms of
knowledge should be considered as an organic, unified process (as we read in E2ax2). This is
particularly so because some of Spinoza’s ideas fall within today’s generally accepted
definitions of ecology: “The scientific study of the inter-relationships among organisms and
between organisms, and between them and all aspects, living and non-living, of their
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environment.”158 Ethology is the study of human patterns of behavior and disposition, as well
as the study of human personalities and their natural habitat with an emphasis on both
empirical experiences and the rational and imaginative use of ideas and reflection. Spinoza’s
system can be used for both.159
Spinoza focuses specifically on what strict deductive logic can show us about different
types of causality within our experience in extension and thought. The connection of thought,
motion and rest, and ontology includes, as noted earlier in passages such as E1p28, that
efficient and material causation (beginnende oorzaak) can only be adequately understood in
relation to ideas about modes. This deduction can accompany the understanding that God (or
Nature) is the immanent cause (inblyvende oorzaak) of all things. Therefore, we are to consider
multiple levels of causality at once. This fact brings up a challenge for relying on one
definition or use of the PSR when reading Spinoza because the nature of causality must be in
relation to both substance as one organic whole and the expressions of modifications of
substance as modes. Modes are not, in other words, conceptual fictions but are real
modifications of substance with their own causal rules and properties. There is not one set of
rules for understanding all types of causes and all effects.
Adequate knowledge includes true beliefs which are logical and about the properties of
things, including about thought and types of ideas. The attributes of thought and extension are
real things (res), and the true beliefs of thought, for Spinoza, include “…that conviction
whereby it is clearly seen that it cannot be otherwise.” 160 Reason does not recognize
contingency because clear and distinct ideas are completely true by necessity and could not
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have been otherwise. The way reasoning recognizes that contingencies are a part of one’s
imagination is only by understanding the laws of thought and how each type of knowledge is
separate, each creating ideas of its own kind. Necessary relations in reason cannot, logically, be
contingent. Learning this is what enhances conscious reflection on those contingencies as
partial knowledge. The experience of contingencies is a part of the imagination, but the
adequate reflection is an action of reason.
Substance is the self-perpetuating single cause of all its effects. Spinoza clearly felt that
he had a philosophical system that is one organic whole with infinite ways of expressing itself
as self-caused and eternal. We can only understand substance and our expressions of it as the
laws of Nature of thought and extension. These deductions bring with them more clarity about
E2p7 (“the order and connection of ideas is the order and connection of things”). The type of
knowledge you are aware of and, consequently, the affects you experience will be how you
interpret the world or environment. In addition, as Ed Curley writes, for Spinoza persons are
“an indissoluble unity which can be considered from two points of view, and with two distinct
vocabularies and two distinct kinds of causation.” 161
All expressions of Nature have some degree of determinate power, but for purposes of
this chapter I am drawing our attention to human thought and reflective consciousness as
potentia mentis. The rational striving for an enhanced capacity for adequate knowledge and
expression leads our rational dispositions to become more automatic and forcefully habitual.
When we adequately understand how the laws of Nature of thought and extension work, we are
able to better recognize how to increase their force and expression (i.e. we comprehend
increasingly difficult topics with more speed and clarity and we extend our diverse motions
with more options and joy or pleasure). Rational conceptual blending increases our conatus.
161
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These increases are highly correlated with the infinite possible experiences and the joy of
existing. As Simon Calder writes, “For Spinoza, it is only through experiencing – and therein
enjoying – the activity of thinking that beings become capable of reforming their
‘imaginings.’”162 This is why it is important to understand the difference between knowing a
truth and applying it well, with more effective force, or with more creativity so a multitude can
experience the joy of such encounters and not only oneself.
Understanding the physics of force that is produced between and within our ideas will
equip us with a capacity to live in a particular way: “The mind as far as it can, strives to
imagine those things that increase or aid the body’s power of acting.” 163 As we learn early in
the Ethics, increasing our capacity to compare and contrast many ideas at once only
strengthens one’s use of rationality, as well as one’s ability to respond to encounters within the
environment more productively. This capacity for enhanced rational discrimination adds to our
power of being able to recognize and reflect on the kind of affect we are experiencing and how
to alter it. In Teaching Philosophy, Richard Shusterman writes, “Contrast makes feelings easier
to discriminate…For such reasons, the use of language [imaginative knowledge] to guide and
sharpen somaesthetic introspection…is crucial even to those disciplines of body consciousness
that regard the range and meaning of our feelings as going well beyond the limits of
language… The key is not to rank them in order of importance, but to coordinate them
better.”164 In summary, the way to fully understand Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology and protophysics of force is to focus one’s singular conscious reflective capacities on singular affects,
and to focus on them in a way that powerfully emphasizes to oneself what is felt, what kind of
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knowledge is being relied upon more heavily, how many other ideas can be compared and
contrasted during an experience, and how all of this can lend itself to an increase in the
rational strength of habitual readiness and affirmative dispositions. Quite simply, Spinoza’s
philosophy can become personally transformative.
The increased capacity to use reason well is what Stuart Hampshire calls
“configurations of thought.”165 According to Spinoza, conatus is a natural right for each
singular thing.166 It is not that we have free will and can go against natural laws. Instead, when
natural laws are in operation, and they always are, there are different ways the laws of thought
and extension are expressed. If sense experience and the imagination are over-active, our
power will still be increased but not to our greatest benefit. If, on the other hand, rational
disposition and rationally created affects are more proportionally powerful (we can never stop
sensing so imaginative ideas are always present), then our power is increased both to our
greatest joy and benefit but also for the benefit of others and all of Nature. In the TP, Spinoza
writes, “But the fact is that men are mainly guided by appetite devoid of reason; yet even so
they do not violate Nature’s order but necessarily conform to it.” 167
Putting our increased capacities for reasoning well and more creatively into action is
what increases our joy: “For more power comes to us from the understanding of proportion
itself, than from the understanding of the rule of proportion.” 168 To apply what we learn is a
type of operational knowledge, which we will read more about in Chapter Five when I address
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the third and final kind of knowledge found in Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. Motion, in
other words, involves more than just the properties of change and spatial direction, much more.
In 2011, Ursula Renz wrote that Spinoza is “not taking the cognitive ability which is
usually only attributed to the human mind as an absolute privilege of human beings…”169 I
partially disagree with this interpretation because human minds cannot know anything else
except what they are consciously aware of as individuals in their expression of ideas. But a
complete theory of human conscious reflection would not be possible if she is correct. It is a
specific human experience to be capable of cognizing well while referencing one’s singular
affects and personal imaginings. Simply stated, we do not know what it is like to be anything
else other than human. But just as important, it is a way for a singular human being to control
and evaluate one’s individual passions and reactions. This is the point in what was referenced
above when Spinoza deduces that not all use reasoning well, but their conatus can still be
active and powerful. Recall that the attributes of thought and extension can be expressed
infinitely in infinite ways.
To be able to control and understand one’s singular passions is specific to being human.
All things may have a certain degree of “awareness” of their conatus, but what that awareness
is for human beings is distinctly different from any other expression. Beth Lord writes, “True
knowledge as such has no power to overcome [our] affects; only insofar as that true knowledge
is felt as an essential desire that is more powerful that other affects will it be able to overcome
them…”170 For example, reflection on essence as expression and on ourselves as efficient
adequate causes is the formal essence of the mind. Furthermore, in both Book Four of the
Ethics and Chapter Two of the TP, Spinoza is clear that the conscious rational reflections of
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individuals are required for true civil order among many competing human interests within one
state or nation. We cannot live as we please or always allow only our personal judgments to
sway us. There are circumstances where we can and should, by reason, defer our personal
evaluations, preferences, or desires to benefit of the greater civil order. This is clear in E4p37s2
where Spinoza writes, “If men lived according to the guidance of reason, everyone would
possess this right of his (by P35C1) without any injury to anyone else… Again, in the state of
nature there is no one who by common consent is Master of anything, nor is there anything in
Nature which can be said to be this man’s and not that man’s. Instead, all things belong to
all.”171 Later, in the TP, we read:
Thus it follows that it is quite inconceivable that each citizen be permitted by ordinance
of the commonwealth to live just as he pleases, and consequently the natural right of
every man to be his own judge necessarily ceases in a civil order. I say expressly, ‘by
ordinance of the commonwealth,’ for every man’s natural right (if we consider the
matter correctly) does not cease in a civil order; for in a state of Nature and in a civil
order alike man acts from the laws of his own nature and has regard for his own
advantage. In both these conditions, I repeat, man is led by fear or hope to do or refrain
from doing this or that. The main difference between the two conditions is this, that in
the civil order all men fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security,
the same way of life. But this does not deprive the individual of his faculty of
judgement, for he who has resolves to obey all the commands of the commonwealth,
whether through fear of its power or love of tranquility, is surely providing for his own
security and his own advantage in his own way. 172
The conclusion is that we are both singular, individual human beings with personal reflective
consciousness and social beings who also need to defer some of our personal interests and
desires in order to maintain a (rationally) stronger civil order. The passage from the TP
supports some of Hasana Sharp’s interpretation as well. Sharp concludes that, for Spinoza,
“The modal nature of human existence…entails that humans cannot be considered in isolation
171
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from one another…I think only if we think.” 173 In E4p70 we read, “Everyone judges according
to his own temperament what is good (see IIIP39).” 174
Spinoza’s proto-physics of force and power (energy coupled with understanding and
application) requires further explanation. Spinoza was interested in and experimenting with
principles in physics, such as force, natural laws, momentum, flow and dynamics. He even
went as far as to dig up his back yard in order to construct an underground water system with
piping which would add fresh running water to his place of residence. As well, and as we read
in Chapter One, physics was becoming an official discipline worthy of its own kind of research
and experimentation in Holland during Spinoza’s young life. The first university physics
laboratory at an academic institution was born at Leiden University. But, more importantly, in
Spinoza’s system and letters we find many references to velocity, force, momentum, friction,
motion, space-time, energy, and so forth. We get many glimpses of such concerns and how
they, conceptually and physically, relate to Nature as expressions of natural laws, but one
striking example occurs in a letter from 1665. In a response sent to Spinoza, van Blyenbergh
writes, “Consequently, it must also infallibly follow that in relation to God I include as much
perfection (differing only in degree) in my actions when I have a desire for pleasure as when I
have no such desire… For at that time there pertains to my essence only as much as is
expressed in action, for, on your view, I can do neither more nor less than what results from the
degree of essence I have in fact actually received.” 175 Spinoza clears up the misunderstanding
of his system, ending the friendship, by simply stating that many confuse concepts when we
attribute to God desires that are similar to human desires. We cannot rationally ascribe human
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characteristics to God (or all of Nature), but we can talk about human expressions of God as
involving the infinite or as part of a force that is eternal.
A key question when examining Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology, proto-physics of
force, and theory of human consciousness, is about principles of conservation. For physicists
and neuroscientists who study the functions of brain matter and the separate, yet related,
experience of human consciousness, what is most puzzling is “the absence of any conservation
laws: synapses, action potentials, neurons, attention, memory, and consciousness are not
conserved in any meaningful sense.”176 Therefore, we have to look for support for conservation
in order to more fully develop Spinoza’s theory of human consciousness in my reading. One
place to look for such a concept and effect or expression of the attribute of thought might be
found in the affirmations and use of common notions. Not only is it the case that memories can
be thought of as a type of conservation, but our expressions of thought and extension are
derived from the same eternal necessity as everything else in Nature. Therefore, if you find
conservation somewhere else in Nature, you may also be able to find it as a part of human
consciousness, especially if the interpretations of Spinoza (particularly E2p7) by scholars such
as Pierre Macherey are correct. Macherey writes, “The movement of thought [in Spinoza]
proceeds from the same necessity as all reality.”177
The main concept to consider is how ideas themselves can have power, force, and act
like bodies. As ideas have their own striving to persist, as everything else, this striving cannot
be described as motion.178 As already noted, motion is a concept and ability assigned to only
the attribute of extension, but the equivalent action found in thought with every motion of
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extension is a type of knowledge with increasing or decreasing force. In addition, motion can
only exist as understood along with rest as a combination of ratio(s). Beth Lord writes, “If we
align our finite existence as far as we can with the true order and connection of ideas and
activities that is our essence, we will be more rational, more active, and more free.” 179 Conatus
is defined as appetite coupled with degrees of power and tendencies towards self-preservation,
and human conatus is expressed in its own determinate ways specific to being human. This is
also part of the logic why we cannot ascribe human characteristics to all of Nature; that is what
makes human characteristics specific to human beings. Spinoza would not be able to use such
logic if there was not something wholly unique about human expressions and reflective
consciousness.
Therefore, we can develop a theory of human consciousness. In Chapter Three of the
TTP, we read, “He who counts himself more blessed because he alone enjoys well-being not
shared by others [humans]…knows not what is true happiness and blessedness… A man’s true
happiness and blessedness consists solely in wisdom and knowledge of truth…”180 Pebbles,
bats, and oceans cannot experience and feel knowledge of truth in the same way human beings
can reflect on the force and motion of singular consciousness and action. 181 Our conscious
awareness is made up of all three types of knowledge, however rare intuition is, but especially
it is composed of a continuously shifting interaction between imaginative and rational ideas. As
Beth Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics, 145. There may be a potential problem with Lord’s reading of “affect” in this work.
For example, she writes on several different pages that affects are feelings, actions, transitions in power, and ideas
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Stuart Hampshire notes, Spinoza “could not accept a simple-minded materialist conception of
personality, having once recognized at first hand and in his own person the power of reflection
and of active self-consciousness…”182 We might also consider what neurophilosopher, Antonio
Damasio, concludes about Spinoza’s early philosophy of human consciousness:
The notion of ‘ideas of ideas’ is important on many counts…it opens a way for creating
an idea of self. I have suggested that the most basic kind of self is an idea, a secondorder idea… Because it is based on two first-order ideas – one being the idea of the
object that we are perceiving; the other, the idea of our body as it is modified by the
perception of the object. The second-order idea of self is the idea of the relationship
between the two other ideas – object perceived and body modified by perception.183
Yet, and of note, Damasio’s later work deduces that Spinoza’s Ethics is not enough to account
for all of human consciousness as we know it today. In Self Comes to Mind, he concludes:
Consciousness is not merely about images in the mind. It is, in the very least, about an
organization of mind contents centered on the organism that produces and motivates
these contents. But consciousness…is more than a mind organized under the influence
of a living, acting organism. It is also a mind capable of knowing that such a living,
acting organism exists. …the decisive step in the making of consciousness is not the
making of images and creating the basics of mind. The decisive step is making the
images ours, making them belong to their rightful owners, the singular, perfectly bound
organisms in which they emerge.184
But if my reading is correct, then Damasio’s early and later conclusions can both apply to a
theory of human consciousness in Spinoza. His system of adequate knowledge does not
recognize contingencies, therefore, what it does recognize, when reflecting on its own kinds of
knowledge, ideas, and conscious experience of Nature as expressions of the laws of Nature
(causes and effects with infinite ways of expressing those effects), is true knowledge about
what it is to be human. To understand in such ways is to enhance our personal capacities to
thrive and persevere. Such understanding is always an affirmation. In E1p33s, we read, “A
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thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause.” 185 To
recognize and reflect on the adequate knowledge of essence, both one’s own and Nature’s, is to
have true ideas, that is, to know with certainty and by necessity that it is my combination of
ideas that are doing the affirming.
Another way to support such a reading includes some of the elements in the TTP where
Spinoza differentiates between being a “slave” and being a “subject,” something he would not
have been able to write about unless he felt human beings were unique in their capacities for
reflective and singular consciousness. He writes, “A slave is one who has to obey his master’s
commands which look only to the interest of him who commands…a subject is one who, by
command of the sovereign power, acts for the common good, and therefore for his own good
also.”186 This exact sentiment, written both before and again during the construction of the
Ethics, is also found later in the TP. In other words, the practice and concept of a sovereign
state are not possible without the existence of individual human subjects with the capacity for
rational reflection, deferment of some personal interests so to live in a state of peace with many
others, and the power to thrive and feel joy in existence as human and as an expression of
Nature. Spinoza continues, “It must therefore be granted that the individual reserves to himself
a considerable part of his right, which therefore depends on nobody’s decision but his own.” 187
Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology and proto-physics of force is an optimistic philosophy:
“…awareness is also an apprehension, it is therefore also a mode of understanding…” 188
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My process of transformation will be different from yours. This makes our expressions
uniquely human in their own determinate ways. And yes, it is, in part, due to the contingencies
picked up by me as an individual. This does not cause any problems for Spinoza’s
epistemology. Anthony Paul Smith writes that the human question in Spinoza is not merely a
new ideology of non-subjectivity; it goes beyond human collectivity as well. The human
question in Spinoza is a radically singular one, and it also, as Antonio Negri holds, consists in a
“fabric of hard relations.”189 Reflective consciousness is how we understand our appetites.
Lord writes, “There is no difference between appetite and desire, except that desire involves
consciousness of our appetite.”190
Spinoza draws specific differences between human emotions and feelings in many of
his works. Reasoning well plays a vital role in regulating our passions. As we read in E4p63c,
rational joys are not a problem when we are passionate about something as long as they are not
excessive.191 Our habits and dispositions help form our embodied knowledge. Damasio
summarizes, “More emotion gives rise to more feeling, and the cycle continues until distraction
or reason put an end to it…”192 Using reason well turns out to be a state of awareness which
includes a disposition of focused attention and the increased use of common notions instead of
sense experience and imaginative knowledge. We can find evidence for this in E2p28 where
Spinoza writes that to consider only our affects will result in confused knowledge, therefore,
we must pay attention to both our affects and increased understanding about laws of Nature
(causes and effects) in general. 193 Because all of Nature is one organic substance, we can say
that pebbles have conatus and are, in some determinate way, aware of their environment if
189
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consciousness is understood as only convenio and with degrees of animation. But our human
situation becomes more nuanced for us because we are passionate and have many desires.
Because of this, the idea of shifting perspectives in Nature is important to consider.
Although we are discussing epistemology, the actions of thought and extension run
parallel to each other so there is a need to understand conatus as it involves extension if we are
discussing a proto-physics of force and motion. Our levels of animation involve energy and
momentum in more rational directions where our actions will be the most beneficial for all of
Nature (because increased benefit is closer to perfection). Enhanced powers of reflection
include being more aware of how we are feeling and how our bodies are affected by others, or
how we can affect others with more force. Recall that the use of rational power “leads to
natural inclination” of the body and mind towards those things which will further add to our
understanding. This is why Spinoza suggests we eat new foods, try new experiences, travel,
and join with others in friendship as well: “But a free man strives to join with other men to him
in friendship (by P37).”194
Because the attributes work together to create one combined affect of power, it is
difficult to discuss why one might concentrate on thought and understanding. Yet, as Piet
Steenbakkers writes, “Spinoza’s favorite expression throughout the Ethics seems to be
‘potentia Mentis…’”195 The “power of the mind” and the “natural light of reason” are regular
expressions used by Spinoza. Reducing all of Nature to extension is impossible, especially
when we have access to our singular experiences of sense date and imagination in thought.
Because of this, thought holds a special ontological status and it involves power relations
between ideas that cause force in capacities for imaginative and rational comprehension and
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application. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, when rationality is able to readily reflect on
what proportion and kind of imaginative idea(s) the mind is using (sensations, memories,
language etc.), it can, with more force, access those specific imaginative ideas which will
benefit the overall increase in one’s conatus. Although common notions involve those “things
which are common to all, and which are equally in the part as in the whole,” and which can
“only be conceived adequately,” these deductions involve laws of Nature of which we are all
subject: how we express those laws occurs in our own determinate ways singularly.196
Foundations of reasoning are not the same as their infinite possible expressions.
When certain determinate chains of ideas are caused, it is not that they are created out
of nothing. Another idea type of the same kind, by using the structures of the laws of the
operation and function of thought, was produced as an effect of the previous idea. True ideas
used by reason and intuition have the most power, but we can apply the structures of thought to
our imaginative ideas and impressions as well. This is what occurs when we rationally reflect
on our sense experiences, for example. That reflection is composed of clear and distinct ideas
about our experiences to greater and lesser degrees of knowledge and force. That is why we are
able to defer judgment, as noted above. It is more useful for us to discover, through reflective
capacities, what other ideas we are associating with our experiences and not only what the
object of our idea is. If we can do this we are closer to the real cause of our ideas (which are
always other ideas).197 This is a version of the PSR, but with a very specific use that cannot
apply to other attributes. This version and use differentiates itself from the definition of
essence. As we will read in Chapter Four, if this is true, and I believe it is, then the essence of
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substance cannot be reduced to a definition of linear causality. It is also why rationally creative
common notions can be used so powerfully, which is evidenced in E2p40s2 III. The force of
our sets of adequate ideas is directly correlated with our knowledge of “the properties of
things.”198 The more knowledge of singular essences, for example, the more creatively
powerful we can use our common notions to create stronger affects in ourselves and in others.
For example, the more life experiences one has the more they may be able to use their
imaginative knowledge coupled with reasoning to create a novel that affects others with greater
intensity, such as in aesthetics and the uses of metaphor to produce knowledge for example.
In a footnote in the essay “Donagan’s Spinoza,” Ed Curley writes that there is little
difference between geometry and physics. The geometric method Spinoza’s relies on produces
a strengthening of rational capacities when we study the Ethics. It is a way of enacting
operational knowledge. This method, as an activity of synthesis already noted in Chapter One,
is a force which produces more common notions and more of an ability to affect others in
affirmative ways. We are affected affirmatively because our existence is enhanced. Such
experiences add to our enjoyment of existence as an effect. As Peg Rawes writes, “Rather than
operating merely as an idealistic mathematical procedure, geometry is associated with modes
of expression that range from the irreducible power of God as ‘substance’ or ‘nature’ to
everyday human powers of expression, such as imagination and emotions, and the
conatus…”199
Existing, thus, becomes a kind of action that can involve novelty. To have increased
adequate knowledge is not the enjoyment of continuous understanding only, but it is also, by
necessity, to enjoy persevering in existence itself (and the existence of the expressions of
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substance are infinite). Spinoza writes, “And so he who has an adequate idea, or (by P34) who
knows a thing truly, must at the same time have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his
own knowledge… For no one who has a true idea is unaware that a true idea involves the
highest certainty. For to have a true idea means nothing other than knowing a thing perfectly,
or in the best way.” 200
It will be helpful if we, lastly, consider some interpretative nuances regarding the
definition of essence and the nature of a true idea. E1A6 states that “a true idea must agree with
its object.”201 This is the translation given by Ed Curley. A different translation is provided by
Sam Shirley as a “true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (ideatum).”202 These
two interpretations can be read very differently. Shirley’s translation seems more in line with
what it is to have an adequate idea of the essence of the object of that idea. When Spinoza
writes that intuitive knowing, the third kind of knowledge we can have, is adequate knowledge
and application of continuous understanding about the essence of singular things, it would
seem his deductions are more in line with Shirley’s interpretation than Curley’s more
correspondence theory of truth interpretation. Carl Gebhardt’s Latin version reads, “Idea vera
debet cum fuo ideato convenire.”
At first glance, these two leading interpretations appear to be very similar or nearly the
same, but consider the distinctions about the formal and objective essence of an idea which
Spinoza elaborates on in the TEI. There, Spinoza draws a specific difference between the actual
“objective essence” of an idea and “formal essence.” He plainly states, “A true idea (for we do
have a true idea) is something different from its object (ideatum). A circle is one thing, the idea
of a circle another… And since it is something different from its object, it will also be
200
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something intelligible through itself.”203 A true idea can be about actual physical objects, but
true ideas can also be about other ideas, entire events, an attribute of Nature, or imaginary
objects or actions that, nonetheless, produce real effects. But agreement between ideas and
objects do not entail that they are identical. For example, an idea about an affection of one’s
body is not identical with the affection itself. The two events occur simultaneous to each other
and are the effects of the laws of separate attributes. A true idea, for example, is “something
intelligible through itself.” In addition, true ideas which take – as their object – other true ideas
(such as we are doing in this analysis) will also be conceived through themselves, that is, they
will be or can be defined as the attribute of thought (or substance) in action. Henry Allison
writes:
[The mind] does not passively perceive but actively conceives its objects. Indeed, an
idea for Spinoza turns out to be the very act of conception or understanding, this
identification [that the mind is its ideas] really amounts to the claim that the mind is
identical with its acts, that its essence, as a finite mode, like that of God, is its
activity…204
The level of activity in thought is not reducible to conceiving thought as only a corporeal
activity, although it does include it within its actions and effects. Any theory of representation
used to explain Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology, therefore, will not be adequate enough.
Spinoza makes this clear as early as Letter 4 when he writes to Oldenburg, “But you say,
perhaps Thought is a corporeal activity. Let it be so, although I do not concede it…”205
Spinoza is concerned with the “formal essence” of the idea, and the ability for the mind
to grasp itself in its formal essence (ideas about ideas or singularity), but which can also be
about the objective essence of an object (as one’s body or something external to us). When we
have an idea about an object that idea is understood in its objective reality. When we have
203
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reflective awareness about the types of ideas we are relying, and are able to better recognize
when we are using adequate knowledge well, the mind is able to reflect on itself in action and
as action (as an adequate cause). Objects and actions are two different things. This level of
reflection carries with it, by necessity, the awareness and grasping of the formal reality of the
idea as adequate knowledge. The result is understanding one’s own thought as an activity. It is
an intellectual affection that is also felt, but that effect is experienced differently by each
singular thing affected by it through individual, singular experiences of consciousness.
What we add to our knowledge and experience is the awareness of the powerful effects
of adequate thinking. Hampshire writes, “Therefore, as our psychological and physiological
knowledge of human actions and reactions increases, the range of human actions of which we
can reasonably say ‘an alternative action was possible,’ or ‘he could have acted otherwise,’
necessarily diminishes.” In E2p21s we learn more about our having ideas about other ideas:
“So the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived
under one and the same attribute, namely, thought… For the idea of the mind, that is, the idea
of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of
thinking without relation to the object.”206 Therefore, the object of one’s mind is not only one’s
body and its affections, but can also be understood as other ideas (as the mind does not have
ideas, it is ideas). The reason our range of possible actions may diminish, as noted above, is
because we use reason to know, as Spinoza says, what is in our best interest, what is not, and
what we can and cannot understand further. You may feel a strong intensity to punch someone
in the face for spreading false and destructive rumors about you which contributed to the end of
your career, and be fairly justified in feeling that way passionately, but reason limits your
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possible choice of actions in the moment if you somehow find a way to reflect on the laws of
Nature and what is beneficial to you and those around you.
When we consciously reflect on our ideas as an activity, the content we are concerned
with are the other ideas that knowledge derived from, is in relation to, and what kind of
knowledge will be produced as an effect. This is what it is to grasp ideas in their formal reality
for Spinoza. In 2p43, we read, “He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a
true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.” He continues, “And so he who has an
adequate idea, or (by P34) who knows a thing truly, must at the same time have an adequate
idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge. That is (as is manifest through itself), he must
at the same time be certain…”207 The most important deduction to grasp is this: ideas in their
objective essence can be understood as some form of representation, but, and here is the point,
ideas grasped in their formal reality are neither representations nor representational. They are
certainty itself, or true ideas (common notions) expressed as “a certain species of eternity.”
Like mathematics, those expressions are eternal truths, but unlike being reducible to measure
and number, such eternal expressions can be rearranged as needed infinitely as an element of a
perfect, indefinite, affirmatively eternal system. The knowledge in our reflective awareness is
forcefully clear and distinct in its formal reality. As we read in 2p44c2, “Add to this that the
foundations of reason are notions (by P38) which explain those things which are common to
all, and which (by P37) do not explain the essence of any singular thing. On that account, they
must be conceived without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity…” 208
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The changes we experience in our increases and decreases in conatus involve our
changes in momentum.209 The objective essence of a true idea is “a mental action.” This action
is another true idea, that of the formal essence of whatever is being thought about. 210 When we
learn, as noted above, that “A circle is one thing, the idea of a circle another,” the same
deduction can be applied to 2p7 as well. That is, we could say that the body is one thing, but
the idea of the body (the mind) is something else. Spinoza not only references a circle and its
properties as different from the idea of a circle that includes those properties in its formal
essence, which “can be the object of another objective essence…,” but he then gives an
important example:
For example, Peter is something real. Now the true idea of Peter is the objective essence
of Peter and is in itself something real, something entirely different from Peter. So since
the idea of Peter is something real, having its own individual essence, it will also be
something intelligible, that is, the object of another idea which has in itself objectively
everything that the idea of Peter has formally. 211
The object of the idea is about the idea of Peter. The idea has an objective essence and is real
in the same way as the adequate idea of Peter (the first idea) maintains formally (formal
essence). In summary, a mode of thinking is not a representation of formal essences, but a true
act of understanding of what it is to have an idea as a mental action. It is a real activity of
recognizing the true ideas we are having by using other ideas to reflect on the initial objects of
thought. These other ideas connected to the rational ones we are having deductively assert
themselves as clear and distinct (have force to produce other adequate common notions), that
is, as true ideas about the objects (and processes) of thought.
Spinoza ends E2 by writing that, “…the affirmation which the idea of a circles involves
differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of a circle differs
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from the idea of the triangle… For there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form
of falsity (see P35, P35S, and P47S).” 212 Each affirmative idea is, therefore, an actual action,
an event with power, and not a passion or passive representation. If all ideas of each kind of
knowledge are caused by former ideas of the same kind, then in a certain determinate way the
new ideas are the object of other ideas to which they are connected or associated by force. This
is also how causes involve their effects and how we can logically talk about direct causal laws
and proximate causal laws or adequate causes.
Since ideas as causes are responsible for and a part of our affects, to reflect on the
necessity of the laws of thought and extension, instead of singular modal experiences as
uniquely personal, is to experience the intellectual love of God (or Nature). It is also to have
operationally true ideas about the laws of proportion as natural phenomena in ways in which
we can put them to use with more force and motion (like God or Nature also do). What is most
important is the way in which we become aware of what ideas we are relying on and why or
what caused them, as well as the differences between the essence of an idea, the essence of an
object, the essence of our affects as conatus (both ideas and affections combined), and the
essence of Nature. All of these are different actions of knowing with different effects. Spinoza
writes, “Hence it is evident that certainty is nothing else than the objective essence itself; that is
to say the way in which we become aware of the formal essence is certainty itself.” 213
Objective essence is coupled with the way we understand the ideas we have having, which
requires, by necessity, a consciously reflective human subject in my reading, as well as the
object of those ideas. We can shift from that which appears representational to that which is
adequately understood in its formal essence, the latter of which cannot be representational.
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In other words, what matters is our method of thinking or what Dan Selcer calls ways of
knowing. The laws of thought are there to be used and are regularly accessed, but developing
rationality directly involves understanding what ways and methods we use to understand the
essence of singular things. This process is an aspect of the understanding of what adequate
knowledge is and how it can be strengthened. Each kind of idea can have its own essence.
Spinoza writes, “And in turn the idea of the idea of Peter again as its own essence, which can
also be the object of another idea, and so on without end.” 214 If all ideas had the same kind of
essence then their power would be invariable and originality in thought, for example, would
have no lasting impact or make no joyous impression. We know this is not the case. Some
ideas are just better than others, often because of their acutely rational import and direct
applications. Ideas, therefore, have force, a proto-physics of force in the ways in which they are
used and expressed, that is, in how they are coupled with other ideas to create a more powerful
and effective body of expression. Our true ideas are expressions of necessary certainty
common to all bodies but put into action singularly with varying degrees of force of expression
because attributes can express themselves in infinite ways sub specie aeternatatis. Thus, in
Letter 37 in 1666, Spinoza writes:
...one clear and distinct perception, or several taken together, can be absolutely the cause
of another clear and distinct perception. Indeed, all the clear and distinct perceptions that
we form can arise only from other clear and distinct perceptions which are in us... Hence
it follows that the clear and distinct perceptions that we form depend only on our nature
and its definite and fixed laws, that is, on our power itself alone... From this it is quite
clear what a true method must be and in which it should especially consist, namely,
solely in the knowledge of pure intellect and its nature and laws... To understand these
things, at least as far as the method requires, there is no need to get to know the nature of
mind through its first cause...215
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I believe the last line of this letter involves the earlier logical argument Spinoza makes in
the Ethics that knowing causes is crucial for advancing knowledge, but one cannot know the
“first” cause of any given idea or motion because of the multitude of continuous influences, both
in ideas (as each idea is always caused by others prior to it) and extension (internally and
externally to one’s body). If we return to Ed Curley’s translation of a “true idea” as one which
agrees with its object, it is interesting to take into consideration not E2p7, but the definition of an
“idea” and an “adequate idea” given by Spinoza at the start of Book 2 of the Ethics. An idea is “a
concept of the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.”216 The notion of
“concept” in this definition is meant to include the content of that idea, but a concept that has
force and its content are meant to be understood differently when required. This is the point of
the last few pages of this chapter. Spinoza then writes that an adequate idea is to be considered in
itself “without relation to an object,” and that it “has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations
of a true idea.”217 Therefore, an adequate idea is a concept or common notion that has content
that may vary depending on what other concepts are needed to combine with it in order to be
rationally understood. Attributes need no other concepts to be true, but modes are conceived
through something else, for example. In these very important definitions, Spinoza is quick to
point out the “action of the mind” in the form of an idea, similar to what was discussed above
from his earlier work in the TIE. Actions of the mind are what Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology
is concerned with. In order for ideas to be comprehended as actions, singular human minds
capable of rational reflection about the methods of understanding are required.
This deduction deserves repeating because of its implications and unique contribution to
the history of Western philosophy in the Seventeenth Century. A true idea is true regardless of a
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finite mind conceiving it, but once conceived, the act of conceiving is an action of a particular
mind, which is an expression of something infinite (substance) and not about only that which is
finite. Consider how Euclidean geometry has defined “common notions” as “axioms concerning
magnitudes in general, e.g. ‘things equal to the same thing are equal to each other.’” 218 The
magnitude of a common notion for Spinoza is that it expresses one eternal substance.
Nonetheless, a direct comparison between magnitude and proportion as the same kind of thing is
not possible in Spinoza’s Ethics. I can express, for example, a proportion (not portion, Spinoza’s
choice of terms is proportion) of God’s or Nature’s entire magnitude, but I could never possibly,
as a finite human being, express all of that magnitude. They are different concepts and actions,
with different kinds of effects, and they need to be evaluated separately. Spinoza comments on
this exact distinction in the CM and how it is imaginative knowledge to consider things in terms
of duration, number, and measure (as in magnitude).219 Yet, the above definition about axioms
concerning magnitudes overlaps with something Spinoza also writes about in Letter 12, the
infamous letter on the infinite: “things which agree with a third thing agree with one another.”220
I will return to this characteristic.
If the previous deductions in Chapter Two of this thesis are correct, then there are times
when we can have adequate knowledge about some of our imaginative ideas in ways that reason
can use to its benefit. To develop better habits of adequate thinking (habitual readiness) is to
understand what methods of thought and distinction between types of essence (and ways) work
more powerfully. It must, therefore, be the case that there is a form of objective essence of
inadequate ideas that is different from the objective essence of adequate ideas. I believe this is
another way to understand what Spinoza intends at the start of E3 about the intrinsic and
Benno Artmann, Euclid…, 4.
Spinoza, CM, 1:1:178.
220
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extrinsic determinations of ideas noted above. If so, and I believe we can draw these distinctions
if we are careful in our methods of thought, then any theory of representation, such as that of
Michael Della Rocca’s which we will review in the next chapter, will not be a completely viable
interpretation of Spinoza. Because of this, as Dan Selcer concludes:
If there is a register in which we may distinguish between 'idea-types,' then, the Cartesian
assertion of the identity of all ideas with respect to formal reality is overcome. One way
to advance this thesis would be to introduce an ontologically or causally differentiated
typology of sensations and intellectual affections that could serve as a comprehensive
catalog of our various ways of knowing... Another would be to frame a differentiated
epistemological hierarchy that would distinguish between levels of ideational power,
conceptual efficacy, or kinds of knowledge. Such a hierarchy could, for example,
differentiate adequate and inadequate ideas, or again, sensible linguistic knowledge,
common notions regarding shared qualities or predicates, and intuition of singular
essences. These last possibilities, of course, are precisely the ones that Spinoza proposed
in his Ethics...221
Bodily encounters, actions, and combinations of powerful aggregates of ideas working together,
produce increases and decreases in motion; ideas generate and express the effects of other ideas
as expressions of real things in Nature. Ideas, in other words, have power, create effects, cause
impressions, affect us with joy, and strengthen our rational capacities. Using our adequate
knowledge well includes reflecting on what methods of thought and action we are relying on and
why. These deductions go beyond what Descartes thought was possible, which is why Spinoza
makes a real contribution to the history of philosophy.
As I will demonstrate in Chapter Four, Spinoza’s proto-physics of ideational force leads
to a detailed discussion about the nature of affects and transitions (transformations) between
registers of singular and collective power. A debate in the scholarship involves what kinds of
transitions occur between passions and actions or between passive ideas and active ones. We
cannot be expected to behave completely rationally on a continuous basis for Spinoza, primarily
because Nature and external causes always have the potential to affect us with more force. We
221
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are also passionate creatures. We write poetically, love passionately, and strive towards dreams
which appear, at first, impossible to attain. We also write poetically about bad or negative things
that affect readers with sadness, yet the writing is rationally well done in structure, form,
creativity etc. There are, in other words, good or joyous passions. As I’ve already stated, the sad
passions reduce our conatus. Spinoza notes as much in the KV when he writes, “We must,
however, note here as an excellent thing about the passions, that we see and find that all the
passions that are good are of such a kind and nature that we cannot be or exist without them, and
that they belong, as it were, to our essence; such is the case with Love, Desire, and all that
pertains to love.”222 These are not representations of Nature, they are expressions of Nature, that
is, they are Nature itself. As we learn, we become more aware of our ideational levels of power
and striving, as well as how this increased awareness involves the intellectual love of God (or
Nature). Stuart Hampshire summarizes, “The individual person’s consciousness of his own needs
and strivings (appetitus) is reflected in his consciousness as desire (cupiditas). But his desire,
which is associated with his pursuits of particular ends, is no more than the reflection in idea of
his total state, which itself is determined by a variety of external and internal causes…”223
As we have learned, and as Pierre Macherey explains in his reading of Spinoza’s
dynamic epistemology, there is not reality and then representations of reality. The finite and the
infinite are expressed in infinite ways by singular things, individually and in combination with or
relation to each other. He writes:
With Spinoza…the conatus that constitutes a singular essence unites it without
intermediary to infinite substance that expresses itself within it, in a determination that is
at the same time finite and infinite, and cannot therefore be restrained by the conditions
of a possible knowledge…there are not two orders of reality, one substantial and infinite
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and the other modal and finite, but one single and same reality continuous and indivisible,
determined by one unique law of causality…224
The degree of adequacy we express will depend on the degree(s) of comprehensiveness and
method we achieve habitually on an individuated and partially non-representational level.
Reading Spinoza through a theory of representation, as Michael Della Rocca does, is an
inaccurate way of understanding his otherwise dynamic epistemology. I will explain why such a
reading ignores foundational concepts found in Spinoza’s epistemology in Chapter Four.225
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CHAPTER FOUR
NON-REPRESENTATION IN SPINOZA:
HOW THE IMAGINATION AND REASON COMBINE TO CREATE GREATER AFFECTS

“Immanence is the very vertigo of philosophy, and is inseparable from the concept of
expression…” -Gilles Deleuze

Immanence and Monism As Structure and Method
In this chapter I argue against a dominant strain of interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics,
particularly found in North America, namely a reading of Spinoza’s epistemology where ideas
are understood as representations about actions in extension. Michael Della Rocca is the main
proponent of this interpretation.1 His representational parallelism is based on a theory that he
calls the “mind-relativity-of-content” thesis. As our mind does not have ideas but is ideas, in my
reading, any theory of epistemological representation applied to Spinoza’s monism ignores the
very real involvement of affects in such a system. It also ignores how the mind and body are
combined in ways where their motions and forces remain distinctly separate modally.
This chapter operates on two levels. First, the first two short sections will further the
conclusions of Chapter Two and Chapter Three by continuing to advocate for a theory of
affective awareness and human consciousness that is non-representational in Spinoza’s dynamic
epistemology. Second, it will describe and argue against some of the main elements of Della
Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza’s epistemology. As Spinoza notes repeatedly and as I have
argued for in this thesis, the adequate understanding of Nature (or God) is nothing other than the
increased understanding of natural phenomena. Our awareness of our ideas in their essence is an
1
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expression of natural phenomena. In other words, adequate ideas are not representations of the
actions of the attribute of extension but are real entities of their own singular kind with their own
variety of dynamic expressions.
As posed in Chapter Three, what is the nature of transformation of intellectual (human)
force and power in extension when the method of increasing conatus becomes the object of our
ideas and desires (and thus the main part of our awareness)? The inquiry involves understanding
both the transitions between our passions and actions, and human consciousness taking itself as a
direct expression of natural phenomena (with increasing levels of intensity). We need not, for
example, overcome all passions as this would be impossible, especially given external causes
that could affect us in unexpected ways. Spinoza writes, “We must, however, note here as an
excellent thing about the passions, that we see and find that all the passions that are good are of
such a kind and nature that we cannot be or exist without them, and that they belong, as it were,
to our essence; such is the case with Love, Desire, and all that pertains to love.” 2 Human desire,
as and combined with common notions and actions, create powerful affects. Where there is
power there is force. Singular experiences of love and desire are highly individuated. Once we
understand such adequate expressions, love is neither a joyous passion nor a passionate joy.3 It is
adequate understanding put to use to create more powerful affects. Thus, the ontological and
epistemological are intertwined in a way theories of representation cannot fully address. As
Stuart Hampshire writes, “The individual person’s consciousness of his own needs and strivings
(appetitus) is reflected in his consciousness as desire (cupiditas). But his desire, which is
associated with his pursuits of particular ends, is no more than the reflection in ideas of his total
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state, which itself is determined by a variety of external and internal causes…” 4 The key is to
determine oneself through internal causes, to become an adequate cause, through a more
powerful understanding. The pursuits of particular ends noted by Hampshire are nonteleological. In finite death we simply become a new ratio of motion and rest, for example.
It is the level of conscious reflective power and ideational efficacy that is most intriguing
and effective in Spinoza’s epistemology. The effect of adequately conceiving ourselves as selfcaused includes the feeling of being a power of Nature that is a natural expression of our being
human. Our ideas do not “represent” what is happening in our body. Our ideas are what is
happening in and to our bodies, just expressed in their own determinate ways:
The reason I speak here of actual intellect is not because I concede that there is any
potential intellect, but because, wishing to avoid confusion, I wanted to speak only of
what we perceive as clearly as possible, that is, of the intellect itself. We perceive nothing
more clearly than that. For we can understand nothing that does not lead to more perfect
knowledge of the intellect.5
As we learn about idea types, and when we include the distinction between the objective and
formal essence of common notions, our body will experience more power and joy. As Dan
Selcer notes, Descartes already focused on ideas which take method and other ideas as their
object, but Spinoza seems to take this fact of the intellect and its capacities to a more nuanced
and logical outcome (made possible by the premises of all 5 books of the Ethics and other
works). Selcer writes, “…in Descartes’ early work we can already see methodological reflexivity
begin to take its definitive rationalist form: an immanent self-constitution of method that results
when method takes itself as its own object… Philosophical method, on this model, emerges
precisely out of its repetition with itself; it arises from the methodological investigation of the
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nature, status, and form of rule-governed thinking.”6 The nature of reflecting on the proportional
power of the intellect is one way of experiencing a transformation in thought and extension
(through affects) because of the laws of thought and taking method itself as our object of
thought.
This organic relationship between idea-types or ways of thinking and accompanying
actions of the body with other bodies in increasing and decreasing degrees of power not only
maintains itself in a homeostatic state of varying degrees of force and transformation, but it also
exists without any intermediary. Without an intermediary, theories of representation will not be
adequate enough to address such a dynamic epistemological system. That is, our power, as an
expression of Nature, is the combination of the expressions of a singular essence and of infinite
substance by definition (with each also being defined separately when needed). The ontological
and epistemological distinctions occur for human reflection understood either as substance and
its attributes or as modal modifications of substance in infinite ways. Pierre Macherey writes:
With Spinoza…the conatus that constitutes a singular essence unites it without
intermediary to infinite substance that expresses itself within it, in a determination that is
at the same time finite and infinite, and cannot therefore be restrained by the conditions
of a possible knowledge…there are not two orders of reality, one substantial and infinite
and the other modal and finite, but one single and same reality continuous and indivisible,
determined by one unique law of causality…7
Thinking adequately about substance, while transitioning between types of knowledge is not that
which is fulfilled by some absolute notion. There is always an infinity of relations and
continuous combinations of expressions involving the attributes of substance, but we can only be
aware of those of our singular expressions of thought and extension through our affects. Spinoza
writes:
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If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first of all things, there has to be some foundation
which may direct our thoughts there. Next, since method is reflexive knowledge itself, the
foundation which is to give direction to our thoughts can be nothing other than
knowledge of what constitutes the specific reality of truth, and knowledge of the intellect,
its properties and powers. For when this is acquired, we shall have a foundation from
which we shall deduce our thoughts, and a path by which the intellect, according to its
capacity, may attain knowledge of eternal things, taking into account, of course, the
powers of the intellect.8
Knowledge of how one’s mind develops its power of thinking adequately with more force only
adds to that force (with joy). But, for Spinoza, such knowledge about the nature of method and
thought must occur before adequate knowledge of eternal things is possible.
Our experience of duration is a good example of the above. For us to recognize that our
duration is an experience of imaginative knowledge takes many strong common notions about
the logic of an eternal substance that we express. Human sentiments on linear temporality and
spatial dimensions in the physical world are part of our imagination (mostly as and for sensations
and bodily comportment and survival), for not only can we not imagine all spaces and
relationships, but also, according to Spinoza’s logic, that which is eternal with infinite attributes
(which have infinite expressions) cannot be fully expressed by one singular thing in thought or
extension. Concepts about measurement can be common notions, but acts of measurement by
singular things are something else (they are limited expressions etc.). This deduction allows
knowledge to be something more than that which is instrumental or representational. Spinoza is
aware that it is a human body and mind that is his reader as well. It’s human subjects with
reflective consciousness building on their operational knowledge and methods of forceful and
joyous, beneficial expressions who are learning his system.9 As Macherey writes:
…the intellect had to first work with the ideas that it had, serving as they did as authentic
knowledges, in order to make them produce all the effects they were capable of,
8
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gradually refining their own activity… There is no introduction to understanding, no
correct method to know; because it is only in its effective practice that thought can be
considered, as a real activity of a mind that puts to work and submits to proof, its own
power…which it forms in its practice.10
In a letter to Schuller, Spinoza defines his consciousness as that which is composed of
“reason and experience,” a letter where he talks about writing as an act of rational and
imaginative thought as well as bodily extension all working together, asking that his reader listen
to “the consciousness of man himself…”11 By better understanding the laws of thought and ideatypes, and what the extent of our power and expression are as extension, we can better and more
quickly recognize errors in reasoning. Such recognition is one of the most difficult problems to
solve in philosophy, for when someone feels he or she is certain about something, clear headed,
with strong arguments and what they feel is logical evidence, it’s virtually impossible to change
their mind. In other words, their beliefs (however partially rational) are so strong that they cannot
easily identify their own errors in method or conclusion. This level of force would be a detriment
to Nature if it were of the imaginary, illusory kind and of passionate behaviors daily in a
proportionally large manner. Beth Lord writes, “Error then, is an inherent aspect of being a finite
mode who is necessarily implicated in the world.”12 We are prone to error when our imaginative
ideas are proportionally stronger than our rational common notions. The important point to
recognize is that errors in reasoning occur on the singular level. Errors are an element of
imaginative knowledge and each of us experiences our imaginative expressions differently.
Ursula Renz writes, “However, in response to the repeated objection that he [Spinoza] allows
individual subjects to disappear, Spinoza has much more to offer than is commonly supposed.
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So, the next time an old schoolmate tells us in glowing terms about beautiful mountain hikes, and
this fills us with pain, we can rest assured that their experience was a different one from ours.”13
In our daily encounters we have opposing affects and individuated experiences.
According to Spinoza, we “develop rational knowledge through experience and imagination.”14
As we become more reflectively aware of idea-types and the varying powers of expression they
have in conjunction with each other, our personal habitual readiness for using reason well is
enhanced. The knowledge of this process, of our ability to enhance our knowledge of natural
phenomena as self-caused expressions of substance, gives us increasingly enjoyable pleasure,
peace of mind, new ideas, and possibilities for action. It enhances our striving in existence.
Personal identity significantly involves singular conscious awareness. Spinoza believes
that we transform into new individuals when our ratios of motion and rest alter our bodies in
significant ways. Macherey writes, “The order of ideas is thus that of their actual production; this
order is necessary, not by virtue of a rule-bound obligation, which could only be satisfied in a
contingent manner, but by reason of the intrinsic causality of the true idea, which determines the
idea in the course of producing the totality of effects, that is, all the ideas that depend on it.”15
Yet, the intrinsic nature of true ideas will also depend on my own conscious awareness of them
in order to use them to further enhance my conatus. The “degree of adequacy” we express will
depend on the “degree of comprehensiveness” we achieve, as Spinoza writes, “…for the
perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or
less perfect because they please or offend men’s senses, or because they are of use to, or
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incompatible with human nature.”16 The degree of comprehensiveness we express will depend
on our capacity to better recognize errors in reasoning and how to defer judgment if needed.
Some of what we judge to be good is based on our desires. Our desire includes that “the
highest satisfaction of the mind stems from the right principle of living,” where we act “from the
necessity of nature.”17 Yet, we cannot account for the totality of human thought nor would it
make sense for Spinoza’s system to say we have or can. This is a place where Spinoza differs
from many previous Western philosophers and scientists before him. Individual knowledge is
fragmentary, with gaps, fissures, external influences, overflows, intensities of varying degrees,
habits of thought according to the preface of E4. It is also open ended. Reason understands that
certain ideas can be used to the benefit itself and Nature. Spinoza writes clearly in Letter 37,
“Hence it follows that the clear and distinct perceptions that we form depend only on our nature
and its definite and fixed laws, that is, on our power itself alone; and not on chance, that is, on
causes which, although acting likewise by definite and fixed laws, are yet unknown to us and
foreign to our nature and power.”18 Using the example of how reason can overpower one’s
passions or false beliefs, but that this action is one of adequate understanding about thought and
extension and not an act of free will, Stuart Hampshire supports Spinoza’s conclusions when he
writes:
I may look for methods and techniques of ridding myself of thoughts which are painful or
harmful, and which are not beliefs genuinely held by me… Even if some unpleasant
affect still recurred when darkness fell [the example being used is about fear of the dark],
it would not be fear, if the thought of danger was not present [along with the fear]. The
method, or technique, that I employed to rid myself of the thought that I was in danger
would not amount to changing my mind about the existence of danger; for to say that I
had changed my mind about the existence of danger would imply that I was now ready to
deny that which I had formerly been prepared to affirm. I had not decided that a
proposition, which I had previously believed to be true, was false… Rather I had used
16
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some means, or method, or technique, to bring about a change in the sequence of ideas
occurring in the natural course of events to my mind, just as I might have used some
means to prevent or remove an impulse to behave a certain way, which I find occurs in
the natural course of events… I used my knowledge of the cause…to produce a change in
the natural course of events. He who employs some method or technique to get rid of an
idea, which he knows or believes to be false or groundless, acts upon himself, and brings
about an effect in his own mind…19
We are not the whole of Nature, but we do express its eternal truths in our own
determinate, dynamic ways. The thoughts we have are our state of mind or the disposition we
take, and this state of mind is directly parallel with the affections of one's body. As we've read
and can be noted in 4p37s2, one can only counter one emotion by another which is stronger, and
rational states of mind always accompany stronger emotions and dispositions. In Letter 30,
Spinoza writes:
For I do not think it right to laugh at nature, and far less to grieve over it, reflecting that
men, like all else, are only a part of nature, and that I do not know how each part of
nature harmonises with the whole, and how it coheres with other parts. And I realise that
it is merely through such lack of understanding that certain features of nature - which I
thus perceived only partly and in a fragmentary way, and which are not in keeping with
our philosophical attitude of mind - once seemed to me vain, disordered, and absurd. But
now I let everyone go his own way.20
As I've already discussed, Spinoza tried to eliminate the concept of “part” when we are
understanding the laws of Nature as substance, which are expressed in their eternity, necessity,
and indivisibility. Extension, as an attribute, is indivisible, and yet, in thought an idea can be
singular in nature in the way described above. That is, we can have individual ideas. God, or
Nature is “simple,” that is, “not composed of parts,” as it is “that which is not composite or
composed of parts that are different in nature, or of other parts which agree in nature.” 21 Our
ideas are not conceived as individual parts. They are adequately conceived as events and effects.
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Conatus and Affect as A Force of Physics in Thought and Motion in Extension
Our desire to keep moving, to endeavor in our existence with power, is a way of affirming
our existence, and it is an “impulse” which is “innate in all men,” yet of “no great force and can
easily be checked by the recurrence to mind of some other thing which is frequently in our
thoughts.”22 This recurrence of thoughts creates a proportion of force all its own. What we will
learn is that it is not that Spinoza prioritizes the mental over the physical, but that we cannot truly
endure with more and more joy, power, and understanding unless we also reflect regularly on the
nature of our affects and the processes by which they can be transformed. 23 To do so is built into
the nature of our conatus as a capacity to be strengthened.
Conatus consists in ratios of acceleration and deceleration in intensities composed of
many different motions of the paths of various interactions forming an organic whole. But human
conatus, and its resulting actions and series of ideas alter consistently, as does our strength of
understanding. With more force, our understanding can increase in its capacities of
comprehension. This force, as a ratio and proportion, composes our affects. Once the powers of
comprehension take hold and we are aware of more adequate ideas that is our mind, other forms
of comprehension and use of such knowledge can occur more easily and efficiently. 24 We need
good methods for such regular continuous understanding and conscious reflective capacities.
The concept of an efficient cause is crucial to adequately understand here. The efficient
cause, for Spinoza, is what always does the moving of any determinate expression of Nature
(which is everything at all times). Expressions of Nature are simply laws of Nature, and laws of

Spinoza, Letter 58: 909. This is why Harold Skulsky writes that 4p15-17 and 4p54s is evidence that Spinoza felt
rational impulses are rare and must be developed. I believe 5p20 in its entirety supports these claims as well.
23
For a very recent work which partially supports a theory of human conscious awareness as it directly relates to the
affects in Spinoza, and of which partially supports my reading in the last chapter, see Eugene Marshall's The
Spiritual Automaton: Spinoza's Science of the Mind.
24
This is also why E2 and E5, in relation to certain aspects of E4 regarding the affects, must be understood together.
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thought and extension operate according to causes and effects. In Letter 60 from 1675, two years
before Spinoza’s death, he writes, “...I assert absolutely that from certain properties of a thing
(whatever be the given idea) some things can be discovered more easily and others with greater
difficulty – though they all concern the nature of that thing.”25 This conclusion (method) can be
paired with what he states in the same letter when he also writes that the only way we can know
the properties of anything at all is if “the idea or definition of the thing should express its
efficient cause...”26 But is this also a strict use of only one form of the PSR? Are there a
multitude of ways the PSR can express its own definition as it relates to the definition of an
efficient cause? Spinoza is clear in E1p8s2 I-V that his version of the PSR is flexible.27
Attributes, as constituting the essence of substance, must be conceived through
themselves conceptually. How will the PSR account for something being both conceived through
itself and also the cause of its own separate effects? Thought cannot affect extension causally and
does not need to be conceived through it in any way. The attribute of thought, nonetheless, is also
understood as natural phenomena. Spinoza writes, “...if the Being is Thought, it cannot be
conceived as determined in Thought, but only as undetermined, and if Being is Extension it
cannot be conceived as determined in Extension, but only as undetermined.”28 Therefore, we can
conclude that, understood in a certain way, the efficient cause operating as the force and speed of
thought is undetermined substance, yet the three kinds of knowledge I can have and singularly
reflect on can be understood as the efficient causes of themselves in the modal distinctions
between different effects produced depending on which kind of knowledge is being used as our
awareness. I use the term “kind” of knowledge, but you can just as easily say “way” or ways too.
Spinoza, Letter 60: 913.
Ibid. Letter 60: 913.
27
Spinoza, Ethics, 1p8s2I-V: 5-6.
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Spinoza, Letter 36: 858. This is similar to the idea that that which is infinitely extended cannot include within its
definition the concept of part nor the concept of divisibility, but this is certainly not a novel deduction.
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In the anthology Spinoza Now, Antonio Negri concludes Spinoza’s concept of conatus is
the combination of continued learning within the experiences of an individual human and an
expression of Nature. Interestingly enough, Spinoza scholar Wiep van Bunge has a conclusion
similar to Negri’s.29 For both scholars, Spinoza's system is, in the end, about intellectual love,
even if in Negri’s interpretation he ends emphasizing the collective more than personal identity.
In my reading, our singular existence can be transformed and continually regenerated by others
as well as by our own rationally powerful combination of ideas. It is a combination of both, but
our adequate knowledge is understood as determined internally as adequate causes and their
effects. There are dual causes interacting simultaneously and multiple types of causes in relation
perpetually. Does not Spinoza place together the concepts of personal identity and memory in,
for example, E4p39s?30 My memories are different from someone else’s memories and that is
partly what makes us singular expressions of our own variations in degrees of power and
intensity. Although conscious awareness may be inherently inadequate or partial due to the
imagination’s fragmentary nature, this does not entail that a concept of the coherent “subject”
cannot exist in Spinoza’s system.
If we didn’t strive to persist in our existence, we would die. The more the body is capable
of having certain images, the more the conscious mind is simultaneously aware of such images.31

Van Bunge concludes in his 2012 collection of essays already noted in this chapter that Spinoza's foundational
theme throughout the Ethics and the TTP can be summed up as a moral (almost Christian) ethic and intellectual
virtue to “love thy neighbor.” Although I have found this theme to be very strong in the TTP, I disagree that it is the
underlying foundation of the Ethics. See also Spinoza Now, edited by Dimitris Vardoulakis (2011).
30
E4p39s reads, in part, “...I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire a different
proportion of motion and rest to one another...even though the circulation of the blood is maintained...the human
body can nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely from its own.” Further, we act according to what
benefits us, but not only this. Spinoza writes earlier in 4p37s2 that we act towards our benefit “according to his own
temperament.” Tenacity is what benefits us, but when we recognize what benefits others, it is nobility. One can also
point back to 2p10s2 and 2p37 for more support. How can we eliminate the concept of reflective, singular affect and
experience while maintaining all of what is written in these and similar propositions?
31
Spinoza, Letter 58: 910: “I think that he must likewise have experienced that the mind is not at all times equally
fitted to thinking of the same object, but that just as the body is more fitted to have the image of this or that object
aroused in it, so the mind is more apt to regard this or that object.”
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The more I am able to imagine something, the more what I am imagining it continuously present
to my mind. What is present to my mind composes my state of mind and bodily disposition. This
is why Spinoza refers to our use of both images and memories of maxims alongside common
notions about the properties of the things we are considering, such as found in E5p10s. 32 This is
also why, as we'll read next in more detail, the dominant interpretation of Michael Della Rocca
will not work as the way to understand Spinoza. As one example, Della Rocca argues,
“...Spinoza speaks only of ideas and not of physical images as representational.”33 But in the
above proposition just noted (and several others), Spinoza does speak about physical images in
singular minds as representational, and it is perhaps the only time we can use the concept of
“representation” in Spinoza at all.34 All three types of ideas can exist separately at one time in a
singular mind in order to create transformative affects, something I believe is supported by
E4p37-39 as well as by 2p13 lem7, where we examine the way we understand the interactions of
the ever-shifting expressions of one substance.35 How will a theory of representation account for
this combined, affective phenomena and its continuous transformations completely?
Because the mind is ideas, understanding the formation of ideas we are reflecting on is
extremely critical because it is equivalent to better understanding one's own mind and its power.
I would even say that this endeavor precedes any other discussion about how “logic” and Being
are defined. If one does not understand one’s own mind and how combining common notions can
strengthen rational processes or if one is not consciously aware about what a singular mind can
and cannot do, then the rest of our inquiries about knowledge, logic, and Being become
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Spinoza, Ethics, 5p10s: 166-167.
Della Rocca, Representation, 60.
34
As we will read, one can contrast the concept/theory of representation with the transitions of corporeal becomings,
eliminating the former in support of the latter, such as we find in the work of Clair Colebrook, for example, in her
article “From Radical Representations to Corporeal Becomings…” (Hypatia 2000).
35
Spinoza, Ethics, 5p10s: 167. The proposition states that we have the power to arrange the modifications of our
body according to an intellectual order the less we are affected by emotions contrary to our nature.
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impossible.36 This is Spinoza's theory of human psychology. Such an endeavor precedes such
questions as inquiring into the meaning of Being because, if you cannot better recognize when
you are relying on imaginative ideas and why, how will you know when they are in need of a
suspension of judgment in order to gather more information? Spinoza allows for doubt when
needed, but not contradictions in deductive logic about the properties of things.37
The difficulty of the Ethics is not due as much to its impenetrability as it is to the amount
of dedication and conscious deductions it takes to get to the logical effects and consequences of
each book in a way in which our knowledge is actively affected in new and rationally powerful
ways. This awareness includes the capacity to consciously use one's increase in the power of
rational thought and action by learning such a system. This is also why the references to the work
of Daniel Selcer at the start of this chapter are important. At the least, the attempt involves
reflective awareness on several levels. It particularly involves the ability to recognize more easily
if we are relying on a series of imaginative ideas or on rationally understood ideas as certain
knowledge. Each attribute must be conceived through itself. It is also about how each attribute is
“determined in its own way.” One cannot be defined as representing the other in any way.
Again, keep in mind that what moves us (or not) are affects, which can be passive or
actively joined together with “the common properties of things” in order to act with more force
or power. For now, it is enough to understand that the intensity of affects is what transforms us.
The intensity of affects is never static, nor can it be explained with concepts that are static.
Concepts can be logical and yet dynamic depending on other ideas they are in relation to. Affects
This is more complex a problem than many give credit to. One example includes the many individuals who seem
to be capable of things most other minds are not capable of, such as, for example, super memory and being capable
of recalling every major detail of one's life on each individual day for years on end. Such rare abilities demonstrate
that we have barely scratched the surface of what the human mind is and can do. We still do not have agreement on
the nature and definition of consciousness across disciplines.
37
See evidence for this, for example, in Letter 56: “I say that a probable proof must be such that, although open to
doubt, it cannot be contradicted; for that which can be contradicted is akin, not to truth, but to falsehood.”
36
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can arise as or because of images in the mind or they can arise as and in conjunction with
adequate ideas. Recall that Spinoza writes, “An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion
as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.”38 And as Gilles Deleuze notes about Spinoza’s
system, “…a feeling of which we are the adequate cause is an action.” 39 As well, this is how
joyous passions can be better understood as adequate ideas about ideas of the imagination
(which include our sense experiences). Spinoza writes that our various affects “can be
compounded with one another in so many ways, and that so many variations can arise from this
composition that they cannot be defined by any number.”40 Again, imaginative and adequate
ideas can work together in ways that strengthen reason and its uses.
Book Five of the Ethics is a very important element of Spinoza's dynamic epistemology
in this respect. There are many references to affects, especially in relation to the ordo et connexio
of things. The images of our mind make us aware of the affections, but affects can shift from
passions to effective actions that benefit oneself and the whole. As E5p4 notes, we can have
common notions about our affections and how they are formed. New series of adequate ideas
about the images of one's mind are more active and powerful. Spinoza writes in the opening of
E5, “Therefore, because the power of the mind is defined only by the understanding...we shall
determine, by the mind's knowledge alone, the remedies for the [passive] affects.”41 Knowledge
of, and transition to, greater affects involves understanding things as necessary, and reducing our
reliance on knowledge of causes external to us, as supported by 5p4s and 5p6. 42 We read, “We
must, therefore, take special care to know each affect clearly and distinctly (as far as this is
possible), so that in this way the mind may be determined from an affect to thinking those things
Spinoza, Ethics, 5p3: 163.
Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, ed. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 221.
40
Spinoza, Ethics, 3p59s: 103.
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Ibid. 5 preface: 162, emphasis added.
42
Ibid. 5p4s, 5p6: 164-165.
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which it perceives clearly and distinctly...so that the affect itself may be separated from the
thought of an external cause joined to true thoughts.”43
Michael Della Rocca labels affects simply “special kinds of ideas.” Yet, affects are
something real according to Spinoza, and they include the affections of the body as part of their
expression. He writes, “But an affect arising from reason is necessarily related to the common
properties of things (see the Def. of reason in IIP40s2), which we always regard as present (for
there can be nothing which excludes their present existence) and which we always imagine in the
same way (by IIP38).”44 Note the very important reference to the definition of reason in this
proposition with the most important epistemological proposition E2p40. When we understand
the necessity of not only the laws of thought and extension, but the expression of those laws as
Nature's eternal existence (and thus as always present), we have more power over our affects as a
result of this increased knowledge. This type of affect does not alter in its necessity, and is
always more powerful than those things which do change.45 This formula of the affects will be
one way to counter certain theories of representation directly.46
Recall also that “an affect toward a thing we imagine as necessary is more intense...than
one toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent, or not necessary.”47 Because “insofar
as we imagine a thing to be necessary, we affirm its existence.”48 Affirmation of existence is
what conatus is about, that is, to persist and strive in existing with tenacity and nobility. Our
actions can, in this way, be said to issue that which is necessary in conjunction with what we

Spinoza, Ethics, 5p4s: 164.
Ibid. 5p7: 165.
45
This is one way Spinoza can escape the need to have an absolute definition of time or space, which is also how to
logically distinguished himself from systems like Aristotle's Physics.
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In certain ways, this whole reading supports some of the work of Hasana Sharp on the nature of affects in
Spinoza. She writes that affects must be read as singular, qualitative changes, equally corporeal and mental,
involving the intensity of what it is for one to have the power to persevere.
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Spinoza, Ethics, 4p11: 122.
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Ibid. 4p11: 122.
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might call internal causes or our perception and conception as God, Nature, or substance, even if
it is the only perspective we have access to. This is why Spinoza needs the concepts of duration
and proximate cause, but it is also why the concepts and understanding of variations in power
and affects (as signs of effects) must accompany the concepts of substance, mode, and
existence.49
Many, if not most, philosophers have engaged in on-going debates about the nature of
causal laws and causality in Nature, as well as our capacity to use the PSR. As Charles Hartshorn
notes, many, such as Charles Peirce, Henri Bergson, Boutroux, Dewey, Montague, Whitehead,
Popper and other well-known thinkers in physics have concluded “that the genuine causal laws
are all approximate or statistical, not deterministic in the classical sense.” 50 Yet, determinism and
laws of Nature as fixed cause and effect processes are what concern Spinoza. As he writes in
4p37s1, if we relate all of what we both desire and what we do “of which we are the cause”
according only to an idea of God, we are remaining within the confines of what he critiques as
“religion.” On the other hand, if we desire and act according to an adequate use and
understanding (guidance) of reason and its various uses it is called nobility, virtue, and
“morality.” The use of ideas in these ways requires personal “tenacity” and perseverance (as our
environmental circumstances are always shifting and unpredictable).51 Spinoza writes, “The
rational principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us to establish a bond with men...”52
In the TdIE we read about the method involved in the process of reflecting on one’s ideas:
Our aim, then, is to have clear and distinct ideas, that is, such as originate from pure mind
and not from fortuitous motions of the body. Next, so that all ideas may be subsumed
This is a reference to the work of Gilles Deleuze on Spinoza again.
Hartshorne, “Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality,” 62. Conceptually we begin to understand how
“‘the many become one and are increased by one’” as Whitehead writes and is noted by Hartshorne.
51
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p37s2: 134. If we need others, which we do according to Spinoza, then we too must be one of
their other(s); that is, there are individuals and we can differentiate from each other. This same proposition reads,
“Now, the good which everyone who lives according to the dictate of reason...wants for himself is understanding.”
52
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p37s1: 135. We also read here that it is religion if we relate all of our ideas to a God.
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under one, we shall endeavor to connect and arrange them in such a manner that our
mind, as far as possible, may reproduce in thought the reality of Nature, both as to the
whole and as to its parts. As to the first point, our ultimate aim, as we have already said,
requires that a thing be conceived either through its essence alone or through its
proximate cause. That is, if the thing is in itself, or, as is commonly said, self-caused, then
it will have to be understood solely through its essence; if the thing is not in itself and
needs a cause for its existence, then it must be understood through its proximate cause.
For in fact knowledge of the effect is nothing other than to acquire a more perfect
knowledge of the cause.53
Clearly the above passage cannot be about only ideas which represent bodily actions, and to have
in thought the “whole” of Nature is an impossibility. This is another reason why I started this
thesis with the nature of definitions for Spinoza.
Throughout the TTP Spinoza writes that we do not have true ideas or understanding of
the second kind of knowledge unless we investigate scientific principles of the causes of natural
phenomena: “For whatever we clearly and distinctly understand must become known to us either
through itself or through some other thing that is clearly and distinctly understood through
itself.”54 We can understand that substance (God, or Nature) is self-caused, and we can
understand adequately that our true ideas are modal expressions of reality determined in their
own ways. Modal expressions of Nature are understood clearly and distinctly through something
else. This would result in understanding that the concept of the essence of substance, for
example, is, in fact, an adequate idea that we can have, but must be understood as determined in
its expressions by each attribute being considered in relation to its essence.55 Hasanna Sharp
writes, “The true ideas of finite modes should not be understood on a correspondence model of
truth... True ideas are not measured by something outside the attribute of thought.” 56 True ideas,
as experienced by a singular mind, have no need to be understood through something other than
Spinoza, TIE, 91: 257, emphasis added.
Spinoza, TTP, 6: 447
55
This is also supported by Letter 50.
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itself and its expression. What this also demonstrates is that modes, as modifications of substance
understood through something else, can themselves be that which become clearly and distinctly
understood, even though they are, by definition, modifications of substance. Modes can be
understood as that which are clearly and distinctly perceived, as long as they are done so in a
way that includes the definition of the attribute of which they are a part. To include something in
its definition is to say that the thing is immanent to it. Modes are immanent to that which is selfexpressed. As Deleuze writes, “The path of salvation [for Spinoza] is the path of expression
itself: to become expressive – that is, to become active; to express God’s essence, to be oneself
as idea through which the essence of God explicates itself, to have affections that are explained
by our own essence and express God’s essence.”57
As we've read in previous chapters, definitions and their order and arrangement are
crucial for understanding Spinoza's system. Specifically, affirmative definitions are those that
generate particulars to be contemplated and used. Part of my task in this project has been to
familiarize the reader with “the conditions of a good definition,” as Spinoza puts it. The
extensive possibilities of building on and working with certain axioms (deductively) are infinite,
but these possibilities can interfere with contemplating “one particular thing rather than
another.”58 We cannot contemplate it all. So, we must have a method to discern what we can
know and express in order to improve our understanding. To start with more general yet
deductively connected definitions and then progress to particulars enhances the capacity to
reason with more force. Not only will we understand more about the thing in question, but the
process itself becomes more fluid and efficient by understanding how this process works (or
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Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 320. Also, adequate ideas about god/causality must coincide with adequate
ideas about necessity and perfection, and never with only human nature. What kind of theory of human
consciousness will now be required if this is the case?
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Spinoza, TIE, 257.
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method). The risk is that this also applies to imaginative ideas that are combined in various
associations without using rational ideas to discern why we are relying on them in the first place.
Reason works with what the mind is often imagining. Spinoza writes, “For a definition to be
regarded as complete, it must explain the inmost essence of the thing, and must take care not to
substitute for this any of its properties.”59 So, as we can see, definitions can be open ended at
times until we have enough information and logical certainty to make them more complete. This
is argued in the preface of Book 4 of the Ethics.
To explain the inmost essence of something is to adequately comprehend its properties,
but it is not only this, as we noted in the last chapter when discussing the law of proportion. It is
not enough just to know this law exists, nor can one understand every possible expression of
such a law. If the existence of a singular thing is an action by definition, then to read or know
about something is not enough to keep it in existence even though, by knowing it adequately, one
is affirming existence itself. Not because they are not actions too, but only because there are
other ways of expressing such knowledge which can become more powerful. Those new ways
can be re-arranged and applied creatively by singular minds and bodies, for example. We must
accomplish the thing as an action of the mind, especially by imagining certain ideas as present
even when they are not. This is the challenge. To rationally reflect on what it does include as a
true idea is to understand its properties, of course, but if the affirmative definition of a thing
includes its own action, then acting is what we must focus on in order to continue existing with
the most power when adequately comprehending.60
This is another reason why a theory of representation will not work to understand
Spinoza, TIE, paragraph 95: 257, emphasis added.
I believe this kind of reading supports the work of Justin Clemens in his article “Spinoza's Ass,” Spinoza Now
(2011). The rational suspension of judgment is possible for Spinoza, but only with the understanding that this
suspension is part of what we are adequately conceiving and rationally reflecting upon, and not only what we are
perceiving. See the TEI paragraphs 27 and 28 for more support.
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Spinoza's system. To “represent” a bodily affection in the form of an idea is not necessarily to
truly comprehend all of what that idea involves, is, or could combine with other ideas to become.
This will be a problem for the dominate North American interpretation of Spinoza by Michael
For example, Della Rocca writes, “For Spinoza…by having a particular representational
character, an idea is certain. [Spinoza’s] point is that that idea is certain by virtue of its
representational features alone.”61 Yet, there can be a true idea in the form of an imagination, but
not necessarily an adequate idea, for example.62 In other words, the object of every idea does not
always have to be reduced to an affection of the body by definition. The object of our adequate
ideas can be other adequate ideas that include the former idea and actions in conjunction with
each other (as greater affects) in order to increase both one's motion and power, especially when
one is reflecting solely on the methods used to understand. The object and action become the
application of method in creating affirmative affects, and not only in knowing.
By the end of the TEI, Spinoza is more concerned with our properly conceiving the
nature and method to achieve affirmative, reflexive knowledge as an act of its own (as a force
that will influence other ideas and enhance our power to exist). As we think adequately, we act in
multiple ways with more power, due to the parallelism of the two attributes. The intellect is to
“reproduce the interconnections of Nature” when conceiving singular essences or particular
things, not merely represent them.63 To “reproduce” Nature because one is Nature is not to
represent it, just as difference is not negation for Spinoza.64 It is an expression of Nature's order
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Della Rocca, Spinoza, 132. This reading is directly correlated with the objective essence of an idea for the author.
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in its own determinate way conceived as a modal modification of substance (a finite mode).
In part, this is thinking with more power of force (reflexive knowledge), adequacy, and
application. To think adequately is to think rationally. To think rationally is to think affirmatively
and productively, but also while reflecting on one's affects more habitually. To think
affirmatively produces more powerful chains of rational ideas and patterns of thought that affect
us. The use of reason in increasing our understanding always produces something with more
force or power if it is in conjunction with understanding the necessity of the laws of Nature of
thought and extension. It is always something that is affirmative and includes an automatic and
simultaneous increase in our ratio of motion and rest. Negation is something that does not
increase our individual conatus for Spinoza. What we express is Nature in every way, but with
more or lesser degrees of power. Therefore, you can understand how ideas are produced,
although that is not enough; you need to actually put that understanding into greater use, or, by
definition, you are not truly understanding the adequate notion you believe you are.
What is contrary to something contained within a definition is not capable of truly being
a part of that definition for Spinoza because definitions are affirmative if we are conceiving them
adequately. A definition that is otherwise always affirmative and generative cannot include any
real negation. This is one use of the principle of non-contradiction Spinoza relies on. We
increasingly comprehend that the more we understand about how these laws work, the more
easily and creatively they can be put into action. To have adequate knowledge of particulars one
must continually access reasoning capacities in ways that include consciously reflecting on laws
of Nature. This means reflection not only on the content of particulars, but also on the actual
adequate function in action and what it can produce. When consciously reflecting on what we are
taking as the object of our ideas (for example, God, laws of Nature, or some external body or
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event), we are accessing adequate ideas about the properties of things. We can be deceived in
thinking we understand such laws if, for example, we simply sit in one place contemplating them
and nothing more. The contemplation is an act of conscious reflection, but it is not an action of
understanding applied to its fullest force and capacity. Each attribute “will be something that
expresses God's nature in some way...”65 The determinateness of Nature is immanent. The
attribute of thought does not express God (Nature) as a representation of extension. This
deduction is another way to understand how God is the efficient cause of all things, as
demonstrated in E1p16c2 for example. But for us, knowledge of God is the same as knowledge
of natural phenomena. Spinoza also refers to God's (Nature's) existence, by definition, as a force
that we will read more about in the last chapter next.66 The order and connection of things
express the order and connection of the laws of Nature. How can God be conceived as the
efficient cause of all things if those things are also conceived as laws of Nature in our series of
adequate ideas? Because to think adequately with more force is to apply what one understands.
To understand involves being continuously capable of reflecting on our affects in ways in which
we can transform them through the application of adequate knowledge. As Eugene Marshall
writes, “For animals such as human beings have a complexity and sophistication that allows for a
peculiar type of affect, one that pans and pancreases likely lack, namely, the ability for one affect
to take another affect as its object. In other words, the affectivity account explains how people
can be self-aware in a way that pans and pancreases likely cannot be.” 67 The deductions made so
far will be given more support in the last section of this chapter next.
The more adequate ideas a singular mind has, the more it is enhancing its own strength in
understanding through understanding the functions of the laws of the attribute of thought, and the
Spinoza, Letter 36: 859.
Ibid. Letter 36: 859.
67
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more power and force those ideas will reproduce. Hasana Sharp writes, “My mind serves as the
adequate cause when it acts, that is, when the idea it produces follows more from its power and
the ideas included in it than from external sources.”68
Motion is understood by thought as only applicable to the attribute of extension. Our
awareness of this naturally increases our action and power in thought. In this context, for
something to be in motion involves that which can be understood as a ratio in extension
(between our levels of homeostasis and striving indefinitely). As that ratio increases or
decreases in intensity, we can evaluate the power of what it is we are thinking and doing. That is,
if increased, we have more power to adequately evaluate the magnitude and kind of an effects we
experience and produce. To speak of qualitative effects is also to understand the causes and
effects of our affects, especially on a singular level. In other words, to slow down in intensity is
not a negation nor is it a decrease in some form of quantitative motion that can be directly
measured; it is simply to be acting with less overall (combined) affective force in thought and
action as a total ratio. Therefore, it involves the result of having less forceful effects. It is a
degree of power along a continuum of animation that has less force than it could have had. To
increase that force is to have an adequate understanding of the laws of Nature that are at work in
the construction or pattern of ideas one is associating while evaluating one’s affects. To increase
this force is an action. Thus, negation cannot be a cause, only an effect or expression of partial or
fragmented knowledge and less force of power (as noted in 4p22s). The essence of God, or
Nature, is to exist. Our essence (conatus) is also to strive to exist, but we are “in part a negation”
because of our finiteness. A true negation of the definition of essence is a conceptual
impossibility for Spinoza. That which is eternally self-caused and self-causing cannot negate
itself in its own existence: “But this reason, or cause [of necessary existence], must either be
68
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contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it.”69 For Spinoza, the cause and definition of
substance is the fact that it exists: “Therefore, there is no cause, or reason, either in God or
outside God which takes its existence away.”70 We can think adequately about God as the
immanent cause of all things because we can think logically, and, for Spinoza, to think logically
about a God (or continuously self-causing agent such as Nature) includes that it would be
illogical to conceive of anything else outside of it and its nature.
At one point in the TEI, Spinoza writes that ideas are embedded in and depend on their
context in the same way that the object of an idea is embedded within reality as a real thing (as
expressions of the laws of thought).71 This distinction is critical. Although the real concept of
what an idea is and can do is discussed in the KV, not to mention what a body is, both concepts
were not fully developed in this work. The distinction mentioned is helpful nonetheless. On one
hand, we can compare the objective essence and formal essence of ideas themselves, as was
covered in the previous chapter. On the other hand, we can also keep the two topics separate and
apply one (objective essence understood as mental action) to Natura Naturans (all of nature
naturing in the active sense) and the other (the object of the idea which is not an action, but only
the thing in question) as Natura Naturata (nature natured simply by being an expression).
Although we can distinguish between these two different concepts logically, we can understand
that all of nature is always both, and we can only truly comprehend Natura Naturata (our
expressions of substance). Jeffrey Bernstein, in his essay “The Ethics of Spinoza's Physics,”
describes it best when referencing Letter 6:
At first glance, Spinoza seems to be making a sharp distinction between topics such as
'movement and rest' (which express nature in-itself) and topics such as 'fluidity and
solidity' (which only express our conventional ways of viewing nature). However,
Spinoza, Ethics, 1p11: 7.
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Spinoza does not (and, in fact, cannot) suggest that there is an ontological distinction
between the former and latter kind of topic. This means that perception of nature ‘in
itself’ is only modally distinct from our imaginations about nature. What Spinoza desires,
therefore, is that we understand the involvement of movement/rest in fluidity/solidity.
Simply put, we need to investigate the causes (Spinoza calls it the 'necessity') of
movement/rest with respect to fluidity/solidity... And since there can be only one
substance (E1p14cor1) from which modes cannot be distinct, it follows that
substance/nature...is its modal expressions.72
We can also reference a footnote on this topic by Sam Shirley in his translation of Letter 40 when
he writes that, for Spinoza, like Descartes, the “objective reality of a representation cannot be
explained by an infinite series of causes, although just such a series does explain its formal
reality.”73 Just as when we understand that something is a part of Nature and, therefore, within
the context of what is influenced by it, the same can be said of ideas. Not only are those ideas
one is contemplating the result of the ideas that have come before them in kind in a causal series,
but they also have the power and force as mental actions to create new ideas not observed or
understood before through a variety of associations. This next statement by Spinoza about
method from the TEI is telling in this respect:
Again, method must necessarily be discourse about reasoning or intellection. That is,
method is not reasoning itself which leads to the understanding of the causes of things,
and far less is it the understanding of the causes of things. It is the understanding of what
is a true idea, distinguishing it from other kinds of perception and examining its nature...
so that we may thereby come to know our power of understanding and may so train the
mind that it will understand according to that standard all that needs to be understood,
laying down definite rules as aids, and also ensuring that the mind does not waste its
energy.74
Spinoza believes the mind's ideas are a kind of energy as force, a power that combines
with our affections to create diverse affects. It is the affects that move us and not just ideas or
external bodies. In fact, as we’ve seen, certain affects can even overpower all of our other
Bernstein, “The Ethics of Spinoza's Physics,” p. 8. Bernstein also suggests that one can find a consistency
between Spinoza's earlier work in the KV with the later Ethics regarding the nature of ratios of motion and rest and
the affects.
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desires.75 This is how Spinoza uses and translates the Latin term vis as well, as an expression of
force. This force is not defined as motion, for motion and rest are what the body does in
extension. It is a force or tendency in the ways in which we apply our ideas and experience our
affects. Recall, the object of the idea as a mental action is its formal essence, but the idea itself
(if adequate and certain) has its own objective essence, and we must attend to that aspect of what
it is to think dynamically in order to discover the true causes of the object of our ideas. A theory
of representation needs to address this distinction in this way.
The goal is to compare ideas as actions of force and degrees of power. This aspect of
Spinoza's epistemological physics hinges on the direct, non-representational parallelism between
the attributes.76 When we discover the adequate cause of something, our power to act is
increased. As Dan Selcer writes, “Spinozan textual materialism involves reconfiguring matter
itself as power and the notions of 'idea' and 'body' in terms of movement and its capacity to
produce effects.”77 This type of dynamic materialism conceives matter as “productive power,”
while bodies can be understood as “complex patterns of movement as well as equally complex
and constantly mutating articulations of a power or force to act and to exist.”78 The ideas we
have now are about force or power that are a part of an adequate series of ideas that we are
certain of after we learn how ideas can have increasing force (i.e. how the laws of Nature work).
This sense of after is not a temporal one because of the definition of common notions as
infinitely affirming the existence of substance. The force of an adequate idea includes its
deductive certainty, and its capacity to also be an action that produces more clear and distinct
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p44s: 139.
Spinoza, Letter 59: 911. Two years before his untimely death, Spinoza was asked for his “General Treatise on
Physics,” including that it was known that he had made “great advances” in this topic. I read Spinoza's work on
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throughout this thesis.
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ideas. The more one understands what it is for ideas to be mental actions, the more one’s
understanding is enhanced as a productive effect. Again, this is about acquiring a powerful
method for the application of operational ideas. Spinoza writes:
So a good method will be one which shows how the mind is to be directed according to
the standard of a given true idea. Again, since the relation between two ideas is the same
as the relation between the formal essences of those ideas, it follows that the reflexive
knowledge of the idea of the most perfect Being will be more excellent than the reflexive
knowledge of other ideas. That is, the most perfect method will be one which shows how
the mind should be directed according to the standard of a given idea of the most perfect
Being. From this one can readily understand how the mind, as it understands more
things, at the same time acquires other tools which facilitate its further understanding.79
To better understand means acquiring new tools for understanding. Notice the connection
Spinoza draws between our ideas, the idea of the most perfect Being, and the most perfect
method. “God, or Nature” can be the efficient and immanent cause of all things. This passage
also brings up the intimate relation between Spinoza's epistemology and his ontology, a topic I
address in more depth in Chapter Five next. Spinoza places emphasis on our need to pay
attention to both, and his discussion of what definitions are, can do, and how they relate to the
concept of a cause and existence involve both.80 For more support we can refer to Letters 34 and
35. There we learn about the nature of definition as they relate to what God is, for example.
Recall that definitions of each singular thing “includes nothing other than the simple nature of
the thing defined,” which entails that absolutely no definition “involves or expresses a plurality,
or a fixed number of individuals, since it involves and expresses only the nature of the thing as it
is in itself.”81
God, or Nature, by “its own sufficiency or force” is the immanent and efficient cause for
Spinoza, TIE, paragraphs 38 & 39: 242.
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81
Spinoza, Letter 34: 854. The footnote of this letter cites E1p8s2 which emphasizes the flexibility of the PSR. In
Letter 35 Spinoza continues, “To come now to the point at issue, I assert that there can only be one Being whose
Existence pertains to its own nature, namely, that Being which possesses in itself all perfections, and which I shall
call God.”
79
80

228

all its expressions, for all its perfection, by necessity of its existence. For continued support we
can briefly note Letter 58, already referenced in Chapter Three. There, Spinoza is discussing
God's necessity, human free will as an illusion, laws of Nature, and the physics of force and
power that are involved:
A stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a fixed quantity of motion
whereby it will necessarily continue to move when the impulsion of the external cause
has ceased. The stone's continuance in motion is constrained, not because it is necessary,
but because it must be defined by the impulsion received from the external cause. What
here applies to the stone must be understood of every individual thing, however complex
its structure and various functions. For every single thing is necessarily determined by an
external cause to exist and to act in a fixed and determinate way.82
Therefore, the more a mind is capable of adequate knowing, including about processes of the
imagination, the more perfectly it understands. Or rather, it expresses Nature's perfection more
forcefully. But this is not merely an exercise in recognizing what we know or think we know. It
is an exercise in increasing our power to know, that is, of our proportion of perspective, our
power to affirm or deny (compare, contrast, and combine) concepts between types of ideas and
their logical limits.83 It includes our power of discerning between continuously changing ideas so
to increase our power of comprehension. Increasing our conatus strengthens our adequate
patterns of knowing leading to an increase in our rational actions. Not only is it the case that “the
more the mind understands of Nature, the better it understands itself,” but it is also an encounter
which increases and decreases the power of our mind as an experience that coincides with the
actions of our body and bodily joy. In other words, we have more joyous and powerful affects.
Therefore, understanding Nature and natural phenomena includes understanding human
perceiving and conceiving as they relate to dispositions and perspective. That is, the more the
Spinoza, Letter 58: 909.
This insight is dedicated to anyone who has ever thought they had the absolutely correct perspective about an
experience, only to discover with enough time, a softened ego, and genuine investigation into either the thing itself
or the nature of how we obtain real knowledge, that they were wrong in their original (seemingly certain)
deductions. This is the meaning of true courage for Spinoza.
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mind “understands the order of Nature, the more easily it can restrain itself from useless
pursuits.”84 Again, we witness a reference to mental energy, to a conservation of energy so not to
waste it on useless pursuits.
It is not as much a matter of understanding the order and connection of the causes of all
ideas, which is an impossibility, as it is about understanding and recognizing the power between
different types of ideas and how that power increases when we affirm our existence as natural
phenomena. The only way one can follow a train of thought in order to enhance one’s own power
is by consciously reflecting on personal, subjective types of ideas in their relations and
productive effects and in accordance with one’s ratios of motion and rest in extension.
Spinoza is interested in how we draw inferences from the ideas that both agree with their
object and are adequately understood to the degree that one can discern between types of
knowledge with more power. How we draw inferences is similar to the above example of a stone
and its impulsion. He is strictly interested in how we draw inferences from ideas (composing the
strength of the mind itself) understood as mental actions and not only as conceptual causation. If
there were not a relation to another idea of which the ideas in question were not associated, what
Spinoza calls interrelated with, then “we could make no inference regarding it.” 85 That is,
because the mind is ideas, we would not be aware of our own mind if we were not continuously
drawing various kinds of inferences. This is the same deduction made in Letter 32 and it is
telling. All of Nature is interrelated and thus, all ideas are also interrelated. With new adequate
ideas, the method and tools of reflexive thought also increases in force and affirmation or
inclination. Things that are interrelated in Nature will be capable of being understood, and the
objective essence of our ideas will also have this order. What is important to pay attention to in
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this letter is the comment about tools acquired “for further progress.” We need to be capable of
recognizing not only the adequate ideas we are having, but how they can be used as tools! That
is, “the order and connection of ideas is the order and connection of things.” As Spinoza writes,
our affect of joy is related both to the mind and to the body simultaneously as one and the same
thing expressed in two different determinate ways.86
When building on a more powerful method of conscious reflection we need the power of
accurate recollection, an aspect of imaginative knowledge. Therefore, recall that in E3p11 we
learned, “Whatever increases or diminishes, assists or checks the power of the activity of our
body, the idea of said thing increases or diminishes, assists or checks the power of thought of our
mind.”87 This is the nature of an affect and our appetites, as noted in E3p9s earlier. We are
conscious of our striving, but reflection is about connections between ideas and consciousness of
our striving (and not only about what words we know and use): “When this striving is related
only to the mind, it is called will; but when it is related to the mind and body together, it is called
appetite. This appetite, therefore, is nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature
there necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation.”88 Book 3 is the exact place
in the Ethics where Spinoza defines desire as appetite together with the consciousness of the
appetite, which creates an affect. If conatus, as desire, is an affect, then we are forced to pay
much more attention to the nature of our affects and the relations of adequate chains of ideas
that we are conscious of.
Of course, we cannot be aware of all the ideas we are actually associating at all times.
Yet, we can strengthen the method we use to recognize the various types of ideas which bring us
more joy, power, and conservation of energy. This method will simultaneously influence one's
Spinoza, Ethics, 3p11: 77.
Ibid. 3p11: 76.
88
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thought processes with the same variation of either more or less power. In this way, conscious
reflection becomes a type of physics of force.
Before moving to the last section about how a theory of representation cannot work to
apply to Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology, we have to add to our understanding about the nature
of what an “idea” is, such as found in E2P49s2 for example. In this very telling proposition and
its demonstration, Spinoza makes clear that the “concept of extension” is not involved in the
definition of what an idea is. This also coheres with 2p6d and elements of Letter 34. 89 As we will
read next, this is going to be a problem for Della Rocca’s interpretation. We can have an
adequate idea about how the laws of extension work, but the object of that idea in its formal
essence is another adequate idea about rational (logical) understanding. Even if all ideas are also
categorized as modes, as it seems they are in 1p31, there are modes of thought that are
determined in a certain way and modes of extension that are determined in their own ways, not to
mention the three distinct categories of modes we learned about in the last chapter. Being aware
of the objective essence of our ideas includes knowing what kind of knowledge one is relying on
when thinking and how it can be used in efficient ways, which transform our affects to include
more reflection on the formal essence of our conatus!
What an idea involves at its core is an affirmation or negation. Words are neither
affirmations nor negations as well. That is how we can clearly understand how an idea in a finite
mind can also be understood as eternal. All affirmative ideas logically connected are clear and
distinct. This claim is a logical deduction related to Spinoza's initial definitions at the start of the
Ethics. We are born with the ability to reason, but those ideas we can understand and use in a
reflectively certain way are not immediately apparent until we synthesize them with more
powerful knowledge. The logical argument is that adequate ideas are eternal affirmations of the
89
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properties of things (common notions), and eternal affirmations are always in existence as true.90
Spinoza writes that those who view images or words as ideas “do not see that an idea, insofar as
it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.”91 An image or word is not, in itself, either an
affirmation or negation, but all ideas are. This is why those who claim that Spinoza's idea of
“cause,” is identical to both what it is “to conceive” and what it is “to explain” something,
cannot be logically possible. To conceive adequately is not necessarily to be capable of
explaining what one knows, although the latter is, naturally, helpful, constructive, and potentially
productive. Recall that words and images are part of imaginative knowledge. They are not
classified as either affirmations or negations because imaginative ideas are always only partial
knowledge, which is why we can use the same word in so many diverse ways of varying
intensities depending on the context. As we read in E3p56, truth does not reside in our
explanations, but in our adequate understanding and application. Explanations can be and are
applications of knowledge, but Spinoza is interested in more than just our explaining things. In
addition, also found in Letter 56, we learn that we can have clear, adequate ideas of something
which, nevertheless, we can never imagine clearly - that is, we don’t form a clear mental image
of in its entirety (such as all of Nature).92 Spinoza concludes this sentiment in Letter 37 years
earlier. We cannot have a series (or many series) of causally connected adequate notions about all
of Nature, but we can understand why this is so logically, that is, clearly and distinctly. This is a
great example of the difference between expressing a common notion that, nonetheless, uses
certain aspects of imaginative knowledge to do so (we need to be alive in order to be thinking),
which is an idea that has no equivalent in the form of images.
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Recall from the last chapter that Spinoza writes that words acquire their meaning from
their use. The “nature of thought” does not involve the concept of extension. What thought is (as
an attribute) must be in relation to types of knowledge, types of ideas, and what it is for God to
be the immanent and efficient cause of all attributes (in relation to the concept that God is a
thinking thing). An idea understood to exist as a mode of brain activity, for example, “consists
neither in the image of anything, nor in words,” as corporeal motions do not involve “the concept
of thought.”93 Recall, as Letter 50 makes clearer, that to think of the concept “one” must include
only the affirmative concept of existence. To speak of human essence, therefore, is to speak of
determinate modal expressions or modifications of modifications of substance that are
affirmative. My conatus on an individual, imaginative level, for example, must include the
concept of mode, but when I understand substance as one, only that substance's existence and
expression as Nature is logically important. This is yet another reason why we might characterize
Spinoza as a type of existentialist thinker. This level of understanding has more power to assist
me in reaching a more homeostatic state and continue to thrive. Spinoza writes, “In the common
round of life we have to follow what is probable, but in speculative thought we have to follow
what is true.”94 This conclusion demonstrates yet again that probability (often conceived as
imaginative knowledge) and reason (common notions) work together to increase our conatus.
It seems Spinoza makes a distinction between thought in conjunction with a process and
motion of the body as corporeal extension and “the concept of thought” that reasoning is both
doing and is trying to understand (in action, in conceiving). The brain’s movements (as corporeal
motions) are not the concept or content of thought, yet our affects include ideas we are having
about the affections of our bodies. Attributal parallelism does not also include a strict identity
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between the attributes, even if, in the end, thought and extension are “one and the same thing.”
Our adequate “concept of thought” involves only other ideas and the laws of the attribute of
thought. Since we strive to exist by necessity, ideas that involve affirmation increase our conatus.
Therefore, ideas about negation must be related only to other ideas about essence, as the concept
of one organic whole involves only the adequate definition of affirmative existence in expression
(modally).
When Spinoza discusses reflexive knowledge he is not only talking about ideas of ideas.
He is also speaking about the activity of comprehending clear and distinct, true ideas that are
intrinsically determined and doing so regularly as an efficient method. Intellectual activity
involves a different kind of transformative force. There is activity when we think, and we have to
find ways to accurately account for the development of novel combinations of ideas that have
more impact and leave a larger trace or imprint of Nature. Activity, therefore, becomes an
expression, and that expression, in turn, becomes more (or less) activity with more (or less)
power and force depending on what other ideas are used in associations and reflective awareness.
Part of this expression is what we affirm or deny about the ideas and affects we are reflecting on
at any given time, and what we decide to keep in mind.95 As Spinoza writes and was referenced
earlier in the thesis, “For an idea itself is nothing but a certain awareness.” 96 Conscious
awareness of (and reflexive knowledge on) what types of ideas one is relying on, in addition to
their actual content, is crucial to Spinoza's epistemology in the TEI, TTP, Ethics, and the
unfinished TP. In all of these works (and his correspondences) it can be demonstrated that, in
order to think well, one must attain an adequate method for becoming increasingly (reflectively)
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aware of both the content and cause of their ideas, and also of how to categorize what type of
idea they are relying on the most (imaginative, rational, or rationally intuitive) in order to affirm
or deny that idea in its meaning and function with other ideas. Further, Spinoza writes that “the
more intelligible a thing is, the more easily it is retained.” Retention is a part of imaginative
knowledge. Therefore, as intelligibility increases in efficiency, rationality is used to strengthen
those aspects of imaginative knowledge that benefit our capacity to reason with more force.
Certain knowledge lasts longer and is easier to recall because it is stronger and present to us. It
can be accessed readily or with habitual readiness.
A Theory of Affects and the Non-Representational Way to Read Spinoza
Here's where things get intriguing! Memory and recollection are something wholly
different for Spinoza. They are not identical processes. Memory is expressed as imaginative
knowledge, and is “the sensation of impressions in the brain together with the thought of the
determinate duration of the sensation.”97 Memory, in other words, is a combination of bodily
sensations coupled with ideas about our duration and pleasure or pain, very similarly to an affect.
Personal memory involves singular affect, and awareness of affects requires conscious reflection
of both imaginative and rational ideas. Recollection, on the other hand, retains the memory of the
original sensations on the brain that left impressions, but disregards the idea of a determinate
duration because recollections involve only conscious awareness of ideas within the attribute of
thought as common notions. Therefore, we can say that in Spinoza's earlier writings he made
explicit the importance of recollection over mere memory, especially if one is remaining
consciously aware of what it is to have adequate and intuitive ideas. The more we think
adequately about true singular essences, the easier one recalls certain kinds of ideas (as
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memories along with their involved affects). Spinoza writes, “...the more singular a thing is, the
more easily it is retained.”98 We more readily retain both memories and recollections of the
essence of a singular thing. It is clear, at least in the TEI, that once understood, we should
concentrate on becoming increasingly aware of how to construct more adequate ideas, and how
to recollect them as singularities more regularly.
Recall what we understood in Chapter Two about weaker and stronger imaginings: when
reason understands its own processes, it can combine its power with certain kinds of ideas of the
imagination to create stronger impressions in order to strengthen itself. It is similar to the idea
that when we understand the laws of Nature and then act rationally in order to benefit others, we
are also aware of how much this benefits ourselves, as well. This is one reason why virtue can be
included in the definition of reason. It is also why the mind works towards a principle of
conservation in its methods and efficient use of various kinds of ideas as power and force.
Yet, this type of awareness and mental activity are not only about recollecting if one also
has desires and daily needs. It is more about retention in the intellect due to a learned impression.
The force of retention in consciousness increases significantly as the ideas that we are
reflectively aware of become more intelligible. The more something is understood adequately,
the more easily it becomes a part of our habits; that is, it becomes ready knowledge, in a similar
way as conceptions of force in mathematical deductions or the physics of bodies when combined
in one activity cooperatively. Spinoza writes, “When on reflection a person perceives the
inadequacy, the emotion is immediately changed.”99 This level of awareness and the processes
involved are Spinoza's proto-physics of force. As Eugene Marshall writes, “…if we become
consciously aware of the fact that the mind is a causal mechanism governed by the laws of
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Nature, and if we actually understand this idea adequately, then it must be the case that this
adequate knowledge has become an affect, increasing our power or moving us to act.”100
If reflection is needed to increase one's power, then debates about whether Spinoza is
discussing human consciousness as direct awareness are diminished. Our concentration on our
conscious awareness is absolutely necessary in order to increase our joy and power in thought
and action. Hampshire continues, “Through systematic knowledge of the workings of the mind,
matching systematic knowledge of physics, we can gain control of our sentiments and follow a
consistent path towards tranquility and happiness.”101 This is also supported by what Spinoza
writes in and after E2p13, as well as what Sam Shirley refers to as offering “a basic outline of
Spinoza's physics.”102
How many multiple, internally determined states we can assume and compare, that is,
how many sets of ideas we can rationally contrast and arrange, determines how one can increase
their force of conatus and of motion simultaneously. By Book 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza writes that
we should “...develop into a body that is capable of a great many activities and is related to a
mind that is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things, and in such a way that everything
relating to its memory or imagination should be of scarcely any importance in comparison with
its intellect...”103 Intellectual affects dominate the mind and are not “special kinds of ideas,” but
are the very increase in our force of existing and joy. They are real, true ideas which express
reality. True ideas must include an aspect of adequate understanding about how one's body is
affected, but that does not imply that they are defined as representations of actions in extension.
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I have already mentioned above the problem of any reading of Spinoza which wholly
collapses the idea of “cause” with the idea of “explanation” into one and the same thing. This
collapsing of both processes/meanings into one is not a new problem in philosophy, but when
Spinoza refers to “the order of Nature,” he is always intending Natura Naturata or substance
modally expressed through thought and extension. Recall that in the very first definition of Book
2 of the Ethics we learn that a “body” is one type of expression of substance, as a mode, and
extension is another type of expression, as an attribute. As is so famously debated, in 2p7 we
then read that “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but
expressed in two ways.”104 If a body, as a mode of expression, is not reducible to the definition
of extension as an attribute, then we might want to read 2p7 as more about affects than about
either modes or attributes. As we read in 2p5, modes can be understood as the effects of their
respective attributes only. The meaning of the determinate expressions of the attributes as the
same substance is different.
Michael Della Rocca, in his influential reading of Spinoza’s Ethics, draws together what
he feels is the necessary and essential relation between three details: an ideational modal
expression, God as cause, and the concepts of essence and existence. He does this through his
reading of the principle of sufficient reason that allows for our ideas to be explained as
representations of expressions of extension. He calls his thesis “mind-relativity of content.” For
him, “each idea 'represents' [an] extended counterpart,” yet we need look no further than certain
propositions in the Ethics regarding the affects in order to demonstrate how his interpretation,
although fruitful in some respects, is inaccurate. For example, when Spinoza asks us to
“imagine” a maxim that pertains to a rational good, but of which we must pair with an image of
something that represents that maxim specific to us, one's understanding cannot be explained as
104
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representing only the extended counterpart of each of these idea chains or combined affects. I
will explain why next.
As already noted, we cannot imagine eternity, but we can reason about it conceptually,
trying to understand its logical limits. “Finite” modes are not, in themselves classified as eternal,
but they express, and are in relation to eternal attributes conceived through themselves. For
Spinoza, words are always an element of imaginative knowledge so we must look past mere
explanation to that of understanding and the feeling of meaning, as well as how meaning can
create greater affects. Primarily, we have to consider what it is for the type of idea we are having
to be either active or passive. In many respects, certain bodies of ideas in relation to each other
have greater or lesser degrees of expression and power. As organically active, they lend
themselves to our being an adequate cause of chains of ideas which are already true facts about
the properties or essences of singular things. All judgments are ideas, as is made clear in 2p49,
but there are elements left unclear.105 Do we express essence when thinking adequately or is this
only possible when we have an adequate idea about essence? It seems both are possible, but the
former is logically something very different than the later. For example, if individuals cannot
adequately recognize errors in reasoning then they may also not know that their ideas are not
adequate enough. So how do we strengthen reasoning? William Earle expresses this distinction
well:
The [ontological] argument states in some fashion that the existence of God or substance
follows from his essence alone; to attempt then to give further grounds for the existence
of God than those asserted by the argument would be to destroy that argument. The
argument must stand or fall by itself... Briefly the argument states that there is an essence
whose existence follows necessarily from that essence. That is all. It does not say: I have
an idea of such an essence, and therefore God must exist as cause. Nor does it say: there
are certain finite things, hence there must be a necessary being as cause. These are both
variants of the cosmological argument, and although used by Spinoza, were considered
by him to be a posteriori and of inferior certitude. ...an essence is not an idea, or a
105
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psychological state of some sort. Spinoza distinguishes between the idea and the
ideatum... The essence of house or of circle, therefore, neither is nor involves the notion
of thought... The conclusion of all this is simply that essences are not ideas, although
sometimes ideas are ideas of essences, the essences do not require that particular act of
thought for their definition, and hence are structurally independent. ...An independent
essence will be one which is conceived through itself and which is in itself... The
discernment, therefore, of an essence which is thought through itself will be at the same
time the discernment of that which exists through itself; defining the essence is precisely
this act of discernment. ...Existence follows only from certain essences, those namely
which express infinity, independence, and substance.106
When we have adequate ideas proportionally more powerful than imaginative ones, we are
expressing an independent substance that is infinite in those strivings. In other words, we are
neither expressing representations of the attribute of extension when thinking adequately, nor
expressing representations of God as cause. In thinking adequately we are expressing directly
God’s (or Nature’s) power. It should be noted that even as the above description is helpful,
Spinoza does away with the ontological status of ideas about ideas in E2p21s.107 This better
clarifies how to read Spinoza accurately, should the mind affirm its existence according to
greater or lesser degrees of power. This is also why a theory of human consciousness is required
for accurately interpreting Spinoza’s epistemology as we read in Chapter Three.
We can rearrange not only our ideas, but also our affects using adequate common notions.
To be an adequate cause in this way is not to be a proximate cause, as Spinoza writes in E4p2-4.
Della Rocca argues that the expressions of the mind and body are absolutely identical, with the
exception that all ideas of a finite, human mind must be called representational. It would be
illogical to say that our ideas represent our mind, as they are our mind. It is not as problematic to
say that they represent some parallel expression of our bodies, perhaps. In later works, Della

William Earle, “The Ontological Argument in Spinoza,” 549-551, 553. Etienne Balibar supports this kind of
reading. For Balibar, every act is also a cause, which is the meaning of causa sui for him. The more we have
adequate ideas, the stronger our desire to learn becomes, the more our existence is enhanced.
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idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to the object.”
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Rocca writes, “The most fundamental question in the philosophy of mind, for Spinoza, is this:
What is it for a thought or idea to represent, to be about, a particular object? This is the crucial
question because...all features of a mental state just are, or derive wholly from, its
representational features. In this way, representation -and not, as Descartes would have it,
consciousness- is the essence of the mental.”108 Yet, our ideas are our conscious awareness of our
shifting affects so I have a problem with the way Della Rocca approaches Spinoza’s system.
Readings from representation of this kind want to replace the idea of reflective
consciousness with that of ideational representations of bodily actions, though I do not believe
this type of replacement is possible for Spinoza. Della Rocca writes, “My interpretation takes
Spinoza's claims at face value, as involving a representation relation between an idea on the one
hand and its extended counterpart and the cause of that counterpart on the other hand, and as
involving no duality of senses of representation.”109 He continues, “Again, I take Spinoza's talk
of perceiving something...as talk about what the relevant ideas represent.”110 Yet, I would like to
ask if ideas about other ideas are included in the above description? As already noted, in
E4p37s2 we learn that there are times when we cannot fully restrain our emotions, but a greater
affect can overpower more passive emotions. It is not clear how Della Rocca's interpretation
might account for ideas about ideas that create transformative affects unless they are conceived
as objects of their own. Some of our adequate ideas, for example, are about eternity, which is
nothing other than another adequate idea that is taken as the object of the first idea. The object of
that particular idea could be said to be what it is for an idea to be eternal. This is a key point for
Della Rocca, Spinoza, 89-90. In contrast, Hasana Sharp writes, “...Hegel is concerned above all with relationships
of representation, while Spinoza examines relationships of composition [as well as decomposition, transformation,
aggregation] among human and nonhuman forces (121).”
109
Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 46. To be fair, about a quarter of the way
into this book Della Rocca writes, “I should note that my aim here is not to give a complete account of Spinoza's
theory of adequate and inadequate ideas (53).”
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Spinoza as early as E1p8, among other places, where he writes that confused knowledge occurs
if one does not track the use of concepts distinguishing between the nature of substance's
modifications (being a singular mode) and what it is to be an attribute conceived through itself.
Some parts of our bodies can communicate their motion to other bodies while the
integrity of our whole body continues to operate according to its own ratios of motion and rest.111
Affects are crucial to this process. Recall that to think of anything as an organic whole is to
consider its thriving as a continuation of existence in an affirmative manner only, that is, as
existing.112 One might ask, is representation a complete conceptual affirmation according to
Spinoza’s logic and definition of existence? Can a representation of something else be a
complete affirmation? No. But do we experience representation? Yes.
The transformations we experience continually contribute to our overall conatus. There
are times when we can think about certain kinds of ideas we are having and their content, and yet
there are many other kinds of ideas relied on simultaneously that are not in our direct reflective
focus – ideas that strengthen or weaken the types of knowledge being used by our awareness. As
demonstrated in E2p9, the adequate idea of a singular thing is defined by its relation to other
singular things or ideas, not only to one's affections. It is a definition that includes the necessary
relations to many other singular things continuously, as well as continuous interactions with the
organic whole that is substance.113 This organic interaction as substance is taken to a new level of
description when considering what it is for something to have infinite attributes expressed in
infinite ways, as clarified by Spinoza in Letter 66. There he writes, “I say that although each
thing is expressed in infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God, the infinite ideas in which it is
expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a particular thing, but an infinity of
Spinoza, Ethics, 2p24: 49. See the infamous Letter 32 for more support.
Spinoza, Letter 32: 849: “Thus the blood would always have to be regarded as a whole, not a part.”
113
See here Letter 50 where Spinoza confirms this. Letter 50 will be taken up at the beginning of the next chapter.
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minds” (as he also makes clear in 1p10 and 2p7s).114 Notice that this is the problem of infinities
later to be taken up in the field of mathematics and which I address, at least in part, in this thesis.
Della Rocca's brand of interpretation fits very nicely within current strands of
physicalism and theory of mind movements that reduce all conscious experiences from or back
to their “origins” in brain states.115 Della Rocca summarizes his interpretive conclusions about
mind-body identity in Spinoza in the following way:
Since all extensional properties must, for Spinoza, be neutral, I will investigate what
kinds of properties Spinoza would regard as neutral. By eliciting these neutral properties,
it will become evident that, for Spinoza, mind and body share all their neutral properties.
From this fact, it follows that mind and body share all their extensional properties and are
thus identical... The parallelism provides the basis for concluding that mind and body are
identical.116
This quasi-materialist approach also ignores some viable atomist strains of arguments in Spinoza
scholarship, as well as theories of consciousness and affectivity. Della Rocca calls his reading of
Spinoza representational parallelism, although also stating there is no duality between attributes
noted above, which he states is “absolutely crucial” to his overall interpretation and that
addresses current problems in the mind-body debate in philosophy.117 I partially agree with him
when he states, “Spinoza's arguments represent a significant advance in our understanding of the
traditional and still raging mind-body problem.”118 The difference is that brain states in his
reading are conceived as wholly physical, giving rise to causal thoughts, whereas ideas are to be
114

Spinoza, Letter 66, trans. Shirley, 921.There is a lot of controversy with this letter in response to Letter 65.
There is a lot of material on this debate over the past century. For one such current and lucid exposition in the
debate, see the recorded dialogue on video at Northwestern University (2013) between Owen Flanagan and Evan
Thompson.
116
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the mental can be reduced to the physical. Reductionists claim that mental properties are necessarily coextensive
with certain physical properties. The connections between the properties would hold by virtue of laws of nature... If
such laws held, mental events could in principle be explained simply in terms of the occurrence of the physical
properties of events and objects... A similar dynamic is at work in the raging debate over the nature of
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represent the other.
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understood pertaining to the attribute of thought as representations of these brain states and
bodily affections. Della Rocca also interprets modes, against alternative readings by Ed Curley,
Piet Steenbakkers, Gilles Deleuze, and many other Spinoza scholars, as “states of substance.”119
Although some elements of his interpretation work, Della Rocca does not adequately address the
very important metaphysical aspects of Spinoza's dynamic epistemology, nor do his initial
assumptions cohere with more accurate readings of Spinoza's works already in circulation by
prominent Early Modern scholars on the nature and importance of the affects. If you recall from
earlier chapters, for an effect to “involve” its cause is for modes (modal modifications) to be a
necessary logical consequence of that which has infinite attributes expressed in infinite ways.
Modes are Spinoza’s answer to the infinity problem and affects provide the evidence. The
problem of contingency does not fall into the problem of an infinite regress, a common critique
of philosophers who work on the infinity problem. As reason does not recognize contingency for
Spinoza, only necessity, an adequate and sufficient explanation for the contingency problem and
infinity does not exist as a problem for Spinoza’s system in the typical ways often addressed by
Western philosophers.
The only neutral property mind and body share is that they are both expressions of
Della Rocca, Spinoza, 62. Della Rocca goes on to write that it is easy to understand how all modes are also
“features or states of God.” Whereas they might be conceived as expressions of substance, I do not believe one can
say modes are “features” of God. There are three types of modes, and finite modes cannot be described as features of
a God as God is eternal, as Spinoza himself writes in footnote 7 to Chapter 1 of the KV. There, Spinoza notes,
“Certainly not from God, for he has nothing imperfect or finite, etc.” Therefore, classifying finite modes as
properties of God might run into logical problems of explanation. For Della Rocca, Ed Curley's interpretation on
modes is particularly problematic. He writes, “For him [Curley], modes are merely causally dependent on God, they
do not inhere in God, they are not states of God. And, while Spinoza does say that modes are in God, by this, for
Curley, there are two different kinds of dependence: inherence and what might be called mere causation or
dependence that is not inherence. The states of a thing would be conceived through the thing on which they depend,
and Curley-esque modes as mere effects would be conceived through substance. The question I want to press here is
this: in virtue of what are inherence and mere causation different kinds of conceptual dependence? What makes
them distinct? ...One can see such a distinction as a violation of Spinoza's naturalism which is, as we saw, the thesis
that everything in nature plays by the same rules (65, my emphasis).” But here I would ask Della Rocca to then
address what is written by Iiro Kajanto in his essay “Spinoza's Latinity,” when he writes that the term “involvere”
can be loosely translated as “to entail,” but “In Aquinas...the word still had its original meaning 'to envelop,' while in
Spinoza it is a logical term, 'to have as a necessary consequence...' (Spinoza to the Letter, 50).”
119

245

substance with respective laws of Nature. It is clear that Della Rocca’s ultimate aim is to
demonstrate the identity of the mind and the body in Spinoza, but we might ask how one’s
personal affects, as part of both the essence of my singularly formed ideas and my extension
together, are in any way neutral? Is any affect, which always involves ideas as either affirmations
or negations, neutral? Della Rocca relies heavily on the much debated proposition E2p7 for
support of his reading, particularly for his claim that our ideas are solely about their objects and
nothing more. But which object and how many motions of the object in question? In other words,
if understanding involves adequate knowledge about the operations of the things we encounter,
one might wonder how far such knowledge can extend at any given moment.
But more problematically, perhaps, is not only that the mind and body can be understood
as “one and the same thing” in certain deductive contexts, as Spinoza demonstrates, but that
Della Rocca seems to include all possible (numerical) causes and effects in his mind-body
parallelism across all contexts.120 As he understands it, each idea we have represents something
else and, therefore, cannot be considered in-itself as a direct expression of substance, for it is
only a representation of extension and ends in identity. To apply a concept of causality that only
refers to the external world as part of its foundational structure will not be able to properly
account for the dynamic status and force of ideational power as the essence of a singular thing. 121
Della Rocca continues, “The thesis of parallelism simply states that there is a structural
similarity between two separate explanatory or causal chains.”122 There may be an element of
structural similarity in that the laws of thought parallel the laws of extension in corresponding
actions or degrees of power. But what does this have to do with types of explanations when
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Spinoza is clear that words are always an aspect of singular, partial knowledge? Della Rocca’s
reading equates issues of linear (possibly temporal) causality with issues of semantics and
identity. He also relies on 2p7 in a way in which there is “not stated or referred to in 2p7d any
requirement that the idea of a cause itself causes the idea of the effect of that cause.” 123 But this
is exactly the opposite of Spinoza's point in Letter 66, as well as Letter 64, as it is often noted
that our understanding of cause aids in our strengthening both reason and creativity. 124 This
means that the force of understanding, as an affect, is something different from the definition of a
cause. Della Rocca’s reading also contradicts E1ax4, where Spinoza insists that knowledge of an
effect involves knowledge of its cause.125
In addition, an important relation to pay attention to here is found 1p33s, which may offer
an alternate way to evaluate concepts about causality. There we read, “A thing is called necessary
either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause.”126 Therefore, one can interpret the
necessity of the relation between cause and effect as adequate knowledge being an element of the
essence of the laws of thought as an attribute, and not that the idea of an effect depends on the
idea of a cause only. Spinoza does not “need to satisfy” this requirement as Della Rocca believes
is necessary.127 As another example, E1p33s includes two allowable, separate ways to explain
something, by its essence (my conatus) or by its cause (God as first cause for example), but each
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one carries its own series of adequate ideas that either refer back to substance and its attributes or
refer to the modifications of substance (my singular modal expressions).
Let's return to an even more fundamental distinction drawn by Della Rocca’s version of
representation in Spinoza. His reading depends wholly on what he interprets as Spinoza's
definition of a human mind. Recall that for Della Rocca, an “idea” in Spinoza is representative of
the object it corresponds to (i.e., our body’s affections in extension): “A further important feature
of parallelism is the fact that an idea represents the item with which it is parallel.”128 This is not
entirely true for Spinoza, something I have noted both in the previous chapter and on the nature
of affects in this chapter. Della Rocca admits that there can be both an identity between thought
and extension and a parallelism in a certain sense, but that parallelism must be conceived in a
way in which thought and extension have actions which are a one-to-one correspondence which
renders the shared property neutral. Isn’t that another way to describe identity? Further, such a
reading misses the crucial importance of Spinoza’s theory of an affect. An affect is, by definition,
not related to definitions of parallelism.
As well, where does Della Rocca’s one-to-one version of (numerical) representation stop?
I think this is why the lesson of Letter 50 continues to be so important. There, we learn that we
can think about the same thing in two different ways. That is, the example used includes that
there are either two numerically separate coins in our hand (a nickel and a dime) or there is
simply money in our hand. Adequate ideas about objects in one’s hand can be either of two
separate and different things or of the one thing that they both are. They can be conceived as

Della Rocca, Representation, 19. In the footnote to this statement is also written, “The representational nature of
parallelism is also evident from the fact that, as we will see, in order to demonstrate 2p7, Spinoza uses 1ax4, an
axiom that involves the notion of 'knowledge.'” Della Rocca seems to feel Spinoza is using traditional forms of the
concept of representation as employed (and thus influenced) by Descartes, making reference to Descartes' Third
Meditation and Second Replies. But Spinoza challenges or extends Descartes’ argument by altering the definition of
immanence.
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wholly different or as the same thing equally. In a way, the first type of idea, that we have two
coins, is a part of imaginative knowledge, but the second kind of idea is much more adequately
conceived. Also, recall that, for Spinoza, extension is indefinite by definition. It is indivisible, yet
the attribute of thought does not carry the same logical type of necessity of indivisibility in the
same way.129 Just as continuous motion(s) in its expression of ratios of motion and rest is what
extension is, continuous alterations between the power of imaginative knowledge and of rational
understanding is what a human mind is defined as. The key is to focus our attention on our
affective knowledge, which becomes easier to do when experiencing joy because our power of
thought is enhanced.
To be fair, in an early work Della Rocca writes, “In a similar way we can arrive at a series
of ideas of ideas of ideas (and so on). What that relation between these various series of ideas is
intended to be is also something I will not explore here.”130 Nonetheless, this specific avoidance
is one key problem with his entire interpretation. The avoidance makes his deductions about
parallelism even more problematic as well when he writes, “This may seem to be a misleading
way to use the term, since parallelism seems to imply a duality of parallel things. But, as I will
argue, the duality in Spinoza's parallelism is not one between distinct things but between distinct
descriptions or ways of conceiving things.”131 Again, conceiving something adequately and
describing it are not identical for Spinoza. Della Rocca conflates conceiving and description.
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Although he insists that this is where he'll end up, he continually relies on the concept of
causality and his version of the PSR in such a way that needs the two attributes to be both
distinct in their description and one and the same thing by definition. At times, this is also where
Spinoza takes us, it is not the logical route Della Rocca takes to reach his deductions. How does
Della Rocca understand Spinoza’s meaning of being “conceived through something else”? He
separates what it is to be a “mental individual” with what it is for an individual to be a composite
of ideas expressing substance in its affirmation through reflective understanding and the
experience of affects, ultimately eliminating the latter. 132 But we cannot eliminate the latter. In
addition, Spinoza has a unique version of what it is to be an “individual.”
As we've already seen, this kind of interpretation does not compare well with the lucidly
written yet divergent readings of Spinoza, such as those of Warren Montag and C. Casarino more
recently.133 In his later work titled Spinoza, when Della Rocca relies heavily on E2p49 to make
his argument, we also witness an overlap with current theories of representation that find their
place in many analytic circles in North America. Some of what is stated in this work contradicts,
in part, what is concluded in his earlier work on representation in Spinoza. For example, Della
Rocca writes, “2p49 is thus not only a crystallization of Spinoza's philosophy of mind and
metaphysics, but it is also a crystallization of his multifaceted anti-Cartesianism.”134 As noted
earlier, 2p49 states, “In the Mind, there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that
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which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea.”135 This proposition cannot be understood
independent of other related propositions and definitions, and it is a very long, important, and
complex proposition (of which many disputes have occurred). To be “about” an object is not
necessarily to represent it in its totality or identity, as we can certainly think about an eternal,
self-causing substance logically and yet, as Spinoza writes, we cannot fully grasp it in our mind
(or we would become that thing in identity). For an idea to correspond to an object does not
necessarily mean that the idea contains all of what that object is. That the first idea of my mind is
of my body does not include, for example, that I am aware of absolutely all of what is occurring
in my body.136
When we know (and are aware) that we have knowledge of an object, this knowledge
does not include confirmation of complete knowledge of the entire object. One might ask what
part of the object(s) in question are being represented in the idea if Della Rocca’s reading is
correct? Direct conscious awareness of our adequate ideas, and of their laws of construction and
power, their method of revelation and action, is absolutely paramount to Spinoza's dynamic
epistemology and our understanding of our epistemic autonomy.137Also, knowledge is infinite,
but knowledge about the function of our finite bodies is not necessarily infinite (by definition of
what it is to be a finite expression of substance at least). As Beth Lord correctly notes,
“Whenever we gain true knowledge about the world, we gain more true knowledge of God. Only
once we understand that basic relation can we begin to truly understand the nature of the body,
the nature of experience and the knowledge available to us.”138 So to know Nature is to know

For more support of the discrepancies, one can refer to Della Rocca, “The Power of an Idea: Spinoza's Critique of
Pure Will,” Nous, 37:2, (2003), 200-231.
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God and to know God and Nature is also to know the mind and body expressed in determinate
ways at once (as affects). Gilles Deleuze writes, “In return, the finite is clearly limited and
determined: limited in its nature by something else of the same nature; determined in its
existence in such and such a place or at such and such a moment.” He continues, “The existing
finite mode is limited in its essence and determined in its existence.”139
For more support of a non-representational reading of Spinoza, we can turn to E2p11c
where Spinoza is not discussing issues of representation, but human awareness and the immanent
ontology of substance: “From this it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect
of God. Therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying
nothing but that God...insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that
idea...”140 Della Rocca takes up this issue and proposition specifically in his interpretation, but
his reading includes that “...the human mind is just a certain (complex) idea that...is an idea God
has. Thus, when Spinoza says that in this situation God 'also has the idea of another thing
together with the human mind,' his point is that in this situation God has the idea that is the
human mind, and that God also has another idea distinct from, and presumably not part of, the
human mind.”141 Yet, anything that is expressed by our mind is a modal modification of
substance, which has to be conceived and understood through the attribute of thought as both
attribute and mode.
In my reading, we are passively perceiving and actively conceiving and continuously
expressing substance all at once, but each of these activities can be described differently and
need to be described differently because of their different logical series of deductions. My
adequate idea of God conceived as a thinking thing is identical to adequately understanding the
139
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laws of the attribute of thought, but that understanding, although wholly my own singular
expression, is also a common notion. Common notions are the common properties of things of
which an infinity of minds can adequately comprehend. In other words, against Della Rocca I
would argue that we cannot apply one strict sense of causal linearity and semantic distinction to
Spinoza’s God if the attribute of thought can be expressed in infinite ways.
Yes, the first idea the mind is aware of is that it exists as something real (a body with a
brain), but this is, at least in part, still an element of singular imaginative knowledge (because it
involves a human perception and sensation). Therefore, as Spinoza writes in Letter 64 to G. H.
Schuller, to understand God as a cause of anything that involves the attribute of extension, and
then to conceive of the mind as the idea of the body, is also to understand God as the cause “only
insofar as he is considered under the attribute of extension.”142 In other words, to understand the
cause of ideas we must go further and adequately conceive what it is for a singular mind to
become an adequate cause of its own knowledge (mind), as well as what it is to have ideas about
other ideas that have God as their cause among the separate attributes. Substance is not neutral,
it’s active and it expresses itself in an infinity of ways. Spinoza gives evidence for these
deductions in Letter 64, E2p13, as well as 2p10 and 3p7 (and most importantly in a reference to
the scholium of 2p7). This is a very important reference because Della Rocca relies on 2p7 and
2p13 to make some of his initial claims regarding his theory of representational parallelism. The
reason Letter 64 is so important is because Della Rocca also uses 2p13 as absolute proof of
Spinoza's parallelism. However, Spinoza is using this proposition as a way to talk only about the
identity between substance and its attributes, something already noted in this thesis. Della Rocca
writes, “In this passage, Spinoza is implicitly invoking parallelism...(The context, which depends
heavily on 2p7, makes clear that Spinoza has in mind here the relations between parallel items.)”
142
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He believes 2p13s points to “some kind of asymmetry between modes of thought and modes of
extension,” yet he cites the identity between substance and its attributes as support. Perhaps we
need only point to 4p8 where Spinoza, in discussing the importance of the power of our affects
and our understanding of that power, is very clear that there is a real difference between things
being really distinct and that which is “conceptually” distinct.143 If this difference exists in his
system, and I believe it does, then Della Rocca cannot hold that real things are identical to the
ways that we describe them conceptually using the rules of the PSR.
As Pierre Macherey has also noted, there is not a hierarchical structure between substance
and attributes. Substance is not transcendent or prior to what the attributes are, that is, the
attributes are not devoid of content.144 Adequately conceiving the affections of substance
logically fall after one has already adequately understood the true nature of substance as per the
very first proposition of the Ethics. Substance is conceived, therefore, prior to its effects.
Substance is logically prior in nature to its affections because it must be conceived as their cause,
as already noted. Furthermore, substance exists eternally, but all finite modes do not, at least not
in the same way as substance is understood. Macherey writes, using Letter 9 as support, “...the
attributes are essences, hence realities. Thus they are absolutely not names in themselves, that is,
designations of substance by an intermediary, a means by which substance would decompose
itself abstractly into a multiplicity of perspectives or appearances.” 145 Things that are really
distinct cannot be said to be one representing the other.
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If, as Beth Lord has written, Spinoza's God is “the activity of actualising its
being...[which] is a power of actualising its essence, of activity 'unfolding' the modes that follow
necessarily from its essence,” then, not only does this eliminate any real problem of inherence in
substance between being and its attributes, modes, and activities (“whatever is, is in God,”), but
it also becomes apparent that its causal nexus would be impossible to deduce in totality for
anyone other than an all-powerful, eternal God.146 The discussion of “parts” interacting with one
“whole” must logically shift to a more important distinction that emphasizes the activities and
expressions of one, unified substance for this reason. That is, the correct arrangement of common
notions about the essence of singular things must shift to a method of interpretation about
expressive, active relations between types of knowledge and bodily capacities, and must include a
conscious singular thing who knows what it is to understand more about the natural phenomena
and the laws of Nature. Inherence, causation, and conception are, thus, not identical.147
Spinoza repeatedly emphasizes the importance of paying close attention to the ordering of
our ideas as an activity, that is, how we attempt to organize and associate all three kinds of ideas
(imaginative, rational, and intuitive) into patterns of thought which are increasingly more logical,
creative, enjoyable, or, at the least, more beneficial. These patterns of thought (or method) are the
understanding of relations and force between all three kinds of knowledge.148 Adequate ideas are
true in-themselves; and because we become aware that they are both true and adequately

Lord, Spinoza's Ethics, 35. The quote “whatever is, is in God” is from Spinoza's Ethics 1p15. For more on the
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conceived by us, they do not need to include a reference to their object in every instance in order
to be understood. That they are “adequate” is enough to posit their certainty.149
Macherey’s interpretation can be relied on further to counter Della Rocca’s reading.
Briefly stated, our point of view within the intellect is what we know of substance, as referenced
in Letter 67, and our proportion of perspective directly involves our affects and reflective
awareness:
Here the fact that in his definition of attributes Spinoza uses the word 'perceive'
(percipere) must be taken seriously: the intellect perceives the attributes as constituting
the essence of substance...regarding the idea that is a 'concept of the mind,' Spinoza
writes that 'I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to
indicate that the mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of
the mind.' This indication can be turned around and applied to the definition of the
attributes: Spinoza does not say that they are what the intellect 'conceives' of substance,
precisely because that would imply an activity of the intellect in relation to its 'object,' on
which it would impose a modification, for example, by giving it form... The attribute is
what the intellect 'perceives' of substance, because, in the relation established here, there
is on the contrary a passivity of the intellect vis-a-vis substance, which it accepts as such,
in the essences that constitute it, that is, in its attributes.150
The above passage helps counter Della Rocca's mind-relativity of content thesis. The human
mind is not wholly different from God's mind, that is, it cannot fully be explained as something
separate from God's mind because we use the attribute of thought to explain such things (and all
expressions of that attribute are through itself). It is only expressive of God's attribute of thought,
conceived as a thinking thing, in its own determinate way. That is, we both perceive and
conceive God according to our singular expression of ideas. This is why “the order and
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”
In the end, one could say they are one and the same thing in the same way that Spinoza
concludes that thought and extension are also “one and the same thing.” That is, the above
passage demonstrates how there is no real representational difference between God's mind and
149
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the human mind once we adequately understand what it is to perceive substance through the
attribute of human awareness and a God with that attribute (a God as a thinking thing).151
Nonetheless, Della Rocca concludes, “...where representation in God's mind is concerned,
Spinoza does quite clearly insist that the correspondence relation involves representation. So it
should not surprise us that this relation involves representation on the level of the human mind as
well.”152 Yet, “God” is never fully external to us, not in any real sense if we are expressing
Nature at all times in some way. There is no relation of transcendence possible other than that we
do not have infinite attributes and substance does. That is, Nature is never wholly external to us
because we are Nature.153 The same can be said for God and the expression of the attributes of
thought and extension. God is never wholly external to us because, in our expressions, we are
God. Everything is God, or Nature.
Recall E2p13, a proposition that Della Rocca relies on repeatedly: “This indicates that for
Spinoza the mind is united to the body simply because the mind is a representation of the
body.”154 Isn’t this similar to saying a conscious mind is representing its brain processes? This is
how the mind and body are united according to Della Rocca. Yet, as we have already read, the
mind's adequate ideas are also expressions of God's power in a non-transcendent way. This
proposition states that the object of the idea is a mode of extension. In other words, our body as
the object of our ideas is conceived (understood) as a modification of the attribute of extension.
This is not news, but Spinoza states that “the nature of thought...is quite removed from the
concept of extension.”155 In light of Della Rocca's 1991 essay on causation, the focus is on the
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problem of any form of numerical identity thesis and the attributes.156 Spinoza is clear in some
aspects of E2p13 that what thought is is not to be found in any concept about extension (due to
his parallelism) other than the concept of substance. Della Rocca modifies his position slightly in
a later work titled Spinoza when he writes, “For Spinoza, as we've seen, no fact about thought
depends on any fact about extension.”157 Yet, he continues to hold throughout his main
conclusions that the two attributes are in relation to each other according to his thesis of
representational parallelism and the mind-relativity of content. He does so by offering that the
mind cannot know itself without the body. So we might ask, what happens to the mind’s
expressions of adequate ideas after the body dies? Are they lost? If so, where were they before?
It is helpful to return to some of what Stuart Hampshire concludes about Spinoza's theory
of human reflective awareness. What we actually are to reflect on in adequate thinking is the
“order of causes” between our own ideas, and not the order of causes between us and God or all
of Nature, as both of these latter types of order and causality are impossible to adequately
conceive.158 There are multiple types of causes and conceptions of causality we could consider.
Recall that knowledge proceeds “...neither from things to ideas nor from ideas to things, but it
goes from idea to idea, that is to say it links acts of thought between them, according to a
necessary causal order that is the same as the one in which things are linked in reality.” 159 If so, a
move to add the idea of knowledge as representation is not needed. Spinoza’s emphasis here is
on “acts of thought” which occur between ideas. This is a helpful deduction to support my
reading of his epistemology.
one of the propositions which he feels proves his thesis, particularly 2p13s.
See “Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1991.
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At one point in his work Della Rocca also writes, “Finite modes of extension are simply
particular physical objects.”160 But, are all modes of extension “objects”? Why are modes of
thought not considered objects of their own kind in reality? Does Della Rocca need modes of
extension to be objects in order for our ideas to be representations of “objects?”
Spinoza’s theory of affectivity is how I will end this chapter and continue to support my
counter-reading. As Spinoza writes in 3p1, where we determine the causal identity of any given
“object” or action (including our interaction as a body with other bodies) is crucial to how we
understand our affects.161 This is important because the deductive move Spinoza draws from this
is, not only the identity of mind and body as both the same substance expressed in different
ways, but also, “The result is that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether Nature is
conceived under this attribute or that; hence the order of actions and passions of our body is, by
nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind.”162 This “oneness” is what an
organic whole can be said to express in the form of an affect. Curiously, in a small footnote to the
above proposition, Della Rocca writes that this description of finite modes of extension includes
all physical events. So now we have finite expressions of the modes of extension as “facts,” as
“objects,” and as “events.” Physical objects, in my reading, are conceived very differently from
physical events, especially of an attribute that is indivisible by nature of its expression. A law of
Nature is an event when it is being expressed. We need reflective thought to adequately
understand what laws of Nature are, but part of that understanding will include that they can be
conceived as involving that which is both externally universal or objective and subjectively
160
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durational or singular in their expressions. In other words, there is an identity on the level of that
which is understood both internally and externally, but there is more than this when describing
substance’s modal modifications. As Spinoza notes in 1p25c, all “particular things” in Nature are
to be conceived as modes (modifications of substance), and modes need other concepts in order
to truly be understood.163
We continue to learn that for Della Rocca “Finite modes of extension and infinite modes
of extension differ in the way they are caused by or conceived through the attribute of
extension.”164 For example, infinite, immediate modes are, well, always immediate. As an action
of extension, the expression of extension is acting in-itself, both in the physical sense and in the
sense of being defined as ratios of motion and rest. The actual definition differs from the many
things that can be expressed in extension. When Della Rocca writes that for Spinoza “just as
there are no conceptual or explanatory relations between mental facts and physical facts, there
are no causal relations between the two realms,” he misses the explanatory relations between the
two attributes, as is demonstrated by Spinoza’s theory of the affects.165 Affects are not “special
kinds of ideas,” nor are they “emotions,” as Samuel Shirley has called them.166 Affects are a
collective expression of one organic whole of both our thoughts and our actions working together
to create effects of which we can reflect on, feel, and of which increase or decrease in power, joy,
energy, and reasoning capacities.167
In a 2009 Spinoza Society lecture in Rijnsburg, Della Rocca drew attention to the
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importance of E1p11d2 and 2p13s, and later 2p11 and 1ax2 and 4.168 The references to E2 and
1ax4 were already noted above, but in this later lecture there is a specific appeal to 1p11d2 for
more support of his theory of representation and the use of the PSR (as conceiving and as
explanation). Yet, if there is any proposition that distinguishes between “concept” and “cause,”
as 1p28 does for example, then Della Rocca is going to have a problem. It is clear Della Rocca
felt his interpretation needed more support yet at that time. I believe 1p28 is an explicit reference
to the very real difference between that which is an adequate cause and which is an adequate
concept. One way to understand this is to understand simply that God, as an eternal cause, is not
to be understood as a human concept, but human minds, as finite modes of expression of
substance, have human reflections as well. To adequately conceive chains of causes and effects is
to separate the understanding of what it is to conceive something adequately in comparison with
what it is to adequately conceive a chain of causes while understanding causality itself as a
process. One is a law of Nature that structurally never changes and the other is enveloped within
itself in a problem of both self-reference and potential infinite regress. It is a productive
repetition. In addition, the only way we can focus reflectively on the content of our ideas that
may interact with things external to us is through our own ideas, and as our affects (which
involve the ideas we decide to use/focus on). Consider what Charles Hartshorne writes in an
essay on creativity and causality to support the difference:
The mistakes of traditional reflections upon causality have been the arbitrary assumptions
(a) that causal conditioning is symmetrical or bi-conditioning (events equally requiring
their antecedent conditions and their respective results) and (b) that the way to understand
effects is to consider what it means to be a cause. By (a) either creativity is wholly
excluded (determinism) or else no strict cumulativeness is allowed (Mead). By (b) one is
trying to understand causal deduction by asking how its conclusions imply its premises,
thus taking the affirmation of the logical consequent as the primary deductive procedure!
Not causes but effects are the premises, the logically stronger terms.169
168
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My thesis has shown that Hartshorne’s reading is correct and can be applied to Spinoza. What we
are to pay attention to are the effects we can create.
Each finite mode is caused by another finite mode in order to produce its effect.
Therefore, depending on what you are comparing, a mode can also be either a cause or an effect.
If so, Della Rocca’s interpretation will run into further difficulties. When discussing substance as
self-causing, modes are always modifications or effects. He writes, “Thus, there are two causal
chains within the realm of extension: an infinite series of finite causes and a series of infinite
causes beginning with the attribute of extension. Each finite mode of extension occupies a point
at which these two series intersect.”170 Although Della Rocca immediately states that he will not
participate in the debate about the nature of attributes and modes as “properties” of substance,
while also stating he feels they very much are to be considered as “properties,” he has already
staked his claim in the debate with some of the assumptions he relies on and the extensive
analysis of Spinoza’s system he offers.
In contrast, we have already understood modes as God's infinite power to exist, that is, as
“ways,” configurations, expressions, constellations, modifications, arrangements and/or things.
The “destruction” of one mode means only it becomes something else, expressed in a new way.
Our perfection includes maintaining a rational identity in the continuous events of changing
configurations of modal expressions and affects in their power. This is the intensity of one's
actuality in the power to exist where patterns of rational thought and action can endure with
increasing or decreasing in force. If, in Spinoza, as Della Rocca believes throughout his work,
“...causal relations must correspond to conceptual connections,” and if there are “two causal
chains within the realm of extension,” does this also mean that there are two causal chains within
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the attribute of thought at all times in order to maintain the thesis of parallelism?
It is not that there is an infinite series of finite causes and, in addition, a series of infinite
causes that are categorized as something other than finite causes. For Spinoza, it is rather that
any and every mode of expression of substance is only what it is “in a certain and determinate
way,” which alters what this determinate way is in effect. Spinoza often asks us not to think
about things as modes, but as direct expressions of substance in their own determinate ways. But
even more, is not an infinite series of all finite causes already inclusive of any series of infinite
causes in any and all attributes? In other words, any adequate concept describing an infinite
series of all finite causes is, in a way, the same thing as describing an infinite series of causes,
because this would include the finite within such a description (doing the explaining by a finite
person able to speak and write for example). The infinite is just that, eternal. The only thing that
“causes” an infinite series of causes and effects perpetually are the laws of Nature themselves.
The effect of that which is self-caused is just an infinite series of causes and effects in all
directions expressed in infinite ways.
Therefore, that the problem of finite modes only partially follows from God directly
(perhaps as proximate causes) is not a logical problem at all. It is only a problem if you believe
that modes must inhere in God in a way that is unrelated to or different from being conceived
through the adequate concept of laws of Nature.171 Causes are not reducible to only concepts as

Della Rocca appeals to the thought experiment of what it would be for an attribute to “produce one finite mode,”
but such a thought experiment does not prove what our logical options or lack-there-of would be. It is problematic to
begin with the idea that we can rationally conceive (in a complete way) such a thought experiment at all. For
Spinoza, all modes expressed by adequate thinking cause other modes of adequate thinking continuously by
necessity. The correlate in extension is that everything is in motion. The mind does not have ideas, it is ideas, and
although we can say that ideas are modes, they are not only modes. Common notions are, in the end, universal
common properties of things of which we can all become aware of and express modally. Della Rocca appeals to
E1p28 and some letters for his conclusion that a mode can be said to come directly from God if understood only “as
part of a package of infinitely many other finite modes.” Number cannot enter into the equation as a concept of
rational measurement here. I would agree that there are infinitely other finite modal expressions which are human
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Della Rocca would hold, and, therefore, are not equivalent to the best possible explanation.172 If
causality were reducible to concept construction alone, Spinoza would be easily classifiable as an
Idealist, Relativist, or Rationalist.
We are aware that we cannot possibly know about all causes and types of causes in
Nature, and, therefore, we can recognize through reflection that our affects regulate the force of
intensity of our ideas and actions. As Hampshire summarizes:
I come to realize that all my knowledge of causes in the common order of Nature is to
some degree fragmented and partial, and that I concentrate irrationally on only a few
proximate causal factors. So a balance between the active and the passive in the mind
characterizes my empirical knowledge...which Spinoza characterizes as the level of
imagination. The laws of thought operating at this level are both the laws of logic and the
laws of the association of ideas, one pressing against the other...173
Return now to combine this reading with what we've already learned (because adequate
repetition produces more conceptual force): “When on reflection a person perceives the
inadequacy, the emotion is immediately changed.”174 Della Rocca's argument that Spinoza does
not clearly account for our singular feelings being restricted to our bodies will no longer hold. 175
Recall that he interprets E2p11 to mean that ideas in the mind are “numerically identical” to
ideas in God's mind and that all inadequate ideas are effects of other ideas “that are not part of
the human mind” which is perceiving them.176 Yet, the inadequate ideas that I am perceiving are

minds and their ideas, and I agree that, because all modes are causally related, Spinoza system is deterministic by
necessity, but measuring one finite mode is an experiment of abstraction in the imagination only.
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not numerically identical to ideas in God's mind and they are not caused only by ideas external to
us, but are a part of our changes in singular affects. Another interpretation of 2p11 and 2p11c is
required. A law of Nature is not only a concept (although it may be conceived as such in its own
way as part of the attribute of thought and within certain parameters of what it is to think about
both processes of reasoning and of explaining).
Della Rocca makes another claim that is particularly difficult to accept, namely, that all
affects are “simply special kinds of ideas,” already noted above. 177 An “affect” is defined by
Spinoza in E2p22 as an idea coupled with its affection. It is a singular organic experience that
combines both thought and extension into something comprehensible and felt, such as joy and
sorrow. For Della Rocca, an affect is only an idea. Yet, he does note that there is a place where
Spinoza makes it explicit that affects are not only ideas (in 1p31d and 2ax3, both very important
to Spinoza's overall system), but then relies solely on elements of Book 5 in order to support his
final conclusion that affects are only special kinds of ideas. In a 2008 publication he writes,
“Affects are simply ideas considered insofar as they are passive, considered insofar as they are
caused from outside a given mind… What’s worse, insofar as we have affects we ourselves are
unintelligible and do not exist. Affects, for Spinoza, literally strip us of our existence… This
charge is propelled by Spinoza’s PSR.”178 The claim that we do not fully exist insofar as we
experience passive affects is highly problematic. Is this account about the representational nature
of the affects sufficient if Spinoza notes in many places throughout E4 and 5 that affects work as
Della Rocca, Representation, 7. He also writes, “It is worth noting that Spinozistic ideas are particular
psychological items. They are always states of some particular mind.” I might agree with these latter statements,
especially as they apply to a theory of subjective consciousness that is possible in Spinoza. He continues, “Spinoza
is concerned with my thought or idea that summer is nice as opposed to your thought that summer is nice.” This is
true, but when both you and I are adequately conceiving the same common notion and combining in our actions
while doing so, we are a stronger body as one organic whole and are now not understood as two separate individuals
alone. Both singular organic unity as one’s affect and a combined organic unity between two minds or two bodies
(or more) are possible in Spinoza’s system. Just as we read in 1p15s, two versions of the same concept are possible
depending on whether we are understanding that idea in imagination or as a common notion.
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something other than only ideas? They are ideas in action, activity and energy itself. In the 2008
article, Della Rocca also writes that the reason affects are representational is because the affect in
question depends on a particular type of “relevant idea” as “prior to the affect,” and he intends
this conclusion as something temporally prior.179 Affects are continuously shifting between our
types of ideas and desires and they are also highly related to the singular imagination.
Affects involve ideas, but they are not only ideas nor only special kinds of ideas. They
combine with affections. They can also be conceived as effects. Della Rocca writes that, because
affects are special kinds of ideas, “all finite modes of thoughts are ideas of one kind or
another.”180 This is accurate. There are three types. While it is certainly true that the mind is
nothing but ideas, it is not the case that this second conclusion can be applied to (or follows
directly from) the nature of affects. The definition of affects includes that they are about one,
unified experience of force(s) and motion(s), that is, they are not understood as one event in only
the body or one idea in only the mind. A theory of representation is not possible between two
things if those two things are considered, in the end, as one unified experience of its own kind
with its own specific definition. Ideas cannot be understood as only representations because they
do not arise solely on account of objects in the world (at least not only). As Spinoza writes in
2p37, “That which is common to all things and is equally in the part as in the whole, does not
constitute the essence of any one particular thing.”181 Therefore, adequate ideas alone do not
compose my essence, conatus does; and my conatus is a continuously shifting force of ideational
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power and ratios of motion and rest.182
There is yet another problem with the theory of representation and Spinoza. Della Rocca
relies heavily on what he considers to be Spinoza's use of the PSR, writing, “Spinoza strongly
adheres to the Principle of Sufficient Reason...” and later, “Spinoza accepts the Principle of
Sufficient Reason and thus, for him, every fact must be explainable.”183 This is the explainability
thesis already noted above. Yet, for something to be a fact about Nature does not automatically
include, by necessity, that it can be completely explainable. If this were true, there might be
nothing left to learn once important facts about Nature are all uncovered and fully explained. In
2009, Della Rocca states that Spinoza relies on a “two-fold” use of the PSR claiming, “The PSR
emerges clearly in Ethics 1p11d2...And in 1ax2...” as well as 1ax4.184 This conclusion is closely
related to what he takes to be that which is explainable, with the only other option being that a
thing is inexplicable (which he calls the “inexplicability argument”). If it is not explainable then
it is deemed inexplicable and forgotten? The PSR must apply to the concept of “existence,” as
well as to all ideas of reason, which therefore, according to some, must be explainable. As Jim
Swindal notes in his work Action and Existence, “As Herbert Schnadelbach argues, even though
all linguistic modes of representation link up with arguments, it does not follow that on what the
argumentation either depends or is conditioned by must itself take the form of argumentation.”185
In addition, in his work Spinoza, Della Rocca claims Spinoza is reliant on the PSR for the
demonstration of the wholly independent nature of attributes. 186 I have already noted in this
chapter that the process of thinking through the absolute affirmation of the logical necessity
182
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involves that which exists. The “reason” for the cause of substance is itself (in its eternity), but
the reasons for the increase in my singular power of existing becomes myself as the adequate
cause of, and result of, understanding things with more rational and imaginative force.
For Spinoza, though, these are not the only two options. Although these statements are
said conclusively, the PSR is mentioned very minimally throughout Della Rocca’s earliest work.
The PSR in Spinoza is the “mind-relativity of content” thesis which then becomes a theory of
representation in later work.187 It is impossible for any one individual to explain every fact of
Nature when relying on, conceptually, the processes of cause and effect to do so. But Della
Rocca's version of the PSR clearly uses an argument which stems first from effects (as “facts”
about objective reality, as he puts it) and then going back to their causes, instead of concentrating
on the property of Nature, which is the infinite production of effects of rational and imaginative
power vis-à-vis Spinoza's dynamic epistemology. Spinoza proceeds from causes to effects after
we have understood how the three types of ideas work together to create affects. Because of his
method, we can alter how we think about the causes of effects after those effects have happened
and we can imagine them as present to aid in increasing our power and joy. This contributes to
the striving of all of Nature. We can transform our affects. Necessity does not prevent novelty
and creative new arrangements that express reality to stronger degrees of perfection and joy.
Spinoza writes, “To have a true idea means only to know a thing perfectly, that is, in the best

Della Rocca, as a student of Early Modern scholars Don Garrett and Dan Garber, has also been influenced in his
interpretation of Spinoza by these thinkers as well as Jonathan Bennett, even though he will point out where he
disagrees with Bennett. In addition, Della Rocca sets himself up as countering Ed Curley's interpretation. Thus, it
seems Della Rocca feels his reading and application of the PSR is the correct way to read Spinoza over all other
major interpretations. For example he writes, “While I disagree with Curley about inherence, he is,
believe, absolutely right that the in-relation just is causation or, more generally, conception (67).” Here and
elsewhere we can see that Della Rocca's conception of the PSR is to collapse what it is for something to inhere in
substance, and for that something to be causal, and thus for it to be completely conceptual and explainable: “For
Spinoza, inherence must be intelligible and it is intelligible in terms of intelligibility itself.” I do not believe that
these three elements (inherence, causality, and conceptual understanding) are identical or wholly reducible to each
other, but they do involve one another.
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way…”188
In the 2009 lecture, Della Rocca relied on Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles (hereafter the PII) to support his interpretation, claiming that “the non-identity of
two things must be explained by a qualitative difference between the things. No two things can
be exactly alike.”189 Yet, I would note that Spinoza is clear about some very fundamental
distinctions we need to keep track of as we read the Ethics: 1) there are times when the definition
of substance and attributes can be used in the same way, 2) there are contexts when the definition
of substance, attribute, and mode must be distinguished from each other, 3) there are no two
substances which are identical (so the PII already appears in a certain form, for example, in the
opening definitions and propositions of E1), and 4) the attribute of thought and extension,
although both substance and (in that way) identical, are to be distinguished qualitatively in “a
certain and determinate way,” as well. The way in which Della Rocca uses the PII will not work
from the outset. Reading E1p10s, which says, “From these things, it is evident that although the
two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct, we still cannot infer from that that they
constitute two beings, or two different substances,” Della Rocca interprets conceiving two
attributes as really distinct to mean “one may be conceived without the aid of the other.”
The point is that each attribute does not cause anything in the other and, therefore, one
cannot be said to “represent” the other. They are qualitatively different in that they each have
their own series of causes and effects, yet Della Rocca has said, “The mind and body are
indiscernible so they must be identical.”190 They are not indiscernible. If the idea of the effect
depends upon the idea of its cause, then we need to adequately be capable of identifying which
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cause (and type of cause) one is associating with which effect. The mind and body are not
identical – or affects would not be possible as Spinoza defines them. Together, thought and
extension create affects we can reflect on, but we cannot possibly reflect on every single effect
which occurs in our bodies or in our associations between ideas which run parallel. This is also
why the nature of reflecting on our changing affects is so important. In 1p10s we learn that there
is a very real difference between what one can conceive and what one can then infer from what
one conceives, thereby drawing a real distinction between that which we can understand
adequately and that which we can possibly explain well using language.
We need to reconsider what it is for something to be “conceived through itself.” The very
definition of a modification of substance in E1p8 includes that we understand what it is for
something to be “in another,” that is, “those things whose concept is formed from the concept of
the thing in which they are.”191 The definition of a mode includes the definition of an attribute,
but what an attribute expresses is something different in explanation from a mode (by logical
necessity). The mind and the body are only modally distinct. Spinoza “could not accept a simpleminded materialist conception of personality, having once recognized at first hand and in his own
person the power of reflection and of active self-consciousness...”192
When Della Rocca writes, “The main problem is this: the fact that all thoughts are
conceived through thought does not show that thought is an attribute unless it also can be shown
that thought, in turn, is not conceived through anything else. Unless this gap is filled, one is not
entitled to conclude that thought is an attribute...,” he has contradicted what Spinoza has already
asked us to do in E1p8.193 It is true that definitions are composed of words, but this is particularly
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applicable to the definition of Substance, whose nature (essence) is that it exists (and not that it
needs a definition or explanation to exist nor that it does not exist through anything else).
It is very important to follow what is written in E1p10 and 1p11 here. Each attribute must
be defined and understood as being conceived through itself because it is the nature of the
attribute to exist as itself, and because its concept, therefore, does not involve the concept of
anything else on which it relies. Critically, in 1p11 Spinoza writes, “But this reason, or cause,
must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it.”194 There is a reference to the
PSR, but it is only within the opening context of proving that substance (and thus its attributes)
must be the cause of itself. In other words, the reason for its existence is itself and its nature is to
exist. No other concept is logically needed. But, this deduction cannot be applied as an overall
principle for the rest of the demonstrations in the Ethics. For example, it cannot be applied to the
definition of modes.
The theory of representation applies a narrow version of the PSR to Spinoza's system, a
version which Della Rocca believes is the only way the PSR can be understood and used. In an
article titled “PSR” as recent as 2010 in Philosophers' Imprint, he starts by saying outright:
And even when I am relentlessly pursuing this line of thought, as I am wont to do, a part
of me really wants to stop because I know that this pursuit can win me few friends and
allies. And where does this line of thought lead? Straight to the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, the PSR, that forelorn principle according to which, for each thing (object, state
of affairs, or whatever) that exists or obtains, there is an explanation of its existence, there
is a reason that it exists.195
An interesting aspect of Della Rocca's reading of the PSR is a confession in the footnote to this
opening statement: “Alternatively, if we focus on truths instead of things or states of affairs, we
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might say that, for each truth, there is an explanation of its truth.”196 I feel this second statement
of what the PSR “really” means is telling. In fact, it alters the very way in which one might read
zesSpinoza. Recall that earlier Della Rocca admitted that our ideas create singular, psychological
“states” of mind and that affects are only “special” kinds of ideas. There can be an explanation
for every truth, but the truth of common notions as rational conceptions and adequate knowledge
is not reducible to their explanations (words) in order to be true. Della Rocca emphasizes a focus
on “truths” and “facts,” but what is and is not a “fact” can alter if, for example, more information
is uncovered at another time.
It is one thing to feel the PSR is in need of a revival, which I tend to agree with for
different reasons than what Della Rocca gives, but he is concerned that many philosophers today
presuppose or “operate under the assumption” that the PSR is false. I feel any decent philosopher
will examine and use the many versions of the PSR and principle of non-contradiction (Leibniz
certainly did). Della Rocca appeals to Leibniz's example about Archimedes for support in
particular. Archimedes, realizing that two equal weights hanging on each side of a scale are not
necessarily at rest, must, nonetheless, reject this possibility as a rational explanation because it is
virtually impossible to prove why the whole apparatus is actually not fully at rest. I feel this line
of reasoning is a poor way to draw our attention to Spinoza's system. For example, it’s clear in
E2p43s and 2p49s that when we have a true idea we simply “know a thing perfectly, or in the
best way,” and this “best way” includes being able to suspend judgment when we are aware that
there may be more to know about the thing in question. In this way, the “act of understanding”
itself is a rational affirmation (an adequate idea with force), and it can be experienced as an
affect, an intellectual affect.197 Spinoza makes this clear throughout E4, but 4p52 and 4p56
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demonstrate this well.198 Therefore, we can adequately conceive (as an act of understanding) that
we do not have to pass judgment and, therefore, give an explanation for what we think we know
at all times. In other words, knowing how to defer such judgments and explanations is also
adequate knowledge. This ability to rationally defer explaining what one is learning about or
knows is critical because it adds a third possibility to the two mentioned above by Della Rocca.
He writes, “...the PSR is simply the rejection of inexplicability in general.”199 If this is what the
PSR is, then it is not applicable to Spinoza’s system as his main tool. Spinoza simply writes that
he will rationally suspend judgment (and explanation) until he can understand more, and that it is
necessary and sufficient to do so. This deduction is also the acceptance of rational inexplicability,
even if we also know that every effect has and involves a cause. For example, I am rationally
aware, because of my ability to reflect on what I am thinking about and feeling or being affected
by, that my imaginative ideas are only (ever) partial explanations, yet cannot escape them
entirely. As we read in Chapter 2, I can access them to aid reason nonetheless, and too many
imaginative ideas can lessen my power to think at any time should they become proportionally
stronger in my awareness.
I think we can consider another kind of explanation or example to make this more clear.
When Spinoza describes what it is to know something that is based on an interaction with other
bodies and ideas, his example in Chapter One of the TTP is very helpful. He writes that when we
hear (hearing being a perception/sensation) someone say “I understand,” we know that it is a
person's mind (and not necessarily their body) that is doing the understanding. He writes that we
use ourselves (as a singular subject with conscious reflection) as a comparison between ideas to
draw this conclusion: “...the hearer knows what it is to understand, that he readily grasps the
198
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speaker's meaning through comparison with himself.”200 Comparing ideas between ourselves and
others is often the nature of human dialogue, but these ideas of comparison are filtered through
many series of my own, singular ideas and their proportions.
Della Rocca is effectively claiming that ideas, as “representations,” arise from the brain
states (therefore are always mediated in some way) and are less real in their singularity then their
physical counterpart.201 If you are not yet convinced, consider his statement (which involves the
topic the nature of consciousness) that rationalists tend to avoid the inexplicability argument
mentioned above: “This concern to avoid inexplicability is, I would argue, the core motivation
behind most forms of physicalism and functionalism in the philosophy of mind.” 202 Yes,
understandably at times, this is the primary concern of physicalism and philosophy of mind, but
that does not include (by necessity) that such an avoidance entails that the PSR is true based on
the inexplicability problem.
Yet, this is not the same as what Della Rocca then writes at the end of his essay in 2010,
which is, actually the real philosophical issue. He notes that many “leave untouched the central
philosophical issue here: viz., determining whether there is a principled line between [types of]
explicability arguments, and if so, what it is. And, again, if there is no such line, then the
argument for the PSR that I have offered may not be able to be avoided.”203 I am offering an
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epistemological line for discussion in this chapter. Unless one is to claim that there is only a first
cause and nothing more, each effect can also be named as the cause of the next effect, and that
next effect becomes the cause of the one after that ad infinitum. In other words, new kinds of
explanations are needed if one decides to explain this new series of causes that are based on
previous effects, and not only for the first cause of all effects. This is yet another reason why
naming a cause and an effect as such requires a different conceptual model from understanding
the process of causality itself according to the traditional sense of the PSR only.
Gilles Deleuze might have an answer for us. As he writes in his essay “Spinoza and the
Three 'Ethics,'” Spinoza is more interested in the logical understanding of “forms of expressions”
(three types of knowledge in their power) than he is their actual shifting content, as the latter is
open ended and alters according to context.204 We are continually shifting ratios of motion and
rest with ideas of three kinds, and placed together are our awareness of our ideas and the
sensations (though not only sensations but much of what occurs in our body is unknown to direct
awareness).
For Deleuze, Spinoza's system can be read in a non-representational way in which signs
are “always an effect,” and effects are traces left on/inside/related to bodies. Strong affects leave
those trace impressions as they alter and form the next singular affect or collective body of
action. These effects as affections are states of duration that cannot be directly compared (as
discrete facts, for example) because they are continuous. Space and time are, ultimately,
elements of imaginative knowledge for Spinoza. Deleuze writes, “...each state of affection
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determines a passage to a 'more' or a 'less'...”205 That is, each passage as affect determines how
much power we have, but this process is continuous and organic in either direction. That our
ideas about our affections are “confused,” at least in part, is not a problem when considering the
nature of the power of affects. Deleuze categorizes the three types of knowledge into affects,
concepts, and knowledge/experience of essences. I believe I have already demonstrated where in
the Ethics Spinoza combines the first two types of ideas and calls that combination its own kind
of affect, an immensely enjoyable kind. Therefore, the second kind of knowledge cannot be
categorized as only concepts. But by categorizing the three types of knowledge the way he does,
Deleuze is better able to discuss the signs of continuous affects, and from there he concludes that
we can be affected by both joy and sadness at the same time.206 How would a theory of
representation account for such an affect?
For more support, we can note that Spinoza writes that we can use reason to alter the
combination of images and imaginative concepts we focus on when we imagine a former
experience which was noble or courageous and couple it with an image about a maxim of what it
is to be noble. But while doing so we are also accessing the adequate knowledge of what it is to
re-arrange ideas of the imaginative sort. We are applying, that is, the laws of thought. This
experience we are creating for ourselves brings a sense of real joy. In our experience of joy there
is a passage from lesser to greater effects in this instant, but as soon as that emotion and affect
are altered, there is no longer any sadness. Or, at the least, the sad passion is weaker than the
adequate idea about it. I believe E4p11 and 5p4-10 are significant examples for support of this
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reading.207 The law at work, that is, is the law of force and strength. Adequate ideas about the
cause of our affects (as ourselves or as externally determined) immediately alters that affect into
something more efficient, enjoyable, and producing more adequate knowledge. Our sad passions
can take over, but not if we are understanding what caused them and how to alter their effects.
What is most important to take away from Deleuze's reading in contrast to Della Rocca’s
interpretation of the PSR is that signs “do not have objects as their direct referents.”208 Similarly
to what Bernstein has written (which was noted above about the ethics of Spinoza's physics),
affects are “variations of power,” they are signs of effects. Deleuze writes that Spinoza
categorizes causality into two types of series, a type of reflection between bodies that affect each
other (variations and combinations or decompositions of motions), and a type of absorption
when we experience a singular affect that includes both the effects between bodies and our own
ideas about our affections as a result. Both processes are occurring at once. Objects can be
causes, and ideas can be causes, but effects can be their own type of cause by definition, and
affects yet another type of cause. Deleuze’s conclusions show why and how Della Rocca's use of
the PSR does not work in the way he applies it to Spinoza's system:
In effect, the structure is geometrical and consists of solid lines, but they are constantly
being formed and deformed, acting as cause. What constitutes the structure is a composite
relation of movement and rest, of speed and slowness, which is established between the
infinitely small parts of a transparent body...there is in each body an infinity of relations
that are composed and decomposed... Modes are geometric but fluid structures...
Structure is rhythm, that is, the linking of figures that compose and decompose their
relations... But the structure moves in both directions simultaneously... If one refers to the
cleavage in causality, signs refer to signs as effects refer to effects, following as
associative chain that depends on the order of the simple chance encounter between
physical bodies. But insofar as concepts refer to concepts, or causes to causes, they
follow what must be called an automatic chain, determined by the necessary order of
relations or proportions, and by a determinate succession of their transformation and
deformations... But when one asks how we manage to form a concept, or how we rise
from effects to causes, it is clear that at least certain signs must serve as a springboard for
207
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us, and that certain affects must give us the necessary vitality... There is thus something in
signs that at the same time prepares for and doubles the concepts... The cries of the
language of signs are the mark of this battle of the passions, of joys and sadnesses, of
increases and decreases of power...The Ethics is the discourse of the concept... The
common notions refer to relations of movement and rest that constitute relative speeds;
essences on the contrary are absolute speeds that do not compose space by projection, but
occupy it all at once, in a single stroke... What the notions grasp are the relations between
relative speeds. But absolute speed is the manner in which an essence surveys its affects
and affections in eternity (speed of power)... They are not simple operations of fact, but
an entire production in principle...209
Can't we say that the above coheres with Spinoza's use of causa immanens (inblijvende oorzaak),
that which is a cause that remains a part of (is involved in) its effects? And can’t we say that the
result is that our adequate common notions about causality are then transformed? For Spinoza,
every effect “involves its cause,” but what sense of “involves” (involvere) is the debate, as noted
above. The use of the PSR for Della Rocca is applied specifically to “facts” about objective
reality, and the PSR as he sees it (especially in his most recent essay from 2010) is always in
relation to existence. He writes, “...the existence of each thing that exists must be explicable, just
as the consciousness of each conscious mental state must be explicable, and so on for other
cases... So the explicability argument concerning existence, unlike the other explicability
arguments, is an argument for the PSR itself...”210 It is clear from this statement that Della Rocca
feels a rational argument for the concept of “existence” is a rational argument for the PSR. But
there are different versions of the concept of existence and, at times, of the PSR that have already
been noted here.211 For Spinoza, existence is, utterly, a complete affirmation first. Yet, to be a
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cause that remains in its effect seems closer to the use of the Latin term involvere as “to
envelop.” The sense of cause and effect Spinoza holds is closer to Ed Curley’s reading than to
Della Rocca's. We might turn to those like Deleuze, Macherey, and Bernstein together for more
support. In addition, Don Hoffman, in a 2008 article titled “Conscious Realism and the Mind
Body Problem,” writes, “Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no
scientific theory of how brain activity can create, or be, conscious experience. This is troubling,
since we have a large body of correlations between brain activity and consciousness, correlations
normally assumed to entail that brain activity creates conscious experience.”212
Against the version of necessity and the PSR Della Rocca embraces, Macherey writes,
“On the other hand, in Spinoza's statement the principle of causality literally inverts the terms of
the traditional principle: from the well known formula 'nothing is without a cause,' which
proceeds in an analytical manner from effect to the cause, he substitutes 'no cause is without
effect,' which proceeds by contrast from cause to effect, synthetically and summing up in a single
phrase the genetic conception of knowledge...”213 This reading relates quite well to Deleuze's
interpretation noted above. Further, Macherey links this synthetic reversal of the way to think
about causality in Spinoza to a theory of non-representation specifically. He writes, “For
Spinoza...adequate knowledge 'explains' its object to the extent that it affirms itself as identical to
it, not in the transparency of a conforming representation but in the likeness of the order of an
equally necessary reality.”214 In strengthening adequate knowledge and action, we regularly
affirm our objects of thought as identical to substance’s causal order.
It is through the effects of other effects that I recognize when my understanding acted as a
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cause. As substance and identical to it, I am both the cause and the effect as the adequate cause.
Della Rocca reads Spinoza's concept of the human mind as having ideas about objects and
things, about facts, of which the cause is in need of a rational explanation, instead of the mind as
ideas that are signs, effects, and an organic part of the ever-shifting landscape. As is clear in
E2D3, having an “idea” is not equivalent to speaking about brain states or physical descriptions
as representations, but is in relation to what it is for God (or Nature) to be a thinking thing
perceived and expressed as a human mind. And in 2p28 we learn that finite affects cannot be
only about the attribute of thought (therefore they cannot be only about our explanations), but are
about the composition and decomposition of relations between idea types and interactions with
other bodies of all kinds in our environments (chairs, clouds, buildings, people, plants, animals,
desks, church, the state, revolutions and so forth).215 As Jeffrey Bernstein writes, “In other words,
the stability of our bodies is due to – in fact our bodies are constituted by – certain proportions of
movement and rest (i.e. forces)... As the ratio of forces changes, the formation of these bodies
changes... Simply put, change occurs by the composition or decomposition of fluid, determinate
bodies; space need not enter the equation... Differently stated, Spinoza's monistic substance is
constituted by ratios of forces. Spinoza calls such forces 'affects.'”216 Ratios of forces always in
motion cannot possibly be reduced to representations of something else. They are Nature.
After we understand the logical consequence of a cause being “in” its effects, “substance”
can be understood as an infinite series of degrees of expression and power that continually
transform into other degrees of power and expression or ratios of motion and rest.217 This is
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Deleuze’s main point. Those things that are in-themselves do not involve the concept of another
thing. Existence needs no explanation. The meaning is conceived through itself. How then do
causes inhere in their effects if the concept of the thing, in the above sense, does not involve the
concept of another thing when conceived through itself? In other words, the explanation of a
definition will alter in what is required depending on whether you are understanding something
as an expression of an attribute or as an expression of a mode. The explanation will logically
alter depending on which common notions are placed together.
When concepts involve the concepts of other things, such as the definition of a “mode,”
their sense of what it is to be a cause, an effect, and “involve” alters depending on what is being
defined. This is yet another reason why Spinoza writes in E2p49s, among a series of replies to
possible objections to his deductions, “But…we perceive that one idea has more reality, or
perfection, than another.”218 Some explanations are better than others, but that which is
conceived through itself needs no explanation in order to be both true and to cause effects.
God's essence is eternal existence and is self-caused. Our essence, as a finite mode, is
understood differently. I can logically understand that I exist as a real expression of Nature, and I
am aware of this regardless of an adequate explanation of how it is possible that I exist as an
expression of an eternal substance. In a way, there is only one explanation of substance; it exists,
eternally. We adhere to the necessity of laws of Nature of which substance is. The rest are the
effects of variations in degrees of intensity of thought and action by all things with each other. 219
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And where there are degrees of intensity in rational and imaginative thought, there are novel
ways to both experience, express, and explain reality. But Della Rocca believes necessitarianism
and the PSR, as he has defined it, are inseparably intertwined: “Precisely because
necessitarianism is an implication of the PSR, the intuitive pressure leading to the PSR is
intuitive pressure leading to necessitarianism. A clear-headed proponent of the PSR can be
expected to embrace necessitarianism for precisely this reason. (Spinoza certainly did.)” 220 Yet,
Spinoza's concept of necessity is intimately related to his metaphysics and the idea of a God. The
meta-physics of the many uses of language as signs, to produce effects, as types of explanations,
or simply as types of knowing also seems to go beyond a strict reliance on the PSR as the best
way to perceive and conceive reality. My ideas are not representations of reality in extension. My
ideas are concepts, methods, and ways of knowing that create my awareness; some are images,
some are words, some are rational common notions connected to other rational common notions
with the force for understanding, novelty, and creativity as well.
At this point it would be helpful to refer back to the definition of an “idea” that can be
found in E2p48s: “For by ideas I understand, not the images that are formed at the back of the
eye...but concepts of thought.”221 Images and concepts are, thus, distinguished from each other. If
the mind is understood not as having ideas but as ideas themselves, then ideas as concepts of
thought are what the mind can be said to be defined as, but not without the dynamic
epistemology of ideational method and “ways” of knowing. Images are only a bi-product or yet

urgent.” Yet, he also writes at the very end of his 2010 essay, “And I must admit that I am not optimistic that such a
line can be found.”
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“To appeal to the PSR's implication of necessitarianism as ruling out the PSR and as enabling us to draw a
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another way for the attribute of thought to express itself. In this respect, if the mind and the body
are “one and the same thing,” then the equivalent of ratios of motion and rest of extension can be
said to be parallel in the mind as proportions of adequate ideas (and what concepts and images
they are in relation to). Our proportions of the power of effects cannot be defined as
representations. Recall that in 2p13 the idea of a mode can be taken as the object of an adequate
idea, even while the expression of that adequate idea is also a mode itself.222 In other words, in
this case the object of an idea is another idea. The attribute of thought has its own kinds of
modes, and although they can be understood as immediate and infinite in certain determinate
ways, mediated and infinite in other determinate ways, or just finite, taking a specific kind of
mode as a concept and object of an adequate series of ideas realizes a different kind of
affirmation in thought (than simply understanding that ideas are modes of the attribute of
thought). In other words, understanding what ideas of ideas are in this system is crucial to
unpacking it correctly. This is related to an argument Spinoza makes about judgments of the
imagination. He notes that our prejudices (opinions) about the mind's ideas and free will, among
other things, “...can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the nature of thought, which
does not at all involve the concept of extension. He will then understand clearly that an idea
(since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in words.” If an
adequate conception of knowledge does not necessarily need words in order to be understood,
how will Della Rocca’s explainability thesis and his use of the PSR hold? Not all of our
understood and felt concepts need to be explained or are explainable in order to be true. Some
222
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can be applied with force and power and, therefore, demonstrate their truth directly.
We can understand how one idea “has more reality, or perfection, then another,” and how
that which ideas involve can differ in their types of affirmation. To repeat, “...the affirmation
which the idea of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much
as the idea of the circle differs from the idea of the triangle.”223 Therefore, we may have two
adequate ideas that differ completely in their affirmative powers. There is not a representational
image for such expressions either. In Letter 17 we read, “The effects of the imagination arise
from the constitution either of body or of mind.”224 It is important to remember while trying to
understand this type of system that, as Spinoza writes, “Whether we are 'determined to act' by
passion or by reason is a matter of where we locate the causes of our activity.”225 Locating causes
is a mental action. We find more support in Chapter 13 of the TTP where Spinoza emphasizes
that we are not to think of God as having motion when concentrating on the nature of extension,
but as ratios of motion and rest, including our own ratio. 226 Thus, the cause of my motion is the
result of a law of Nature that is an expression of God, but I am only to concentrate my
understanding of the natural phenomena of the law of Nature itself. My expressions will be
different in intensity from yours. Substance cannot negate itself so when I die, it is simply a new
ratio of motion and rest that my body has in relation to Nature.227 I expressed myself as Nature
prior to death according to a level of homeostasis and bodily comportment and I will do the same
Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49s II, IIIA (iii), and IIIB (iii): 64-67, italics added.
Spinoza, Letter 17: 803.
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holding between two existing things.” How can we think clearly and distinctly about existence if the definition
includes that it need not exist as something real? To equate (treat?) existence and the PSR as identical, as one thing,
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after death. The “awareness” of such a process and transition, the parallel attribute of thought in
action, is where the current debate is located still today.
As Macherey holds, we are able to explain the fact that substance proceeds from cause to
its effects (as modifications and synthesis) in generating itself. Substance's continual generation
of itself is its effect. We cannot define Spinoza's use of the PSR as simply that “every fact must
be explainable.” There may also just be too many facts in Nature to explain them all anyway.
They are infinite in expression. Spinoza's use of a version of the PSR understands identity that
proceeds in explanation from that which is self-caused (substance, God) to the nature of its
generated effects (modifications of modifications of substance).228 In this way, I believe we can
gather a tremendous amount of support for a non-representational counter-reading, including
support from E3p37, p47, p49, p53-54, 4p7, p8, p9, p14, p18 (and several other related
propositions). Perhaps Spinoza makes this most clear when he writes in the preface to E4,
“Finally, by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, understand reality, that is, the essence of
each thing insofar as it exists and produces an effect, having no regard for its duration.”229 The
understanding of the essence of singular things, as we will read in Chapter Five, is intuitive
understanding.
My reading of Spinoza’s theory of affects is a way to argue against Della Rocca’s theory
228

Mendal Sachs draws a nice summary of what we are also talking about above when he writes on physics and
what it means to attempt measurements of that which is always in motion: “To predict the motion of a "test body,"
one must first solve for the field solutions corresponding to the entire closed system, and then take the asymptotic
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of representation. To conclude, we can examine how and why Spinoza references our
experiences of (psychological) freedom, love, sadness, affects as effects, and passages to greater
perfection, but he also references the use of powerful images and imaginative knowledge in
creating more affirmative affects. We read in 3p47 that when we are sad it is often because the
memory of what caused our sadness is still vivid: “While the image of the thing still remains, this
determination is, indeed, restrained by the memory of those things that exclude its existence; but
it is not taken away. And so man rejoices only insofar as this determination is restrained.”230
Restraining a certain type of imaginative determination is a rational affirmation because our
adequate knowledge understands which imaginative determinations need restraining and why.
Clearly, our adequate knowledge about joy and sadness is not enough. We need to include, as a
general affect that we experience and feel, those memories that are strong enough to overtake the
existence of the thing we are recalling to mind. This is because such things reduce our tenacity
and capacity to thrive. In this way, ideas of the imagination have their own type of existence
because memories are in existence for us, they are real, but as singular memories the object they
refer to may not be real. In fact, in restraining them there is no real way to explain what exactly
is becoming passive and what is becoming active through a theory of representation. Therefore,
their object is directly related to the proportions of other types of ideas we associate with them,
such as the imaginative idea of freedom from a past danger or “evil” (which Spinoza refers to
directly). In many places, including the previous 3p43 (which also references 3p37), we learn
that our striving “will be greater or lesser in proportion to the affect from which it arises.”231
Conatus is a striving, a tendency, and it is clear that the strength of that striving is in direct
relation to our changing affects of which we are aware in conscious reflection. We read in 4p14,
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adequate knowledge of what is true is not enough, as “no affect can be restrained” by this true
knowledge “but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.”232 So the restraining of certain
imaginative ideas spoken about above can only occur if the ideas are understood as an organic
whole of force and motion expressed in an affect that has degrees of power. This changes the
strength of our desire because the affect that desire arose from (by necessity) is stronger. 233 And
recall that desire is “the very essence of man.” True knowledge cannot be used to restrain affects
necessarily. Only stronger affects can achieve this according to Spinoza’s dynamic
epistemological system. Conscious reflection is required for such a task. It’s where the propelling
force of intellectual power, creativity, and joy arises. Our method is what aids us in recognizing
what ideas we are affirming or denying and locate the cause of our affects.
We also learn in 3p48 and p49 that our understanding of causes can increase or diminish
the power of the affects we are experiencing. E3p49 reads, “Given an equal cause of love, love
toward a thing will be greater if we imagine the thing to be free than if we imagine it to be
necessary...”234 This is telling because it means that, at times, a stronger, affirmative affect is
experienced if we rely on an imaginative idea rather than an adequate one. Awareness of the laws
of Nature helps generate stronger affects.
Where things get really interesting is in what Spinoza writes next as the demonstration.
He notes, “A thing we imagine to be free must be perceived through itself, without others (by
ID7).” We are all affected differently by the same object (3p51). We also judge from our own
affects what is good or bad, better or worse for us, and we can suspend this judgment, as stated
above. Noted in 2p49, the rational suspension of judgment is a perception and an affirmation. It
is the affirmation of a series of inadequate thoughts, but an affirmation that we are understanding
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p14: 123.
Ibid. 4p15: 123.
234
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how to use such ideas, which is clearly a rationally adequate series of understanding about
natural phenomena.235 The diversity of expressions of this kind are infinite: “it follows that men
can vary as much in judgment as in affect” and, as already noted from the TTP, the more certain
terms are used to describe things, the more we come to believe that we have adequately described
the thing in question. If this is a real problem, then explanations can also become a real problem
when they are inaccurate and yet perpetuated. Spinoza writes, “...we can deduce more affects
than those which are usually indicated by the acceptance of words. So it is clear that the names
of the affects are found more from the ordinary usage [of words] than from an accurate
knowledge [of the affects.]”236 Naming something (description) is, therefore, not enough for
understanding things. The explainability and inexplicability thesis won’t hold if understanding
Spinoza’s system in the ways I have outlined in this chapter. As Syliane Malinowski-Charles
writes, “it is all a matter of a question of proportion between adequate and inadequate
knowledge...”237 Words are always, for Spinoza, a part of inadequate, partial knowledge. There
are other ways to express what one knows, particularly by application.
As one last claim of support for my reading on the nature of our affects and their role in
strengthening not only adequate knowledge, but also imaginative ideas and images which can aid
reason, consider what Yirmiyahu Yovel writes: “Cognitive events are at the same time affective
events.”238 Spinoza confirms this as early as the TEI where he writes that what we are to pay
most attention to is “the way we become aware” of our changing ideas.239 The way we become
aware of powerful knowledge is directly needed in a theory of human consciousness as a result.
We are always to reflect on our power of action in existence, and we can do this through
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reflecting on and altering our dispositions and affects. As Anthony Paul Smith writes, reason
guides our affects and our affects guide reasoning in ways that become actions, that is, “...they
become acts through being known.”240 This places the singular experience of wonder within an
important current debate as well, particularly because some believe Spinoza felt wonder could
move us with great accuracy and joy if used well with other series of rational ideas. Others, such
as Piet Steenbakkers, believes that wonder is left solely to the imagination as a passive (and thus
less forceful) response to our environment.241
Other explanations are possible against a reading from a theory of mind and
representation perspective, but in 2011 we find more support for where Della Rocca goes off
course. Because his interpretation of Spinoza has been so influential in North America, it is
important to gather as much alternative support as possible. In Mogens Laerke’s essay,
“Spinoza's Cosmological Argument in the Ethics,” the author argues that Della Rocca's reading
has gone wrong from the start. The reading won’t work because of how DR interprets 1p11D3
and Letter 12, both already cited in this chapter in detail. Spinoza's system is directly relating to
the continuous transformation of our affects within a singular theory of human reflective
consciousness which we have learned about in later books of the Ethics.
Letter 12 is highly relevant to this conversation. Spinoza lucidly writes that we can
understand the same thing in one of two ways, either by its definition alone or by its cause
(which can alter depending on what kind of knowledge we are using and why). The latter is
about the use of the PSR, but the former is something entirely different. It seems Della Rocca, in
combining both the nature of definitions (explanation) and of causality, collapses these two
Smith, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 61. Paul Wienpahl, in his work Radical Spinoza, also writes, “At its very
abrupt end BdS was using 'perceiving,' 'thinking,' and 'understanding' interchangeably...(107)” I would agree.
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Ethica III, 200. Steenbakkers writes, “In EIIIdef.aff.4exp, Spinoza ranks wonder as imagination and he does not, for
that reason, number it among the affects.”
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distinctions that Spinoza goes to great lengths to remind us to keep separate.242 Spinoza is clear
both here and throughout the Ethics that we must learn how to distinguish between that which
only the intellect can comprehend from that which can also be apprehended by both the intellect
and the imagination together to create greater affects. The main reason is that “its parts cannot be
equated with or explicated by any number, although we may know its maximum and its
minimum.”243
The point about what can be comprehended by the intellect alone is very important here.
Letter 12 states that the imagination cannot adequately comprehend the nature of Substance or
Eternity. In other words, there is no real representation of reality possible if examining only
imaginative ideas. This is important because for Della Rocca's interpretation to be correct, that
all ideas are representations of the affections of our bodies, he would have to say that these
representations then do not, in any way, involve imaginative ideas when thinking through the
nature of Substance or Eternity. In other words, he would have to show that no part what-so-ever
of imaginative knowledge is used when comprehending the true definition of Substance or
Eternity in his reading, a position I demonstrated is not possible to maintain.
In addition, in this same letter Spinoza notes that the concepts of “number,” “measure,”
and “time” are simply “aids to the imagination” and, therefore, cannot be conceived as truly
infinite by definition. I believe Della Rocca needs, at the least, the concept of measure for both
his explicability thesis and number for his numerical identity arguments to be true. Explicability
is a concept of measure, that relies on the nature of words to explain what was previously
thought unexplainable (i.e., to measure and understand “facts” about Nature). The concept of
“facts” is a numerical concept in many ways, as well. But modes of Substance, Spinoza
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continues, cannot be fully understood using these kinds of concepts. Direct adequate application
of the knowledge of reality as natural phenomena is what we experience with stronger rational
affects. We learn that there is also a difference between “mental constructs” and “real things” for
Spinoza, something that I believe Della Rocca does not pay enough attention to. For him mental
constructs are real things, they are facts about Nature. The problem with “facts” is that many of
them change over time with shifting paradigms of knowledge and methods of investigation,
hence the requirement that reason be able to defer to others (for democratic fluidity in a state for
example) or suspend its assertions of certainty when needed. Furthermore, some things may be
explainable about any one complex thing, while other aspects or properties of that same thing
may never be explainable, as Spinoza also addresses in Letter 60 later in his life.244
Therefore, in conclusion, as substance can be understood as one, eternal, self-causing,
organic whole alongside an adequate understanding that the attributes of thought and extension
are separate (in the sense that they can be conceived through themselves and are only modally
distinct), we can then understand how we are both individuals and collective assemblages of
desire and power with other bodies. Affects are something other than emotions. They are real
expressions of natural phenomena and they increase and decrease in force. This is clearly stated
in 5p39s where we read that a mind becomes more capable the more it is conscious of its own
ideas, of God, and of things.245 Our feelings and our ideas give rise to variations in affects, but
also to reflective awareness. We find more evidence of this in E2p19-23 and 2p31. There is
always more to learn. Such an awareness of this law of thought in reflection makes more
Spinoza writes in Letter 60, “...I assert absolutely that from certain properties of a thing (whatever be the given
idea) some things can be discovered more easily and others with great difficulty – though they all concern the
nature of the thing.”
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learning possible.246 We are allotted these experiences in duration, but the laws of Nature operate
in the same way structurally for all. But the variations in power that affects create is an organic
combination of both knowledge and affections. Our singular imagination, memory, and language
use can only take place if our body endures, but our expressions can cause effects in series of
relations with other ideas and bodies for eternity. Singular reflective awareness requires some
sense of organic identity. This is why Spinoza writes in 3p53 and p54, “When the mind considers
itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and does so the more distinctly it imagines itself and its
power of acting.” We then read, “The mind strives to imagine only those things which posit its
power of acting.”247 Spinoza draws a direct reference in the final thoughts of the Ethics for us to
reflect back on 2p40s again, the well-known epistemological proposition. Why? Because the
more we learn, the more we understand that there is more to learn. This brings us joy in both
ways, bodily and as energy given, as well as by having three kinds of ideas to use and
experience.
Our power of thought, or reflective thought as action, is diminished when we experience
the sad affects. As we learn in the list of affects in E3, an affect of sadness can be an action, but it
is an action as “a passing to a lesser perfection.”248 It is similar to what we might think of as a
slowing down of a motion or not putting all of one’s energy into something when we are aware
that we could. Do you call this action less motion or do you call it a coming to rest? For Spinoza,
it is simply a shift in the intensity of motion and rest as a ratio. So an affect can be understood as
always in action in this way. It is an action that increases our power to act or that which
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decreased our power to act as an increase or slowing down of our motion. Therefore, both the
imagination and reason are needed to work together to reflect on one's power of thought and
motion. This new affect includes adequate thinking about our power of acting, which is then
increased by such understanding. This is Spinoza's proto-physics of motion and dynamic
epistemology of ideational force. It is an ethic because, when we understand how the mind can
reflect on itself in its actions and on the body and mind in its affects, it is nothing more or less
than a “strength of character” with tenacity according to BdS. 249 E4Def8 reads, “By virtue and
power I understand the same thing...” and virtue is “nothing but acting from the laws of one's
own nature.”250 I believe this is directly related to what is stated in 2p7, 2p11, and 2p40. The first
idea of the mind is the body because “The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only
foundation of virtue. For no other principle can be conceived prior to this one (by P22) and no
virtue can be conceived without it (by P21).”251 This is why suicide would not be permitted in
such a system as well. Reason strives “for nothing but understanding,” its essence is one's mind
“insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly...” and “this striving for understanding (by P22C)
is the first and only foundation of virtue...”252 But affirming one’s increase in power can also be a
sad passion. Affirming one’s increase in power when one errors in reasoning is an example of a
sad passion. The power is not increased, though, in the same intense proportion and causal
influence if it were a joyous passion or a series of adequate common notions.
There is not an identity between thought and extension because they are substance –
substance just expressed in two different ways infinitely. Although common notions are adequate
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ideas we all share (as they are the common properties of things which are true), imaginative
knowledge is highly singular in its internal processes (and it involves ratios and proportions).
One reason why it is beneficial to us and our survival and use of energy includes, by necessity,
that we must work towards understanding more about this process. That is, a regular aspect of
our daily ways of living and knowing, of understanding and doing, includes strengthening
reasoning, and allowing ourselves to use certain imaginative ideas to do so as well.
For Spinoza, every idea we have does not represent its “counterpart bodily mode and also
the external cause of that bodily mode,” as Della Rocca concludes is necessary, and which 5p4s
demonstrates is not where we should direct our attention and reflection.253 As 3p56 and p57
make so clear, the more we are affected in a way in which what we imagine involves both
ourselves and bodies external to us, the more we are acted upon. But the more we imagine our
own power of thought regardless of temporality and external causes, combined with reasoning
about the laws of thought themselves, the more we act and the less we are acted upon. “It is
enough, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affects and of the mind, so that
we can determine what sort of power, and how great a power, the mind has to moderate and
restrain the affects.”254 If affects were only “special kinds of ideas,” why would Spinoza develop
Books 3 and 4 of the Ethics in the ways cited here? “No life, then, is rational without
understanding, and things are good only insofar as they aid man to enjoy the life of the mind,
which is defined by understanding...all those things of which man is the efficient cause must be
good...”255 Spinoza's ethics are clear:
I do not say these things in order to infer that it is better to be ignorant than to know, or
that there is no difference between the fool and the man who understands when it comes
to moderating the affects. My reason, rather, is that it is necessary to come to know both
253

Spinoza, Ethics, 5p4s: 164.
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our nature's power and its lack of power, so that we can determine what reason can do in
moderating the affects, and what it cannot do... Since reason demands nothing contrary to
Nature, it demands that everyone loves himself, seek his own advantage, what is really
useful to him, want what will really lead a man to greater perfection, and absolutely, that
everyone should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can. This, indeed, is as
necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its parts...256
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CHAPTER 5
PROPORTIONS AND MAGNITUDES OF SINGULAR ESSENCES:
JOY AS THE PASSAGE TO GREATER PERFECTION

“I may desire absolutely and forever a revelation of a moment.”
-Simone de Beauvoir
“A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea.”
-Gilles Deleuze
“...the greater complexity of the human body does not 'causally' explain consciousness in the
mind. This would violate the causal and explanatory separation that exists between the attributes
of Thought and Extension in Spinoza's parallelism; no mode of Thought can be causally affected
by a mode of Extension, and no state or property of a mode of Thought has its causal explanation
in a state or property of a mode of Extension. 'The modes of each attribute have God for their
cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not
insofar as he is considered under any other attribute' (IIP6). ...what I am claiming is that for
Spinoza, human consciousness just 'is' the greater complexity of the human body as this is
manifested under the attribute of Thought.”
-Steven Nadler
The Intellectual Love of God and Nature
The title of this chapter is a reference to the third kind of knowledge (intuition) that we
find in Spinoza's genetic epistemology. Intuitive knowledge is conceived both as something
eternal in its truth and as the singular intellectual love of God. As we read in the opening
definitions and axioms of E1, all things are either in themselves or in something else. 1 From a
given determinate cause(s) there follows an effect(s).2 The knowledge of an effect depends on
and involves the knowledge of its cause (or at least some partial or proximate knowledge of its
cause).3 Things that have nothing in common with one another cannot be conceptually

Spinoza, Ethics, 1D3, 1D5, and especially 1Ax1 and Ax2: 1-2.
Ibid. 1Ax3: 2.
3
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understood through each other, nor can they be the cause of each other. 4 This is also applicable
for the process of combining an immanent system with other elements important to rational
beings – rational beings who contemplate their immanence as expressions of that system. A true
idea must agree with that of which it is an idea (have something in common with the object of
the idea).5 Finally, if a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence cannot involve
existence.6 Therefore, substance is one organic and eternal expression of itself as its attributes.
Their effects or modifications (modes) are conceived through substance as expressions of it. We
are an expression of substance as “bodies conceived as complex patterns of movement,” and
intuitive knowledge is both the direct awareness of the laws of our attributes (of which we are an
expression) and also an open possibility to combine with and understand other singular essences.
This chapter focuses on one way to interpret the third kind of knowledge in Spinoza's
dynamic epistemology. In the scholarship, the nature of intuition in Spinoza’s system is one of
the most challenging concepts to unpack and one of the most controversial. As we've seen, the
necessity of the laws of Nature do not absolve the rational capacity to speak about a “God.”
Spinoza writes that, “...the inevitable necessity of things does not do away with either divine or
human laws.”7 Using reason alone does not allow for intuitive knowing or Spinoza would have
only needed to identify two types of knowledge instead of three. Intuitive knowing is its own
kind of knowledge but we use ideas of both the imagination and reason to develop it. This is
apparent as we use language, words, and calculative deductions in order to understand and
explain what we are reflecting on. Spinoza was, in many ways, myopically focused on thinking
about what a God might be. For instance, he writes the following: “...Nature's bounds are not set

Spinoza, Ethics, 1Ax5, 1p3: 2-3.
Ibid. 1Ax6: 2.
6
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by the laws of human reason which aim only at man's true interest and his preservation, but by
infinite other laws which have regard to the eternal order of the whole of Nature, of which man is
but a particle.”8 At the least, we can conclude that he believed there was “one Being which
subsists through its own sufficiency or force. This I not only affirm, but undertake to prove from
the basis, that its nature involves necessary existence.”9 To have beliefs is one disposition and to
use common notions regularly is another disposition. However, the expression of intuitive
understanding is in the act of combining rational beliefs, regular habitual practices, and increases
in the power of thought and activity with others.10 For Spinoza, these human expressions are as
close to God as we'll ever express (as he makes clear in E1p25c, 5p24, and 5p25).11 In this way,
we are God or Nature. As Steve Nadler writes, “The knowledge of God just is the knowledge of
Nature in its broadest dimension.”12
As we'll see, intuitive knowing is “difficult and rare.” When we achieve intuitive
knowing we have the clearest knowledge we can have without the need to rely on “hearsay, or
experience, or the art of reasoning, because by [one’s] penetration [one] sees the proportion in all
such calculations immediately.”13 Yet, this immediacy does not last. Singular imaginative sense
perceptions and memories, for example, are always shaping our affects continuously as well.
Intuitive knowing will include more than “our being convinced by reasons,” but it will also
include “our feeling and enjoying the thing itself...”14 You cannot feel and enjoy any theory,
person, event, encounter, relation, affect, or knowledge without applying it directly to your own

Spinoza, TTP, chapter 16: 528.
Spinoza, Letter 35: 855. This letter specifically addresses Spinoza's logical understanding of a God. I find it adds
striking evidence that he felt he was not an atheist or a materialist.
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Spinoza, Ethics, 5 preface: 160. Spinoza writes that “much practice and application are required” for restraining
the power of regular affects which we experience daily. This too is a form of operational knowledge.
11
Ibid. 5p24, 5p25: 173.
12
Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 189.
13
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Ibid. chapter 2:2: 63.
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life and experiences “because when we know and enjoy what is best, that which is worst has no
power over us.”15 At the least, intuitive knowledge overrides those proportions of motion and rest
we experience singularly that decrease our power to exist by enhancing those elements in us
(proportionally) that increase our power to exist.
Intuition is joyous, instantly applicable, and useful in its expression for singular
individuals.16 It is the direct awareness (alertness) in conscious reflection of our conatus (and not
only of our existence). It is adequate knowledge and, therefore, knowledge of the essence of
singular things. It is both an intellectual intuition coupled with a sensuous felt action and
effect(s) in the form of an affect(s). This knowledge is crucial because, as we read in E2p24, it is
the communication of motion between the parts of one whole, thus involve essence. 17 Singular
things are understood in E1p28 as finite things with a determinate existence, as that which is
capable of producing effects by another finite cause.18 The awareness of the power of our
singular essence (conatus) includes the intellectual love of God. However, as each singular thing
has its own determinate essence, we can, therefore, not always hold that the concepts of “cause”
and “essence” are easily inter-changeable (as demonstrated in Chapter 4). For example, even
though we express two of God’s infinite attributes, God’ essence differs from our own in many
ways.
Martial Gueroult's famous essay on Spinoza's letter(s) on the infinite is helpful for

Spinoza, KV, chapter 2:19: 87, footnote 16.
Spinoza, Ethics, 5p33: 175. In 5p38s, Spinoza writes that the “greater the mind's clear and distinct knowledge,”
the “more the mind loves God.” Therefore, all three types of knowledge are both immanently and metaphysically
related. The same “rules of reason” apply to us even if we are not yet aware of the eternal nature of our capacities for
comprehension, as is evident in 5p41. Therefore, becoming aware of this must include an automatic increase in the
power to reason itself.
17
Ibid. 2p24: 49.
18
Ibid. 1p28: 19: “...all modes (by P25C) are nothing but affections of God's attributes.” Add this to the
opening proposition of the Ethics that substance is prior to its affections and we can deduce that the best logical way
to understand Spinoza’s system requires that one adequately understand what substance and attributes are before
addressing the nature of modes.
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understanding Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. On the infinity of substance and indivisibility
of modal expressions as substance, Gueroult concludes that both can logically derive from
substance as self-caused. He writes, “Indeed, whatever necessarily exists of itself cannot, without
contradiction, be deprived of any part whatever of its existence; consequently, it is necessarily
infinite and excludes any partitioning.”19 This deductive conclusion also applies both to the
concept of eternity and magnitude, rationally understood, “insofar as it is conceived as the
extension of bodies.”20 In other words, the infinite divisibility of modes is the same as the eternal
indivisibility of substance with infinite attributes expressed modally in infinite ways. This is not
a numerical distinction. Gueroult continues, “Indeed, just as modes, qua modes are conceivable
only through substance...so, too, the endless divisibility of the continuous, which is that of
modes, is conceivable only through the indestructible subsistence in them of an indivisible
absolute...”21 Both reason and the imagination are needed to understand the inter-relatedness of
both. In our adequate knowledge we conceive that it is the attributes which are understood as
eternal because they are, like substance, conceived through themselves.22 Gueroult writes that the
divisible and finite cannot explain the indivisible and infinite, but “being explained by them, are
henceforth reconciled with them.” In this way we can conceive of the infinite indivisibility of
substance as already complete in each modal expression.23 Why? Because, as definitions are very
important in Spinoza's system, the definition of that which is indivisible is always complete and
is “equally in the part as in the whole,” as Spinoza writes. This is how Gueroult can then deduce:
...Hence, every mode, whether small or large, envelops within itself the indivisibility of
infinite substance... But, after the understanding has been returned to its authentic
Gueroult, “Spinoza's Letter on the Infinite,” 182, 184 (as found in Marjorie Grene's anthology Spinoza: A
Collection of Essays).
20
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constitution, substance, by the same stroke, is restored to its true nature, and since its
infinity as well as its indivisibility are grasped genetically from its necessary existence,
they are imposed upon us in their full intelligibility. In this way light penetrates
Metaphysics. ...The antinomy regarding the divisibility of matter is then resolved in favor
of the Infinite. Thus, light penetrates Physics as it penetrates Metaphysics. ...My duration
is my existence posited by the immanent and eternal act of substance...24
As we read in the TTP, “This is the point we have demonstrated above, namely, that our
intellect and knowledge depend solely on the idea or our understanding of God, and spring from
it and are perfected by it.”25 As Steven Nadler cites in one of his works, “...what is most
advantageous to a rational being is the perfection of its proper and 'better' part, that is, the
rational faculty or intellect. And what prefects the intellect, bringing it to its ideal condition, is
knowledge. ...to know God is ultimately to have an adequate causal understanding of natural
phenomena.”26 Clearly, though, it is also to have the rationally efficient capacity to comprehend
logical deductions about both substance and modes as found above in Gueroult's insights. Finite
things cause other finite things within each respective attribute to produce effects as natural
phenomena, but as God's affections (modes) are the direct expression of substance God must be
conceived as “the proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him, and not [a
proximate cause] in his own kind...”27 The intellectual love of God, or “blessedness,” is defined
most directly in E5p32: “Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take
pleasure in, and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause.” He ends by saying
that this is called the amor intellectus Dei.28 This may be close to what Lucretius writes in De
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Rerum Natura regarding the power to understand causes or vivida vis animi.29 In introducing one
of Gilles Deleuze's works on Spinoza and intuitive knowing, Robert Hurley references Deleuze's
reading of the intellectual love of God as a type of understanding which is “'performed with the
maximum perspective possible',” and in which one doesn't necessarily need to follow the
deductive method exactly as it is found in the Ethics. In point of fact, “the intuitive of affective
reading may be more practical anyway.”30 Why? Because our “units of understanding are not
propositions but acts.”31 In his larger work on Spinoza, Deleuze writes, “The production of all
ideas, starting from the idea of God, is of itself a reproduction of all the things in Nature; the
sequence of ideas has no need to copy the sequence of things… An adequate idea is thus an
expressive idea… Method leads us to the highest thought, that is, leads us as quickly as possible
to the idea of God.”32
E2p1 states that our singular thoughts are modes. When we rationally regard something
as “good” we find a certain kind of confidence and perspective “unmixed with any sorrow”
regardless of context.33 Although we may not call it “good,” this also applies when we
understand that something could not have been otherwise. But we have to be careful because
what human beings decide is good relates to what they desire: “By good here I understand every
kind of joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever
that may be.”34 Surely not everything we desire is good for us so how does Spinoza develop what
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are better goods for us when speaking about the intellectual love of God?
As we read in 2p17s, our bodies exist “as we are aware of them” and, therefore, as we
reflect on our affects, we can rearrange our affects and compare various ideas we are having with
a stronger understanding of the relations between types of knowledge. 35 As we accomplish this
level of reflection, our conatus increases and we are, as Spinoza says, ready for anything. In
loving our own increase in power in rational comprehension and action, God (Nature) is
expressing itself in its perfection. However, decreases in power are also a part of Nature's
perfection (just to a lesser degree of force). In The God of Spinoza Richard Mason summarizes
one interpretation regarding the intellectual love of God on a singular level:
The system is meant to be self-propelling. Knowledge of nature – of our nature – can lead
to virtue because we will correctly understand our interests as part of our nature, and we
want such knowledge because our nature also includes a positive drive towards activity –
an accumulation of truths and a diminution of falsehoods. We want knowledge not
because truth is attractive – that would be teleology – but because the positive side of our
nature has a drive towards it... We may think that a way of life, a religion, is based on all
sorts of human needs, wishes, hopes or desires. It is certainly based on an historical and
social position. People can and do act well without what he sees as true beliefs. But if
they cultivate the positive part of their natures they will seek true beliefs about
themselves and about their location in nature. The reason or cause to do that is to be
simplified in the basic drive of conatus. Why be religious? means the same as, why live a
life of piety and virtue? With suitable research, we will see that this is our nature, it is in
our interest. How do we know that? Because that is how we are. We cannot look further.36
Some may argue that we are not naturally disposed towards virtue. In contrast, a
Spinozist would respond in a twofold manner. First, she would agree with you in part, as Spinoza
writes in both the TTP and the TP, men are not, on average, disposed towards using reason well.
However, that does not include additionally that such behavior (not thinking well) increases our
conatus. Two, if reasoning well was not inclined toward more education for those who do use it
Spinoza, Ethics, 2p1, 2p17s: 33, 46.
Richard Mason, The God of Spinoza, 145-146. We can look to Letter 76 here also where Spinoza writes that he
knows that he has discovered the truest method of rational contemplation as clearly as he knows the three sides of a
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with more strength (or desire to), then one would have to adequately address what it is disposed
towards. This is because we have this positive aspect in our nature that drives us towards
understanding our shared natures. This simultaneously includes the following insights: 1)
understanding that we have diverse singular desires, 2) learning about human psychology, 3)
necessary social interactions, and 4) the necessity of social-emotional collectives. This is evident
in E4p73 and the 4 appendix.37 As we will see, we are to “accommodate” ourselves “in ways
nearly infinite” according to the guidance of reason and continuous understanding of all things
human and humanly perceivable; this is something we also read about repeatedly prior to books
4 and 5 of the Ethics. If we are to seek the highest “human good,” then using adequate thinking
is something “good” which makes human beings their own efficient cause.38 This is also stated
clearly in 5p39 where we read the following: “He who has a body capable of a great many things
has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.”39 With understanding such things more freedom
follows. Stuart Hamshire writes, “The mind is active and free when, and only when, the
argument is strict, when the conclusion of a passage of thought is internally determined by the
thinking process itself.”40 Hampshire writes elsewhere, “...for at the highest level of knowledge
Nature is presented sub specie aeternitatis; Nature must be understood, not as a temporal
sequence of events, but as a logical sequence of modifications necessarily connected with each
other... In so far as the ideas which constitute my mind add up to such a logical sequence of
ideas, reflecting the true order of Nature, my mind becomes part of the infinite idea of God
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p74, 4 appendix: 154-160: “For this reason, he strives most of all to conceive things as they are
in themselves...”
38
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(infinita idea Dei)…41
When we are dealing with material and efficient causes then we can also say that we are
talking about physics, whereas when discussing formal or final causes, traditionally speaking, the
topic was usually referred to as metaphysics. Spinoza invented a new way to think about both
simultaneously, but without the use of teleological concepts. This claim is why we can return in
this chapter to the infamous epistemological proposition E2p40s2 where, regarding intuition
specifically, we learn, “And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.” 42 He
proceeds to explain all three kinds of knowledge through one example regarding understanding
proportionals. And what is the essence of singular things, but humana natura as communem
hominum conditionem?43 This idea about the nature of essence is reinforced in E5p31 where we
read about becoming the formal cause of the third kind of knowledge that we can have:
“Therefore, the more each of us is able to achieve in this kind of knowledge, the more he is
conscious of himself and of God, that is, the more perfect and blessed he is.”44 Steve Nadler adds
to this writing about intuitive knowing, “In fact, Spinoza's intellectual love of God is the key to
dispelling fear and hope, not generating them... It involves not passivity but activity and an
appreciation of one's own powers and their cause. It is, in Spinoza's view, the proper
accompaniment of virtue.”45 This is true, but it does not exactly square with other relevant
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interpretations, such as that of Stuart Hampshire for example. The latter writes, “We know that
some of our movements are actions, some are the effects of external forces acting upon us, and
some of them are the outcome of a mixture of forces, internal and external. The active-passive
distinction is prominent in all our self-awareness and in awareness of our own activities.”46
This position or trajectory in interpretation taken in this chapter is supported by, among
other places, what is written about being in the present with one's understanding (remaining there
clearly) as often as possible in E4p62 and especially p62s. There we read that we are determined
by nature to discover if what is in front of us on a daily basis is good for us or not. We can call
this our natural biological tendencies for summary purposes, but what is most important is that
Spinoza ties this to our evaluations of “good” and “evil.” He finds it highly problematic that we
believe we can have continuous adequate knowledge of the duration of things because we
cannot. He warns that the reason we cannot is a natural one regarding the powers of singular
things who have access to both thought and extension writing:
If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration (by IIP31), and we determine their
times of existing only by the imagination (by IIP44S), which is not equally affected by
the image of a present thing and the image of a future one. That is why the true
knowledge we have of good and evil is only abstract, or universal, and the judgment we
make concerning the order of things and the connection of causes, so that we may
determine what in the present is good or evil for us, is imaginary, rather than real.47
Although we can focus more on the physics (natural laws) involved with intuitive
knowing, it is important to note that Spinoza did not believe himself an atheist in any sense, once
writing that atheists “are usually inordinately fond of honours and riches...” 48 Adequate
knowledge through the observation of natural phenomena as the intellectual love of God are the
“supreme good.” This brings up an interesting point which has been written about my Michael
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Mack. Blessedness is a level of joy we can experience while interacting with our environment
that waxes and wanes in intensity and homeostatic balance, but orienting ourselves towards an
unselfish type of preservation is also an element of the intellectual love of God and Spinoza's
understanding of eternity. If this is true, and I believe it is at least partially, then those who
conclude Spinoza's system is an egoistic ethics are not warranted in their critique. Although it is
our singular essence and existence of which we are continuously aware, and this good is that
which can be shared by all, it is not only that which is enjoyed by us alone or only to our own
benefit.49 This is also evident in E4p51. Comparing the sentiments of Goethe in relation to
Spinoza's conception of intuitive knowing and blessedness, Mack writes:
Deepening and developing Spinoza's notion of the intellectual love of God, Goethe
proclaims that we are only universal by remaining subjective [singular]... What governs
the logic of Spinoza's conatus is the seemingly paradoxical formula according to which x
can only be x by not merely being x... This type of love is intellectual, because it
presupposes that we realize what keeps nature or God from destruction and selfdestruction. As such it keeps the selfish passions in check... Keeping the passions in
check is not an end in itself. Rather it is a means for performing a new kind of selfpreservation: a Spinozist one where the boundaries of the self turn porous so that selfhood
overlaps with the life of the other and of others...50
New forms of self-preservation are acutely possible when we are also consciously rationally
reflecting on our continually changing passions, especially as we are also aware of how the laws
of thought and extension operate as one organic whole while shifting in ratios of motion and rest.
This level of awareness allows for more rationally intense interactions with others, something we
know is good for us, which also constitutes the feeling of freedom and a joyous affect.
Speaking about the love of God, Spinoza is very clear in the TTP what his conception of

“Everyone's true happiness and blessedness consists solely in the enjoyment of good, not in priding himself that
he alone is enjoying that good to the exclusion of others. He who counts himself more blessed because he alone
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others are without true knowledge...”
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theology is noting, “Theology thus understood, if you consider its percepts and moral teaching,
will be found to agree with reason; and if you look to it purpose and end, it will be found to be in
no respect opposed to reason, and is therefore valid for all men.”51 This is the nature of what
Spinoza, at times, calls blessedness. Salvation and blessedness “consist in the true contentment
of mind and we find our true peace only in what we clearly understand...”52 The logical
deduction does not include the abolition of all organized religion as Spinoza felt the creation and
destruction of varieties of religion was a historical and social process, at times as necessary as
any other social phenomena, and he practiced toleration for the varieties of religious ideas of his
time in many respects. He was a critic of the historical construction and content of the Bible and
other religious texts, and the many uses and abuses of imaginative knowledge for obedience and
ritual.
At times, the problem for the philosopher was the concepts used and practices done in the
name of salvation. Salvation, in the religious sense, required “simple obedience” and this is one
main reason why he rejected it, for it did not require the use of reason and understanding. In
addition, as we read in E4p8, there is not a real thing as “evil,” and any knowledge about good or
evil “is nothing but an affect of joy or sadness...”53 Note that our knowledge of what is good for
us is an affect of joy. Our feeling of joy brings more strength. Further, as Nadler writes:
On Spinoza's view, then, the divine law includes no historical content, no metaphysical
doctrines, and no prescriptions of ceremonies. It does not require the belief in any
narratives of events in the past, the assent to any philosophical claims about God's nature
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writes that the term, therefore, was perfect for Spinoza to employ in his own way in his system (161, note 53).
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61 as late as 1675 (as the latter is preparing to print and distribute the Ethics): “But on considering the whole matter
more closely, I find much that convinces me that, so far from intending any harm to true religion and sound
philosophy, on the contrary you are endeavoring to commend and establish the true purpose of the Christian religion,
together with the divine sublimity and excellence of a fruitful philosophy.”
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or about the cosmos and its origins, or the performance of any devotional rituals...54
The force of ideas is substance as that which is eternally in existence, something that
Gueroult was also noting in the passage referenced that began this chapter. Ratios of motion and
rest in extension become ratios for motion and rest in practice. We are passionate beings and our
levels of power for action often depend on external influences, but if we are conceiving
substance adequately, then we understand that we can become the adequate cause of how we
conceive things and why. Ideas about ideas “involve knowledge about God insofar as [God] is
considered under the attribute of thought, and not under any other attribute.”55 The above
passage shows that all references to motion are left to the realm of the laws of extension. Also, it
shows that our ideas involve not only some knowledge of God (or Nature), but are also
expressions of God's ideas determined in a certain (modal) way. Spinoza did not desire to
eliminate theology. As Warren Montag writes, “Spinoza sought not to convince his readers to
abandon theology...but instead to show them how to think rationally within it, in its terms, in a
way that not only accepts the premises of any theology, but which even offers itself as theology's
strongest defense, thereby turning it against itself.”56 Indeed scholars such as Neal Grossman and
Charlie Huenemann go so far as to conclude Spinoza's primary epistemological aim was to
demonstrate how to properly think about God so in order to increase our power to exist.
Huenemann writes:
Spinoza's goal, in other words, is to find something divine in the world... The naturalists
among us face a critical decision about how to regard nature. Is it as an arbitrary lodging
or a kind of sanctuary? That is a question as alive for us as it was for Spinoza. It is
perhaps, in the end, the deepest question anyone can ask... Every understanding of God is
set against a backdrop of metaphysics. This backdrop is what makes it an understanding,
Nadler, 156.
Spinoza, Letter 64: 918-919.
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as an explanation is always a broader context into which we project the phenomena being
explained... 57
Spinoza is very clear about his deductions regarding God in the opening propositions of E1.
E1p17 and p18 read: “God acts solely from the laws of his own nature, constrained by none” and
“God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.”58 This immanence, on a singular
level, has to do with our modal expressions of power in varying degrees of intensity (potestas)
and our interactions with other bodies in our environment (potentia), and, therefore, as
God/Nature.59 By the time we get to Book 5 of the Ethics, we have already learned that we have
to combine both of these aspects while continuing to investigate natural phenomena. With this
understanding and use of common notions about the essence of singular things we automatically
strive to understand more.60 This increase in our striving involves much more than just a
tendency to persist in existence. It also involves more knowledge about God, or Nature. In E5p25
we learn, “The greatest striving of the mind, and its greatest virtue is understanding things by the
third kind of knowledge.” We read next in the demonstration of this proposition that this is
because intuitive knowledge “proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an
adequate knowledge of the essence of things...and the more we understand things in this way, the
more we understand God.”61 This knowledge cannot derive from imaginative knowledge alone,
but it does involve the first kind of knowledge significantly. Even further, this chapter provides
support for the interpretation that what Spinoza was most interested in, however rare, is the

Huenemann, Spinoza's Radical Theology, preface, 32.
Spinoza, Ethics, 1p17, p18: 13, 16.
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productive powers in activity between collectives and within singular individuals as the way to
know God and what it is to be human. That is, we learn how to enter into more relations with
others in ways that enhance our joy, understanding, and collective productive powers. This is the
position Daniel Selcer takes, referring to Spinoza's intellectual debt to the work of Francis
Bacon. In his most recent essay from 2014, we learn:
Baconian scientia operativa does not consist in the injunction to generate particulars
through experiment simply so that they may be known, but so that something may be
done... The aim of experiment, for a surprisingly Baconian young Spinoza, is the
discovery of true natures or forms... [Spinoza's] essence can no longer designate a formal
account of what a thing is (Aristotle), let alone an independent substantial form through
which it is actualized (Scholastic Aristotelianism). Instead, the essence of a thing must be
fully immanent to it and bound up in the particular ways it manifests its primary
qualities... This essence may be conceived relationally, from the perspective of a finite
thing immersed in a broader realm of duration and extended relationships; or, sub specie
aeternitatis, from the perspective of its cause...62
So what is the passage from a lesser to a greater perfection as the strength of our bodies
and minds increase towards that which is affirmative, creative, and effective in the application of
adequate knowledge? Stuart Hampshire writes, “...pleasure and pain always represent a change
in psycho-physical state; they are mental reflection of the rise or fall in the power of activity of
the organism.”63 As we read in E2p1s the patterns of thought that endure in one's mind will help
determine which affects one continues to be affected by.64 That is, we become more aware in
conscious reflection of ourselves as an adequate cause that can produce powerfully rational
affects. In this way, we are the one doing the determining and are not being acted upon. And in
Selcer, “From scientia operativa to scientia intuitiva: Producing particulars in Bacon and Spinoza,” 42, 45, 46.
Selcer concludes, “To reason, for Spinoza, is certainly not to leave the 'imaginative' realm of sensation, language,
memory and experiment behind. It is to do something new with the materials those forms of knowing provide...” In
support of this position, Chapter Two and the conclusion of this thesis address how Selcer’s reading is accurate and
works in conjunction with strengthening both creativity and reason. We can also look to the works of George Eliot
and Moira Gatens for more support. For example, Simon Calder, in his essay “Georeg Eliot, Spinoza and the Ethics
of Literature,” writes, “[Eliot's] fictions were 'simply a set of experiments in life – an endeavor to see what our
thought and emotion may be capable of – what stores of motive, actual or hinted as possible, give promise of a better
after which we may strive.'”
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this way we are truly free, as free as we can be within the laws of Nature, because we are acting
from our necessary nature according to our essence: “I call him free who is led by reason
alone.”65 The above is mentioned at the start of the Ethics in 1p24 when we read that intuitive
understanding is acting from our essence as singular things and not according to only our
existence, that is, in accordance with our conatus and knowledge of it. In addition, 4p1s tells us
that “imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true...”66 And
in 5p24 we read, “The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.”67 As
early as the KV we also read, “...the whole only consists of and [exists] through its parts, and so it
comes that you represent the thinking power as a thing on which the Understanding, Love, &c.,
depend. But you cannot call it the Whole, only a Cause of the Effects just named by you.”68 In the
KV we can continue to gather support for Spinoza's consistency in some main systematic ideas
over his texts early and late, even if he did abandon the KV around 1662. Yet, as we learn
throughout the Ethics, the organic whole is always more powerful than any of its parts.69
What has been demonstrated so far includes a rationally understood proto-physics of
power, force, proportion, and motion of the intellect and of our actions. Ideas affect other ideas
through their force or lack of force. As ideas have their own essence they can combine in powers
to become an organic body of their own creating multiple effects at once instead of only a few.
Rationally understood common notions are the universal properties of things that all rational
minds have access to by way of recognition in reflection, but not all can use this capacity with
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p68: 151. A free man “strives to join other men to him in friendship (by P37)...”
Ibid. 2p1s, 4p1s: 33, 118.
67
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the same force of ideational power, creativity, and action. Therefore, we might have to seriously
consider here if such ideas can be said to be innate?70 Common notions lead us to the increased
capacity to apply what we have understood in ways that bring great joy, a sense of peace and
harmony, and a feeling of continued striving for more understanding, but the latter are singular
experiences of our individual essence. As we know from E2p45, the third kind of knowledge is
specific to individual essences and not only to or as common notions.71 If it were only about
common notions then there would not be a need for a third kind of knowledge to be
distinguishable as its own kind of knowledge.
This increased capacity for reasoning leads us to understand more than general things in
Nature, something Spinoza comments on in 2p13s, but the essence of particular things more
immediately. Essence is wholly related to both God as cause and to our conatus as striving to
exist. In E1p25 we read that from each of the previous propositions certain logical conclusions
are required, including “that from the given divine nature both the essence and the existence of
things must be inferred.”72 And in Chapter 5 of the TTP we read that “intellectual axioms” are
that in which our adequate conclusions are drawn “from the force of the intellect and its orderly
apprehensions.”73 The necessity by which each attribute expresses itself is part of God's
necessity, that is, what each attribute expresses in its own ways is both all we can know logically
at that time and all that is possible for that attribute in power.74 In the KV, in the chapter “That
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God Exists,” Spinoza has a wonderful footnote where he writes that “it belongs to the essence of
a mountain that it should have a valley, or the essence of a mountain is that it has a valley; this is
truly eternal and immutable, and must always be included in the concept of a mountain, even if it
never existed, or did not exist now.”75 In this vein he also writes in the TTP “...everything in
Nature involves and expresses the conception of God in proportion to its essence and perfection;
and therefore we acquire a greater and more perfect knowledge of God as we gain more
knowledge of natural phenomena.”76
Logical error in reasoning diminishes our capacity to strive just as much as something
overtaking us physically that has more power or is stronger than us externally. 77 But the rational
use of creativity brings us an experience of physical and mental joy and pleasure. Therefore, the
stronger our capacity to think about an immanent God of which we are both expression and
effect, the more power of thought we will have.78 Spinoza writes, “They say also that God has no
knowledge of particular and transient things, but only of the general, which, in their opinion, are
imperishable. We have, however, rightly considered this to be due to ignorance. For it is
precisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a cause, and not the general, because
they are nothing.”79 It is particular things of a singular experience “that have a cause.” This
deduction concerns the essence of singular things only. Most important to recognize and reflect
on again is how we confuse concepts of understanding if we ascribe anthropomorphic
characteristics to God:
...while we are speaking philosophically, we ought not to use the language of theology...
But in philosophy, where we clearly understand that to ascribe to God those attributes
which make a man perfect would be as wrong as to ascribe to a man the attributes that
Spinoza, KV, chapter 1: 15.
Spinoza, TTP, chapter 4: 428. This deduction is similar to what we find in E2p13s as well.
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make perfect an elephant or an ass, these and similar words have no place, and we cannot
use them without utterly confusing concepts. So, speaking philosophically, we cannot say
that God wants something from somebody, or that something is displeasing or pleasing to
him. For these are all human attributes, which have no place in God.80
Later, in Letter 60, Spinoza writes to friends about how God cannot be ascribed any
characteristics that are applicable to human expressions with complete identity. This is why the
nature and function of definition is so important. He continues, “So too, when I define God as a
supremely perfect being, since this definition does not express the efficient cause...I shall not be
able to extract therefrom all the properties of God as a being, etc.” 81 When we are talking about
efficient causes, our definitions need to remain within the purview of sets of ideas that are true
properties of objects, that is, we follow the rule “that the idea or definition of the thing should
express its efficient cause...” Spinoza, in other words, does not equivocate on the concept of
necessity.82 The adequate idea of God expresses all of God's causal models. At its core, God (or
Nature) is the immanent expression of itself in all its possible manifestations. It is its own cause
at all time for all expressions and effects.
If so, what are we to make of our intellectual love of God and acquiring more perfection
in accordance with God as a thinking thing if we cannot ascribe human characteristics to that
God? In other words, how do we relate directly to such a metaphysical concept and reality in our
immanence (as physical human bodies and minds)? Perfection and imperfection are “only modes
of thinking.”83 Affects are involved on this level because they are the passage from greater or
lesser degrees of perfection or “certain modes of thinking.” In the TP and the TTP we learn that
we endeavor to understand everything about human nature as natural phenomena, and in this
Spinoza, Letter 23: 833.
Spinoza, Letter 60: 913.
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desire we are closer to expressing God with more perfection. We learn, as Richard Mason writes,
that “Even human passions such as love, hatred and envy are seen as phenomena which are
necessary, having 'causes by means of which we endeavor to understand our nature.'”84 In the
TTP we read:
...we must unreservedly conclude that we get to know God and God's will all the better as
we gain better knowledge of natural phenomena and understand more clearly how they
depend on their first cause, and how they operate in accordance with Nature's eternal
laws. Therefore, as far as concerns our understanding, those events which we understand
clearly and distinctly have far better right to be termed works of God, and to be referred
to God's will, than those of which we are quite ignorant...85
As we also read in chapter two of this thesis, we can have clear and distinct ideas about the ways
in which the imagination operates, which can be utilized to enhance our singular power of
reasoning. In Letter 36, Spinoza is clear that the concept of “imperfection” includes that which
lacks something, and substance does not lack anything in this system.86 He also writes,
“...perfection consists in being, and imperfection in the privation of being.”87 Our method of a
rationally powerful understanding includes the following:
So a good method will be one which shows how the mind is to be directed according to
the standard of a given true idea. Again, since the relation between two ideas is the same
as the relation between the formal essences of those ideas, it follows that the reflexive
knowledge of the idea of the most perfect Being will be more excellent than the reflexive
knowledge of other ideas. That is, the most perfect method will be one which shows how
the mind should be directed according to the standard of a given idea of the most perfect
Being. From this one can readily understand how the mind, as it understands more
things, at the same time acquires other tools which facilitate its further understanding.88
In addition, as Piet Steenbakkers (noting passages from the TEI) concludes, “The most perfect
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method will start from the idea of a most perfect being.”89
Ed Curley has asked what the definition of “rationality” becomes within relations
involving human intuitive knowing? How, in light of the above emphasis, might the definition
alter? One might also ask: what is the phenomenal experience of intuitive knowledge? E1p31d
demonstrates Spinoza's belief in our capacity to rationally examine the phenomenal nature of
more intense forms of overlapping certain knowledge.90 We can do this not only as thought, but
also understood as the nature of our knowledge about extension. The question is what are the
types of equivalent actions (physically) when we are intellectually loving God intuitively
(mentally)? If the intellectual love of God involves intuitive knowing, and intuitive knowing is a
combination of both rationality and imagination in a way in which our conscious reflection
grasps the laws of thought while strengthening our imaginings to aid rational processes, then a
question arises about what rational love would consist of when we have enhanced intuitive
knowing? It also involves what it is for some ideas of our mind to be understood as eternal. Early
Modern scholar Ursula Renz notes, “The notion that there is some part of our mind which is
eternal can, for instance, be equated with the claim that in principle all our subjective experience
can be expressed in terms of completely true, i.e. eternal truths. Understood in this way, the term
‘eternity’ is denoting a possible epistemic achievement.”91 Neal Grossman would agree with this
sentiment writing:
Philosophers for ages have wondered how something mental can cause something
physical and vice versa; how can there be an interaction between mind and body. Some,
like Descartes, give up on the problem and conclude that it is one of those mysteries that
we humans cannot hope to grasp. Others, like the materialist philosophers who dominate
the academic scene today, also give up on the problem and conclude that minds do not
Steenbakkers, Spinoza's Ethica..., 153. He ends this work stating, “Form always matters when a philosopher has
something important to say.” True, but what expression these forms take can be rationally creative and diverse.
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exist (or to put it more charitably, that what we call conscious experience is entirely
produced by the brain). For Spinoza, the mental and the physical are distinct
manifestations of a single Divine Being and there is no causal influence from one to the
other. The consequences of this metaphysical picture, when applied to ourselves, are
enormous.92
Recall that ideas are modifications of substance which exist along with their cause.
Together with their affections they create affects. It is the affects we are patterning our thought in
response to. We need the concept of modes and modifications of substance because, as one
example, we cannot say that God is the cause of a specific number of things but only of all things
(singularly expressed) by definition.93 I have already demonstrated that rationally understood
processes of imaginative knowledge can transform our reflective awareness and habits of thought
in ways that create stronger, more useful imaginings, which reason can then better recognize as
aids to its own capacities and power. From this we were able to deduce that one is capable of
enhancing their power for reflective awareness in ways that influence (as effects) the power of
rational thinking and bodily movement and capability. This is an expression of God's (or
Nature's) power. As Spinoza makes clear in the TTP, it is through love for others, both
intellectual and in our actions, that we can recognize how God can be our expression: “It is only
through this love [of one's neighbour]...that every man is in God, and God in every man.” 94 This
same sentiment is shared throughout the Ethics. Recall that E1p14 reads, “Except God, no
substance can be or be conceived” and in 5p14 we read, “The mind can bring it about that all the
body's affections, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.” In addition, 5p16 reads,
“The love towards God must engage the mind the most.”95 The mind, in its rational ordering of
adequate ideas about how our reflection can increase or decrease our power also understands
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how to use imaginative visualization, for example, to our increased efficient ways of conceiving.
Why the above is so important to reflect on and use as a method to understand intuitive
knowledge further includes the crucial importance of E5p10, p11, p15, and p20 taken together. In
5p10 we learn just how important tenacity and habitual readiness are for the strengthening of
conatus. Spinoza writes that a “greater force” is required to order our ideas and affects on a daily
basis then is required for “uncertain and random” affects. If a greater force is required in order to
increase our capacity for habitual readiness and rational tenacity, then how might this occur and
why is Spinoza writing about it as late as E5? He writes, “The best thing, then, that we can do, so
long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a correct principle of
living, or sure maxims of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the
particular cases frequently encountered in life. In this way our imagination will be extensively
affected by them, and we shall always have them ready.”96
In this way, memory and imaginative knowledge become crucial for strengthening the
force required for ordering our ideas about our affections as regular affects. That is, imaginative
ideas work to help reason create the “greater force” required. This method guarantees that we
will act from affects of joy and power. E5p11 demonstrates that the more we have a certain
image in our mind the more power it has over our other ideas. In fact, previously in 4p17s we
learn that there are times when reason cannot control all one's affects all the time: “My reason,
rather, is that it is necessary to come to know both our nature's power and its lack of power, so
that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects, and what it cannot do.”97 In
other words, sometimes even reasoning is not enough because of what it cannot do. We need to
be aware of what reason cannot accomplish, which is an affirmative use of reasoning.
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Why is Spinoza returning so often to the importance of imaginative knowledge again and
again? Images (as ideas) will continue to affect us in reflection and gain more force the more
present they are, that is, the more we use a certain image and relate it to other ideas the stronger
its force becomes. This is because “there are more causes by which it can be aroused and
encouraged.”98 What we imagine is what is engaging our mind in reflective awareness. The more
we imagine something the more we start to connect it to other ideas, but in E4 we have already
learned that affects and the imagination work together to create stronger affects of various kinds.
E4p11 demonstrates that if we imagine something as necessary (the eternal nature of one organic
substance for example) the affect will be more powerful than if we imagine something as
contingent.99 This demonstration is coupled with a discussion on salvation and knowledge of
human created concepts such as good and evil. The best method we can employ is to use our
memories and imagination in ways in which we know will guarantee strengthening our habitual
readiness from affects of joy. Affects (as ideas about the state of our body) are a way for the mind
to “affirm of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before...” Our increased force of
action (ratio of motion and rest) and power of adequate thinking are derived in this way from
internal causes, and we are aware of this process and its effects directly if we conceive the laws
of thought adequately. As we read in the KV, an intelligent soul “uses the body as a tool.”100 This
is another way to understand the direct application of intuitive knowing. When individual
humans who use visualizations to attain more knowledge of “God” or Nature, they are still using
reasoning to order their thoughts and meditations appropriately to the more efficient degree.
Spinoza writes that we can relate our images to the idea of God. If we add to this what is
said specifically in 5p15 and p20 we get a very strong picture and more clear understanding,
Spinoza, Ethics, 5p11: 168.
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including why this is related to the intellectual love of God. In these propositions we read, “He
who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and does so the more,
the more he understands himself and his affects.”101 Not only is this love “joined to all affections
of the body,” but the more we understand how this process works adequately the more joy and
power are produced. This is a singular experience and expression, but it involves the collective
because the laws of thought and extension work the same for all humans. As the power of our
mind “is defined by knowledge alone,” we can imagine many individuals joined together in the
same ways as we are understanding our affects. Spinoza writes that we desire this activity with
more force once we understand it: “...the more men we imagine to enjoy it, the more it must be
encouraged... So we can conclude that this love is the most constant of all the affects, and insofar
as it is related to the body, cannot be destroyed...”102 This works to increase our affects of joy and
strengthen the force required to order our daily affects in new ways. As Spinoza lists, we have a
greater (adequate) understanding of our own affects, we relate those affects to an intrinsic cause
(the power of our singular mind) and not an external cause, what we understand with greater
clarity increases our capacities to act with more power and motion (parallelism between the
attributes), we understand God (substance) as the cause but because it is our understanding
expressing itself we also know that we are the cause of this greater force and joy, and as a result
we have a greater power to order our affects. And we all know that the affect of love is the most
powerful, which is why the intellectual love of God too, as we'll see, is what Spinoza
concentrates on in the last parts of the Ethics. External causes will be very important for our
experience of love and joy.103 This coheres with what we learned in E5p20 above because the
effects created by our rationally loving Nature and our expressions of it add to the overall
Spinoza, Ethics, 5p15: 169.
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103
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homeostasis of Nature as eternally affirmative.
Next, Spinoza refers back to E4p5 and writes, “the force of each affect is defined by the
power of the external cause compared with our own. But the power of the mind is defined by
knowledge alone...”104 The key common notion relied on is our ability (as knowledge) to
compare ideas with greater force of thought and, therefore, increase our powers of both thought
and action as the effect of such comparisons. This is also stated very clearly in 4p33 where we
read, “The nature, or essence, of the affects cannot be explained through our essence, or nature,
alone (by IIID1 and D2), but must be defined by the power, that is (by IIIP7), by the nature of
external causes compared with our own. That is why there are so many species of each affect as
there are species of objects by which we are affected (by IIIP56).” 105 For example, we learn in
4p66 that it is rationally powerful to desire a greater future than settle for a lesser present
circumstance. Note that such a desire must use the imagination as well. In the appendix of E4,
we are reminded to meditate on the varying degrees of power of our affects. Our highest
happiness (blessedness) is the result of perfecting our powers of reasoning because we are then
able to rearrange our affects accordingly with more force and increased activity. The habitual
readiness we acquire is the increased capacity to understand that although we are affected by
things external to us regularly, our affects can be ordered according to reason, and we are the
cause of that understanding. As well, if we surround ourselves with others who act rationally, we
increase our ability to survive and thrive in a way where we are “capable of affecting, and being
affected by, external bodies in a great many ways,” and “the more the mind is capable of
thinking...”106 This lends itself to a kind of freedom of thought which is in relation to what
Spinoza calls blessedness. As we can never exhaust continuing to understand Nature’s possible
Spinoza, Ethics, 5p20: 170-171.
Ibid. 4p33: 131.
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modal modifications and expressions, so too does rational thought require a type of freedom.
Individual human beings are actual things existing in Nature with their own essence.
Quoting the Apostle John, Spinoza agrees that “God is love.” As he points out in the TTP, the
Hebrew word Jadah can be translated as both “to know” and “to love.” To know is to love, to
love is to know. The word Jehova can also include the meaning “to be,” that is, to exist. In other
words, to know is to love and to love is to both exist and to understand with more power. There is
evidence for this series of ideas as their own web of relations in Spinoza's correspondence in
Letter 21.107 Thus, the intellectual love of God or Nature is how we “acquire a virtuous
disposition” using reason, which includes what it is to love oneself, others, and a God conceived
logically and felt as joy. In Letter 23, Spinoza writes “For by a righteous man I understand one
who has a steadfast desire that each should possess his own, which desire I show in my
Ethics...arises necessarily in the pious from the clear knowledge they have of themselves and of
God.”108 Note the emphasis on clear knowledge of both oneself and of the intellectual love of
God. What we are observing and comparing is the natural phenomena of knowing and living
both singularly and collectively. This does not include conceiving finite things in abstraction as
parts or as good or evil, at least not for Spinoza. What it is to have an affect of the intellectual
love of God includes our understanding of expressions of substance in its power as our
expressions. Substance cannot be divided: ex quo sequatur, substantium posse dividi.109 In other
words, God (or Nature), in its effects, has the power to express itself in infinite ways.110
Intuitive knowledge includes (or just is) the singular intellectual love of God. As Spinoza
As noted by Charlie Huenemann in his work Spinoza's Radical Theology, Letter 21 reads, “My intellect does not
extend so far as to embrace all the means God possesses for bringing men to the love of himself, that is, to
salvation.”
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writes in the KV, “...if we use our understanding aright it will be impossible for us not to love
God.”111 Amor erga Deum (I am here and I am expressing a love towards...) becomes amor
intellectualis Dei (the intellectual love of God).112 We experience ourselves as an expression of
the eternal when we adequately grasp what the rational concept of Eternity (and love) can be for
a human mind, as Spinoza writes about in E5p31 and 5p39s for example.113 We can adequately
conceive the difference between finite modes and that which is eternal. Although every finite
idea is a real expression of Nature, finite modes are not (by definition) eternal. It is only
immediate, infinite modes and mediate, infinite modes which are conceived as eternal. Thus, as
we increase our rational comprehension of what Eternity is and how it gets expressed the more
we experience the profound joy of that which is both unified as one organic whole and conceived
as our own degree of power. What could be more fun than experimenting with creative
combinations of rational sets of ideas along with others which not only benefits all involved, but
also produce experiences with unexpected or novel powerful effects? As Deleuze writes, “…the
third kind of knowledge has as its formal cause nothing but the soul or understanding itself. It is
the same with the idea of God: what is expressed is infinity, but what expresses itself is the
absolute power of thinking.”114
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We understand that it is necessary to separate, when needed, the logical series of concepts
connected to our rational understanding about the relationship between the finite and the infinite.
Letter 54 clearly reads, “This I do know, that between the finite and the infinite there is no
relation, so that the difference between God and the greatest and most excellent created thing is
no other than that between God and the least created thing.”115 In the KV we also read that
“...human understanding is immortal, because it is a product which God has produced in
himself.”116 Many years earlier in Spinoza's correspondence in Letter 12 he also writes on
infinity. Something can be infinite by virtue of its cause or by virtue of its essence. Spinoza
strictly distinguishes between the two when needed.117 In Letter 64 he does not want to define
God, substance, or Nature as part of any numerical (or mathematical) distinction. Spinoza calls
all three the same thing and eternal or of the nature of that which is “an absolutely infinite
Entity.”118 He addresses the concept of the infinite in the same way again in 1676 in Letter 81,
one year before his early death. He writes that when we speak about “parts” of Nature, we are
not then inclined to deduce “an infinity of parts.” This is primarily so because it would include a
spatial concept and no such spatial concept about an infinity of parts can be clearly and distinctly
perceived by us when thinking adequately about infinity.119
Spinoza's conception of a God is not an anthropomorphic idea, which is another reason
not to name it as something that is “one” thing (as the use of numbers is a tool for human minds
only).120 Daniel Selcer writes, “...Spinoza's mature metaphysics will reject entirely the notion
that God, as the sufficient reason for the existence of the world, can be radically separated from
Spinoza, Letter 54: 899. For more support how the finite and the infinite are inter-related see Noa Shein's lucid
and excellent paper “Necessarily Always a Bit Confused,” Spinoza Research Network, June 2012.
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it. Instead, he advances an immanent monism that identifies God, substance, and nature (with all
its immanent expressions) as the same thing, distinguishing them only with respect to whether
they are grasped in terms of their productive power (natura naturans) or in terms of their
expression in the dispersed totality defined by the infinite modes that follow in infinite ways
from God (natura naturata)...”121 We might also turn briefly to the work of George Eliot, the first
writer (author) to translate Spinoza’s Ethics into English even though her work was suppressed
from publication. Eliot interprets E3p2 as adequate and intuitive knowing including the ability to
“retain the impressions or vestiges of objects”122 needed in order to pass into greater perfection.
Spinoza confirms such a position in some of his earliest work. For example, in the KV we read,
“...for, as the Understanding is that in us which must know God, and as it stands in such
immediate union with him that it can neither be, nor be understood without him, it is
incontrovertibly evident from this that nothing can ever come into such close touch with the
Understanding as God himself can. It is also impossible to get to know God through something
else.”123 The only way one can know anything at all is through observation of natural
phenomena. And this is how one also knows God, but it is not conceived as understanding God
through something else. Therefore, the understanding of natural phenomena and the immanent
expression of one’s singular understanding are (logically) the understanding and expression of
God (or Nature).
It is quite common that the importance and coherence of Book 5 of Spinoza's Ethics is
continuously debated among scholars much more than other books. 124 The last book is where we
Selcer, Philosophy and the Book, 167. I am indebted to Dr. Selcer for a decade of mentorship and lessons.
Spinoza, Ethics, trans. George Eliot, Saltzburg Studies in English Literature. For more support on how this kind
of interpretation might work in productive ways one can turn to the work of Warren Montag.
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learn about beatitude. To aid our understanding, Spinoza writes, in response to questions put to
him by Hugo Boxel, “To your question as to whether I have as clear an idea of God as of a
triangle, I reply in the affirmative. But if you ask me whether I have as clear a mental image of
God as of a triangle, I reply in the negative. We cannot imagine God, but we can apprehend him
by the intellect. Here it should be observed that I do not claim to have complete knowledge of
God, but that I do understand some of his attributes...”125 The imagination is of assistance to the
understanding when thinking about our singular expressions and interactions with other ideas
and bodies. The concept of an attribute is not possible without the distinction between that which
is indeterminate and determinate being in a unified relationship.126 God is conceived as an
eternal indefinite reality with infinite attributes. We can only know and experience the actions
and ideas of two as our own expressions.
It would do well for us at this point to briefly examine some of Nancy Cartwright's work.
In “The Limits of Exact Science, from Economics to Physics,” Cartwright not only summarizes
the processes relied on within the science of her time, but she also demonstrates that most likely
we will never have an exact science about all the possible natural phenomena of Nature. In other
words, there is no end to particulars and their combinations in the universe. This logical and
reasonable conclusion effects how we construct our models of measurement. Cartwright's
position does not damage any of Spinoza's epistemology. Her reading on how we use and express
human scientific practices only strengthens our possibilities for continued democratic leanings,
identifications, methods, and enjoyment. In reviewing the “iron law of probability” as “an
association generated by particular social and economic structures and susceptible to change in
energy explaining what it is.
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these structures,” which apply to the natural phenomena of social interactions, and Cartwright
concludes:
The same, I claim, is true of all our laws, whether we take them to be iron – the typical
attitude towards the laws of physics – or of a more flexible material, as in biology,
economics or psychology. I repeat the lesson about the dual nature of frequencies and
propensities: probabilities make sense only relative to the chance set-up that generates
them, and that is equally true whether the chance set-up is a radio-active nucleus or a
socio-economic machine.127
All of our knowledge is an expression of substance and its power, but as we have already
noted in previous chapters that a clear and distinct conception of God does not include a
reduction of what we know to that of material substance only. Instead, we are to try and
understand all that we can about the force of thought and the movements of extension. We cannot
do this in isolation. Both attributes interact within series of causal actions and reactions
continuously. There is a necessary conceptual and metaphysical relation between our singular
expressions of “true ideas” and God (or Nature) in its eternal nature. In Chapter 19 of the TTP,
we read that our true ideas are “the very percepts of God.”128 Spinoza is not an occasionalist in
the strict sense where the force of extension is located somewhere outside our ratios of motion
and rest (or direct effects caused by the power of an attribute would not be possible). Spinoza's
system is the perpetual self-causing immanence of one substance with infinite modifications in
the form of the expressions of attributes that are God.129 As we read in E5p24, to truly know
Cartwright, “How the Laws of Physics Lie,” 323. “The view of course only matters if the kind of knowledge that
we need to understand the operation of a socio-economic machine is not itself more knowledge of 'deeper'
probabilistic and causal laws...the knowledge we need here is knowledge not of laws but of capacities... In the
simplest sense these capacities can be thought of as probabilistic propensities.” I think Spinoza would agree with
this sentiment completely.
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singular things well is to know God in the best way possible. Also, to know God well is to know
singular essences. The infinite is, in this way, an aspect of finite expressions of adequate
knowledge, which is Spinoza’s point in Letter 64 as well. The infinite and the finite cannot have
a direct relation to each other conceptually otherwise. This is the only way. If our true ideas,
expressed in our own singular, determinate ways, are the very percepts of a God, and the former
is finite whereas the latter is infinite, demonstrating a direct relation is not needed in order to
comprehend the difference.130 E5p20s explains that this idea is also an affect. It “is the most
constant of all the affects” and 5p26 explains that our conatus is increased for understanding
more particulars through the third kind of knowledge the more we experience what that kind of
knowledge is and can do.131
Piet Steenbakkers writes that Book 5 (in both the Latin and the Dutch translations) had
multiple variations and interpretations added by its publishers and editors: “My hypothesis is that
Spinoza himself had not written out the final parts of the demonstrations fully and systematically,
but contented himself with a summary indication...”132 Knowing that Spinoza may not have
written the exact full demonstrations of the last part of the Ethics (at least not without editorial
suggestions from friends), and realizing that the majority of the disputes revolving around Book
5 include its inconsistencies, we can still examine what the eternal parts of our mind might be.
True intuitive knowledge is possible for a finite mind, but it is a complex issue how to describe
the world... Indeed, it is through our own ability to cause motion in our bodies that we have the understanding we do
of God and angels as causes of motion.” As an aside, this otherwise excellent collection of essays jumps completely
over any reference to Spinoza on causality.
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exactly what it is, although I believe Daniel Selcer’s reading is the most accurate. Spinoza
already prepared us for the deductions of E5 in earlier sections of the Ethics, particularly within
E2, of which E5 is intimately connected.
Intuitive knowledge includes (finite) rational understanding and enjoyment of singular
essences in their capacity to increase their powers of thought and action. Intuitive ideas are
always affirmative and giving us pleasure, and, as stated in E3p54, this type of knowledge uses
imaginative ideas.133 The power and striving of our mind, as its essence, “affirms only what the
mind is and can do, not what it is not and cannot do.” Spinoza continues, “So it strives to
imagine only what affirms, or posits, its power of acting...”134 Next, in 3p55s, a very important
passage for understanding the entirety of the Ethics, we read, “For whenever anyone imagines
his own actions, he is affected with joy (by P53), and with a greater joy, the more his actions
express perfection, and the more distinctly he imagines them, that is (by IIP40s1), the more he
can distinguish them from others, and consider them as singular things.” 135 We have the most
power of thought and action when our mind is composed more of these types of ideas in
proportion (adding to the power of our joy as a singular thing). As we learned in previous
chapters (using E3p17s for support), when the mind has two contrary affects, it tends to vacillate
instead of having the right force to think in clear chains of adequate ideas. In E4p45s we read,
“On the contrary, the happier we are, the higher the perfection we rise to...” 136 We cannot always
act in moderation continuously because of unforeseeable external causes, for example, nor is it
always enjoyable to do so (i.e. joyous passions and passionate joys are a part of human living).
There are times of great inspiration, for example, where one feels compelled to act, not only
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because of the joy and energy involved, but also because the original rational ideas being
experienced and played with. But what are new ideas if they are not put into action but figments
of one’s imagination?
The above passages explain, as does Letter 54, that the effects created in us by our
perceptions and by our ideas determine how we judge something as beautiful or perfect. Spinoza
writes, “Beauty...is not so much a quality in the perceived object as an effect in him who
perceives... So things regarded in themselves, or as related to God, are neither beautiful or ugly...
Perfection and imperfection are designations not much different from beauty or ugliness.” 137 This
deduction is also expressed in 2p49 as another example. Affirmations, as concepts, are about the
singular essences of things, and Spinoza has just written that ideas are “concepts of thought.”138
The key is to become an affirmation of singular essence and, therefore, of the existence of
substance in its power and expression. Expression is a critical conceptual dynamic for
understanding Spinoza’s epistemology correctly. As Deleuze writes, “The notion of expression is
essentially triadic: we must distinguish what expresses itself, the expression itself and what is
expressed [i.e. the effects]. The paradox is that ‘what is expressed’ has no existence outside its
expression, yet bears no resemblance to it, but relates essentially to what expresses itself as
distinct from the expression itself.”139 The increase in our power of affirmation involves being
able to compare our internal ideas and affects with knowledge of how the laws of thought and
extension work. More specifically, intuitive knowing includes the intellectual love of God and
Nature as they are conceived together where our adequate comprehending of ourselves as cause
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of the ideational and extensive effects we experience are recognized and reflected on. The
concepts and experience of love and enjoyment are very important for this kind of
epistemological system. As early as the KV, Spinoza writes, “True belief is good only because it
is the way to true knowledge, and awakens us to things which are really lovable.”140 Indeed,
when we learn something true that cannot be denied we are awakened to things lovable. Spinoza
writes in Letter 54 that “beauty” is more an effect than a real thing or even just an idea. It has a
real effect on us that we incorporate as an affect with our bodily affections (pleasure etc.). Love
and knowledge are intimately intertwined for Spinoza.141 He claims as much in the opening
pages of his interpretation and commentary on Descartes's philosophy in the PCP when he
distinguishes between that which is really difficult and that which is impossible. It is important to
be capable of thinking well (with more rational force in reflection) so to be able to know the
difference. In the KV, we read, “As man has not been in existence from eternity, is finite, and is
like many men, he can be no substance; so that all that he has of thought are only modes of the
attribute thought which we have attributed to God. ...without God no thing can be or be
understood. That is, God must first be and be understood before these particular things can be
and be understood.”142
Immediately preceding E2p11, Spinoza emphasizes that although God “does not pertain”
directly to the essence of singular things, nonetheless, “singular things can neither be nor be
conceived without God...”143 In the same proposition we also read, “From this it follows that the
human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore, when we say that the human
Spinoza, KV, part 2:4, 66, footnote 11 and comment on p. 67. Spinoza will condense what he writes in the KV
and the TEI by the time of the Ethics in ways that involve more strongly combining rational power with the
“immediate union with the thing itself” as intuitive knowing. I do not understand Spinoza’s notion of “immediate
union” as that which is innate.
141
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mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but
insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the
essence of the human mind, has this or that idea.”144 I suspect that this is also why, in 2p13s, we
read that everything prior to this specific proposition has been composed of general statements
about such important things as a God and human expressions of Nature.145
We already read that God does not constitute the essence of any one human mind, but
singular things cannot be (nor be conceived) without God. God, as a rationally understood idea
of the attribute of thought, is that concept which modal modifications are also conceived through.
The idea of me as a thinking thing cannot exist without its relation to God conceived as a
thinking thing (which has adequate ideas common to all things) and also as Substance itself. Ed
Curley writes:
Whatever happens according to the laws of nature is an expression of the power of nature,
but it is equally, and by that very fact, an expression of the power of God, for the laws of
nature just are God's decrees regarding nature. To think of them as expressions of a power
which nature has independently of God is to limit God's power. If God were to act
contrary to these laws, he would act contrary to his own will, intellect, and nature, which
is absurd.146
Right at that point in the Ethics where we learn that we cannot adequately understand our
own mind without the concept of God, Spinoza asks us to pause and wait for him to fully explain
the other important elements of his deductive system.147 In other words, our method should
include that we are to defer our judgment about God until we have as much information about
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how the mind forms adequate ideas as is logically possible.148 He knows that we will reject what
he has so far attempted to demonstrate (as it is not yet adequate enough). It is our singular
attempts to comprehend the connections between adequate ideas about God as intuitive
understanding in application to our own lives. Demonstrations by others are not enough...one
has to experience and understand common notions in the regular application to their own lives.
This is also why, as we'll read in the next chapter, Spinoza's system is still relevant for us today.
In the KV Spinoza uses the example of bees to illustrate this point. The activity of bees are about
preparing for winter, responding to natural sunlight in their dance, and all related, but they are
also used by man for their honey. In the KV, we read, “So also is it with man, insofar as he is an
individual thing and looks no further than his finite character can reach; but, insofar as he is also
a part and tool of the whole of Nature, this end of man cannot be the final end of Nature, because
she is infinite, and must make use of him, together also with all other things, as an
instrument.”149 With more understanding about how thought works, the stronger our thinking
becomes. This is not a performance, but the necessary result of using our affects with power.
Spinoza emphasizes the same sentiment in E2p11s when he asks us to use patience and
“continue on with me slowly, step by step, and to make no judgment on these matters until they
[we] have read through them all.”150 Whereas in the opening of the Ethics, the generative
definitions Spinoza uses include the phrase “in so far as we wish to know...,” by Book 5 he relies
solely on the phrase in so far as we “ought to know.” By the end of the Ethics we have learned
what it is we ought to know regarding the laws of Nature. Our desire to know more and
capacities for acquiring more adequate knowledge become enhanced and are more efficient by
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using Spinoza’s method. The ways in which we order our ideas according to the nature of our
conscious reflection and disposition alters in a way that combines rational power between ideas.
What matters is the regular disposition we learn to acquire more regularly. In Letter 19 Spinoza
defines those who partake in rational understanding according to this method as expressing the
intellectual love of God as “conscious.” The “wicked” move about existence “unconsciously.”151
Clearly, this is a deductive conclusion that requires human consciousness and reflection. Human
joy is a passage to greater perfection, as noted in the definition of the affects at the end of E3. We
need conscious awareness and reflection in order to experience such passages.152 Yet, joys can be
excessive as well, and we learn in 4p63c where we read that joy that is excessive cannot produce
an increase in desire from the use of reason.153 The desire for continuous learning remains. Our
motions and ideas regarding Nature's necessity are now more quasi-automatic and more habitual.
It is not just that reason produces joy; it is also that rational affects can only arise from adequate
understanding and ideas of reason.154 These passages to greater perfection are included in the
intellectual love of God.
E1p15 states that whatever is, is in God.155 God is conceived as substance, therefore
whatever is expressed by the universe must, by necessity, be conceived through God as one
organic whole. The laws of human thought are God's ideas expressed as those laws, but only if
God is rationally conceived as a thinking thing because this is the only chain of ideas we can
rationally have about something eternal. God has infinite attributes and one of them is thought.
Thought is all we have access to as our mind and awareness. God is not conceived as having
151
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ideas about the affections of human finite bodies. Our affects are the ideas about our singular
affections. In other words, we can say that our affects, as ideas about our bodies, are unique to
our singular expressions, but the laws the attributes abide by are God’s expressions. The latter is
solely about the nature of what it is to be an expression of one substance that has infinite
attributes. The human mind is not identified with only one idea (i.e. of only the body as one
idea). The mind is identified according to both the increasing complexity of the body in relation
to other bodies (potentia) and its disposition, as well as the increasing habits of reason in relation
to other ideas expressed by the laws of thought. That is, the mind and the body, in all its causal
interactions with its environment and other bodies, is the attribute of thought and extension being
expressed (potestas) in their respective determinate ways.
The importance of ideas of the imagination rationally understood in Spinoza's dynamic
epistemology at this point cannot be overlooked. Inadequate ideas (partial knowledge) are not
always false or inaccurate; they are merely incomplete knowledge. Imaginative ideas are the only
source of falsity, but the emphasis here is on the nature of a source. In other words, just because
they are the only source of falsity does not also entail that they always produce false ideas. Yet,
none of God's knowledge can be conceived as partial or inadequate. Therefore, there must be an
element to all our ideas that can be understood under the conceptual and expressive rubric of that
which is infinite and perfect in one sense and finite and imperfect in another. This is the nature of
what it is to use (human) logical deduction and adequate ideas about what a finite mind is
capable, and how infinite substance expresses itself. The example is that we are only one mind
and body and yet, we can think about what it entails for something to be eternally in existence.
Spinoza scholars Herman De Dijn and Richard Mason (noted above) summarize what is
required when tackling Spinoza's epistemology from the perspective of his ontological
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deductions. Mason writes that we must take into account the first premise of Spinoza's ontology
in order to comprehend either his epistemological or ontological system adequately. Mason
extracts from the TTP quoting directly, and writes that, in our chain of adequate ideas about both
ourselves and about Nature, “God or nature comes first, the mind second: 'our intellect and
knowledge depend solely on the idea or knowledge of God, and spring from it and are perfected
by it.'”156 This must occur after we learn that there is only one substance (logically) and then
defer judgment until we learn how the laws of thought and ratios of motion and rest (extension)
work with greater perfection for us singularly. It is then that we can return again to the
intellectual love and knowledge of God, as Spinoza does by ending the Ethics in this exact way.
The Ethics is structured with knowledge about how there is only one substance with infinite
attributes and includes how finite individuals express two of those attributes, but leads to the
nature of human (finite) ideas and bodies, the power of human affects, and the intellectual love
of God. In this way we realize that all modes are not to be conceived as only finite. This is
because our adequate idea of God includes an identity with what we understand as an infinite,
immediate mode of thought, that is, as the laws of Nature of human thought that are necessarily
and eternally expressed.157 Mason continues:
In response to the question, how does God exist? Spinoza's thought was that God exists in
infinite ways as one substance. That was not an answer or a solution – just as the
'question' was never put so directly. It was not an answer because the basic thought that
God exists in infinite ways as one substance advances a discussion hardly at all in itself.
It helps only in so far as we understand that Spinoza meant to take his assumptions as
literally as he stated them, and in that he intended to pursue them consistently. There
were, he believed, different ways in which nature – things in nature – can be conceived...
What Spinoza needed was a framework to capture the notion that God or nature could be
characterized in the most basic sense, in an unlimited number of ways. And he could not
have wanted to interpret that notion so that it might impute to God any kind of
unintelligibility...158
Mason, The God of Spinoza, 106.
For support see Spinoza's Ethics 1p17s, 1p21-23, 1p29s, and 1 Appendix.
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Recall that, as E2p11c notes, it is not that God constitutes our essence as something
necessary but only in relation to the fact that all of our ideas are expressions of the attribute of
thought. And yet, because we are finite, every idea we have can also be understood from the
perspective of a finite mode. In fact, it must be understood in that way. Not only does this not
destroy Spinoza's parallelism, but what appears to be a contradiction is actually a chain of
deductive arguments which, at one point, are understood according to the relation of every idea
alongside the idea of a God conceived as a thinking thing, and then, in another way, can be
understood in relation only to the ideas a finite mind had prior that led to the ideas in reflective
awareness. This awareness though cannot be completely deduced or described within any
arrangement of concepts of human temporality other than the way in which Spinoza has
understood finite duration. Actual time and space cannot exist as logical dimensions within a
system that is an eternal and organically expressive unified whole with infinite expressions in
infinite ways.159 In E4p62s we read, “But we can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the
duration of things (by IIP31), and we determine their times of existing only by the imagination
(by IIP44S), which is not equally affected by the image of a present thing and the image of a
future one.”160
Because duration is always in relation to what it is to be finite (our sense of time being a
part of imaginative knowledge), we need to train our mind to strive towards a rational
disposition about laws of Nature of both thought and extension and about the nature of cause and
effect. These laws are conceived through themselves as part of what attributes are, and each
attribute’s parallel causality can be enhanced to produce more powerful effects by adequately
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comprehending what it is for Nature to be self-caused and eternal. As expressions of one organic
substance, we also express a degree of eternity in our own determinate ways. Your ways are
different, perhaps more effective or powerful, than my ways. That is, we can express the
adequate conception of the intellectual love of God, or Nature, depending on the perspective
(disposition) we hold, as well as the deductive chain of adequate ideas used to create the effects
of understanding. This is why the concept of singularity and individual subjectivity cannot be
completely done away with in Spinoza.
Reasoning about the laws of the attributes of thought and extension will include
concentrating, in reflective awareness, on that which is sub specie quadum aternitatis from the
perspective of a finite, singular essence. This leads to the logical conclusion that ideas about the
affections of our bodies, that is, of a human mind as the idea of its body, must be understood in
at least two different ways. For Spinoza, there is no true opposition here, only difference in
degrees of ideational complexity and expressive power or capacity. In other words, we are God
in our expressions as substance, just to a lesser degree of power. We are substance, but we are not
all of substance. Beth Lord writes, “Because it is part of the infinite intellect, the essence of
every finite mode is eternal.”161
Necessarily Finite in Our Expressions of Eternity
The concept of freedom is an important part of Spinoza system, particularly as it relates
to the last two books of the Ethics. As noted in previous chapters, freedom is understood as
acting from one's determined singular essence while entering into relations with others and
discovering (through reflective awareness) the causes of the effects we experience as our own
increases or decreases in power. In other words, we can select which perspective and disposition
we hold in our reflective awareness based on our understanding. Our bodies and ideas change as
161
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we come into contact with the forces of other bodies and ideas. We can engage in rational
thinking, but we interact with these laws through our singular reflection, awareness, sense
perceptions, and habitual dispositions or habits. Effects are the product of the coming-together
and decomposition of relations between bodies and ideas, but the interaction with imaginative
ideas when one alters their disposition is an internal process experienced singularly. Nonetheless,
this recomposition between ideas has already been affected by previous ideas that we have had,
both internally and externally, in causal chains.
Consider how many combinations, rearrangements, and decompositions are occurring in
an eternally existing substance. In the first part of the KV Spinoza writes about the distinction
between the concepts of generation and creation, composition and decomposition. He writes,
“...men are not created, but only begotten, and that their bodies already existed, but in a different
form.”162 He clearly states that we also cannot think of ideas as “created.” They are merely
unique expressions (ways) of the laws of thought (laws of Nature which are causal). We must
think of our ideas as continually “generated” and rearranged, and new combinations are always
possible through conceptual blending. When something is conceived as that which is “created,”
we immediately posit both its existence and its essence. This is why, logically, positing the
existence of an eternal God must also include that it is self-caused and continually self-creating
in essence. But the meaning of that which is continually “generated” (or regenerated) involves
positing only the nature of existence.163 That is why we are concerned with our singular conatus
as a way to express our power in existence.
We can possibly deduce that, depending on which of the three types of knowledge we are
reflecting on, the mind can be conceived as both representational and non-representational. This
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outcome, if possible, is still up for debate. Ed Curley writes, “Persons must be mind-bodies, an
indissoluble unity which can be considered from two points of view, and with two distinct
vocabularies and two distinct kinds of causation.”164 Curley's point is that there is not a logical
possibility of a causal relationship between thought and extension. The result is that we cannot
say that one attribute represents the other. What, then, is the equivalent of bodily action when we
are adequately comprehending the intellectual love of God and how can a human mind
adequately describe such a thing? Part of this answer is made clear in the TTP when Spinoza
writes that we should join with others of like mind in friendship, love our neighbors, practice
charity, and continue to strive towards understanding. Such experiences enhance our powers of
thinking and acting with more affirmative effects. In this way of expressing human desires,
capacities, needs, and use of rationality we are expressing the intellectual love of God (and
Nature). When we are happy we are free.
Potentia Mentis is more than this as well. This term and concept was referenced in
Chapter Three. We must first understand the meaning of what it is for the human mind to be the
idea of its body prior to truly understanding Spinoza's claims about the mind and body being one
and the same thing, that is, as expressions of the power of Nature, or God. The following quote
by Spinoza bears repeating in this respect: “When you say that by making men so dependent on
God I reduce them to the level of elements, plants, and stones, this is enough to show that you
have completely misunderstood my views and are confusing the field of intellect with that of the
imagination.”165 What this statement also demonstrates is that Spinoza clearly feels human
consciousness, thinking, and acting are not the same as the animated activity of the extension of
plants or stones. The “elements” don’t imagine with joy.
Spinoza, Ethics, introduction: xv. Further, we can locate some evidence for David Hume's indebtedness to certain
aspects of Spinoza's system expanded upon in the work of Wim Klever.
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The deduction that human conscious experience is real and includes certain
characteristics and laws is not problematic for Spinoza’s system because we cannot understand
the power of either substance or how we express substance in finite ways unless we also
understand the laws of thought and extension as two points of view of the same thing. One
conceptual effect includes the new knowledge that Spinoza's epistemology and ontology are
collapsed into one while continuing to understand that each can also be understood separately. In
other words, what we logically realize is that our finite mind and body are one and the same
thing and were all along, but each must be described in completely different ways. They are
comprehended as God and Nature. The definition of affect is important here yet again. Curley
writes, “We may think of a particular thing (animal or person) as having an aim and appetite of
its own, which explains its behaviour...as a desiring and perceiving creature; or we may explain
the thing's behaviour as the effect of external causes, and this is the model of a mechanical
explanation.”166 Both ways should be explored separately, but they are always one and the same
thing. It takes the training of the mind to clearly differentiate between these sets of ideas in their
separateness and as the same thing without falling into contradiction or negation. As Spinoza
writes in E1p25c, “Particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by
which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way...” 167 Therefore, to
understand intuitively is to realize the above deduction’s validity (and subsequent consequences)
in the ontology of the everyday. It is also to understand why “substance” is always logically prior
to its affections.
If our starting point is that we have a mind inside our bodies spatially, a mind that has
ideas, then it is not logical to also say that the mind is ideas. Yet, instead, if we begin from the
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understanding of what it logically entails for all of Nature to be both one substance with
infinitely connected causal interactions and that this whole is continually expressing itself
according to degrees of power that exist as the separate laws of Nature of its attributes, then the
non-spatial notion that the mind is ideas is logical. This is why Spinoza spends Book 1 of the
Ethics on his ontological argument before appealing much more specifically to his epistemology
and the nature of affects in later books. It’s true that substance, as a logical concept, must be
understood adequately before the affections of substance, but this is also not even possible until a
human mind understands how human minds and bodies think and act according to their laws. In
other words, as evident in the opening proposition of the Ethics, ontology precedes epistemology
for Spinoza. It is also another reason why several Spinoza scholars have written about Spinoza's
method and/or form as such an important topic. This debate includes the need for analysis
between sets of ideas in relation to each other and only then acts of conceptual synthesis about
what has been deduced (along with its logical implications afterward). Referencing the process
of analysis and synthesis, just as this thesis began referencing, Piet Steenbakkers writes, “For
Spinoza method [as in the ordo geometricus]...involves both moments...”168 In my reading,
therefore, such a method requires human consciousness. As Spinoza writes in the TEI, the reason
for conscious reflection about the types of ideas and power between them is “...so that we may
thereby come to know our power of understanding and may so train the mind that it will
understand according to that standard all that needs to be understood laying down definite rules
and aids... From this we may conclude that method is nothing but reflexive knowledge, or the
idea of an idea.”169 This is another clear indication why readings such as Della Rocca’s do not
work. Such readings do not take seriously enough the affects in creating our most efficient and
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rationally creative effects in our expressions as substance.
In the same set of adequate ideas used to distinguish between understanding laws of
Nature from understanding that which is partial, abstract, or in error rationally, we can also
recognize how reason alters our affects. Anthony Paul Smith writes, “There is no strict separation
between reason and affects [in E5], for reason can act on an affect and change it from a passion
to an action when we form a clear and distinct idea of it (Evp3), and an affect can arise from or
be aroused by reason (Evp7).”170 Yet, as we have learned, rational knowledge is composed of
ideas, and affects are both an idea and an affection together. Affects are not ideas, but ideas help
shape affects into new affects. The body matters, but Spinoza's deductive order starts with God's
essence as concept in book 1 of the Ethics and proceeds for all other concepts from there
derivatively.171 Nonetheless, naturally, we cannot adequately realize the complete synthesis of his
argument until we first understand the laws of human thought and action as well. All of this leads
to the singular expression of the intellectual love of God if we have worked through the system
deductively and synthesized it adequately. It is only after we understand the nature of rational
analysis, the priority of specific concepts which result as ideational effects of such analysis, and
the synthesis that also results that we realize what our reflective processes involve and how they
express more powerful affects as God (as Nature). Affirmative affects that we are the adequate
cause of are actions. As Spinoza writes in both E2p7 and earlier in the TEI, what is necessary is
that we deduce what we know “from physical things...” He writes:
As to the ordering of all our perceptions and their proper arrangement and unification, it
is required that […] we should ask whether there is a being – and also what kind of being
– which is the cause of all things so that its essence represented in thought is also the
cause of all our ideas. Then our mind […] will reproduce Nature as closely as possible;
for it will possess in the form of thought the essence, order, and unity of Nature. Hence
we can see that it is above all necessary for us always to deduce our ideas from physical
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things, i.e. from real beings, advancing, as far as we can, in accordance with the chain of
causes from one real being to another real being.172
The ordering of perceptions is the ordering of our ideas through the reflective lens of
conscious awareness and adequate understanding about both the essence of God and our essence
as conatus. Chapter 3 of the TTP can be directly correlated, in my reading, with two of the most
important propositions of the Ethics, 2p7 and 2p11:
By God's direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of Nature, or chain of natural
events; for I...have already shown elsewhere, that the universal laws of Nature according
to which all things happen and are determined are nothing but God's eternal decrees,
which always involve eternal truth and necessity. So it is the same thing whether we say
that all things happen according to Nature's laws or that they are regulated by God's
decree and direction.173
Therefore, the intellectual love of God, or intuitive knowing, can be an awareness of our chains
of ideas and actions as laws of Nature or as that which is “regulated by God's decree and
direction.” All natural phenomena involve eternal truth. The important point here is that we have
already learned that a substance monism of one organic and eternal whole is that which is
immanently expressed.174 Even errors in our awareness are substance in expression in their own
determinant way. To recognize errors in reasoning we need to develop the habits of a rational
method already understood as remaining aware of the laws of thought and extension. It is one
thing for something “to be” and another thing “to be conceived.”
Although the attributes of thought and extension are ontologically identical, they have
separate types of determinate effects that have already been described as three different kinds of
modes. Related to this are the three categories of modal modifications to describe how substance
is immanently expressed by each attribute. These are the infinite immediate modes, infinite
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mediate modes, and finite modes already discussed in previous chapters. To have an idea about
what an infinite, mediate mode is is to understand that such modes express the totality of all
possible ideas mediated by substance as a modification of itself. This expression is a true idea
that we can understand about the nature of infinite, mediate modes, even when we cannot
express all the ideas that are possible in a substance that is eternally expressing itself. The
infinite, immediate modes are the actual laws of each attribute, and they can be read about in
E2p21, p23, and p31, among other places. Because expressions of the laws of Nature occur
continuously and in infinite ways, we cannot possibly have a singularly complete experience of
them, but we can have adequate knowledge about what an infinite, immediate modal
modification is by definition. Each thing is caused by its own laws of Nature in an infinite and
immediate way continuously because God (Nature) is eternally in existence. The adequate idea
of God that we can have is also the infinite, immediate mode of thought conceived through an
attribute of substance. That is, it is the idea of God as action, as immanently expressed, and not
any idea of a “representation” of a God as external to us. As we’ve read in E1p25, “God is the
efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.”175 Spinoza
continues to write that all modes are “nothing but affections of God's attributes.”176 Therefore,
substance is logically the cause of all modal modifications as effects, but we are expressing
substance at all times. Our expressions can be understood as both causes and effects. We can, for
example, conceive ourselves as an adequate cause of the effects of substance determined in a
singular way.
Recall that, for Spinoza, we cannot attribute anthropomorphic concepts to God, so why
would we attribute to God an interest in human affairs and desires? We express God conceived as
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a thinking thing and a thing whose existence is eternal in an immediate way. Spinoza writes:
Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely, those which follow
necessarily from his absolute nature [infinite immediate modes], and others (which
nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God) had to be produced by
mediation of these first things [infinite mediate and finite modes], it follows: I. That God
is absolutely the proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him, and not a
proximate cause in his own kind, as they say. For God's effects can neither be nor be
conceived without their cause (by P15 and P24C)... II. That God cannot properly be
called the remote cause of singular things... For a remote cause we understand one which
is not conjoined in any way with its effect...177
Notice the separation in conceptual thinking and categories here. God is to be conceived as the
proximate cause of things produced immediately, but is the immediate cause of itself because it
is of its own kind. If this is true, and it is in a logically deductive sense, then this system requires
different versions of modal modifications. No effect of substance can be adequately conceived
without involving its cause. A true effect always involves its cause in Spinoza’s system. Any
singular awareness or expression of this is an effect of its cause. If we are using human logic to
understand such a system, then we have to find ways to separate what a cause is from its effects
and expressions with the knowledge that all effects involve their cause(s).
Infinite, mediate modes, by contrast, maintain a much more nuanced and controversial
interpretation. You can read about how they operate in E2p22 and 2p23, as well as Letter 64 and
other places. Spinoza writes that they are “the face of the whole universe.” Ed Curley translates
this as “...those features of that individual which enable it to retain its identity through change,
that is, the contrast relationships between its parts... The mediate infinite mode of the attribute of
extension is supposed to follow from the absolute nature of the attribute of extension, timelessly,
logically, and without the need for any other cause.”178
An adequate idea is recognized by the way in which that idea is determined, but also in
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its truth by definition. Ideas can be felt as an element of our affects. To have an adequate idea is
also to have a mental action that is non-physical yet composed of power and force. The brain’s
actions that parallel are a part of extension. Ideational affective responses include an awareness
that one is thinking with rational force (as we read in previous chapters). That expression is
singular, but the action can also be defined as that which is the immanent action of God (or
Nature) conceived as a thinking thing. The mediated aspect is that we have to include all possible
expressions of the singular sort of that attribute, but all possible expressions of substance are also
defined as logically infinite as well. To have adequate ideas about other adequate ideas is an
action as well. They are ideas in relation to each other within their own series of logical
relationships that are both finite and infinite. The same applies to the singular actions of the
attribute of extension. The series of fixed and eternal things includes “that if we really want to
understand the series of singular changeable things, we must attend to the series of fixed and
eternal things.”179
The above reading coheres with what I have emphasized about the imagination in
Chapter Two and brings us to finite modes. A finite imaginative idea used with more rationally
understood power by a singular individual can be classified in two different ways, as both active
and passive. To think rationally and intuitively includes not only conscious awareness of what it
is to understand necessary truths (common notions) more clearly and distinctly (or be used with
more power), but it also includes understanding how the ideas of the imagination operate in a
form of conceptual blending. Susan James notes, “The passionate life might be perfectly ok most
of the time...but it is insecure...it could turn out you are mistaken.” 180 To understand the laws by
which imaginative knowledge is produced is another type of rational common notion, as we
Curley, “Donagan’s Spinoza,” 123. Also see the TEI paragraphs 99-101. This includes that “the totality of finite
things does not exhaust reality…”
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learned in previous chapters. Our rational and imaginative ideas effect other ideas in series
continually connected to their respective type of knowledge. We can use our powerful series of
ideas to cause effects in the minds of others as well. Yet, as Beth Lord writes, “No matter how
rational a person becomes, he will never be able to avoid the affects altogether: they interrupt the
flow of rational ideas and determine our thinking and acting.”181 This is where Spinoza’s system
differs significantly from many other Western philosophical systems. As we enhance the power
of conscious reflection, our combined knowledge becomes more useful and enjoyable for us. We
become more consciously aware of what it is to have shifting registers of ideational power and
usefulness with a method that recognizes that ratios of motion and rest run parallel with our
reasons for our motions. Spinoza writes, “It is enough, I say, for us to understand the common
properties of the affects and of the mind, so that we can determine what sort of power, and how
great a power, the mind has to moderate and restrain affects.”182
This brings us back to the nature of affects and is how I will end this thesis. Affects, as
we've already read, are at the core of Spinoza's dynamic epistemology. Ideas of intuition
(knowledge of the essence of singular things) are real, natural things. They are ideas involving
knowledge about other ideas of the first and second kinds, and act as a type of knowledge that
can be put to use. This can become easily confused when, for example, we believe we have free
will. I may prefer coffee in the morning and you may prefer tea, but our separate decisions are
not acts of free will. There is a cause for the affect I have which I associate with other ideas and
actions, while your associations are different but still related to each other by the laws of thought
and extension in the same way as are mine. Spinoza writes, “For of each thing there is
necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way that he is of the idea of
Lord, Spinoza's Ethics, 96.
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the human body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human body must also be said
of the idea of any thing.”183 It is singular adequate thinking that understands the difference. All
things, in their own determinate way, strive to continue to exist. E1p17c2sII reads, “Hence, they
can agree entirely according to their essence. But in existing they must differ.” 184 Because
everyone does not use reason regularly, this insight demonstrates that human essence agrees in
being made of degrees of power but existence differs on a singular level. Perhaps this would
have been a great proposition to begin this chapter with, but it logically synthesizes with other
important ideas currently to create more ideational power. As Antonio Negri writes, “The realm
in which singularities are immersed, the phenomenological fabric of existence, is in fact a fabric
of hard relations...”185 Hard relations require individuals with reflective consciousness. Negri
often refers to Spinoza's system as that which has “personality,” and as a realistic ethics for
living; as that which lucidly describes the nature of true human experiences. And, as Anthony
Uhlmann writes in Spinoza Now, “Intuition, then, also involves affect...”186 Spinoza confirms this
when he writes in Chapter 4 of the TTP that what it entails for us to have knowledge of an effect
through its cause “is nothing other than the knowledge of a property of that cause...”187
The best we can do is adequately conceive of the cause of our effects which is both
involved in those effects and stronger than them. Spinoza, in discussing the impossibility of
miracles, writes:
For since a miracle is an event of a limited nature, expressing a power that is never other
than fixed and limited, from such an effect we could not possibly conclude the existence
of a cause whose power is greater than that effect. I say 'the most' because an event can
also be the result of several simultaneously concurring causes, the force and power of the
result being less than all the causes taken together, but far greater than the power of each
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separate cause.188
The adequate idea of God is an eternal expression. The Hebrew term for both thought as
deliberation and for vigilance is mezima. Spinoza wrote a compendium for Hebrew grammar so
he was highly familiar with the language and its many uses. As already noted, the Hebrew word
for what it is to know something can also be defined as what it is to love. In addition, the Hebrew
word for God can also be defined as “to be.” Thus, to know is to deliberate and to have vigilance
in doing so. It is also to love, just as we see in Spinoza’s definition of blessedness, and to love
can also be understood as what it is to exist. In an absolutely beautiful and modern passage,
Spinoza summarizes these deductions in E4p45s. I quote the passage at length as no element can
be left out. The passage is at the heart of Spinoza's dynamic proto-physics of thought and action
and a theory of human affects:
Nothing forbids our pleasure except a savage and sad superstition. For why is it more
proper to relieve our hunger and thirst than to rid ourselves of melancholy? My account
of the matter, the view I have arrived at, is this: no deity, nor anyone else, unless he is
envious, takes pleasure in my lack of power and my misfortune; nor does he ascribe to
virtue our tears, sighs, fear, and any other things of that kind, which are signs of a weak
mind. On the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the
perfection to which we pass, that is, the more we must participate in the divine nature. To
use things, therefore, and take pleasure in them as far as possible...this is the part of a
wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation
with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with
decoration, music, sports, the theater, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use
without injury to another. For the human body is composed of a great many parts of
different natures, which constantly require new and varied nourishment, so that the whole
body may be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and
hence, so that the mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things at
once.189
The transitions to greater degrees of perfection are discussed in the preface to E4, and they bring
us greater and greater joys of all types. Spinoza explains that perfection is the adequate
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understanding of “reality.” Yet, not all knowledge of reality is joyous. Our greater disposition
towards understanding reality involves intuitive knowing because it is the understanding of “the
essence of each thing insofar as it exists and produces effects” without regard to its duration.190
We can have an idea that is conceived both as constituting God's idea and as not
constituting it.191 It is here, among other places, that I feel theories of representation will not
work to fully capture Spinoza's system. For example, Della Rocca writes, “Similarly, the fact that
a given idea has one content relative to God's mind and a different content relative to the human
mind must be explained by some difference between the two minds.”192 But the point is that we
can never know God's mind fully or we would be God. We can only know our mind as ideas, and
we understand that its power of adequate expression is God conceived as a thinking thing
expressing itself as natural phenomena. We, therefore, have no real need to distinguish between
this difference Della Rocca points to. We can investigate with more depth human phenomena as
expressions of God (or Nature’s laws).
Rationality can recognize the truth of the limits of human finiteness while also
maintaining a disposition towards its own continued activity as an expression of an eternal
substance. In E4p18s we read, “Since reason demands nothing contrary to Nature, it demands
that everyone love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, want what
really leads a man to greater perfection...This, indeed, is as necessarily true as that the whole is
greater than its part...”193 But one's mind cannot operate in isolation. If a mind and body did not
understand anything but itself it would be imperfect and there is nothing imperfect in Nature.
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Spinoza continues, “There are, therefore, many things outside us which are useful to us, and on
that account should be sought. Of these, we can think of none more excellent than those which
agree entirely with our nature...”194 These activities aid in our capacity to produce more powerful
effects, especially when we combine with others of a similar nature and disposition to form a
larger body of action. As Richard Mason summarizes so well:
The system is meant to be self-propelling. Knowledge of nature – of our nature – can lead
to virtue because we will correctly understand our interests as part of our nature, and we
want such knowledge because our nature also includes a positive drive towards activity –
an accumulation of truths and a diminution of falsehoods. We want knowledge not
because truth is attractive – that would be teleology – but because the positive side of our
nature has a drive towards it...195
As we read in E4p66, a proposition which is key to the adequate understanding of the Ethics,
when we are acting from reason “we want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present
one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.”196
Virtue was discussed as part of reason in Chapter Three, but it must also include the
nature of affect and power in intuitive knowledge as well. Virtue is a part of our rational use of
imaginative knowledge to enhance our power and expressions of thought and extension. Yet, if
so, then as we read in E4p17s earlier, affects and the use of reason are different, as reason cannot
control all of our affects. Spinoza reminds us that we have to learn about the power of reason so
we can distinguish what reason can and cannot do in relation to our affects. In this way, what is
written in books 4 and 5 of the Ethics on virtue and power is critical to evaluate correctly. For
example, 4p20 states that virtue is “human power itself, which is defined by man's essence
alone...,” and in 4p22c we read that our self-preservation “is the first and only foundation of
194
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virtue.”197 Recall, in the TTP, that a man can strive to preserve his or her nature without the use
of reason. If affects are also about power, and not everyone uses reason well, then virtue is
conceptually about more than that which involves only adequate ideas. This is also why, I
believe, Spinoza injects another idea about what it is “to be blessed” right between these two
propositions in 4p21. In 4p21 we learn one has first to desire “to be, to act, and to live, that is, to
actually exist” before they can then desire “to act well and to live well.”198 This is also why
suicide cannot be a justified rational action according to this system. You have to desire to exist
before you can also desire to live and act well. Even so, we still learn that all of Nature benefits
and we increase our own advantage by using reason. By reasoning well our desire to understand
more is strengthened, but this leads us to understanding that God and Nature are identical, at
least in the sense of what a human mind can rationally comprehend: “Knowledge of God is the
mind's greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God.”199 And we could not exist nor be
conceived if we “did not have the power to enjoy this greatest good.” 200 We might ask at this
point if a phenomenological account of temporality is required? One example to explain why we
have to include some temporal concerns (even though duration is only partial knowledge) is
found at the start of E4 in the preface:
But here it should be noted in addition that just as we can distinctly imagine distance of
place only up only up to a certain limit, so also we can distinctly imagine distance of time
only up to a certain limit. ...we imagine to be equally far from the present all those
objects whose time of existing we imagine to be separated from the present by an interval
longer than that we are used to imagining distinctly; so we relate them, as it were, to one
moment in time.”201
The dynamics of force and power involved in the expressions of Nature are infinitely
Spinoza, Ethics, 4p20, 4p22c: 126, 127. In chapter 3 of the unfinished PT we read that the most essential feature
of a human being is “to preserve themselves” and that this preservation is a “striving.”
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more complex than any one body.202 Our tendency towards both understanding and doing many
things at once is a type of stability that increases in strength. The complexities are actually that
which can be combined in order to become more useful, more powerful in its effects, and thus
more joyous and pleasurable. This level of power in ideational awareness is directly correlated to
an individual's increase in reflective awareness and intuitive knowledge. Our method of
investigating the object of our ideas as other ideas is an effect of being capable of better
recognizing and using true ideas about knowledge and things. This is why we need to investigate
and pay more attention to the importance of imaginative knowledge in understanding Spinoza’s
dynamic epistemology. Beth Lord writes, “Passive joys are important in increasing our power to
act and think, just as imagination is important in increasing our rational knowledge...”203
The more you read the Ethics and other works, the more you understand the nature of
your own ideas, which causes more joy and desire for knowledge. The Ethics becomes a tool for
growth in personal self-awareness and further understanding of laws of Nature (which apply to
all things), but also of continuous understanding about the environments that we influence and
are influenced by. The increased knowledge we gain through reason coincides simultaneously
with an increase in the ways in which our body is affected and can affect others, including the
ways in which we can experience joy and develop better methods for understanding. This is why,
as Dan Selcer notes, experimentation is a part of intuitive knowledge for Spinoza. Note what is
written in the TEI that aligns with what will later be systematized in the Ethics in this respect:
“...they [we] have reached a point where they can make very many complex things with little
labour. In just the same way the intellect by its inborn power makes intellectual tools for itself by
Recently a Chronicle of Higher Education article, dedicated to fairly assessing Tom Nagel's 2012 now heretical
work Mind and Cosmos, noted the following: “The chemist Addy Pross...argues that life exhibits 'dynamic kinetic
stability,' in which self-replicating systems become more stable through becoming more complex – and are therefore
inherently driven to do so (Michael Chorost, May 13, 2013).” I wonder how this might apply to our ideas?
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which it acquires other powers for other intellectual works, and from these works still other tools
- or capacity for further investigation...”204 Just as it is of God, as a thinking thing, who can
conceive an idea of its own essence and all which follows from that essence, we too, in our own
degree of rational power can formulate an adequate series of ideas about our essence and what
can (and cannot) follow from that essence. And in this way, thought and extension, or God and
Nature as one substance, are one and the same thing.205
Between ideas of the first kind and ideas of the second and third kinds there is a
significant ontological and epistemological shift of emphasis. Spinoza writes:
Men have been so mad as to believe that God is pleased by harmony... All of these things
show sufficiently that each one has judged things according to the disposition of his
brain; or rather, has accepted affections of the imagination as things... For although
human bodies agree in many things, they still differ in very many. And for that reason
what seems good to one, seems bad to another; what seems ordered to one, seems
confused to another... We see, therefore, that all notions by which ordinary people are
accustomed to explain Nature are only modes of imagining...206
Experiencing real joy includes the ideas of the imagination, but the intellectual love of God is
also a type of joy. This is more than just bodily pleasure. It is not only the knowledge of
harmony, as is also written in the PT, but this level of joy involves homeostatic conatus with
increased energy, peace, and seeking environments which allow us to thrive. Spinoza emphasizes
this aspect of conatus specifically in E3p1. As an idea “in itself is nothing but a certain kind of
awareness,”207 if ideas are also actions, then conscious reflection on a singular level must be part
of the ontological equation we seek in our understanding. In Chapter 8 of the PT we learn, “For
he who swears by God puts at stake a private good of which he alone knows the value, but he
who by his oath puts at stake the freedom and welfare of his country is swearing by the common
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good of all, the value of which is not set by him [but by as many equally rational collective
interests as compose the body of the state]...”208
The knowledge of the essence of things comes with adequate thinking, which can
transform understanding into intuitive knowledge. When we have true knowledge of the causes
of our ideas and actions, we have more knowledge about ideational and extensive effects. This
includes a rational process that is the understanding of the scientific principles of thought
(common notions) and our relations to the environment.209 This is also why Spinoza writes in
several places:
...the more the mind understands of Nature, the better it understands itself...the more
things the mind knows, the better it understands both its own powers and the order of
Nature. Now the better it understands its own powers, the more easily it can direct itself
and lay down rules for its own guidance; and the better it understands the order of Nature,
the more easily it can restrain itself from useless pursuits.210
Another way to explain this level of intellectual love and affection is to consider that if there is a
God, the best we can do as expressions of laws of Nature is to better understand those laws. This
will bring us closer to a better understanding and stronger expression of God. The sentiment is
about understanding the nature of one's essence and its power to reproduce its natural force, and,
therefore, to express Nature with more power. These registers of degrees of power of thought and
action is why I read Spinoza’s system as a proto-physics of force. The continuous increases in
power is not caused by our knowing the adequate reason or true cause alone, although this does
add to that power. It is also about the simultaneous process that is cause and effect at once,
understood as one and the same thing, as substance itself in its nature as self-caused. This
transforms our adequate understanding about what causes and effects are and can do.
Maintaining the force and intuitive understanding of power and virtue as a common disposition
Spinoza, TP, 119.
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takes more than habit formation, especially because such knowledge is “both difficult and rare.”
It also requires what was described in previous chapters as habitual readiness, for such
knowledge is strengthened the more we understand the mechanics involved. Our strengthened
habitual readiness is what Spinoza is referring to with the meaning and use of the term quatenus
or “in so far as...,” a term relied on often throughout the Ethics related to which perspective one
can acquire according to type(s) of knowledge being relied on. If you are focused on only your
sensations, for example, then you are too reliant on imaginative ideas and lack understanding.
Care for our ideas and actions involves how we use ideas accompanying our actions,
what affects we experience, access, and produce for ourselves and others, and how much these
ideas increase the power to produce related ideas that include more creative and effective actions.
You can engage in activities with others, but still lack the true understanding of the laws of
Nature that your actions are abiding by, that is, of the causes of your affects that increase and
decrease your power of thought and action. The more rationality understands the laws of thought,
the more it can use the imagination to its benefit. If our circumstances are limited by external
causes, the power to imagine those things that we have already rationally experienced that
brought us joy becomes particularly important for our peace of mind and overall homeostasis.
If we govern everything from our affects, what we can learn how to do is act with a level
of rational and intuitive force which expresses the intellectual love of God. This is because we
can both imagine what causes real happiness and power in us and use reason to reflect with
regular awareness on the causes of those particular affects in their laws of force and motion.
When we imagine what we love we also imagine that it is preserved, for example. 211 The
stronger the affect of joy and love, the stronger our desire arises from such joy.212 What we can
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learn how to do is “apply one's zeal to those things which help to bring men together in harmony
and friendship.”213 This level of love and nobility requires “skill and alertness” which varies for
each of us in degrees of power. It requires so much alertness that Spinoza writes in the KV that
we should not even speak of such things to others unless they too are of a rational and alert
disposition: “I do not want to say that you should absolutely keep them to yourselves, but only
that if ever you begin to communicate them to anybody, then let no other aim prompt you except
only happiness of your neighbour, being at the same time clearly assured by him that the reward
will not disappoint your labour.”214 Spinoza is interested in the ways in which we conserve and
use our energies, aiming as often as possible to add to the joyous affects of others.215
Because of the variation in levels of power and experience, a method is employable for
all to understand how to use in Spinoza’s system, but it still “requires a singular power of mind
to bear with each one according to his understanding...”216 Not only according to each of our
levels of individual understanding, but also, as we read in the KV, “we could not exist without
enjoying something with which we become united, and from which we draw strength,” that is,
love and knowledge are “a union with the object which our understanding judges to be good and
glorious; and by this we mean such a union whereby both the lover and what is loved become
one and the same thing, or together constitute one whole.”217 In other words, through the
intellectual love of God we become one with God (Nature).
To summarize, this chapter has demonstrated that adequate reasoning, including
reasoning about how to access imaginative knowledge in ways that aid reasoning, are required
for the increased capacities to think and act with more force, as well as for the intellectual love of
Spinoza, Ethics, 4 appendix XIV: 157.
Spinoza, KV, 2:26: 102.
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God (and Nature). As we move into the last book of the Ethics we learn that conscious
awareness, reflection, and alertness are continually required. Joy can be excessive “unless reason
and alertness are present.”218 As Stuart Hampshire writes, in adequate thinking we move from
using reason to understanding that we are not a “particular standpoint and location in time,” but
intuitively we know that we are “parts of the eternal framework of Reality.”219 That which is an
expression of an eternal reality is an absolute affirmation. Right at the start of the Ethics in 1p11s
Spinoza is already preparing us for how this level of conscious alertness works. We can only take
the perspective of a singular finite individual, but we understand rationally that we are also an
expression of substance, and substance is an eternal affirmation of itself:
For things that come to be from external causes – whether they consist of many parts or
of few – owe all the perfection or reality they have to the power of the external cause; and
therefore their existence arises only from the perfection of their external cause, and not
from their own perfection. On the other hand, whatever perfection substance has is not
owed to any external cause. So its existence must follow from its nature alone; hence its
existence is nothing but its essence. Perfection, therefore, does not take away the
existence of a thing, but on the contrary asserts it.220
In the same proposition we also learn that human beings can create each other in existence
(procreation of the species), but we cannot create another individual's essence. Spinoza writes,
“because whatsoever exists in Nature, if we entertain any wish about it, then we must always
improve it, whether for our sake or for the sake of the thing itself. And since a perfect man is the
best thing for us that we know of all that we have around us and before our eyes, it is by far the
best both for us and for all people individually that we should at all times seek to educate them to
this perfect state.”221 Thus, Spinoza’s Ethics involves human education. The nature of our
essence and existence in transformation involves increased capacities for true knowledge and
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powerful (creative) activities, and includes the alertness of such passages to greater perfection.
That which is our striving, that is, “the better part of us,” agrees with what is most beneficial and
joyous for us and for a rational collective. This is the love of God, an awareness of one's essence
in-so-far-as it acts. As self-caused and self-causing, God is always in action (an absolute
affirmation). To be free is to join in continuous and creative democratic collectives with others,
but not without enjoying one's own singular ways of being. Because a rational collective is aware
of their shared experience, we can rejoice in the joy of others. Spinoza writes, “Indeed
blessedness is nothing but that satisfaction of mind which stems from the intuitive knowledge of
God.”222 Intuitive knowledge is as important for correctly interpreting Spinoza’s system as are
the first two kinds of knowledge, imaginative and rational.
In the conclusion of this thesis, I address some weaknesses of Spinoza’s dynamic
epistemology, but end with an emphasis on using such a system to strengthen our creativity. In
the KV, Spinoza writes, “For it is precisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a
cause, and not the general, because they are nothing.”70 Intuitive and operational knowledge aid
not only the rational collective, but also singular joy and expressions of creativity. In the preface
to his translation of Spinoza’s works in 1982, Samuel Shirley writes:
Can the essence of God be seen as the source of the ill-understood phenomena that we
call artistic creativity? In the ‘conatus’ of human beings, a conatus that derives from
God’s potential, do we see a shadow, an image, of God’s creativity, finding expression
most markedly in the process of artistic creativity?223
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CONCLUSION
SPINOZA TODAY
“Curiosity about the object of knowledge and the willingness and openness to engage theoretical
readings and discussions is fundamental. However, I am not suggesting an over-celebration of
theory. We must not negate practice for the sake of theory… By the same token, to negate theory
for the sake of practice, as in the use of dialogue as conversation, is to run the risk of losing
oneself in the disconnectedness of practice. It is for this reason that I never advocate either a
theoretic elitism or a practice ungrounded in theory, but the unity between theory and practice.
In order to achieve this unity, one must have an epistemological curiosity – a curiosity that is
often missing in dialogue as conversation.”
“But action is human only when it is not merely an occupation but also a preoccupation…”
-Paulo Freire
“To have work that promotes one's liberation is such a powerful gift that it does not matter so
much if the gift is flawed... When our lived experience of theorizing is fundamentally linked to
processes of self-recovery, of collective liberation, no gap exists between theory and practice...
Theory is not inherently healing, liberatory, or revolutionary. It fulfills this function only when
we ask that it do so and direct our theorizing towards this end.” -bell hooks
“Human activity dignifies the song.” -Leonard Cohen
Spinoza’s Dynamic Epistemology and the Enhancement of Creativity
In A manifesto for cyborgs, philosopher Donna Haraway writes about the legitimacy of
understanding and using various forms of epistemology today. Echoing Paulo Freire, Haraway
writes, “In the consciousness of our failures, we risk lapsing into boundless difference and giving
up on the confusing task of making a partial, real connection. Some differences are playful; some
are poles of world historical systems of domination. Epistemology is about knowing the
difference.”1 There are multiple ways to evaluate, theorize about, and utilize the methods and
applications found in theories of knowledge. The term “epistemology” has a questionable history
in Western philosophy in the ways in which it normalizes certain terminology and concepts that
apply only to a privileged group of thinkers (typically male for example). But I believe we can
As noted in the opening to Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology edited by Kathleen
Lennon and Margaret Whitford (1994), emphasis added.
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say how much this term and concept changes throughout the epochs depending on what we learn
and the new kinds of knowledge we gain. What is involved in the examination of various forms
of knowledge can be summarized as a variation on what it is “to know,” and what types of
knowledge are rationally legitimate, as well as what we take as our objects of knowledge. We can
explore theories of knowledge without falling back into the dangerous and often destructive
ground of placing more value on theory or traditional problems of the concept of what is
considered “objective.”2 As Alison Baily writes, we need to be careful what we value (and how
often, thus repetition takes on new meaning as a method of investigation) when discussing the
nature of true ideas; that is, we need to recognize when we hold an idea as more valuable than
the actual experiences of human beings and our relationships with each other: “Sometimes [in
philosophy] we hold concepts so tightly that our love for them replaces our love for one another.
We care more for the coherence of our arguments than for the coherence of our relationships.”3
I have used the chapters of this thesis to provide more rigorous and systematic evidence
that we can rely on Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology to apply to our everyday lives and
(methodologically) to larger social, scientific, theological, and philosophical debates today. The
laws of thought and action read as a proto-physics of ideational force and motion can be accessed
with greater ease, efficiency, and creativity by each of us, and used collectively to create
affirmative changes with stronger results.
One reason we can access such a system today as Spinoza's includes that there is infinite
room for the development of creativity, novel concept creation, and various applications in ethics
and human psychology, for example, by understanding this kind of dynamic epistemology. As
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Beth Lord writes, “Experimental art is, like experimental science, based on combining ordered
thought with affective experience; it explores processes of making and relating things together in
order to understand the world more clearly.”4 In this way, Spinoza’s epistemology can be
demonstrated through the arts.5 For purposes of this chapter, that epistemological art is learning
and teaching philosophy specifically, or what we might do to strengthen philosophical thinking.
We are also free to use philosophical systems in new ways that apply to our current
context.6 It is also worth noting that one of the feminist pioneers to write against the theoretical
Western “Man of Reason” (MOR), Genevieve Lloyd, was also a Spinoza scholar. She advocated
for using his system to address on-going social issues and epistemological concerns, including
the problem of gender and meaning in the philosophical systems we chose to emphasize and
repeat. Lloyd writes:
Taking temporal distance seriously [between old systems as compared to how we think
today] demands also of course that we keep firmly in view what the thinkers themselves
saw as central to their projects. This exercise involves a constant tension between the
need to confront past ideals with perspectives drawn from the present and, on the other
hand, an equally strong demand to present fairly what the authors took themselves to be
doing. A constructive resolution of the tensions between contemporary feminism and past
Philosophy requires that we do justice to both demands.7
Not only can Spinoza's proto-physics of ideational force and activity enhance individual
and collective (rationally powerful) uses of creativity and strategies for problem solving, it can
also be understood as an alley for philosophies of race which address on-going problems of
Lord, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 8. This work combines Spinoza’s system with various themes of art and
creativity.
5
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racism that persist today, including in the ways in which we “do” philosophy. Spinoza's system is
not without critique.8 I will briefly address some of the weaknesses of his system before ending
this thesis on the productive uses of a proto-physics of force and motion that can enhance
creativity and understanding.
To have an increased capacity for reflection on not only one's knowledge but also the
methods of construction of that knowledge only allows the development of a better capacity to
use knowledge in powerful and collective ways. What is the difference between words on a page
and paint on a canvas or actors on a stage if all of these arts can produce similarly powerful,
affirmative effects? As Moira Gatens writes, “Spinoza's non-dualistic metaphysics offers
interesting possibilities for conceiving of the transformation of social and political life.” 9 Of
course, Spinoza was very interested in the production of material effects through reading and
writing, or what we might understand as the arrangement of words in a certain order so to create
real effects.10 He was also highly invested in what a rational political life consists of. In the TTP,
we read, “Furthermore, as we have a better understanding of a person's character and
temperament, so we can more easily explain his words.”11 In this way, as problematic as it may
be to categorize people by temperament (because as we learn we can change the ways in which
we live, think, and act etc.), both imaginative and rational knowledge work together with the
capacity to produce real material (ethical) effects. Warren Montag writes:
The meanings (both literal and metaphorical) of a word or phrase must be determined by
reference to established linguistic usage alone. Language is not a reservoir of possible
The term “womanism” was first used by Angela Davis. I will define womanist epistemology in more detail as we
proceed.
9
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meanings waiting to be realized, although it is this in the case of poetry and related of
course. On the contrary, meaning always exists in an actualized state and the set of
meanings attached to a given phrase is finite, limited to those meanings actually in use...12
Again, repetition becomes an important theme to pay attention to. The above insight becomes
especially powerful if the limited contexts in use that are recognizable to reader and writer can
overlap each other in diverse and meaningful ways creating new affirmative effects as affects.
I believe there is another question about the definition of subjectivity in philosophy that
can be addressed from a Deleuzian perspective in support of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology
being applicable today. One aspect includes that Deleuze makes an excellent case for the notion
of subjectivity when he identifies what he calls the “plane of organization” and the “plane of
immanence.” Planes of organization in our social, political, biological, and personal language are
not the only elements of idea formation and physical motion we are capable of. We are also
planes of immanence which are continually “deteritorialized” on a daily basis, and this includes
“lines of flight” and dynamic intensities created by our ideas and action that cannot be
completely categorized, classified, or closed off by any definition or theory of knowledge. In
other words, continuous understanding and the processes of the ontology of the everyday are
open ended. Our experience of the plane of immanence includes several layers of flows,
transformations, and the unnamable between the myriad of shifting ideas and actions we produce
and encounter. Nonetheless, this does not mean we cannot evaluate such lines of flight.13
Deleuze’s philosophy becomes even more interesting when combined with Spinoza’s dynamic
epistemology because he relied on the latter’s system in massive ways in his own work and
education in philosophy, especially involving the ideas and actions of creativity, concept

Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power, 9-10.
See Gilles Deleuze’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (Minneapolis: University of
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creation, and experimentation.14 More importantly for this thesis, Deleuze used and relied on the
idea of “ethology” as the study of human (animal) behavior. Moira Gatens describes the
implications of a Spinozist ethology in thinking and acting in her work well. In an essay titled
“Feminism as 'Password': Re-thinking the 'Possible' with Spinoza and Deleuze,” Gatens
describes Deleuze’s version of a Spinozist ethology as follows:
'Ethology is first of all the study of the relations of speed and slowness, of the capacities
for affecting and being affected that characterizes each thing.' If we understand a rulebased morality as one which addresses itself to molar subjects, then ethology may be
understood as offering an ethics of the molecular, a micropolitics concerned with the 'inbetween' of subjects, with that which passes between them and which manifests the range
of their possible becomings... An ethological evaluation will not select subjects, animals,
or persons categorized according to species and genus, but rather will individuate
according to principles of compossibility, sets of fast or slow combinations, the range of
affects and degrees and affectability... A Spinozist will insist that to think differently is,
by definition, to exist differently: one's power of thinking is inseparable from one's power
of being and vice versa.15
Note that the above reference is both for singular human subjects and about the forces
and power between humans and other bodies (both human and non-human) in Nature. As we've
read in the last five chapters, Spinoza’s system can be applied in ways that better strengthen our
capacities for creatively powerful thought and actions. Placing together the various ways that this
kind of system can be applied across disciplines will have more powerfully affirmative effects
then if we were to remain only within our respective disciplines. Gatens continues, “Creation
displaces the command function of language, it expresses a new action, it calls upon the
'commander' to react or flee because it shows his world as one possible world rather than the
world.”16 In other words, as an action creating can be revolutionary. In this vein, I diverge from
the usual way of writing a doctoral thesis for a moment and embrace my creative side:
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“What is truly Spinozist about this architecture is the fact that
one is forced to develop the second degree of knowledge
(the one that makes your body compose harmonious relations
with your physical environment) that can ultimately flirt
with the third one (a perfect reading of the material assemblages
in their movement of speed and slowness). The outcome
of such a conquest is an increase of power (potentia),
hence the joy to which I was referring in the original text. The
joy is quite literal in the case of the playgrounds...
In a society of idols and comfort that
serve the exact opposite purpose, we absolutely need more
architectures of Spinozist joy.”17
There are significant aesthetic, social, ethical, and intellectual conditions of various
kinds that apply to innovative problem solving in a modern, technological age and Spinoza’s
dynamic proto-physics of thought and action can aid our problem solving capacities with
rational force and efficiency. Another way to summarize the point can be expressed by the writer
Saul Bellow in his novel Humboldt’s Gift:
He wanted to be magically and cosmically expressive and articulate, able to say anything;
he wanted also to be wise, philosophical, to find the common ground of poetry and
science, to prove that the imagination was just as potent as machinery, to free and to bless
humankind.18
This is why things become even more interesting when we are discussing what it is a body can
do, or rather, what a body can become, such as Deleuze writes when he states, “Spinoza offers
philosophers a new model: the body.”19 Innovative thinking is critical in so many aspects of our
lives. To be regularly creative and original is virtually impossible to enact (although I have met
individuals who try to live this as a daily ethic, creating powerfully affirmative effects
continuously), but various levels and types of creative thinking through ideational fluidity in the
ontology of the everyday is possible for anyone using reason and understanding with increasing
force. One of the most difficult aspects of creative thinking includes the risk it involves, as any
The Funambulist Pamphlets, Vol. 1, chapter 7 (40).
Saul Bellow, Humboldt’s Gift. (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 120.
19
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experiment might. There is no teleology to look forward to and the range of outcomes are
virtually unknown. Yet, if you have a method that guarantees an increase in understanding and
reasoning capacities, then the potential harmful risk and margin for error significantly
diminishes. One example I use involves how to relieve the more taxing elements of creative,
critical thinking to include “contagious,” joyous affects while helping to eradicate some of
society's challenging problems (such as racism or sexism for example). When it comes to
invention, creatively powerful, rational groups of ideas can be immensely joyous, reaching more
than just a few individuals. I like how Alexis Philonenko describes the act of writing, innovation,
and affecting others using a good method:
The creative flashes of writing are a spattering of dirty and dangerous mud…the writerphilosopher is an energumenos, a person possessed… To write is to dirty one’s hands, to
give over that ultimate thought by which one is possessed to anyone and everyone, and to
risk not being understood…one must be prepared to be invaded in every part by
writing… Man writes everywhere – in his churches, in his ships, in his fortresses, in his
houses, in his paintings, in his gardens. The field of writing is immense… Innovation,
repeated but not imitated, allows us to plunge into myth, into the essence of things – their
power of renewed presence…20
As we’ve already read, understanding the essence of singular things in the present is
using intuitive knowledge in the application of our understanding with more effective force.
What Spinoza teaches us is that by understanding the process of thinking in these ways more
adequately, we are better able to cope, experience joy, and have the greater part of our mind
enhanced by continued adequate thinking. This is what a body can do. As Deleuze writes, “To
think is to create – there is no other creation – but to create is first of all to engender 'thinking' in
thought.”21 We combine with others to create and manifest new things, but each individual body
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is necessary in those instances for producing greater effects. This is why there is no need for a
theoretical erasing of the concepts of “subject” and “object.” To do so would disavow the
subjective experiences of others which differ from our own, a point made in Chapter Five by
Ursula Renz about Spinoza’s epistemology. In this respect, we can return to the practice of a
Spinozist ethology to further our understanding while remaining critically aware of the dangers
of repeating forms and methods that can be problematic and biased. Gatens continues:
One cannot predict merely from the form of a body all the relations and affects of which
it is capable... From the standpoint of ethology, sex, gender, race, and class distinctions
appear as coagulations of molecular combinations, strata of more or less stable
configurations that are held in place by a complex variety of practices that are at once
discursive (for example, the human sciences), normative (for example, medical and legal
'codes'), and subjectifying (subjects designated as 'woman,' 'native,' 'mentally ill')... On
the ethological view, ways of being both implicate and explicate ways of knowing, that
is, both the power of thought and the power of existing express a mode of embodied
life...22
By enhancing our diversity of experiences, we increase our reflective awareness of cause
and effect processes in Nature, but we also enhance our capacities to gain new knowledge (and
then use that knowledge in novel and enjoyable ways). This is why it is quite amusing to read
Spinoza’s fairly extensive list of human affects at the end of E3. For example, at one point we
read about how important it is to experiment with cooking and food in order to enhance the
diversity of our levels of possible joy and adding to our knowledge. Recall that it is also in E3
that Spinoza writes that we define as good “every kind of [rational] joy, and whatever leads to it,
and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever that may be.”23
Yet, even if we accept Spinoza's position on the necessity of laws of Nature, what we
have learned is that there are several different ways to reflect on and use one's ideas, actions,
preferences, and alterations in habitual readiness in more creative ways. In a recent anthology of
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interdisciplinary essays on the history of the concept of habit in the Western canon, philosophers
Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson write, “...habit is never simply an aspect of what people do
or what occurs in their bodies, and it is much more than a name for what happens when humans
mimic machines.”24 Habit, in other words, is not only something physical. Spinoza's system
allows for creatively powerful applications across interests and disciplines as well. Beth Lord
writes, Spinoza's system is inter-disciplinary in two ways: “...his thought, while expounding a
complex metaphysics and epistemology, ventures into physics, politics and hermeneutics, and
while Spinoza is studied mainly as a philosopher today, he is widely read and cited by many
others. Categorizing his work as 'philosophy' is restrictive, for he is interested in truth, wherever
that may be found.”25
It is those with the courage to be vulnerable in informed ways who enjoy true happiness,
are genuinely open to gaining real and continuously altering forms of knowledge or knowing
(especially for new experiences, new ways of learning, or true aspects of reality that they
previously thought were not possible etc.), and so forth.26 Spinoza advocates for rationally
exploring in experimental ways in order to gain both new knowledge and have new experiences.
When we are habitually ready to learn more, opening ourselves up to being wrong or
understanding something through another's lens, we become more interested in learning as an
aspect of our essence and of Nature. In such practices, our tendencies towards more education
and uses of reasoning are enhanced, and we desire to understand more about how the effects of
learning involve pleasurable experiences and outcomes, both bodily and intellectually, and on
Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson, ed. A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu. (New York: Lexington
Books, 2013), introduction.
25
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both collective and individual levels.
This is exactly what philosopher George Yancy will describe as included in his teaching
pedagogy in the philosophy classroom; that is, for all involved in a learning environment to
allow a space for the validity of real, lived experiences, including subjective reports (personal
narratives) as legitimate forms of knowledge. This involves altering some of the ways in which
philosophy has traditionally been done in the classroom. Yancy writes, “It is necessary to rethink
the ways in which philosophy speaks to the mind and the heart.”27 The idea of fearless speech,
and what Yancy also calls fearless listening, are practices that we can all engage in when learning
about different types of knowledge, experience, and ways of knowing. 28 In this respect, the
following bears repeating. Pierre Macherey writes:
...the power of the intellect is not determined a priori by conditions that would limit its
activity...the reflexive knowledge that has for an 'object' the power of the intellect, is not
the condition of the manifestation of the true but on the contrary, its effects, its results.
The method does not precede the development of knowledges, but it expresses or reflects
it. What this implies is that it is necessary to produce real ideas before being about to 'recognize’...the conditions of their understanding.29
Therefore, experimentation and imaginative knowledge in learning will be crucial for new ways
of being.30 Spinoza’s system, in my reading, cannot be adequately understood, used, or
developed without the inclusion of imaginative knowledge in the importance of rational
capacities. In this is another powerful ideational tool or methodological device we can access
which Spinoza refers to as levity. There is much work to be done on Spinoza and the experience
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of levity. For Spinoza, when we experience levity we are also the most open to forming
powerfully creative, rational groups of ideas and actions with others. Is it not the case that when
we genuinely laugh together we are the closest, and that we might say, in that moment of levity
we are in union with each other as one body of thought and experience?31
Ursula Renz has noted that to read Spinoza well is to read his ethics in conjunction with
anthropology, among other areas.32 This is yet another aspect of Spinoza’s system in its
interdisciplinary applications. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, an understanding of
how affects work are prior to any real understanding of effective ethical relations with others,
something demonstrated throughout this thesis. In this way, I appeal to how Stuart Hampshire
summarizes Spinoza's contemporary systematic possibilities when he writes, “Nothing is more
useful to a person, [Spinoza] claims, than the added strength that comes from the union with
other persons in a community, which then becomes itself an individual thing, with its own drive
to self-preservation.”33 Spinoza’s system has also been used in the advocacy for green politics
and environmental philosophy, as another example of its interdisciplinary applications. Although
his works can be and are tools of motivation, inspiration, understanding, rigorous scholarship,
art, science, philosophy, psychology, ethical and political theory, and theological criticism, one
friend turned foe critiqued Spinoza's character and ideas in an exchange of letters, stating:
You claim to have finally discovered the true philosophy. How do you know that your
philosophy is the best out of all those that have ever been taught in this world, are at
present being taught, or will ever be taught in the future? To say nothing of possible
future philosophies, have you examined all those philosophies, throughout the entire
world? And even if you have examined them properly, how do you know that you have
In his biography on Spinoza, Steve Nadler points to a note by someone who knew about Spinoza’s overall
personality, wit, intelligence, and charm with all who he came into contact with, writing, “Lucas tries to convey just
this when he writes that… ‘He had a wit so well seasoned that the most gentle and the most severe found very
peculiar charm in it (196).’”
32
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chosen the best? ...Come to your senses, philosopher, acknowledge the folly of your
wisdom, and that your wisdom is madness.34
Certainly, not all communities with increasing strength are beneficial to the larger whole
of humanity, such as white supremacist organizations like the Klu Klux Klan, for example.
Regardless of their strength in numbers, the pathological ideals, lack of the use of reason, and
continuous violent actions of such groups are harmful to society at large. For example, the types
of sad passions such groups might engage in will end up being more destructive than beneficial
to the larger whole, will not last as long, will use up more energy to the point of lacking the
motivation to think with reason and community. To address one way Spinoza countered his
critics, we can refer back to an early and beautiful passage where Spinoza confesses in Letter 19:
For my part, of all the things that are not under my control, what I most value is to enter
into a bond of friendship with sincere lovers of truth. For I believe that such a loving
relationship affords a serenity surpassing any other boon in the whole wide world. The
love that such men bear to one another, grounded as it is in the love that each has for
knowledge of truth, is as unshakable as is the acceptance of truth once it has been
perceived.35
In addition, we can turn to E3p46, a proposition that encourages the joining with others from
another nation or class.36 In the unfinished TP, we also read about how to allow marriages
between countries (nations) and account for their children as equal citizens in their country of
birth as a democratic action. This is why Debra Nails writes that Spinoza demonstrates that he
was “...the philosopher [of the Early Modern and Modern periods] who provokes the deepest and
most difficult philosophical questions about race...”37 Spinoza did accomplish what Nails
suggests with his overall system if you place together several of his texts, but he did so in a
limited sense. For example, there are other elements to the otherwise unfinished TP which

Spinoza, Letter 66: 922, 928.
Spinoza, Letter 19: 807-808.
36
Spinoza, Ethics, 3p46: 94.
37
Nails, “Metaphysics at the Barricades: Spinoza and Race,” 57.
34
35

374

continue to support the position that Spinoza's overall ethic can be applied to the philosophy of
race as a white ally, but there are also comments made in this text which are negative
assessments of both women and those known as “slaves” in the Seventeen Century.38
Nonetheless, Spinoza offers a distinction between what it means to be free as compared to what
it is to be a slave. Charlie Huenemann writes, “A community of Spinozists sages would establish
a harmonious social order with ease.”39 In other words, we would work to help everyone be free.
What is so striking is the way Nails puts together Spinoza's larger system in the Ethics
with the issue of his philosophy being accessible enough to counter racism as a philosophical and
social problem. Nails notes that Spinoza's ontology is what “undermines all forms of racism
while preserving the right of a race to do what is within its power.” 40 Spinoza wrote in Latin, for
example, in order to avoid censorship and discrimination, and this demonstrates that he was
acutely aware of such issues as discrimination. She continues to examine such a system as that
which addresses issues of racism by pointing out several key ontological and epistemological
structural formulations found in the Ethics. For example, “right” (jus) and “power” (potentia)
can be read as co-extensive, and they are co-extensive in ways that make Spinoza a political
philosopher to the core:
Spinoza argues that 'whatever an individual thing does by the laws of its own nature, it
does with sovereign right...'...he admits no 'distinction between men and other individuals
of nature' (TTP 16, par. 3). With this statement, the necessity of examining Spinoza's
metaphysics, rather than his political theory, should be clear: no distinction between men
and other individuals of nature. Thus there is no reason a priori to take the citizen, or the
state, or the worker, or the cell, or the race, class, or gender to be one's fundamental unit
of analysis across a variety of contexts; for to take any of these – or some other – as
fundamental is to distort the interconnections among them that are characteristic of them.
There is literature combining Spinoza's epistemology and certain elements of the philosophy of race only recently.
To add to this, in his biography of Spinoza, Steven Nadler writes that Van den Enden, one of Spinoza’s greatest
teachers, insisted on “civil, political, and legal equality between all members of the state, absolute freedom of
speech, religion, and opinion; and freedom of ‘philosophizing.’”
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Human beings exist as parts of ever more encompassing systems, and yet are themselves
contexts in which other individuals (viruses, freckles) are embedded. Yet our human
distinctions are not merely arbitrary, for some inhibit, and others promote, our ability to
persevere in existence (conatus). What is a person? A web of relations. A race? A web of
relations.41
Racism, sexism, classism are also a webs a relations. Nails continues to examine Spinoza's
ontology in this way. I have placed more emphasis on human consciousness and singularity on
an individual basis for understanding Spinoza’s system than Nails has, but perhaps this is a way
to also incorporate important phenomenological considerations about race and epistemology.
One cannot deal adequately with race and racism without allowing for the legitimate
philosophical categories of subjectivity, phenomenal experience, and singular imagination. Nails’
account of Spinoza's notion of an “individual” is still relevant. She writes that an individual, for
Spinoza, is “that which has a natural disposition to cohere in existence, so each molecule of my
cup is likewise an individual.”42 These are brute facts about the nature of existing. That my and
Debra's coffee cups can also be called individuals in similar ways as we can call human beings
individuals is because Spinoza includes within his ontology ways for bodies and minds (as one
and the same thing) to express laws of Nature in varying complexities and with multiple types of
degrees of power and intensity and still both be expressing the same identical laws. This applies
to all animated bodies of Nature. The way Spinoza gets away with then making human emotions,
experiences, affects, dispositions, challenges, and types of knowledge (which can be creatively
accessed, used, applied, and experimented with) as something specific to human subjectivity is
by continuing to show that what it is to use imaginative knowledge is distinctly particular to
human essence in a singular way. It also shows that to use human reason well is correlated with
what it is to experience, clearly and distinctly, human consciousness in reflection. That is,
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although a pebble and a human being are both “individuals” by Spinoza's definition, I do not
know what it is like to be a pebble and the pebble does not know what it is like to be a human,
but we are a web of relations interconnected to each other expressing the same laws nonetheless
and sharing environments. If the pebble is with me in my pocket for years, inspiring me to
continue to write philosophy, a pebble over two thousand years old that carries a world of
inspiration for me personally, as well as has many beautiful lines of sedimentation (lines of
flight) and was a gift from a close friend in love and support as a pen pal, then the pebble in my
pocket and I are even more causally connected within a web of relations than any other stone I
may come into contact with. Nails continues, “To speak curiously again, but not incoherently, my
cup has exactly as much right to exist as it has power to persevere (conatus) against the
onslaught of heavier and sharper objects, the effects of my clumsiness, and the pressures of style
to exchange mugs for dainty teacups.”43 That is also why it will become important for us to be
capable of imagining something that increases our power to exist as present to us (as our
personal web of relations and causal meaning) in rational ways.
What Nails writes next on Spinoza and race is worth noting extensively, especially within
the context that I work (both on epistemology in Early Modern philosophy and the philosophy of
race). As “race” is a web of relations or what Spinoza calls a finite mode of substance expressed
in a certain and determinate way, it can be explained under the attribute of thought and its laws
within the rubric of how the three types of knowledge operate together. Under the attribute of
extension and its laws, race can be explained as perceived, embodied, and acted out according to
interactions with other bodies of similar and different races which effect its ratios of motion and
rest. Therefore, an informed, compassionate, and humble white body can add to the power of a
black body as much as another knowing black body can. At the least, they can combine in
43
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rational understanding to form one body of effective force.
The only element of this description Nails provides that can be questioned is when she
equates all thought with sets of mathematical descriptors, as she calls it: “The descriptors are to
the race as the mind is to the body – the expression of an idea of what is physically
perceptible.”44 In addition, a race can continue to exist and persevere in its existence because, as
she writes, “a race depends for its continued existence on the free identification and participation
of its members. Rational voluntary association is the only legitimate form of solidarity. Thus one
of the potentially oppressive uses of race is precluded – at least metaphysically.”45 I agree in part,
but there may be a problem with this definition of race when we consider that an element of the
most violent forms of racism include that bodies and minds of one race, typically those with dark
skin visually, cannot escape being seen as lesser human beings by those of another race (typically
those with white or lighter skin). In other words, where “rational voluntary solidarity” may apply
easily to white people (although as part of a racist culture I might continue to question the
“rational” aspect of this description), being forced into a category of a race which is understood
as sub-human, irrational, animal like, and criminal is not a voluntary association by any stretch
of the imagination. Such limits force “rational” categories on some as natural and on others as
unnatural.
Perhaps what Nails writes next can clear up some confusion for us. Race qua race cannot
act independent of its collective members, their web of relations with each other, and their
various environments according to Nails. Although I agree that this analysis applies in many
respects, especially for those of the white race, it may not completely apply to all of those with
darker skin tones in a racist nation. In a passage that speaks to more than Spinoza on race, Nails
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continues, “Imagine rounding up all the philosophers, or all the redheads, and announcing that
they are a separate race. Like a colony that grows into a state, the redheads might come to view
themselves as a race. But, for Spinoza, there is no individual state and no individual race until
each has conatus to unify and preserve it.”46
We learn that what it is to be a human being, as I stated above, is not the same kind of
web of relations as what “race” is for Spinoza. That is, humans have an acute awareness
(consciousness) of their conatus, but just as a school of fish, as Nails references, is not aware of
their conatus in the same way as human beings, “race,” as an individual thing, is also not
conscious of its conatus.47 Nails writes, “Whereas a person has a mind that is complex and is
conscious of its own existence, a race (like a state) can be severally conscious of its existence of
the whole but has no distinct consciousness of its own.”48 Therefore, a state, as an individual
body, is different from a person as an individual body (even as both abide by the same laws of
Nature). What Nails is referring to is that a race, a sports team, a classroom, a group of trees and
so forth can come together to create a larger group as one “body” of force and motion, and can
be conceived as a Spinozian “individual,” but each of these bodies coheres with “no [real] fixed
existence in space time.”49 Nails writes:
...racial bias is a species of bias, and all bias is for Spinoza a refusal of the counsel of
reason; and reasoning validly from true premises is the business of all persons who would
be free... Spinoza takes issue at the most fundamental ontological level with claims that
race exists independently, claims that will, a century later, fuel the rise of the
physiological basis for modern racism. In our day, those same arguments from
ontological principles against the concept of group consciousness, against the organicist
notion of collective social entities, and thus against the very idea of the black experience,
or the mind of the ancients... There is no collective consciousness, according to Spinoza,
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only the consciousness of persons...50
Yet, there is a different problem with Spinoza’s deductions on human consciousness and
rational capacity. One might ask how, in such an extensive and dynamic epistemology, a system
with such verve and capacity to empower us, can we still have an epistemological problem
involving gender? Spinoza appears, on the surface, to believe that women cannot reason as well
as men. He is not exempt from a line of male thinkers of his time (and in the history of Western
philosophy) whose systems we continue to use as our examples of excellence in thinking while
simultaneously allowing for their ideas on female thinkers to be ignored or neglected. 51 Feminist
epistemological concerns cannot and do not separate issues of acquiring knowledge, race, and
gender, although, as bell hooks has written on, even the history of Western feminism has a
problem with being primarily white. Note what Elizabeth Spelman writes in her essay “Gender
& Race: The Ampersand Problem in Feminist Thought,” when she concludes, “...thinking
differently about women and about sexism might lead to thinking differently about Blackness
and about racism.”52 Clenora Hudson-Weems has written regularly about the need to understand
black female writers as holding a special epistemological category of their own in order to
address the very real concerns which face African American women. She writes that female
philosophers who identify as Womanists, for example, have only recently been able to create a
space within academia, having prior adapted to traditional Feminist discourses and language in
order to navigate the academic community.53 Hudson-Weems concludes, “…more and more
African women today in the academy and in the community are reassessing the historical
realities and the agenda for the modern feminist movement. These women are concluding that
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feminist terminology does not accurately reflect their reality or their struggle…”54
So we need to talk about gender and its relationship to epistemology. It is clear, by the
end of the unfinished PT, as Margaret Gullan-Whur, in her article “Spinoza and the Equality of
Women,” also notes, that Spinoza's views on women are inconsistent with his larger
epistemological and political project at the end of his life. 55 Yet, she writes that in this last text,
Spinoza’s views on women are both peculiar in a negative sense and also striking in an
affirmative sense considering their metaphysical import. I agree with her, especially if we take
seriously what is said in the TTP in Chapters 15 and 20. In these two chapters we learn that
freedom of judgment and of thought itself (within a safe environment) is the aim for every
individual who resides in a state, male and female. As already noted, Chapter 3 also states that
we might have to yield some of our natural rights to others, including some of our own rationally
justified reasons for things, if it can benefit the larger whole (majority). This is only a hypothesis,
but one that can defend Spinoza’s system in the face of some of his otherwise irrational views on
women.56 In addition, in Chapter 7 of the TP, we learn that what is to our advantage as a whole
depends “on the general welfare and the peace of all.”57 This conclusion would be applicable, for
example, to general safety of all members of a community. Gullan-Whur writes, “...his refusal to
allow that any woman's intellect could match a man's, is odd.”58 But because of this fact, and
because we read it in the latest of works, it “is an argument claiming to affirm a metaphysical
principle that justifies a strong type claim about the class 'human female'. It thus warrants neither
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charity nor neglect.”59 In the same essay, Gullan-Whur later concludes, “Spinoza's indictment of
female mentality could be construed as meaning that women have the same chance at
recognising common notions as men, but just are more likely than men to let them be confused
by sensual or emotional ideas.”60 Although somewhat helpful, this conclusion is still highly
problematic for obvious reasons. And to combine insults, according to Whur, the Dutch
scholarship condemns the last page of the TP, calling it...the black page.61 “If the ‘black page’
claim is accepted then Spinoza the political pragmatist has proved the Spinoza of Ethics
wrong.”62 The condemnation is necessary, but the title given to it, from the perspective of
philosophers of race, as another example, is problematic as well.
I certainly feel some of the unfinished ending (and possible editing) of the TP is
problematic. Yet, consider the claim in the TTP in Chapter 15, which also shows us how much
Spinoza cared deeply about keeping ourselves open to new ideas, open to new ways for
expressing those ideas in a civil society, when Spinoza writes, “And again, I ask, who can give
mental acceptance to something against which his reason rebels? For what else is mental denial
but reason's rebellion?” He continues, “I am utterly astonished that men can bring themselves to
make reason, the greatest of all gifts and a light divine, subservient to letters that are dead, and
may have been corrupted by human malice...”63 These are Spinoza’s own words and, on that
note, I will try to utilize his methods in ways that lead me on to authors, philosophers, ideas, and
systems of thought other than only those found only in the Ethics.
As a way to speak about our more contemporary and practical needs or societal problems
today, Spinoza's system can be useful for anyone. Spinoza would encourage you to take what
Gullan-Whur, “Spinoza and the Equality of Women,” 93.
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you learn and find affirmatively creative ways to both singularly express what you know and to
also form more rationally powerful collective bodies of which you can participate in. I will not
make allowances for the very real systematic issues involving comments about women and
rationality. I simply believe Spinoza would have been in agreement with our pointing out this
flaw in his system. I can draw this assumption based on the temperament found in his letters to
friends where he is repeatedly open to being shown any errors in his reasoning, but this does not
excuse the problematic deductions nonetheless.
The problems regarding his choice of description on the matter leads me to believe that
the issue of female intelligence is the largest epistemological weakness of his corpus, but it may
be something we can still work on through a better understanding of human affects. As GillanWhur notes, when we understand the nature of our own ebbs and flows of affects, the more
easily it is to control or override one affect with another (more rational) affect. Regarding the
nature of women, Whur continues, “Can Spinoza legitimately claim that women are as a class
more subject to the passions than men? ...induction does not vindicate a Spinozistic claim that
women tend, more than men, to blur the boundaries of purely rational thought. Instead, it gives
grounds for belief in a sex-differentiated shackling of reason in some, even most, males and
females. This coheres with Spinoza's principle that all people are subject to the passions...”64
Being subject to our passions, both sad and joyous, are something many if not most of us
experience fairly regularly. The key is to reduce the sway of the sad passions by adequately
determining one’s more powerful affirmative affects and understanding oneself as the cause.
We learn that there are ways to demonstrate the coherence of the Ethics and other works
by Spinoza while still understanding the last page of the TP as a “philosophical abberation.” Yet,
even this otherwise helpful description, that the black page is an aberration, can be shown by
64
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philosophers of race to be a highly problematic choice of terms. Dark skinned individuals have,
throughout time, been labeled as human abberations. Luckily, Whur writes, “I conclude...that the
argument of the last page of the Political Treatise is inconsistent with Spinoza's general Ethics
doctrine...”65 In added support of her reading, we can turn to Chapter 7 of the TP where Spinoza
writes that when civil order turns to natural order “...sovereignty reverts naturally to the people,
which therefore has the right to enact new laws and repeal the old.” 66 I read statements like this
as inclusive ways for rational groups of individual citizens who are equal in all rights to change
their laws and ideals as needed, including abolishing practices of slavery and allowing women to
enter the political arena, for example.
That being said, as is found in works like the “Combahee River Collective” in Home
Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, issues of oppression for African American females in
particular cannot separate race, class, and gender. So even if we can rely on Spinoza's system as a
white alley, those in Womanist epistemology may not be able to rely on such a system in the
same ways as other groups of females might be able to. In the “Combahee River Collective,” we
read, “This focusing upon our oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics... We
believe that sexual politics under patriarchy is as pervasive in Black women's lives as are the
politics of class and race. We also often find it difficult to separate race from class from sex
oppression because in our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously.” 67 With similar
sentiments, Vanessa Sheared writes, “The Africentric feminist perspective is not just about the
voices that have been silenced on the grounds of race or gender but instead considers the
simultaneous effects of race and gender... The womanist perspective acknowledges the
Gullan-Whur, “Spinoza and the Equality of Women,” 110.
Spinoza, TP, chapter 7.
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intertwining realities that human beings experience within society. Race, gender, and class are
interwoven.”68 I am acutely aware, for example, that my white privilege can skew the way I
interpret womanist or Black Feminist epistemologies, but in being continually and reflectively
conscious of this fact, I can grind my epistemological lens to greater socio-emotional clarity. As
Patricia Hill Collins writes, “Self-defined Black diasporic feminisms require links among U.S.
Black feminisms and feminisms expressed by women of African descent as well as ties with
transnational women's rights activism.”69 Individual rights for all were the concern of much of
the unfinished TP for Spinoza. These were also the concerns, among others, of the TTP. Spinoza
writes in Chapter 8 of TP that even an aristocracy with a council who has absolute power would
never cause a fear that the citizens would become slave like in any manner if it were behaving as
one elected rational body; a body with one voice that speaks for all its people and their ruler.70
After reading passages such as these, that all voices are represented as one body and one voice if
they are being rationally represented, I wonder how anyone can question that Spinoza was a
philosopher who wanted his system to be included within a future politics of fairness, justice,
peace, and democracy?
There is yet a further problem. As a philosopher of race writing on Spinoza, I am
continually calling into question my own white privilege. To borrow the words of philosopher
Emily Lee regarding her work within professional academia today, “I cannot escape the
ambiguous circumstances of the current socio-historical influences—including my own
education—within which I think. Moreover, I must admit that the structure of my analyses—
pointing to a conceptual difficulty in race and turning to the work of another dead white man for
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a solution—is problematic.”71 These same concerns apply to my own work of which I must
continually aim to understand better, balancing both tradition with honesty about the systems I
study and rely on to live a better life. Rosalyn Diprose, in an article about feminist philosophy
from 2000, writes that she is forced to rely repeatedly and, at times, heavily on male
philosophers because that is what the discipline is primarily composed of and concerned with.
Diprose also considers, rightly, that she reads various philosophers and philosophical texts in the
realm of “the other,” as in all others, and, in this way, she can attempt to understand an author's
philosophy regardless of their race or gender. But this attempt has its limits.72 I understand these
same potential critiques are applicable to my thesis in many respects. In a recent essay, Audrey
Thompson notes, “As Michael Hanchard points out, 'there has been a popular and academic
tendency to diminish, deny, or neglect the impact of African peoples, practices, and civilizations
have had on the West's development, as well as to forget the extent to which these populations
have sought paths that have veered away from Western modernities even while being interlocked
with them.'”73 It may help to refer to what Spinoza scholar Sam Shirley writes in a footnote to his
translation of Letter 76 of Spinoza’s correspondence. Shirley writes, “In fact, no philosophy (his
or any other) can claim completeness on Spinoza's own account; since philosophy by its very
nature is a finitary activity and deals at most with a finite number of the divine attributes. No
matter how adequate or true a philosophy should be, infinite orders of nature will lie beyond its
range of understanding.”74 This analysis is consistent with Spinoza’s system and philosophy.
To read Spinoza is to enhance both our creative capacities and our regular use of reason.
See Emily Lee’s comments on race at http://www.berfrois.com/2012/10/emily-lee-maurice-merleau-ponty.
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To enhance reason with natural power is to become more virtuous. This virtue, in turn, benefits
others, as we are also always in need of our environment and other finite ideas and bodies to
interact with. Therefore, we can use our imaginative and rational understanding to help others.
Continually working to enhance our rational capacities yields the greatest and most joyous, most
powerful effects, shared benefits, and singular experiences with greater knowledge and enhanced
affirmative affects. When we are more consciously aware of this process as it unfolds, in addition
to whatever else we are considering topic wise, it adds to our joy, gives confidence and courage,
and thinking with rational force becomes easier. Perhaps a theory of temporality that addresses
what we know in today’s context can be combined with Spinoza to explain these processes even
better? If so, it must take into account other forms of knowing, such as Feminist and Womanist
epistemologies, for example. As Patricia Hill Collins writes, “Thus the significance of Black
feminist epistemology may lie in its ability to enrich our understanding of how subordinate
groups create knowledge that fosters both their empowerment and social justice... Black feminist
thought addresses ongoing epistemological debates concerning the power dynamics that underlie
what counts as knowledge.”75 If Spinoza's dynamic epistemology is going to be beneficial in
these other areas, it needs to account for singular, subjective experiences that are both real and
valid. This makes a theory of human consciousness even more important than was already
addressed in this thesis.
In Black Bodies/White Gazes, philosopher George Yancy explains why “subjective
narratives” and related phenomenological considerations are so important for any philosophical
system that overlaps with topics in epistemology. Speaking about different races is not the same
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as speaking about the oppression of certain communities and groups of individuals based on their
skin tone. Race, according to Yancy, is “...a contingent social category, but the persistently real
bodily-cum-material-institutional-symbolic effects of race are profoundly devastating, to which
the history of racism attests... Although race is not real, this does not mean that race is not
'objective' or that it does not affect how we actually see ourselves, comport ourselves, transact
with each other, and assess each other morally, aesthetically, and ontologically.”76 So something
that is not “real” (in the sense that the sun and the universe and humans are real) is still a valid,
sound, and relevant category of human experience. Recall that for Della Rocca the “real” is what
is rational. Yet, human perception becomes the key indicator of how people with different skin
tones are treated in this world. Individuals with lighter skin tones might believe they are acting
well, with good intentions, and with objectively real knowledge, but actually end performing
their “whiteliness” (and thus dominant status and privilege) within their assessments and
descriptions of the way the world is or the objects of their knowledge. It is a privileged position,
for example, to believe that there is nothing to worry about regarding race today. Yancy writes,
“Whites develop a form of immunity that enables them not to be 'mindful' of that from which one
is exempt...'”77 That immunity enables many environments to perpetuate racist behaviors,
including within institutions of higher learning. As Yancy has recently written, “…the problem is
that blackness is pre-marked and pre-nominated as a site of 'deviance' vis-a-vis white racist
epistemic and axiological frames of reference.”78 And this applies to everyone, but the problem
for philosophers is what counts as “epistemic,” and how to address it in our contemporary
George Yancy, Black Bodies/White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
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philosophical circles? In this way, I am reminded of a passage written by Patricia Hill Collins in
her womanist epistemological project, Black Feminist Thought (already noted above), when she
writes about our methods of explanation moving more towards paradigms and, what philosopher
of science, Sandra Harding, calls, standpoints:
Distinguishing among epistemologies, paradigms, and methodologies can prove to be
useful in understanding the significance of competing epistemologies (Harding 1987). In
contrast to epistemologies, paradigms encompass interpretive frameworks such as
intersectionality that are used to explain social phenomena. Methodology refers to the
broad principles of how to conduct research and how interpretive paradigms are to be
applied. The level of epistemology is important because it determines which questions
merit investigation, which interpretive frameworks will be used to analyze findings, and
to what use any ensuing knowledge will be put.79
As it turns out, this is yet another reason why we can support Spinoza as a white alley, by
combining his most valuable insights with other more contemporary theories of social change,
when examining those changes through certain paradigms found both within traditional and more
current epistemological frameworks. Spinoza's system is highly adaptable and his methodology
is applicable to several different types of epistemological paradigms today. Further, many forms
of mild resistance can accomplish moments of “re-narrating the self” for any person oppressed of
any race or gender as well. Re-narrating the self is directly involved in how we describe and
understand our lives and interactions with others. Yancy continues, “...the white oppressors'
narrative [about raced bodies] is not faithful to Blacks' hermenutics of self-understanding...the
discourse of workable and unworkable narratives replaces the logic of metaphysical essentialism
regarding racial identities, and dispenses with the correspondence theory of truth.”80
The above is not a problem of essentialism, as Yancy states and as is often the criticism
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made against philosophers of race. It is an ontological and epistemological, “socio-historical,
political, and deeply embedded psychological problem,” and Yancy continues:
On my view, some material-cum-axiological/epistemological framework first must exist
that 'justifies' the valorization and sovereignty of whiteness, and, by extension, the
denigration of Blackness. ...the ideological norms informing the white self as all seeing
and all knowing, forms the larger unthematized sociovisual epistemology that militates
against the slippages between 'seeing' and 'knowing,' at least with respect to the enslaved
African body.81
Yancy also writes, “Through the process of rendering the Black body hypervisible, white bodies
became invisible.”82 How would a philosophy of “the real is rational” address these facts? In this
way, white privilege is able to dominate social relations, institutions, various systems of power,
what we call legitimate systems of knowledge, and many other areas of life. How, then, does
white (male) privilege structure, unconsciously or otherwise, traditional systems of Western
epistemology? As Alessandra Tanesini, in defense of naturalized epistemologies, writes,
“Feminists have criticized traditional epistemology for its disregard of the situatedness of the
knower, and of the specific circumstances in which knowledge is acquired.”83 I would agree and
argue that unless we allow for singular human consciousness and reflection as a part of Spinoza’s
epistemology, his system only partially addresses what it’s like to be a human being. And as
Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi writes, Womanism includes those who have to answer to both
their racial and sexual predicaments. There is a version of womanist thinking which simply
means a woman “who is ‘committed to the survival and wholeness of the entire people, male and
female.’”84
As Shannon Sullivan also suggests, if we all derive from a history of the cultural
oppression of individuals with dark skin, as well as from the continued oppression of women,
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then we maintain a culture of these oppressive feelings, ideas, choices of preference, blind spots,
and behavioral responses.85 How does one re-signify the racist, sexist, or classist unconscious
tendency towards oppressive ideas and behaviors when it is already so difficult to recognize such
things in the conscious mind? What role can reasoning play in situations where the very
functioning of reason can be persuaded by racist or sexist affects? Further, Tanesini writes that
“Women belonging to different social classes, race, and sexual orientations face very different
problems, and encounter different forms of oppression.”86 Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology is
not reducible to scientism or naturalized epistemology as often found in some North American
interpretations. Tanesini writes that the social practices of scientists today can be understood as
just that, practices, and not as the only model for one to hypothesize about, experiment with, or
describe how human beings get and use knowledge. She writes, “Social factors can be
constitutive of knowledge.”87
The changes needed have to start with oneself, and with regular rational and imaginative
conscious reflection. One way is to retrain the imagination in order to create greater rationally
constructed, informed affects for oneself and between groups of people in innovative ways. We
would also have to find more ways to interact spontaneously and creatively with each other in
order to re-signify one’s socially embedded beliefs.88 Spinoza’s system works well with the
issues of the philosophy of race in this respect. For example, in Chapter 7 of the TP we read,
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“For freedom and slavery do not go well together.”89 Indeed, in the work of Warren Montag in
Bodies, Masses, Power, we read that Spinoza’s entire corpus of work can be read as a way for all
to free themselves from any form of oppression and strive towards liberation.
The trajectory of themes in this thesis have supported, assisted, perplexed, moved,
frustrated, and transformed me throughout the last decade. In the words of Hegelian Katrin Pahl,
“The ability to stay with torn, restless, trembling transports is of great value to me.”90 It is an act
of courage to spend years with Spinoza’s system. We all have experienced such transports and
transformations, of course, but the phenomenological and ontological-epistemological problem
here is clear. How can we rely on Spinoza's system as one among many possible aids to better
understand and deal with racism and sexism if oppressed individuals are already being torn
regularly in ways they cannot escape? In this way, Yancy writes, “My Black embodiment, after
all, should solicit whites to self-interrogate their certainty, to re-cognize, to know otherwise, to
look yet again, to wonder and to stand in awe of my shared humanity. Yet, it is precisely my
humanity that has been questioned and denied within white North America.”91 As a visibly white
individual I have some power, and I try to use it to raise awareness about others who are
marginalized or have less power. Yet, as a woman I have to continually manage the
predominately male terrain which, directly or indirectly, believes I am less capable of reasoning
than my (male) interlocutors.
As we read in E4p52 on the nature of self-esteem, Spinoza writes, “Next, while a man
Spinoza, TP, chapter 7: 719.
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considers himself, he perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, or adequately, except those things
which follow from his power of acting (by IIID2), that is (by IIIP3), which follow from his
power of understanding. And so the greatest self-esteem there can be arises only from this
reflection...”92 Here is one instance where Spinoza clearly writes that our power of acting has
more to do with our power of understanding. Regarding a more collaborative understanding of
all three forms of knowledge, Susan James writes:
By cultivating and sharing our capacity for philosophical understanding, [Spinoza]
claims, we can learn how to live in ways that avoid the psychological and social conflicts
that are usually so prevalent, and approach an ideal of maximal harmony and
empowerment. Achieving this ideal is a difficult process, which always remains
incomplete, but its rewards are such that we have every reason to work towards it and get
as far as we can.93
Although there are singular essences as part of Spinoza’s system, we are social beings
and, as we learned in E2p40s and 2p47, certain common notions are formed differently for each
person depending on their past experiences and recollections. Therefore, although common
notions are the true ideas about the nature of things, how we come to that knowledge and apply it
varies greatly.
Just as we need certain conditions in order to experience a variety of different foods in our
lives (I cannot try all the new foods of the world unless I have the financial means to travel for
example), we also need a certain type of environment for affirmative and adequate sets of ideas
to grow and develop. We cannot develop our understanding alone. This is applicable at least in
the sense that those ideas will have the opportunity to develop with more force and creativity in
conjunction with many other ideas and individuals if the conditions are conducive to such
growth. But, in many ways, we might say that we can always find other methods of gaining
knowledge on an individual level as well. We will just be limited to our personal experiences and
92
93

Spinoza, Ethics, 4p52: 143.
James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-Political Treatise, 2.

393

recollections when doing so. Yet, working through Spinoza’s system teaches us how to develop
our ideas in such a way that they are conceived as internally determined, that is, our adequate
ideas become understood as self-caused (and not as the effects of external causes).
As Hasana Sharp notes in her work on the politics of renaturalization, Spinoza's system
“encourages us to consider which practices, associations, and relationships might strengthen
and care for emerging, fragile, and challenging ideas... Favorable ideas are those that enable a
mind better to understand the conditions of its power and activity and thus to aid its
perseverance... One must gather the forces of ideas compatible with one's striving.”94 This
involves all our appetites, but especially individual capacities to thrive based on knowledge of
the operation of affects. What would it entail to “gather the forces of ideas” compatible with our
conatus? Could this process include a method of enhanced creativity, for example? In support of
the position that there is a substantial theory of singular consciousness in Spinoza in this respect,
Peg Rawes, in “Spinoza's Architectural Passages and Geometric Comportments,” writes that
Spinoza's Ethics is “a kind of architectural passage because of the diverse figures and passages of
comportment that his geometric thinking enables.” She continues to combine values found in
architecture with similar values in Spinoza, writing, “Geometric thinking in the Ethics is
therefore aligned with life, and the reader's journey towards fulfillment or joy reflects this
process as they make the step-by-step movement through the text's different elements, its
axioms, definitions, corollaries, propositions and scholia.”95 This produces the transformation of
our affects and an emphasis on the third kind of knowing in the development of rational
individuals and collective democracies. Rawes continues, “…Spinoza inaugurates a diverse
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living geometry through which multiple, transformative subjects live out life.”96 Rawes’ reading
also supports Dan Selcer’s interpretation about the meaning of dynamic materiality, learning, and
ideational and bodily transformations found in Spinoza’s philosophy.
One concern becomes how difficult it is to care for the development of our ideas (and the
experiences of our bodies) in the midst of rapidly changing social norms, expectations,
institutional power, technological advancement, external influences (racism, sexism, classism),
or other challenging factors and dynamics. If this thesis is going to end on a more
phenomenological note, which I would like it to because of the importance of individual
conscious awareness and the affects, discussing how we move about our environments, how we
comport ourselves in our many dimensions with each other and with objects, how we work and
how we have fun, all of this is phenomenologically one's own. Reflection is not possible for a
singular mind without an enveloped environment of which it (we) are a part. In addition, we all
have many different kinds of communities of which we are engaged in our lifetime. From those
different types of communities, we draw different variations in power and vitality, energy and
levity. In these ways, creative thought and action becomes an important skill to develop.
It is on the nature of creativity that I would like to end this thesis. Consider what Berys
Gaut writes in a recent article “The Philosophy of Creativity” when he notes that there has been
little philosophical work on the nature of creativity between the years of 1950-2000: “Yet given
its importance and the number of interesting philosophical questions it raises, it should be a
major topic in philosophy.”97 Creativity is a regular topic in areas of Continental philosophy, but
its epistemological elements can be taken up more systematically through Spinoza as well. The
science of creativity includes incredibly exciting and lucid research begun in the past decade, but
Rawes, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 81.
Berys Gaut, “The Philosophy of Creativity,” 1034. See also Irving Singer’s Modes of Creativity: Philosophical
Perspectives (MIT Press 2011) for more recent work.
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any sustained examination and experience of the history of great aesthetic works will also add to
our education about the rationally powerful uses of creative ideas in a philosophically systematic
manner. Spinoza's philosophy is deductively rigorous, creative (the scholia alone could be a
humorous book on human psychology and sarcasm), and intense in its ontological and
epistemological conclusions. It encourages both moderation, deliberation, and seeking varied
intensities in living and new experiences. In other words, moderate pleasures and “gentle
motions of the body” or ataraxia are not the only things we seek in our dynamic transformations
for Spinoza.98 The element of favoring creativity and experimentation also certainly separates
Spinoza from previous influences, such as Thomas Hobbes, who felt creativity should be
classified as a weak sense.
In work on emotion and creativity, Mike Radford references Antonio Damasio’s books on
human development, neuroscience, psychology and philosophy (not to mention on Spinoza) to
elaborate on the role of rationally developed emotions and the use of creativity. Teachers know
how this works. In the classroom, good teachers can read their student’s emotions well and adjust
the class presentation or discussion as needed, adding unexpected questions, art, or a sense of
humor. Teachers are also very creative in the many ways in which knowledge is transmitted
effectively and with inspiration.99 Radford notes that Damasio includes the creative process as an
aid to reasoning, writing that it is “‘a ceaseless process of creation which is what reasoning and
deciding are all about.’”100 Using imaginative knowledge well was also the focus of Chapter Two
of this thesis. Radford continues that we can access both language and non-verbal cues from the
store of memory. We do this regularly, and such a mechanism allows us to also rearrange
powerful ideas in ways that can positively affect others. This process also includes “a selfNoted from the edited student reader ethics: contemporary readings, James Swindal ed. (2004).
For an excellent resource on this topic see Andrea Kenkmann’s edited volume Teaching Philosophy.
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regulatory character” and, as we consider more complex decisions and how to act in our nuanced
and varied circumstances, we also realize through rational reflection that the many possible
outcomes “might be complex, multiple, or uncertain.”101 From this, individual subjectivity is
both aware of its uniqueness and that it is a social being in constant interaction in its web of
relations. Both are required for enhanced uses of creative rationality and actions such as
composing good art. Our intuitive knowledge accesses these insights and puts them to use.
Experience and emotional intelligence:
…put emotional feelings at the heart of intelligent action. They influence the way we
select to process that information and account for the differences that we experience in
different people’s perceptions and interpretations of reality. They are at the heart of
individual subjectivity. At the same time, having been acquired through our acculturation,
it might be suggested that they are also shared.102
This is what, in Early Modern circles, is called thinking in Spinoza. Notice how it involves the
use of understanding to create positive affects for oneself and for others in joyous ways, but also
for the environment in which one interacts and needs to survive. Radford concludes:
Genuinely creative efforts are accompanied by intense feelings of emotional commitment
and great excitement upon their realization, but the argument goes further than this. The
actual guidance mechanisms that lead us to choose one path over another or that nudge us
into the realization of a particular theoretical explanation or inspirational artistic
construction are informed by non-rational, emotional markers, a taste for some particular
informational items, or lines of connections over others. We are, in a non-reflective sense,
guided by our feelings.103
Again, those who believe only the rational is real will run into problems with this version
of Spinoza. It is also true that feelings and emotions are not affects, but it becomes increasingly
important to find ways for rational reflection to focus on which emotion we are having and why.

Radford, “Emotion and Creativity,” 60.
Ibid. 62. Radford continues, “The sense of excitement, of the ‘rightness’ of a particular expression of judgment
and the way the creative act enables everything to fall into place might address a basic emotional tension that is
embedded in the psychology of human beings. This tension takes the form of an impulse toward self-understanding
and understanding of one’s relationship with the external world (62).”
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In this process of reflection we are transformed in multiple ways. We may be able to enhance the
use of reason and use it both well and creatively often, but there are times when we are overcome
with emotions in unexpected ways that decrease our power to exist. It is just not the case that
Spinoza’s epistemology, in all its capacities to help us enhance our reasoning about laws of
Nature, will comfort me immediately upon the unexpected passing of a loved relative or friend.
This kind of evaluation and serious contemplation about the use of kinds of knowing in Spinoza
is very similar to what we find in the naturalized epistemology debates in feminism that have
been occurring for decades. But I believe Spinoza was well aware of just how human we all are.
As the above research also notes, to “‘play’ at the boundaries of sense” is what rational
creativity also demands. It is not a static, solitary, or even gentle process. Our capacities to use
reason with increasing force and effect are dynamic, and this includes understanding how to use
creativity well. To use creativity well, as anyone who has ever experienced the power of amazing
works of art understands, is an intensely affective event. The process of creativity may also
contribute to the relief of natural tensions between singular interests and a collective interest.
Such a collective transformation comes with the experiences of joy in recognizing we are using
reason creatively with more power. Emotions are part of the thinking process and our on-going
experiences. Natural tensions create an environment for the mind and body which are an
“impetus to creative development…the reconciliation of such tensions is an emotionally
satisfying experience.”104
Spinoza gave the title of Ethics to a work combining important questions about
metaphysics and epistemology, including a rigorous evaluation of human psychology. I believe
the title is an indicator that Spinoza was adept at human interactions and psychology, enough to
write a proto-physics mechanics of interactions between force, motion, and bodies. “In order to
104
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be creative, the original and novel outcomes of generation within the system must be perceived
to be of some value. It is quite possible for individuals to generate new perspectives, new
combinations of elements within a system, and produce something that is attractive or interesting
to a particular group.”105 As Alexis Philonenko writes, “Reason is what gives essence to
innovation.”106 This is another reason the philosophy of George Yancy can be applied in
combination with Spinoza’s system. Yancy writes, “Not only am I excited by ideas, but I also feel
the transformative dimensions of wrestling with them. Furthermore, this excitement is deeply
embodied; it is not captured in a ‘pure’ moment of abstract contemplation, but induces
shuddering and ecstasy.”107 Spinoza’s philosophy does the same when both understood and put
into use to create more powerfully affirmative effects (and affects).108
In this way, Hasana Sharp has the right intuition when she concludes that ideas have real
force. Ideas are what change, transform, combine, alter, negate, compare, contrast, inspire, reimagine, and express reality. The use of creativity cannot, therefore, entail only the act and
concept of mere production or creation of some object or experience. Artistic creativity can be
applied to the use of ideas arranged in a powerfully affective manner. It includes many different
types, kinds, and expressions of human activity and uses all three kinds of knowledge. It can also
be read as an affirmative force or affect which occurs not only as an effect of thinking with
rational force, but also as the natural consequence of our immanent expression of Nature.
Benjamin Dalton writes, “…all action, whether defined creatively, rationally, normatively, or in
another or an eclectic fashion, involves physical and symbolic relationships to objects in the

Radford, “Emotion and Creativity,” 57.
Alexis Philonenko, “Reason and Writing,” 188. The author ends, “So the task of philosophy is to save writing…”
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environment.”109
In addition, rational uses of creative thinking and acting have political and social import
as production and as expression. If we adequately understand such increases in our joy, power,
and possibilities to affect others affirmatively (rationally), then we also will be inclined to agree
that the concept and practice of creativity can and does enhance human conditions for increased
happiness, freedom of thought, and peace between various groups of individuals with diverse
interests. In other words, it can act as a social cohesive. The use of creativity “…identifies a
significant set of concerns that macrotheoretical approaches must take into account when
considering social change. This would add to my reading that Spinoza’s system can be used as
support of certain aspects of the philosophy of race. Further work in this direction, then, might
consider how social and cultural structures systematically manage the constant introduction of
creative accomplishments produced in action and thereby influence the direction of historical
change.”110 Spinoza’s descriptive epistemology in its dynamism creates lasting impressions in
one’s mind and as one’s bodily affections. In the practice of working through such a system, one
is transformed by the work. This is Dan Selcer’s reading of materiality conceived dynamically
and the material book as rhizomatic, a Deleuzian term. Selcer concludes:
Instead, it demands a perspective that understands the book as the locus of causal power.
The rhizome, in other words, is the figure for a book that is what it is insofar as it
produces a regime of singular effects. The rhizome-book is a dynamic individual that, on
the one hand, maintains a consistent, complex pattern of motive action while
simultaneously undergoing profound transformations with respect to its elements or parts
(up to and including the limit-point of its own destruction when it can no longer maintain
the integrity of its nature)… This concept of the dynamic unity of an individual whose

Dalton, “Creativity, Habit, and the Social Products of Creative Action…,” 617. He continues, “Thus, creativity
implies not simply the overcoming of practical or strategic problems or the reestablishment of the capacity for
practical activity through the refinement of habit and is not only social in the direct judgments and environments in
which creative action is embedded, but it also involves creating material and symbolic objects that exist in a social
space and that have implications for the embodied existence and practice of other agents (618).”
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parts undergo constant flux is also…precisely the key to Spinoza’s account of the body. 111
Selcer uses the terms “individual” and “body” to include something in addition to a human
individual, but the processes undergone by both a person and the book (which needs an audience
to be known, a reader with subjective consciousness in my reading) can be described in similar
ways. What is a book without the fact that such an object requires consciously reflecting subjects
as both author and audience or reader?
In an edited work on creativity, J. P. Guilford, in his article “Traits of Creativity,” writes
that the primary trait for creative thinking is fluency of thinking (both associational and
expressional). I am not certain we can describe a book as being creative in the same way as a
human according to this description. Perhaps that factor, of how creativity is used, is the
difference between a human body and other types of bodies. Guilford notes, “A trait of probably
much wider usefulness is fluency in the production of ideas, or the factor of ideational fluency.
We cannot necessarily say that a book, such as a philosophical system, has immediate ideational
fluency for all readers. Ideational fluency is the ability to produce ideas to fulfill certain
requirements in limited time.”112 Creative fluency also includes spontaneous flexibility (which is
adaptive and original). Does a text, as a body, have such spontaneous flexibility? Perhaps works
of literature and related can, but can we say, for example, that Immaneul Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason has the same capacity? Guilford notes:
Selcer, Philosophy and the Book…, 201. Selcer continues that the implications of the importance of examining
“the mobilization of material figures of inscription” in the early modern period which includes reading Spinoza’s
conception of materiality “on a dynamic model directly connected with figures of material inscription.” It also
includes that “conceptualization and embodiment can be understood to be one and the same thing differently
expressed.” Selcer includes in this, drawing from Epicurus and Lucretius, the importance of “images, arguments,
concepts, and metaphors” for reading Spinoza in this way. Yet, how I live is not always the same as my thinking.
It’s my conclusion that this is too general of a categorization. We think about much more than we can do…
112
Vernon, Creativity, 171. The article first appeared in the work Creativity and Cultivation. Ideational creativity
also includes things like a tolerance for ambiguity, the manipulation of symbols and symbolic symbols, and a use of
divergent thinking (including a sensitivity to problems and their nuances). This includes an enhanced social
intelligence. What is striking was that the authors also found that things like temperament and motivation were
minimal factors in enhanced creative acts. I wonder if motivation isn’t of more need and use though, as perhaps
Spinoza’s system demonstrates for us.
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There are many, no doubt, who would look for the chief secrets of creative performance
outside the modality of aptitudes. There is no denying that traits of motivation and of
temperament should be expected to have significant determining effects upon whether or
not an individual exhibits creative performance… There has been little rigorously
obtained information regarding the roles of such traits in creative performance, however.
In her studies of leading artists and of leading scientists in several fields, Anne Roe found
only one trait that stood out in common among individuals. This was a willingness to
work hard and to work long hours…113
Art is hard work, science is hard work, philosophy is hard work, but I’m not so sure we can
extend this description to texts. Human conscious reflection and transformation is needed to add
the hard work factor to the book. Guilford replies that this trait is also found in any successful
profession or endeavor. What is most striking about the use of ideational fluidity and flexibility
for creativity is “…a freedom from perseveration, which is one form of rigidity, and that adaptive
flexibility appears to be a freedom from a persistence in using previously learned, futile methods
of solution, another form of rigidity.”114
For the sense of our creativity and ideational flexibility to become enhanced, a general
feeling of freedom is required, and, as we know, this involves the affirmative uses of the
imagination for Spinoza. This kind of freedom must be free of continuous evaluation/observation
by others, for example, but not free from responsibility and reason. Reason is aware that the laws
of thought and action (cause and effect) are also at work. This recognition is not a problem, for
the imagination loves to play and, for that matter, to imagine all those things which increase
one’s power to exist (real or not). The understanding and intuition access the imagination and put
it to work with more force and rational deliberation. As we read in the article “Moral Freedom
and Artistic Creativity” by L. P. Chambers, “Belief in determinism implies freedom no less than
freedom implies belief in determinism.”115 Spinozists Moira Gatens and Susan James have
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deduced the same. Chambers continues:
If I once grant the futility of human effort will I not refrain from further hard endeavor? I
may continue to act and think in terms of habit; but when habitual belief and behavior fail
to function I will not enter upon the difficult quest for more efficient conduct and
adequate theory, but will assume that the limits of human capacity have probably been
reached. If I am to persist in my endeavors I must have some hope of their success, some
confidence in man’s capacity to discover truth.116
As already noted, Spinoza is clear that his system aids in our more adequately understanding not
only the uses of imaginative and rational capacities, but also in being able to better recognize the
limits of reason. On enhancing levels of artistic expression in these ways, Chambers continues,
“But the musician’s reason for thus acquiring habits is not that habits are preferable to voluntary
acts, but in order that the mechanical performance of acts already proved useful by trial and error
may leave the creative spirit of the musician free to rise to higher levels of achievement
undreamed of and indeed impossible before.”117 Now, when we read about Spinoza’s insistence
on developing habitual readiness through the use of both the imagination and reason, we may
better understand the level of enhanced creative thought and action Spinoza edges us towards. As
Berys Gaut notes in his recent work on creativity, the philosophy of creativity goes “beyond
aesthetics” and is in its infancy in philosophy.118 Thus, as Dan Selcer notes, experimentation with
reason is an excellent way to enhance both the affirmative uses of imaginative knowledge,
experience, and rational ideational force.
Throughout my project I have been discussing an enhanced form of understanding found
in Spinoza’s epistemology that includes learning how to express more efficient power in our
116
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rational thoughts and actions. This includes the powerful and affirmative use of imaginative
knowledge in many aspects. But there is a further aspect of his proto-physics of force and motion
that benefits our communal nature, and that is Spinoza’s concept of love. In our enhanced
understanding, we transition to more powerful forms of affirmative expression in our love of
Nature. As there are infinite ways for the attributes to express themselves relationally, we are
drawn, through the understanding, to feel more power, joy, and striving in our affects and actions,
including a general tendency towards effective and creative uses of such knowledge. Martha
Nussbaum writes that Spinoza, in some ways, can be compared to Plato, but on the notions of
creativity, enhanced knowledge, and love Spinoza goes beyond Plato. Nussbaum writes:
As we are, we need many things. We therefore attend closely to our transitions – that is,
to the significance of external things for the status of our own project… Emotions are our
recognitions to these significant relations to external things… Where in all of this is love?
Love, Spinoza argues, is an awareness of a significant transition in the direction of greater
flourishing, combined with the idea of an external cause of that transition. In other words,
it is both a necessary and sufficient condition of love that we find a person (or thing)
extremely helpful to us in preserving our being. Indeed, love just is nothing other than the
recognition of such significance.119
My working through Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology has been a greater transition towards more
enhanced flourishing combined with the adequate understanding of the external causes which I
have combined with to form a more powerful body of understanding and action. As we read in
E5p24, if we continue to understand better the essence of particular things, the more we are
expressing them with increased power sub specie aeternitatus: “The more we understand
particular things, the more we understand God.”120
In a recent article on the creative aspects of being human, writer Maria Popova, in citing
R. M. Rilke, reflects that we are pushed out of the use of creativity by the familiar, by routine,
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because the familiar allows us to become increasingly more habitually passive in our ideas. This
occurs in our “inability to ‘live the questions.’”121 We are inclined in the direction of enhanced
forms of the use of both the imagination and reason the more we understand about how to “live”
both, but also the more we understand how to live the questions remaining, the expressions yet
possible. This includes an element of uncertainty or ambiguity that we allow for because we
understand that there is always more to learn, always more to understand, always new ways to
express our understanding, actions, and joy. We are experiencing love and an increased force of
power when engaged in such understanding and, therefore, our activity and energy for more
activity automatically increases. Using Spinoza’s system to critically analyze the intellectual and
artistic aspects of Proust’s writing about the experience of human beings impacting each other,
about living the questions, Nussbaum writes, “This love is not contingent on any particular state
of the body, or on any external event. Therefore it need not come to a halt at any time… Nor is it
tarnished by ambivalence… And since it is the common property of all human beings, [an
individual] will not envy in anyone else this understanding, but will realize that the
understanding is made the more complete the more people enjoy it…”122 It is as aspect of our

Popova, “The Perils of Plans: Why Creativity Requires Leaping into the Unknown,” Brain Pickings,
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conatus that we realize this brute fact with joy. Such realizations add to our “energy, beauty, and
wonder.” It is a human ethology, a Spinozist ethology, a delight of and in the expressions of
natural phenomena sub specie aeternitatus.
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